Muller Report - WikiLeaks

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  U.S. Department of Justice At:t:ef'fle)' Werle Predttet /,' Ma;? CeHtail'l
  Material Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) TABLE OF CONTENTS -VOLUME I
  INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I .......................................................
  ................................................... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO
  VOLUME 1. ................................................ ,
  ............................................. 4 I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S
  INVESTIGATION
  ......................................................................... ,
  ....... 11 II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
  ..................................................... 14 A. Structure of the
  Internet Research Agency
  ................................................................. 15 B. Funding
  and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin
  ................................................. 16 C. The IRA Targets U.S.
  Elections ......................................................................
  ............ 19 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
  ....................... , .............. 19 2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-
  Controlled Social Media Accounts ..................... 22 3. U.S. Operations
  Through Facebook.
  ..................................................................... 24 4. U.S.
  Operations Through Twitter
  ......................................................................... 26 a.
  Individualized Accounts ........................................................
  ........................... 26 b. IRA Botnet Activities ........................
  .............................................................. 28 5. U.S.
  Operations Involving Political Rallies
  .......................................................... 29 6. Targeting and
  Recruitment of U.S. Persons
  .......................................................... 31 7. Interactions
  and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ...........................................
  33 a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIRA Political Materials
  ................................. 33 b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in
  Connection to Rallies ................. 35 Ill. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING
  OPERATIONS .....................................................................
  36 A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign
  ....................................................... 36 1. GRU Units Target
  the Clinton Campaign
  ............................................................. 36 2. Intrusions
  into the DCCC and DNC Networks
  ..................................................... 38 a. Initial Access .....
  ................................................................................
  ............... 3 8 b. Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks
  ................................ 38 c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC
  Networks .................................... 40 B. Dissemination of the Hacked
  Materials ......................................................................
  41 I. DCLeaks ..................................................................
  ............................................. 41 2. Guccifer 2.0 ...............
  ................................................................................
  ............ 42 3. Use of WikiLeaks .................................. :
  .............................................................. 44 a. WikiLeaks's
  Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign ............... 44 b.
  WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
  ........................... 45

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  U.S. Department of Justice MterHey Werk Pretittet // Ma,? Cel'ltail'I Material
  Preteeteti UH:tier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen
  Materials to WikiLeaks .................................. 45 d. ? WikiLeaks
  Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials ....................
  ................................................................................
  .... 48 C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations
  ............................................................................. 49
  l. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims
  ............ 49 2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections
  ................................... 50 D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination
  of Hacked Materials .................................. 51 l. ...................
  ........................................................................... 51
  a. Background ..................................................................
  .................................... 51 b. Contacts with the Campaign about
  WikiLeaks ................................................ 52 C. Harm to Ongoing
  Matter .................... 54 d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen
  Podesta Emails .................... 58 e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with
  WikiLeaks ................................................ 59 2. Other Potential
  Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials ......................... 61 a.
  Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)
  .................................................... 61 b. Campaign Efforts to
  Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails ...................................... 62 IV.
  RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
  ................ 66 A. Campaign Period (September 2015 -November 8, 2016)
  ......................................... 66 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project
  ............................................................................. 67
  a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) ............ 67
  b. Communications with LC. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze
  (Summer and Fall 2015)
  ............................................................ 69 c. Letter of
  Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January 2016) ..........
  ................................................................................
  ...... 70 i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump
  Organization .... 70 ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia
  ......................................... 72 d. Discussions about Russia Travel
  by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016)
  ......................................................................... 76 i.
  Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
  ........................................ 76 ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities
  to Travel to Russia ............................ 78 2. George Papadopoulos .....
  ................................................................................
  ...... 80 a. Origins of Campaign Work
  ..............................................................................
  81 b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts
  ........................................................................ 82 c.
  March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting
  ......................................................... 85 ii

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  U.S. Department of Justice AtterAe~1 \\'erk Prea1::1et // Mft)1 CeHtttil'l
  Material Preteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) B. Russian Hacking and Dumping
  Operations .............................................................. 175 1.
  Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy
  .................................................... 175 a. Background .........
  ................................................................................
  ........... 175 b. Charging Decision As to ....... 176 2. Potential Section 1030
  Violation By .............................. 179 C. Russian Government Outreach
  and Contacts ............................................................. 180
  1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion
  ............................................. 180 2. Potential Coordination:
  Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. ? 951). 181 a. Governing Law ........
  ................................................................................
  ....... 181 b. Application .....................................................
  ................................................ 182 3. Campaign Finance .......
  ................................................................................
  ....... 183 a. Overview Of Governing Law
  ......................................................................... 184 b.
  Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting
  ................................................ 185 i. Thing-of-Value Element
  ......................................................................... 186
  ii. Willfulness ................................................................
  ............................. 187 iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised
  Information ...................................... 188 c. Application to
  WikiLeaks 1.
  ....................................................................... 189 ii.
  Willfulness ....................................................................
  ......................... 190 iii. Constitutional Considerations
  ................................................................ 190 iv.
  Analysis ....................................................................
  190 4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation
  ....................................... 191 a. Overview Of Governing Law
  ......................................................................... 191 b.
  Application to Certain Individuals
  ................................................................. 192 i. George
  Papadopoulos
  ..............................................................................
  192 11.
  .............................................................................
  194 111. Michael Flynn .........................................................
  .............................. 194 iv. Michael Cohen ...........................
  ........................................................... 195 V.
  ..............................................................................
  196 vi. Jeff Sessions ..........................................................
  ................................. 197 vii. Others Interviewed During the
  Investigation ....................................... 198 V

