Islamic Reformed Epistemology

Please make the following passage coherent and cohesive:

Let us begin by considering a formal outline of a ‘Taymiyyan’ model of Reformed Epistemology:
(1) God as the Creator of the universe has instilled within human beings different cognitive faculties in order that they may acquire true beliefs about Him.
(2) God created all of mankind upon an innate natural constitution (fiṭrah). This fiṭrah urges them to recognise Him, to know Him and to worship Him alone.
(3) The fiṭrah has been set to work in tandem with other cognitive faculties for the production of beliefs; such faculties include, particularly in the context of theistic belief, the heart (qalb).
When one’s fiṭrah functions properly, it ‘triggers’ within the heart an immediate awareness  of God. This awareness arises within the intuition of the heart by the natural workings of the fiṭrah upon it.
(4) The proper function of these faculties, which produces basic awareness of God, typically arises from one’s direct experience of the many ‘signs’ (āyāt) that God has placed within the world, which allows one to experience knowledge of Him in a basic manner. This knowledge of God comes to one in the basic sense in that it is immediate and involuntary.
(5) Therefore, through the epistemic role of the fiṭrah in connection with the heart, upon the apprehension of God’s distinct ‘signs’, belief in Him is reached immediately without the need for inference or propositional evidence.

Ibn Taymiyyah, in elucidating these ideas, explains that the fiṭrah indeed refers to an innate capacity, but also an urge to know God and moral goodness. He states: “It has been shown that in the human being’s natural disposition [i.e., fiṭrah], there exists a power [or urge] to believe in truth and to intend the beneficial … The fiṭrah has a power [or urge] to know and believe in the Creator … The fiṭrah [also] has a power [or urge] for His Oneness”.

In his epistemological framework, Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledges a number of knowledge–bearing faculties, such as the faculties of perception, reason and the heart. In the case of fiṭrah however, it is not construed as being an independent faculty in the same sense. Ibn Taymiyyah suggests that the residing place of fiṭrah is the heart.
He writes: “[God] made the original nature [i.e., fiṭrah] of His servants ready to understand the truth of things and to know them. And if it were not for this readiness within the hearts to know the truth, neither speculative reasoning would be possible, nor demonstration, discourse or language”.
He continues by adding that, “just as God made the physical bodies ready to be nourished with food and water, and had it not been for that, it would not have been possible to nourish and nurture them [i.e., the bodies], and just as the physical bodies have the faculty to distinguish between suitable nourishment and its opposite, so is there in the heart a faculty to distinguish truth and falsehood that is greater than that”.
That faculty residing in the heart is the fiṭrah.

As Ibn Taymiyyah puts it, “The affirmation of a Creator and His perfection is innate and necessary with respect to one whose fiṭrah remains intact”. And elsewhere he states that, “the acknowledgement of God’s existence, and knowledge of Him, and loving Him, and unifying Him, are from the fiṭra, and firm in the heart (qalb).”58 Hence, one can know through the faculty of the heart that God exists in a basic manner, but this knowledge will only be basic to those whose fiṭrah is functioning properly in tandem with the heart. Therefore, given that premises (1) through (3) outline, in accordance with Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemic scheme, a way in which belief in God may be acquired in the basic sense, one ought to consider the means by which this cognitive process may originate.
These basic beliefs about God arise through an apprehension or experience of God’s ‘signs’, such that, upon these apprehensions theistic belief will be immediate and involuntary.

Ibn Taymiyyah explains that God sends prophets with these signs in the form of miracles or revelation in order to awaken the fiṭrah within. He writes:
“No Prophet has ever addressed his people and asked that they should first of all know their Creator, that they should look into various arguments and infer from them His existence. Everyone is born with the fiṭrah, only that something happens afterwards which casts a veil over it. Hence, when one is reminded, one recalls what was there in one’s original nature.”

In other words, the prophets are sent to remind people and to reawaken the intimate knowledge of God within all human beings: “The prophets only come with that which reminds the fiṭrah of truths already known to it”.
Therefore, ‘signs’ do not function as a proof without their intrinsic connection to fiṭrah. When the fiṭrah is sound, it apprehends these signs, producing basic beliefs about God via the intuition of the heart.
These ‘signs’ are vast in number and can produce an overwhelming intuition that God’s presence is with us, or that He is the world’s Maker. This may occur upon observing the splendor and glory of the night sky, in pondering the vastness of the universe, or even upon observing the mercy of a mother toward her child. Through encountering these ‘signs’, one can come to know God in an immediate and basic way.
Consequently, the this theory of the role of signs elucidates a more specific element of the cognitive process: it points toward the precise way in which basic belief about God can arise in the heart through the natural workings of the fiṭrah. Then, in so far as premise (1) through (4) are more probably true than false, it seems to follow from premise (5) that through the epistemic role of the fiṭrah, in connection with the heart and upon one’s acquaintance with God’s ‘signs’, basic belief in His existence can arise in an immediate manner without deliberation.

