The question of what the European powers had learned, or failed to learn, from previous wars in the buildup to World War One tends to pop up in this thread. Well, I recently got my hands on a Swedish military publication from 1912 titled “Observations from the Russian-Japanese war” which answers just that, and I thought I’d do an effortpost on the subject.

The book shows its age – unsurprisingly, for a work that’s more than a century old. The terminology and language used is endearingly old-fashioned, there’s a lot of f:s where modern Swedish would have v:s, a lot of swedified French words that are no longer in use, and in some places the authors are clearly struggling with words that (at the time) have yet to enter Swedish military parlance. For example, what we now call splitter (shrapnel) is referred to as skrot (junk). The book also uses the word fordon (vehicle), which I first took to mean motorised vehicle, but eventually realised meant horse-drawn carriage. It also clearly shows the German dominance in military matters of the time – the majority of sources for the book are from German observers, or from similar works by the German high command. Many of the Russian sources are also either German translations or – quite likely – written in German by their Russian authors. Many of the high-ranking Russian officers which feature in the book have German family names.

The work concerns itself mainly with Russian actions and conditions, probably because Japanese sources where harder to obtain. Occasionally, however, it makes use of testimonies from Japanese officers. The Swedish authors come off as rather impressed with the Japanese, though it is hard to tell how much of that comes from traditional Swedish disdain for the Russians.

Infantry
The book starts, not with describing the training and equipment of the common Russian soldier, but rather analysing his moral and intellectual nature. The common Russian soldier is described as hardened by life of poverty, but lacking in initiative and mental fortitude. His greatest shortcomings is superstition and imagination, which makes him an easy victim for rumours and panic. A number of examples are given describing the behaviour of panicked units. One occasion stands out to me in which an entire regiment including artillery – without orders or directions - starts to randomly fire away into the dusk at non-existent Japanese. The regiment isn’t taking incoming fire and isn’t observing any enemies, yet it takes hours to get it back under control. This and many other examples seems to indicate that the soldiers weren’t really trained in what to do in sudden and unexpected contact (or what they believe to be contact) with the enemy. They should march and fire on order, and not much else.

The way infantry fights is very different to modern tactics. The infantry operates in large formations. On some occasions the book notes when very small-scale movements are taking place by speaking of “half-troops”, which seems to be some 10-20 soldiers. On the attack the infantry advance in line, several hundred soldiers at once with just a few meters between them, with stops at regular intervals to fire at the enemy. The units assume attack formation several kilometres from the enemy. The fire is opened as far out as 2000 meters, and on occasion even 3000 meters. Getting within 300 meters of the enemy is considered very close, and this is also the distance at which the Russians fix bayonets and begin the charge. The book takes for granted that bayonet charges is the way infantry combat is decided, though it notes that the Russians start theirs rather early. It cites a Russian commander telling his soldiers that if he could get away with taking away their bullets and have them attack with only bayonets, he would.

The book clearly notes how incredibly difficult it is to flush out infantry in protected positions, and also the devastating effect of machineguns against unprotected infantry. However, at the start of the war Russia has less than 20 machineguns in their army. The word “camouflage” has yet to enter the Swedish vocabulary, but the book notes the importance of having uniforms in discrete single colours “well adapted to the terrain”.

Racial theory is also taken for granted. The book cites a Russian commander explaining that the small, mountain-dwelling Japanese naturally fared better in the hilly terrain of Manchuria than the Russians, who are a people of the steppe and should thus avoid fighting in the mountains at all costs.

Cavalry
The book goes out of its way to explain that the lacklustre performance of cavalry during the war is due to several factors, including the relatively small amount of cavalry involved, incompetent commanders and – on the Russian side – lacking horsecare, and that thus no conclusions can be drawn as to the effectiveness of cavalry on the modern battlefield. However, with the wisdom of hindsight it is easy to see that all the examples given in the text clearly point to cavalry being incapable of tackling even a moderately prepared enemy.

In an interesting precursor to later special forces, the Russians organise so-called “ranger commands” consisting of cavalrymen handpicked for their intelligence and initiative, which are used for long-range independent recon.

