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  1. ❗️🇷🇺🇺🇦 (https://rybar.ru/piwigo/i.php?/upload/2023/02/11/20230211124252-aed1fc30-xx.jpg) Chronicle of the battles for Ugledar - analysis of Rybar
  2. (https://t.me/rybar)Part 1 - Activating the attack on Ugledar
  3.  
  4. Photo and video materials (https://t.me/milinfolive/96816) with a broken column of military equipment of the RF Armed Forces have been circulating the Internet.
  5.  
  6. Many began to mistakenly attribute the losses to the 155th brigade of marines of the Pacific Fleet, which is active in the suburban areas southeast of Vugledar, but this is not so. As reported in the feedback bot, the equipment could have belonged to the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army (it seems to have been transferred to the operational subordination of the 29th Army).
  7.  
  8. Regardless of whose equipment it was, what happened is an extremely tragic and unpleasant episode, comparable to the loss of columns in Belogorovka, Brovary, north of Popasnaya, in the Kherson region.
  9.  
  10. In order to understand what really happened near Ugledar, and who is responsible for the decision to send the column without cover into the open field, we decided to make an overview chronicle of the battles in the Ugledar sector.
  11.  
  12. 🔻What happened under Ugledar?
  13.  
  14. ▪️On January 23-24, soldiers of the 155th brigade of the Pacific Fleet and the 7th operational-combat tactical formation swooped through the defenses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and occupied summer cottages west of Nikolsky. The general plan provided for the simultaneous advancement of several formations on a wide front: it was planned to “take Ugledar in pincers”. But the marines and the Cascade, unfortunately, were the only ones who managed to break through the battle formations.
  15.  
  16. Taking advantage of the effect of surprise, the RF Armed Forces took the enemy by surprise: in the course of intense fighting, they advanced towards the settlement, squeezing out units of the 68th Opebr and 72nd Ombre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Ugledar and the South Donbass mine.
  17.  
  18. ▪️January 25, by joint efforts, the Marines and the Cascadians reached summer cottages in the southeast of Vugledar, gaining a foothold in private homes. The disorganization in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine made it possible to gain a foothold: the first reports appeared about the entry of Russian units into the city itself.
  19.  
  20. During the day, assault detachments of the 72nd Ombre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine tried unsuccessfully to counterattack from Ugledar and from the territory of the mine. Nevertheless, the initial goal of the Russian troops to cut off the supply of Ugledar was not achieved: the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to hold the line.
  21.  
  22. ▪️On January 25-26, the soldiers of the RF Armed Forces advanced to the outskirts of the dachas. Separate assault detachments carried out raids on the outskirts of Ugledar itself in the area of ​​the pumping station. At the same time, an advance began from Pavlovka to the southwestern outskirts of Ugledar.
  23.  
  24. However, the Ukrainian command had already begun to reinforce the defensive grouping in the city, artillery firing positions were moved to a safe distance, and mortar crews were constantly mining the approaches. At the same time, motorized rifle units of the RF Armed Forces failed to reach the planned lines.
  25.  
  26. ▪️By January 27, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to build a dense defense in Vugledar. At least three companies acted on 1 km. The supply along the Ugledar-Konstantinovka-Marinka highway was not cut either physically or by fire: Ukrainian reinforcements were placed at the main nodes.
  27.  
  28. ▪️Marines, with the support of artillery and aviation, continued fighting near the dachas near Vugledar, despite the complicated situation. The transfer of additional units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine began from the Soledar direction.
  29.  
  30. With each passing day, the Ukrainian formations drew up more and more reserves to hold an important strategic point. Remote mining of streets and approaches continued - almost all fields were covered with mines even before the offensive, and over a week of fighting, the Armed Forces of Ukraine installed more than a hundred barriers.
  31.  
  32. Marines of the 35th Marine Corps of the Navy and paratroopers of the 80th Airborne Infantry Brigade of Ukraine arrived in Vuhledar to replace the 72nd brigade, which suffered huge losses, and a battalion-tactical group was transferred to Bogatyr to create an operational reserve. Later, the 21st battalion of the 56th brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with UAVs equipped with night vision devices was noted, and a few days ago an armored personnel carrier of the 53rd brigade was seen near Ugledar. In multi-storey buildings, ATGM crews were placed, and long-range artillery fired at the positions of the RF Armed Forces.