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  U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e:y? '>lork Preettet // Moy Cefttttift Material
  Preteetee Ul'leer Fee. R. Criffl.. P. 6(e) INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I This report
  is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. ? 600.8(c), which
  states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall
  provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or
  declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached." The Russian government
  interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.
  Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In June,
  the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced
  that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked
  materials-hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-
  began that same month. Additional releases followed in July through the
  organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in October and November. In late
  July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign
  government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign
  foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a
  representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received
  indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign
  through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential
  candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016,
  to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump
  Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference
  activities. That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian
  government "directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and
  institutions, including US political organizations," and, "[t]hese thefts and
  disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process." After the
  election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia
  for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional
  committees were examining Russia's interference in the election. Within the
  Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017
  appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the
  Special Counsel authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts
  to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," including any links or
  coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the
  Trump Campaign. As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's
  investigation established that Russia interfere~ in the 2016 presidential
  election principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out
  a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and
  disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian
  intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities,
  employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released
  stolen documents. The investigation also identified numerous links between the
  Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation
  established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump
  presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it
  would benefit

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  U.S. Department of Justice Atterrte~? Werk Predttet // May Cetttairt Material
  Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I RUSSIAN
  SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the
  earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a
  social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social
  discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and
  received funding from Russian oligarch Y evgeniy Prigozhin and companies he
  controlled. Pri ozhin is widel re orted to have ties to Russian President
  Vladimir Putin In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo mission with instructions The IRA
  later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
  political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign
  evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the
  U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored
  candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA' s operation also
  included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names
  of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside
  the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S.
  grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump
  Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify
  evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II
  of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media
  campaign. RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS At the same time that the IRA operation
  began to focus ?on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian
  government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking)
  and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
  intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General
  Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations. In March 2016, the
  GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and
  employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU
  hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign
  Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole
  hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and
  networks. Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian
  government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen
  materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0."
  The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks.
  4

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  U.S. Department of Justice AH:erHey \?Brit Pr6d1:1et // Mtty Cet1:tttifl
  Mttterittl Preteeted Ut1:der Fed. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) The presidential campaign
  of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign") showed interest in
  WikiLeaks's releases of documents and welcomed their otential to damage
  candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016,
  llfilllillliliilfll~llliillllllilllilli forecast to senior Campaign officials
  that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton.
  WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate
  Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing
  from a private server used b Clinton when she was Secreta of State he later said
  that he was s ? eakin sarcasticall . WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta' s stolen
  emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released
  video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section lII of this Report details
  the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other
  efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. RUSSIAN
  CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN The social media campaign and the GRU hacking
  operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials
  and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office investigated
  whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or
  coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the
  investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit
  from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign
  expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released
  through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the
  Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its
  election interference activities. The Russian contacts consisted of business
  connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate
  Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and
  representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking
  improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts
  between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition
  periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order.
  2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump
  Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow.
  Candidate Trump signed a Letter oflntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November
  2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and
  spoke about the project with the office of Russian government press secretary
  Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June
  2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.
  Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early
  contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to
  Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to
  London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had
  "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands 5

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  U.S. Department of Justice l\.ttortte~? Work Pt'od1:1et // Mtty Cotttttitt
  Mttterittl Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) of emails. One week later,
  in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a
  foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the
  Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous
  release of information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of
  time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two
  Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian
  government. No meeting took place. Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump
  Campaign continued into the summer of 2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the
  presumptive Republican nominee for President. On June 9, 2016, for example, a
  Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump Jr., Jared
  Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing
  the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would
  incriminate Hillary." The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part of Russia
  and its government's support for Mr. Trump." The written communications setting
  up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from
  Russia that could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian
  lawyer's presentation did not provide such information. Days after the June 9
  meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced that
  Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to
  opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents. In July 2016,
  Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity to
  Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived
  and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United
  States, Page became acquainted with at least two Russian intelligence officers,
  one of whom was later charged in 2015 with conspiracy to act as an unregistered
  agent of Russia. Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-
  Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself
  from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign. July 2016
  was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the
  DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents
  revealing information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public
  reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that the Russian
  government was.behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC. And within
  a week of the release, a foreign government informed the FBI about its May 2016
  interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government
  could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign
  government rep01ting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential
  coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the
  Trump Campaign. Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul
  Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin
  Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik
  requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that
  Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a "backdoor" way for
  Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would
  require candidate Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President).
  They also discussed the status of the 6