Artillery
The power of modern artillery is clearly recognised. On several occasions the book brings up the devastation wrought on troops caught in the open by artillery – but it also notes how inefficient it is against properly prepared fortifications, and how infantry hidden in shelters can quickly man their positions again once the artillery fire stops.

Indirect fire is mentioned a few times, but only as something which has been rumoured to have taken place. Most artillery battles take place with a clear line of sight to the enemy, and the crews often come under direct infantry fire.

The book mentions a single instance of what appears to be use of chemical weapons. Following a Japanese artillery barrage, some shell fragments are said to give off fumes which cause nausea and illness in nearby soldiers.

Communications
Almost all communication is done through courier, whether on foot or horse. The Russians have a dedicated telegraph company, but it is capable of serving only a very small part of the army. They are criticised for their poor use of heliographs. Wireless radio isn’t even mentioned. Orders take time to arrive, if they arrive at all. Cossacks are singled out as being particularly apathetic and careless when it comes to delivering messages, sometimes not even bothering to get the job done.

A single instance of Russian use of transporting troops by railroad is described, and it is pointed out how this allowed them to quickly reinforce their defences along the rail line.

Recon
Recon is mainly done by cavalry, or by infantry patrols. Artillery batteries make use of tall, self-supporting ladders to get a better view of the surroundings. Over the course of the war, the Russians set up the East Siberian Air Sailing Battalion, for recognisance from balloons. However, they are only used a handful of times throughout the war.

Eventually, both sides start making use of what the Swedish authors refer to as “ambushes” – forwards observers hidden beyond their own front line. They operate in a pair of two, and are not supposed to open fire or light bonfires when the enemy is sighted – which normal observers would. Instead, one man returns to report, while the other stays hidden. This is considered very unorthodox, and the fact that, towards the end of the war, the majority of Japanese forward observers are made up of “ambushes” is seen as remarkable.

Command
The command situation, at least on the Russian side, seems to be a clusterfuck. Orders go missing, arrive too late, or are adjusted or countermanded ad infinitum. Cooperation between units suffer from petty rivalries between their officers, and examples are given of commanders who refuse to commit their units to battle because they feel they have been slighted by another officer. High-ranking officers set up their headquarters within areas allocated to other units, simply because there happens to be nicer houses there.

Russian officers are often criticised for their rigidity and lack of initiative. However, at other times they are criticised for failing to maintain discipline and order among the soldiers. I was left with the impression that occasionally the authors were pointing out every perceived fault among the Russians without reflection.

Conclusions
Judging from this work, a book of observations collected by a neutral state, should the European powers have seen the shape World War One would take? Well, yes and no.

The authors note the power of artillery and machineguns, and also how incredibly bloody it is to attack trenches and bunkers. However - though it is never said outright, it is implicitly understood that you should not attack a fortified enemy if at all possible. You pin him down and outflank him. The basis for strategic and tactical thinking is movement, often over rather large areas.

What strikes me is that no conclusions are drawn from the poor state of what we today call infrastructure in Manchuria and the Russian far east. The speed with which you can reinforce your front when you have access to railroads and proper communication is observed in the book, yet nothing is made of it.

It is also notable that the serious impact on morale of unnecessary or costly attacks is explicitly spelled out. These people knew that it sucked to attack trenches, and that it was something you shouldn’t do (though the authors don't use the Swedish word for trench – in Swedish a trench is called skyttegrav, which literally translates to “shooting grave”).

The general view appears to be that a modern war becomes static only when the opposing sides lack either resources or the will to act rapidly. A properly equipped and motivated force would act with such speed and decisiveness that it could not be pinned down long enough for what we now call trench warfare to develop. The Russians are criticised for their passivity and lack of offensive spirit, the rigidity in their thinking and the lack of initiative at all levels of command.

Almost all of the problems that the belligerents would face on the western front are observed and identified – the power of artillery and machineguns, the futility of attacking a fortified enemy, the grind of static warfare – but these problems are largely taken to be a peculiarity of the fighting in the Far East, and something that a more competent army can bypass.