The primary disciple of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), similarly explained that “in the Qur’an, God invites His servants to know Him through two ways: one by contemplating the creation, the other by pondering over the Qur’an and contemplating its meanings. The first are His signs that are seen and witnessed; the second, His signs that are read and understood.”
Therefore, just as the Qur’an points us toward numerous signs in creation, the book itself contains signs of a more intimate nature. Through apprehending these signs of God that are “read and understood”, basic belief in the truth of these ‘signs’ will mean that the subject can have an immediate apprehension of the Author behind them, and the reality of His message for humanity.
Therefore, basic belief in the revealed nature of the Qur’an can be arrived at in this basic way, similar to the manner in which general theistic belief can be produced, through the proper function of the heart in conjunction with fiṭrah.
Thus, we may bring the standard model together with these additional points of extension to complete the full Taymiyyan model:

(1) – (5)
(6) Just as God has made available an immediate apprehension of His existence by reference to His ‘signs’ in the external world, so too has He permitted more intimate knowledge of Him through ‘signs’ in the form of His revelation.
(7) Through an apprehension of these ‘signs’ that are “read and understood”, human beings are able to understand the truth of God’s revelation in a basic manner and, consequently, the truth of His religion and the purpose He has in store for them.
(8) Human beings are able to know that these ‘signs’ are God’s words written as a message to mankind and that Islam is the religion of God to be followed by all. This immediate belief arises through the natural workings of the fiṭra in conjunction with the heart in an immediate fashion upon apprehension of these ‘signs (that is, the verses of the Qur’an).
(9) Therefore, full-fledged Islamic belief can be grasped in an immediate and basic way according to this model, in accordance with the design plan upon which God has created human beings.

Central to Ibn Taymiyyah’s conception of reason is the notion of ‘aql ṣarīḥ i.e., pure or clear reason.
For Ibn Taymiyyah aql ṣarīḥ is always congruent with naql ṣaḥīḥ i.e., sound religious tradition, and that any apparent conflict between the two can be explained in reference to either or both bid’ī ‘aqlī (innovated/contaminated rationaltiy) and bid’ī naqlī innovated/contaminated revelation).
In critiquing the general claim of certain theologians and philosophers concerning the conflict of reason and revelation, Ibn Taymiyyah seeks not to reject reason outright, but something closer to what C. Stephen Evans termed elsewhere “concrete reason” as opposed to “ideal reason” (1998, 94).
That is to say, Ibn Taymiyyah rejects the conception of reason or of what is “reasonable” as concretely conceived in the intellectual strata of society in his time. In his case, that refers to an “Islamicized Hellenistic-Late Antiquity” conception of reason and the reasonable.
For Ibn Taymiyyah, this is not “ideal reason” or ṣarīḥ al-‘aql as he would put it, but rather bid’ī ‘aqlī; an example of the ways in which human reason is finite, limited and often flawed.
For ideal or sound reason could never be at odds with true revelation, and even if it appears to be the case when reason is construed through the lens Islamicized Hellenism.
A crucial component of this Taymiyyan conception of reason that is highly relevant for the present discussion, is the notion of fiṭrah.
For Ibn Taymiyyah, aql ṣarīḥ predicated on fiṭrah: “the foundation of reason is grounded in the soundness and health of the fiṭrah”.

Interestingly al-Azmeh—whose article we made reference to earlier—points out that “Ḥanbalite writers often use the notion of innate natural knowledge (fiṭrah) to express what they see as the self-evidence of their position”.
So, perhaps the notion of fiṭrah could better explain the supposed self-evidence of those very clear or “conspicuous matters” of Islamic dogma alluded to by Ibn Qudāmah in such a way that salvages the apparent superfluity with which his fideistic religious epistemology regards the place of reason.
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, “fiṭrah is the original nature of human beings, uncorrupted by later beliefs and practices, ready to accept the true notions of Islam”.  Jon Hoover suggests it may be viewed “in Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought as an innate faculty”.
However, it wouldn’t be right to think of fiṭrah as a distinct a cognitive faculty per se. Rather, it is the focal-point around which all other faculties turn for direction; a disposition steering our cognition toward truth.

Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that,
“[God] made the fiṭrah of His servants disposed to the apprehension and understanding of the realities [of things] and to know them. And if it were not for this readiness (i.e., fiṭrah) within the hearts/minds (qalb) to know the truth, neither speculative reasoning would be possible, nor demonstration, discourse or language.”
Significantly from the epistemic point of view, Ibn Taymiyyah appears to conceive of “the proper functioning of all our epistemic faculties … [as] predicated in all cases on the health and proper functioning of the fiṭrah”.
Accordingly, it is due to fiṭrah that a human’s “knowledge of truth … and the recognition of falsehood” is grounded. Moreover, as suggested previously, fiṭrah holds an integral connection to reason (‘aql).

In Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemic scheme “fiṭrah is a divinely placed inclination … which provides guidance to the intellect … [And] separates ‘right reason’ from reason’s misguided uses”.
Perhaps most importantly of all, fiṭrah in a crucial sense resembles the sort of sensus divinitatis to which Alvin Plantinga refers in his work on reformed epistemology.
Ibn Taymiyyah declares that “the affirmation of the Creator and His perfection is innate (fiṭrīyya) and necessary (ḍarūrīyya) with respect to one whose fiṭrah remains intact”.
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, this knowledge of God is actualised through a recognition of theistic signs present in the natural world and in scripture.

Indeed, for Ibn Taymiyyah, “everything else other than He is evidence of His Self and signs of His existence … no contingent existent can be actualized without His very self being actual. All contingent existents are entailed by Him; they are evidence and a sign of Him”.
Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah argues on theological grounds that, “it was the method of the prophets—may God bless them—in proving the existence of God to [make] mention of His signs (āyāt) … [and] God's method of proof through signs are plentiful in the Quran”. However, crucially this “inference through signs (istidlāl bi’l-āyāt)” is not to be conceived as an inference of any traditional kind.
It doesn’t appear to work on the basis premises through to a conclusion.

This is what Ibn Taymiyyah suggests where he writes that, “affirming one’s knowledge of the Creator and prophecy does not depend on any syllogistics (¬al-aqyisa). Rather, this knowledge is attained from the signs (āyāt) that prove a specific matter that is not shared by others. These matters are known by means of necessary knowledge (bi’l-‘ilm al-ḍarūrī) which does not require discursive reasoning (naẓar)”.
Therefore, the epistemic and cognitive process does not involve argumentation, and the religious beliefs which are a consequence of such a process are duly non-inferential.
One way of construing how this cognitive process may proceed may be in terms of a kind of quasi-perceptual model. For according to Ibn Taymiyyah, “the signs of God are always known through sense perception”,
which as Wael Hallaq notes, includes both its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions (al-bāṭin wa’l-ẓāhir).

With this in mind, we might think that Ibn Taymiyyah’s thesis runs something close to what Del Ratzsch has argued for on the basis of Thomas Reid’s epistemology: that belief in a designer from the apparent design in nature, can be formed non-inferentially akin to the way in which we form our ordinary perceptual beliefs.
We might think that Ibn Taymiyyah holds a similar position concerning the connection between our disposition (fiṭrah) to form theistic beliefs—upon an apprehension of the signs in nature—and our sense perceptual faculties.
That is, given our fiṭrī disposition to form beliefs about God, our sense perceptual faculties may be geared up to form non-inferential beliefs about God from perceiving His signs in nature.

That being said, Ibn Taymiyyah recognised that fiṭrah is susceptible to cognitive impediment; it can become corrupted in some sense.
Impediments may arise due to certain desires (hawā) or personal motives (gharaḍ), which obstructs one from accepting the truth.
They could also be manifest through doubts or spurious objections (shubuhāt),
blind imitation of one’s socio-environment (taqlīd),
or engagement in sheer conjecture (ẓann).
As such, it’s possible that one may even need inferential evidence to revive fiṭrah—and hence come to knowledge of God—in cases where fiṭrah has become impaired, although it may also be kept intact through spiritual practice.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s emphasis on reason as being congruent with revelation sees him affirming that in some sense reason is the epistemic ground for accepting revelation.
As we’ve seen, he also admits that inferential evidence may be epistemically required for knowledge of God.
Yet, at the same time his acknowledgement of being able to know God via fiṭrah non-inferentially, coupled with the notion that fiṭrah is nurtured spiritually, means that it’s possible to see Ibn Taymiyyah simultaneously embracing all three religious epistemological positions: theistic evidentialism, fideism, and reformed epistemology.
This being so in the sense that although it is quite clear his position maps onto reformed epistemology in the fullest sense, he can also be seen as a weak theistic evidentialist and a, weak or responsible fideist.
The evidentialism can be gleaned from the fact that he has a broad evidential scope when it comes to evidence drawn upon to know God i.e., a sign (āyā), argument (dalīl), testimony (khabar), and spiritual inspiration or deep religious experience (ilhām).
His fideism can be gleaned from his understanding that religious knowledge grounded on a sound disposition or fiṭrah, rests on religious and spiritual practice such as meditative remembrance of God, without which the mind/heart (qalb) is unable to grasp the evidence for God.


reformatted from the works of Ustadh Jamie Turner