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  U.S. Department of Justice Atteffle'.} 'Nm?k P1:1edttet // May Cm~taitt Material
  Preteetecl Uttcler Fed. R. C1:1im. P. 6(e) Trump Campaign and Manafort's
  strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that
  meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik,
  and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
  Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump
  speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered
  damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second
  release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that had been stolen by the GRU in
  late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were at the time
  continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to
  interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department
  of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
  issued a joint public statement "that the Russian Government directed the recent
  compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US
  political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked
  materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued,
  "are intended to interfere with the US election process." Post-2016 Election.
  Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government officials and
  prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
  administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged
  these efforts. The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to
  congratulate the President-Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin.
  Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there. Kirill Dmitriev,
  the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among the
  Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early
  December, a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of
  the Trump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon.
  Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 2017 in the Seychelles and
  discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, another business
  associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on
  the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated
  on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which
  Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal
  to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and
  incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. On December 29, 2016, then-President
  Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election.
  Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador
  Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the
  sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take
  retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later,
  President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin)." The next
  day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had
  been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a
  result of Flynn's request. * * * On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence
  community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment-drafted and
  coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and 7

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  U.S. Department of Justice A1:1:erHey \?erk Predt1et // Mey CeHtttiH Matel'ial
  Pl'eteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) and whether prosecution would serve a
  substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution
  elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual ? 9-27 .220.
  Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging
  decisions, which contain three main components. First, the Office determined
  that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016 U.S.
  presidential election-the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping
  violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the
  social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to
  defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of
  federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections, as
  well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet Research
  Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers
  who carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal
  email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to
  violate, among other federal laws, the federal computer-intrusion statute, and
  the have been so char ed. See United States v. Ne ksho, et al., No. 18-cr-215
  D.D.C .. Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between
  individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with
  the Trump Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal charges.
  Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to charge any Campaign
  official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian
  principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks's
  releases of hacked materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-
  finance violation. Further, the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any
  member of the Trump Campaign conspired with representatives of the Russian
  government to interfere in the 2016 election. Third, the investigation
  established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign lied to
  the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated
  individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the
  investigation of Russian election interference. The Office charged some of those
  lies as violations of the federal statements statute. Former National Security
  Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his interactions with
  Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George Papadopoulos, a
  foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to
  investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with
  Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on
  candidate Clinton .in the form of thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization
  attorney Michael Cohen leaded uilt to makin false statements to Con ress about
  the Trum Moscow ro ? ect. 9

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  U.S. Department of Justice Attem1:ey Work Prod1:1et /,' M1ty Cot1t1tit1
  Mftteri1tl Proteeted Ut1der Fed. R. Crifl'I. P. 6(e) III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND
  DUMPING OPERATIONS Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation's
  Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers
  and email accounts of organizations, e?mployees, and volunteers supporting the
  Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign chairman John Podesta.
  Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the
  Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National
  Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton
  Campaign employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds
  of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks.109
  The GRU later released stolen Clinton Campaign and DNC documents through online
  personas, "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0," and later through the organization
  WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to interfere with
  the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign. , the
  Trump Campaign about WikiLeaks's activities. The investigation was unable to
  resolve WikiLeaks's release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7, 2016, the
  same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic
  language about women. A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign 1. GRU
  Units Target the Clinton Campaign Two military units of the GRU carried out the
  computer intrusions into the Clinton Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units
  26165 and 74455.110 Military Unit 26165 is a GRU cyber unit dedicated to
  targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations
  outside of Russia, including in the United States.111 The unit was sub-divided
  into departments with different specialties. One department, for example,
  developed specialized malicious software "malware" , while another de artment
  conducted large-scale spearphishing campaigns.112 jfllllililliliilllilli
  lilillllll~ a bitcoin mining operation to 109 As discussed in Section V below,
  our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the hacking of these
  computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in
  violation of 18 U.S.C. ?? 1030 and 371. See Volume I, Section V.B, infra;
  Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No. I :18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018),
  Doc. 1 ("Netyksho Indictment"). 110 Netyksho Indictment ,r 1. 111 Separate from
  this Office's indictment of GRU officers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting
  in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain
  members of Unit 26165 with hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-
  Doping Agency, and other international sport associations. United States v.
  Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.). 112 A spearphishing email
  is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and
  solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or
  network, or causes the recipient to 36

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  U.S. Department of Justice Attarl'ley Werk Predttet // Mey Cel'ltail'l Material
  Preteeted Unaer Fed. R. Cril'l'I. P. 6(e) Unit 26165 officers appear to have
  stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later released by
  WikiLeaks in July 2016.136 B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials The GRU's
  operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing documents
  stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the
  anonymous release through two fictitious online personas that it created-DCLeaks
  and Guccifer 2.0-and later through the organization WikiLeaks. 1. DCLeaks The
  GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit
  26165 registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the
  registrant.137 Unit 26165 paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that
  it had mined. 138 The dcleaks.com landing page pointed to different tranches of
  stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other dcleaks.com pages
  contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the
  sender, recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of
  releases, pages were sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later
  made unrestricted to the public. Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen
  documents onto the website dcleaks.com, including documents stolen from a number
  of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign. These documents appeared to
  have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google and
  Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaks
  victims included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and
  Clinton Campaign employee, and four other campaign volunteers.139 The GRU
  released through dcleaks.com thousands of documents, including personal
  identifying and financial information, internal correspondence related to the
  Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and
  information.140 136 Netyksho Indictment ,i 29. The last-in-time DNC email
  released by WikiLeaks was dated May 25, 2016, the same period of time during
  which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server. Netyksho Indictment ,i
  45. 137 Netyksho Indictment ,i 35. Approximately a week before the registration
  of dcleaks.com, the same actors attem ted to re ister the website
  electionleaks.com using the same domain registration service. 138 See
  SM-2589105, serial 181; Netyksho Indictment ,i 2l(a). 140 See, e.g., Internet
  Archive, "htt s://dcleaks.com/" archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally,
  DCLeaks released documents relating to , emails belonging to_, and emails from
  2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name "The
  United States Republican Party"). "The United States Republican Party" portfolio
  contained approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs,
  campaigns, state parties, and businesses dated between May and October 2015.
  According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same 41