  33.  
  34. The initiative from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was intercepted.
  35.  
  36. ❗️🇷🇺🇺🇦 (https://rybar.ru/piwigo/i.php?/upload/2023/02/11/20230211124252-aed1fc30-xx.jpg) Chronicle of the battles for Ugledar - analysis of Rybar
  37. (https://t.me/rybar)Part 2 - Loss of initiative during the assault on the Ukrainian fortified area
  38.  
  39. 🔺Part 1 — Activating the attack on Ugledar🔺
  40.  
  41. (https://t.me/rybar/43515)▪️By the end of January, the offensive initiative of the RF Armed Forces had practically come to naught. Due to severe weather conditions, aviation could not operate, and drones could not be used.
  42.  
  43. By February 5, the battles had practically passed into the positional phase. Artillery and aviation of the RF Armed Forces actively fired on the areas of concentration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which during the offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lost more than two hundred people killed.
  44.  
  45. The bodies of the dead could not be taken out due to the lack of transport equipment and the active fire impact of the Russian army. The corpses were either simply left or taken to the Yuzhno-Donbass mine, where they were left. To prevent flight from the positions, the nationalists of the Kraken arrived.
  46.  
  47. ▪️In fact, it has become simply impossible to attack only by the forces of the Marines and the OBTF. To tie down the resources of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and cut off supplies, another blow was needed - from Nikolskoye in the direction of the Maryinka - Vugledar highway and the South Donbass mine.
  48.  
  49. ▪️It was at this stage that the introduction of motorized rifle troops into battle to strike at the enemy’s flank with an armored fist was simply inevitable and it was no longer possible to postpone it. However, an adequate military plan was never implemented properly.
  50.  
  51. 🔻What happened?
  52.  
  53. Before any offensive, in order to achieve the assigned tasks, appropriate training is necessary - reconnaissance, artillery and engineering. UAV crews and advanced scouts identify enemy positions, and artillerymen, together with aircraft, fire at strongholds and fortified areas.
  54.  
  55. At the same time, the electronic warfare crews must ensure the complete suppression of communications and drones, and the engineering and sapper troops must carry out mine clearance of the surrounding area - otherwise the offensive is doomed to failure.
  56.  
  57. The delay in the entry into battle of motorized rifle units and the subsequent defeat of the column became possible only because of the general unpreparedness of the infantry involved in this sector.
  58.  
  59. Due to the large-scale mining of approaches, the inadequate use of available electronic warfare equipment, a predictable result was obtained: a rather narrow passage was made in mine-explosive barriers, through which a column of armored vehicles rushed.
  60.  
  61. The entire route was tracked by UAVs and shot through by artillery and anti-tank crews.
  62.  
  63. 🔻 So who is to blame?
  64.  
  65. You can put the blame on the command of the group as much as you like, but in this particular case, the cause of the tragic events was the general unpreparedness of the commanders of the battalion and tactical level, the lack of coordination between the units involved and the disruption of the combat mission.
  66.  
  67. Motorized rifle units were supposed to enter the battle almost simultaneously with the marines, but this did not happen. The commanders of the formations, probably fearing punishment, reported on the complete readiness of their subordinates for the assault, which was far from reality.
  68.  
  69. Due to the lack of elementary cover for electronic warfare and air defense, as well as the objective difficulty of completely clearing all approaches to Ugledar and dachas (well, and insufficient efforts, to be honest), there was simply no other option for movement. The entire column was at a glance from the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Ugledar Heights.
  70.  
  71. At the same time, all the equipment was not destroyed, as Ukrainian media say. Some were only damaged, some remained intact. Under favorable conditions, it can be pulled out and repaired. Judging by the open hatches, most of the personnel were successfully evacuated, but there are dead and, alas, they cannot be returned.
  72.  
  73. Fear of command, unwillingness to work on mistakes, failure to use the experience of the NWO year and the most common bureaucracy are the main reasons for what happened. Systemic changes are needed in approaches to the conduct of hostilities - both at the operational-tactical and simply tactical levels. Otherwise, Belogorovka (https://t.me/rybar/32643) and Ugledar will be repeated from time to time.
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