RESULT: 12

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  U.S. Department of Justice AtierHey Werk Predttet // Moy CeHtttiH Material
  Preteeted UHeer Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) In early August 2016, Twitter's suspension
  of the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers
  posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote 1;c?)Wp ,,ia private message, "thank u for writing
  back ... do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?" On August 17,
  2016, the GRU added, "please tell me if i can help u anyhow ... it would be a
  great pleasure to me." On September 9, 2016, the GRUi;(T);f posing as Guccifer
  2.0-referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked ? "what do u
  think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential
  campaign." -responded, "pretty standard."155 The investigation did not identify
  evidence of other communications between-and Guccifer 2.0. 3. Use of WikiLeaks
  In order to expand its interference in the 20 I 6 U.S. presidential election,
  the GRU units transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the
  chairman of the Clinton Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the
  DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter
  private messaging and through encrypted channels, including possibly through
  WikiLeaks's private communication system. . a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition
  Toward the Clinton Campaign WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian
  Assange, privately expressed opposition to candidate Clinton well before the
  first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange wrote to other
  members and associates of WikiLeaks that "[w]e believe it would be much better
  for GOP to win ... Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in
  their worst qualities. . . . With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her
  worst qualities., dems+media+neoliberals will be mute .... She's a bright, well
  connected, sadisitic sociopath."156 In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a
  searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton emails that had been obtained
  through FOIA litigation.157 While designing the archive, one WikiLeaks member
  explained the reason for building the archive to another associate: 154 155 Harm
  to Ongoing Matter 156 1 l/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276,
  @WikiLeaks et al. Assange also wrote that, "GOP will generate a lot oposition
  [sic], including through dumb moves. Hillary will do the same thing, but co-opt
  the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hence biliary has greater freedom
  to statt wars than the GOP and has the will to do so." Id. 157 WikiLeaks,
  "Hillary Clinton Email Archive," available at https://wikileaks.org/clinton-
  emails/. 44

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  U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Prodttet // Mtty Cofl:tttifl:
  Mttterittl Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) [W]e want this repository to
  become "the place" to search for background on hillary's plotting at the state
  department during 2009-2013. . . . Firstly because its useful and will annoy
  Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the
  US election, because eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more
  important leaks.158 b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
  Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in
  June 2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about
  possible coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016,
  @dcleaks _ sent a direct message to @WikiLeaks, noting, "You announced your
  organization was preparing to publish more Hillary's emails. We are ready to
  support you. We have some sensitive information too, in particular, her
  financial documents. Let's do it to ether. What do ou think about ublishin our
  info at the same moment? Thank ou."159 Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated
  communications with the GRU persona Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to
  release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22, 2016, seven days after
  Guccifer 2.0's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used Twitter's
  direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest
  that Guccifer 2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to
  review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing."160 On
  July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter's private
  messaging function, writing, "if you have anything hillary related we want it in
  the next tweo [sic] days prefab le [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she
  will solidify bernie supporters behind her after." The Guccifer 2.0 persona
  responded, "ok ... i see." WikiLeaks also explained, "we think trump has only a
  25% chance of winning against hillary ... so conflict between bernie and hillary
  is interesting." 161 c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks Both
  the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the
  Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus,
  although it is clear that the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred
  from the GRU to WikiLeaks, -Investigative Technique 158 3/14/16 Twitter DM,
  @WikiLeaks to Less than two weeks earlier, the same account had been used to
  send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton "in whitehouse with her
  bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist
  appointees." 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276,
  @WikiLeaks et al. 159 6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks. 160 Netyksho
  Indictment ,r 47(a). 1617/6/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks & @guccifer_2. 45

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  U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Werk Predttet // Ma:y Cettta:itt Mttteria:l
  Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) The Office was able to identify when
  the GRU ( operating through its personas Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks) transferred
  some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set up by the
  GRU. Assan e had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embass in London, En
  land. On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send
  WikiLeaks an email bearing the subject "big archive" and the message "a new
  attempt."163 The email contained an encrypted attachment with the name "wk dnc
  link I .txt.gpg."164 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account, GRU officers sent
  WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it.165 On July 18,
  2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Gucci fer 2.0 account that
  it had "the 1 Gb or so archive" and would make a release of the stolen documents
  "this week."166 On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and
  other documents stolen from the DNC computer networks.167 The Democratic
  National Convention began three days later. Similar communications occurred
  between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016,
  @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, "hi there! I'm from DC Leaks. How could we discuss
  some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via your secured
  chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. You
  won't be disappointed, I promise."168 The WikiLeaks account responded, "Hi
  there," without further elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respond
  immediately. The same day, the Twitter account@guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a
  direct message, which is the first known contact between the personas.169 During
  subsequent communications, the 163 This was not the GRU's first attempt at
  transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the GRU used a Guccifer 2.0
  email accou~ted file to a WikiLeaks email account. 6/29/16 Email,
  guccifer2@mail.com (The email appears to have been undelivered.) 164 See
  SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis). 165 6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 to
  @WikiLeaks. 166 7/18/16 Twitter OM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. 167 "DNC Email
  Archive," WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available at https://wikileaks.org/dnc-
  emails. 168 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks. 169 9/15/16 Twitter DM,
  @guccifer _ 2 to @dcleaks _. 46

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  U.S. Department of Justice AtterRe;? Werk Predttet // Mtt;? CeRtail'l Mftferial
  Preteeted URder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that
  WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and arrange for a way to speak through
  encrypted emails.170 An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks
  site revealed that the stolen Podesta emails show a creation date of September
  19, 2016.171 Based on information about Assange's computer and its possible
  operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the stolen Podesta emails
  for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for the
  DNC emails).172 The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken
  from Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had
  a creation date of October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments
  were separately staged by WikiLeaks on its site.173 Beginning on September 20,
  2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in a brief exchange. On
  September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com sent an
  email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject "Submission" and the message "Hi
  from DCLeaks." The email contained a PGP-encr ted with the filename
  "wiki_mail.txt.gpg."174 %?The email, however, bears a number of similarities to
  the July 14, 2016 email in which GRU officers used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to
  give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC files. On September 22, 2016 (the
  same day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account dcleaks sent a sin
  le messa e to WikiLeaks with the strin of characters The Office cannot rule out
  that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through intermediaries who
  visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified A d
  M"'ll M h w?kiL k . t h h . t d "th th t fi fth Investigative Technique 170 See
  SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. 171
  See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64 Investigative Technique At the time, certain
  Apple operating systems used a setting that left a downloaded file's creation
  date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would
  explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks's version of the files was still
  September 19, 2016. See SM-Investigative Technique 2284941, serial 62 173 When
  WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer
  system appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new
  creation date. See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64. 174 See 9/22/16 Email,
  dcleaksproject@gmail.com 175 Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker Offers a
  Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington
  Post (Jan. 17, 2018). 47

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  U.S. Department of Justice Atton=iey Work Protl1:1et // Mtl:y Cottt:tl:ifl
  Mtl:teritl:l Proteetetl UAtier Fetl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Investigative Technique
  . On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the
  Podesta email account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails
  between October 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016. The releases included private
  speeches given by Clinton; 177 internal communications between Podesta and other
  high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign; 178 and correspondence related to
  the Clinton Foundation.179 In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000 documents
  stolen from Podesta's personal email account. The last-in-time email released
  from Podesta' s account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta
  received a spearphishing email sent by the GRU. d. WikiLeaks Statements
  Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials As reports attributing the DNC
  and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged, WikiLeaks and Assange made
  several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source of the
  materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described
  above and other information uncovered during the investigation discredit
  WikiLeaks's claims about the source of material that it posted. Beginning in the
  summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements about Seth
  Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements
  about Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails.
  On August 9, 2016, the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks
  has decided to issue a US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for
  the murder ofDNC staffer Seth Rich."180 Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange
  was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in Seth Rich's killer?"
  and responded, "We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to
  alleged Wikileaks sources." The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by
  commenting, "I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly
  sounds like you're suggesting a man who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then
  murdered." Assange replied, "If there's someone who's potentially connected to
  our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious t79 Netyksho
  Indictment ,r 43. 180 @WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet. 48

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  U.S. Department of Justice Attort1ey Work Prndttet ,'/ May Cot1:tait1: Material
  Proteeted Ut1:der Fed. R. Cri1fl. P. 6(e) circumstances, it doesn't necessarily
  mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious matter ... that type
  of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us."181 After the
  U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was
  behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton
  materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to
  media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside
  job," and purported to have "physical proof' that Russians did not give
  materials to Assange. 182 C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations While releasing the
  stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks, GRU
  officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign
  and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in
  several states. 1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked
  Victims On July 27 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to
  candidate Clinton's personal office . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made
  public statements that included the following: "Russia, if you're listening, I
  hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will
  probably be rewarded mightily by our press."183 The "30,000 emails" were
  apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been
  stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as
  Secretary of State. Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU
  officers targeted for the first time Clinton's personal office. After candidate
  Trump's remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email
  accounts at the domain including an email account belonging to Clinton aide The
  investigation did not find evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise
  accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify
  these email accounts, which were not public.184 Unit 26165 officers also hacked
  into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service copies of the DNC da
  databases (referred to On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate function
  designed to allow users to produce backups of as "snapshots"). The GRU then
  stole those snapshots by moving 181 See Assange: "Murdered DNC Staffer Was
  'Potential' WikiLeaks Source," Fox News (Aug. 25, 2016)(containing video of
  Assange interview by Megyn Kelly). 182 M. Raju & Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman's
  Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange, CNN (May 23, 2018). 183 "Donald Trump on
  Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails," YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted
  7/27/16, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU (starting at
  0:41). 49

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  U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Werle Proattet // Moy CoHtoiH Moteriol
  Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e) for vulnerabilities continued through
  the election. Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials
  involved in election administration and personnel a~ involved in voting
  technology. In August 2016, GRU officers targeted employees of ..... , a voting
  technology company that developed software used by numerous U.S. counties to
  manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company network. Similarly, in
  November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email accounts used
  by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S.
  election.191 The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded
  with malicious software (commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the
  GRU to access the infected computer.192 The FBI was separately responsible for
  this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled
  the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government.
  The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did
  not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
  D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials The Trump Campaign
  showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases hout the summer and fall of 2016. 1. a.
  Background I , Investigative Technique Investigative Technique 51

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  U.S. Department of Justice Attertte,? Werk Proclttet // Mtt'' Cettttttft
  Mttterittl Proteetecl UHcler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) b. Contacts with the
  Campaign about WikiLeaks Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter On June
  12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating to
  Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,"194 but provided no additional
  context. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . ... Harm to Ongoing.Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
  Gates recalled candidate Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton
  emails had not been found.196 , ! Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
  ?; 194 See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic
  Convention, Time (July 27, 2016) (qu.oting the June 12, 2016 television
  interview). 195 In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
  agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to
  defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure to report foreign
  bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal)
  against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office.
  Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:
  17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 ("Gates Superseding Criminal
  Information"); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W Gates III, 1:
  17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 205 ("Gates Plea Agreement"). Gates has
  provided information and in-comt testimony that the Office has deemed to be
  reliable. 196 Gates I 0/25/18 302, at 1-2. 197 As explained further in Volume I,
  Section IV.A.8, irifra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office.
  We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer
  sessions and before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of
  events in this report only when his statements are sufficiently corroborated to
  be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may
  themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort's explanations for
  certain events, even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation
  was credible. His account appears here principally because it aligns with those
  of other witnesses. 198 52

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  U.S. Department of Justice Att:erttey '+\'erk Prnt=lttet // May Cetttaitt
  Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Michael Cohen, former executive
  vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump,
  199 told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in candidate
  Trum 's office in Trum Tower Cohen further told the Office that, after
  WikiLeaks's subsequent release of stolen mails in July 2016, candidate Trump
  said to Cohen something to the effect of 202 199 In November 2018, Cohen pleaded
  guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him
  with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ? l00l(a) &
  (c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought
  by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York, after a
  referral from this Office. In the months leading up to his false-statements
  guilty plea, Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and
  provided information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and
  that is included in this report. 202 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at I 0. Harm to Ongoing
  Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 203 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. 204 20S
  53

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  U.S. Department of Justice Att:erHey Werle Predttet ,',' May CeHtttiH Mttterittl
  Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee) developments with WikiLeaks and separately
  told Gates to keep in touch--about future WikiLeaks releases.206 According to
  Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a press
  strategy, a communications cam and messa in based on the ossible release of I
  IQI 111 LV '-'ll~VII I~ HIQLL r Clinton emails b WikiLeaks.207 208 ,: Harm to
  Ongoing Matter Harm to ungomg Matter to LaGuardia Airport. , shortly after the
  call candidate Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would
  be coming.209 c. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
  u ?. -? ? Harm to Ongoing Matter 207 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302,
  at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2. 208 209 Gates 10/25/18 302
  (serial 241), at 4. 210 211 ,HOM 212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in
  August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans
  Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained
  prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was
  not born in the United States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed
  interest in his writings, and that he spoke with Trump on the phone on at least
  six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3. 213 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2; Corsi was
  first interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counsel's offices in
  Washington, D.C. He was accompanied by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi
  was subsequently interviewed on September 17, 2018; September 21, 2018; October
  31, 2018; November I, 2018; and November 2, 2018. Counsel was 54

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  U.S. Department of Justice Att:arttey Wat1k Pt1adttet // Mtty Catttttitt
  Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) Malloch stated to
  investigators that beginnin in or about Au ust 2016, he and Corsi had multiple
  Face Time discussions about WikiLeaks ? had made a connection to Assange and
  that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released prior to Election Day
  and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or around
  August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta
  emails was coming, after which "we" were going to be in the driver's seat.221
  Harm to Ongoing Matter 1if11Harm to Ongoing Matter 1i1Harm to Ongoing Matter
  111Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 111Harm to Ongoing Matter -Harm
  to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ? Harm to Ongoing Matter 223 224 225
  226 227 228 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
  Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 56

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  U.S. Department of Justice AM:erttey Wer:k Predttet // Mtty Cetttaitt Mttterial
  Preteeted Uttder FeE:I. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016
  Release of Stolen Podesta Emails On October 7 2016 four days after the Assange
  press conference , the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that
  captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to
  adversely affect the Campaign.239 Less than an hour after the video's
  publication, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by the GRU from
  the account of Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta. Harm to Ongoing Matter
  111Harm to Ongoing Matter -Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
  1111Harm to Ongoing Matter Corsi said that, because he had no direct means o
  communicating with WikiLeaks, he told members of the news site WNO-who were
  participating on a conference call with him that day-to reach Assange
  immediately.244 Corsi claimed that the pressure was 239 Candidate Trump can be
  heard off camera making graphic statements about women. 240 241 242 243 244 In a
  later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated Harm to Ongoing Matter that he
  believed Malloch was on the call but then focused on other individuals who were
  on the call-invitation, which Malloch was not. (Separate travel records show
  that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight). Corsi
  at one point stated that after WikiLeaks 's release of stolen emails on October
  7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with Assange. Corsi 11/1/18
  302, at 6. 58

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  U.S. Department of Justice Attet'He~? Werk Prnfitiet // Mft)? CemaiH Material
  Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) enormous and recalled telling the
  conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.245 Corsi stated that he
  was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when
  they did.246 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought
  that he had told people on a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and
  had sent out a tweet asking whether anyone could contact Assange, but then said
  that maybe he had done nothing.247 The Office investigated Corsi' s allegations
  about the events of October 7 little corroboration for his alle ations about the
  da .248 However, the phone records themselves do not indicate that the
  conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the Access Hollywood sto ,
  and the Office has not otherwise been able to identif the substance of the
  conversation. However, the Office has not identified any conference call
  participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi that day, who says that they received
  non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having
  contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation with
  Corsi. e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks Donald Trump Jr. had
  direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the campaign period. On
  September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks the
  password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's "unprecedented and
  dangerous" ties 245 During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may
  have sent out public tweets because he knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our
  Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets. 246_ Corsi 9/21/18 302,
  at 6-7. 247 Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6. Harm to Ongoing Matter ??Harm to Ongoing
  Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 59

RESULT: 25

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  U.S. Department of Justice At:tarHey 'ille,rk Pratittet // Ma;? Ce,AtttiH
  Material Pre,teeteti UHtier Feti. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) to Russia,
  PutinTrump.org.252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: '"Let's bomb Iraq' Progress for
  America PAC to launch "PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is 'putintrump'
  putintrump.org." Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to
  Donald Trump Jr., "A PAC run anti-Trump site putintrump.org is about to launch.
  The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We have guessed the password. It is
  'putintrump.' See 'About' for who is behind it. Any comments ?"253 Several hours
  later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaign staff: Guys I got a weird
  Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it works and the
  about section they reference contains the next pie in terms of who is behind it.
  Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me
  as I follow them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the
  conspiracy they are looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a
  fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and ifwe
  want to look into it.254 Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the "About" page for
  the unlaunched site PutinTrump.org. The next day (after the website had launched
  publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks: "Off the record, l
  don't know who that is but I'll ask around. Thanks."255 On October 3, 2016,
  WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking "you guys" to help
  disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to
  target Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already "had done so," and
  asked, "what's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"256 WikiLeaks
  did not respond. On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was "great
  to see you and your dad talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your
  dad tweets this link if he mentions us wlsearch.tk."257 WikiLeaks wrote that the
  link would help Trump in "digging through" leaked emails and stated, "we just
  released Podesta emails Part 4."258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly tweeted
  the wlsearch.tk link.259 ' 252 9/20/16 Twitter DM~hbein to @WikiLeaks; see
  JF00587 (9/21/16 Messages, -@jabber.cryptoparty.is ~@jabber.cryptoparty.is);
  Fishbein 9/5/18 302, at 4. When interviewed by our Office, Fishbein produced
  what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the participants discussed
  U.S. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and password
  that Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks. 253 9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to
  @DonaldJTrumpJr. 254 TRUMPORG _ 28 _ 000629-33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to
  Conway et al. (subject "Wikileaks")). 255 9/21/16 Twitter DM, @DonaldJTrumpJr to
  @WikiLeaks. 256 10/3/16 Twitter DMs, @DonaldJTrumpJr & @WikiLeaks. 257 At the
  time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign
  documents. 258 10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr. 259
  @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/16 (6:34 a.m.) Tweet. 60

RESULT: 26

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  U.S. Department of Justice AM:at't=tey Wark Pra<:ittet // Moy CaHtoiH Material
  Prnteete<:i Ul'l:<:ier Fee. R. Crifl'I:. P. 6(e) and Kellyanne Conway.280 The
  investigation established that Smith communicated with at least Flynn and Clovis
  about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,281 but the Office did not
  identify evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed
  Smith's efforts. In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each
  other about their respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, "wondering if you
  had some more detailed reports or memos or other data you could share because we
  have come a long way in our efforts since we last visited .... We would need as
  much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it against the new data
  we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only.'"282 Ledeen
  claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the "dark
  web") that purpo1ted to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to
  authenticate the emails and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik
  Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor to ascertain the authenticity of
  the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that the emails
  were not authentic.283 A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had
  been downloaded from WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails
  received by John Podesta. The files on Smith's computer had creation dates of
  October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release by WikiLeaks.
  Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not
  reflect when the files were downloaded to Smith's computer. (It appears the
  creation date was when WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed
  in Volume I, Section III.B.3.c, supra.284) The investigation did not otherwise
  identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their release by
  WikiLeaks. Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about
  Clinton's deleted emails until shortly before the election. For example, on
  October 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there was a "tug-of-war going on within
  WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days," and that WikiLeaks
  "has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the
  theory this allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November
  8."285 An attachment to the 280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome
  Corsi under "Independent Groups/Organizations/Individuals," and described him as
  an "established author and writer from the right on President Obama and Sec.
  Clinton." 281 Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et al.;
  8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith (bee: Clovis et al.). 282 9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to
  Smith. 283 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5. 284 The forensic analysis of Smith's
  computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple operating system that
  would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded
  (no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See Volume I, Section
  111.B.3.c, supra. The Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the
  two files found on Smith's computer from WikiLeaks's site using the same Apple
  operating system on Smith's computer; both files were successfully downloaded
  and retained the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62. 285
  10/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 64

RESULT: 27

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  U.S. Department of Justice Att6rHey W6rle: Pr6dttet // May C6HtaiH Material
  Pr6teeted Una er Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) email claimed that WikiLeaks would
  release "All 33k deleted Emails" by "November 1st." No emails obtained from
  Clinton's server were subsequently released. Smith drafted multiple emails
  stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian hackers. For example,
  in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had
  organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails,
  including parties with "ties and affiliations to Russia."286 The investigation
  did not identify evidence that any such meetings occurred. Associates and
  security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did not believe that
  Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such
  connection.287 The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact
  with Russian hackers or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with
  the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained the deleted Clinton emails. * * * In sum,
  the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons
  affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of the DNC and
  DCCC. The GRU then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these
  accounts and computers, and disseminated that data through fictitious online
  personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later through WikiLeaks. The
  investigation also established that the Trum Cam ai n dis la ed interest in the
  WikiLeaks releases, and that explained in Volume I, Section V.B, infra, the
  evidence was sufficient to support intrusion and other char es a ainst GRU
  officers for their role in election-related hackin . 286 8/31/16 Email, Smith to
  Smith. 287 Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 6. 65

RESULT: 28

PAGE: 96

TEXT:

  U.S. Department ofJustice AtteFHe~? Werk PF0eh:1et // Mtt)' CeHtttifl MateFial
  Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. CFil'l'l.. P. 6(e) meeting).463 During that meeting,
  Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government
  officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip,
  he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton.
  As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the
  form of "emails of Clinton," and that they "have thousands of emails."464 On May
  6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos suggested to a
  representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received
  indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign
  through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary
  Clinton.465 e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign While he was
  discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials
  with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised
  of his efforts. On April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about
  the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that
  "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet
  him when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London is that
  these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities."466 On
  April 27, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second
  message to Miller stating that "some interesting messages [were] coming in from
  Moscow about a trip when the time is right."467 The same day, Papadopoulos sent
  a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that
  Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin
  wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right. "468 Papadopoulos'
  s Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued throughout the
  spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an email
  from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski
  whether that was "something we want to move forward with."469 The next day,
  Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top
  of the email "Russia update."470 He included the same email in a May 21, 2016
  message to senior Campaign official Paul Manafort, under the subject line
  "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump," stating that "Russia has been eager to
  meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me 463
  Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud &
  Papadopoulos. 464 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense~ 14. 465 This information is
  contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials.
  iHferfflatiat1. is lu 111 eHfareefflefl.t seHsitive (LES) sHs f!'lttst be
  trestes ueeersiHgly iH uHy e,cten1al sisseffliHstiatt. The foreign government
  conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26, 2016, a few days
  after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its
  investigation of potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a
  few days later based on the information. 466 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S.
  Miller (8: 12:44 p.m.). 467 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58
  p.m.). 468 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.). 469 5/4/16
  Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.). 470 5/5/16 Email,
  Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.). 89

RESULT: 29

PAGE: 183

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte)' Werk Predt1et ,',' Ma:>? Cefltaifl
  Material Preteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) the releases, the defendants
  used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through WikiLeaks. On
  July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that
  the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. Netyksho Indictment ,i 48. In
  addition, on October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some
  conspirators had stolen from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta after a
  successful spearphishing operation. Netyksho Indictment ,i 49. Harm to Ongoing
  Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter
  Harm to Ongoing Matter -Harm to Ongoing Matter 1278 The Office also considered,
  but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and
  dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen
  property under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. ?? 2314 and
  2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover "goods, wares, or merchandise," and
  lower coutts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items
  since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207
  (1985). See United States v. Yijia Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa.
  2014) (collecting cases). One of those post-Dowling decisions-United States v.
  Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)-specifically held that the NSPA does not
  reach "a computer program in source code form," even though that code was stored
  in tangible items (i.e., a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Id. at
  1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the Brown opinion in explaining the need for
  amendments to 18 U.S.C. ? 1030(a)(2) that "would ensure that the theft of
  intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in
  the same way theft of physical items [is] protected." S. Rep. 104-357, at 7
  (1996). That sequence of events would make it difficult to argue that hacked
  emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute
  "goods, wares, or merchandise" within the meaning of the NSPA. 176

RESULT: 30

PAGE: 208

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice At:1:6me,? W6rk Pr6tlttet // Ma,? C6Htaifl Material
  Pr6teetetl UHtler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) TABLE OF CONTENTS -VOLUME II
  INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME IT ......................................................
  ................................................... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO
  VOLUME TI ......................................................................
  ....................... 3 I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
  ................................................................ 9 A. Legal
  Framework of Obstruction_ of Justice
  ................................................................... 9 B.
  Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations
  .............................................................. 12 II. FACTUAL
  RES UL TS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
  ...................................................... 15 A. The Campaign's
  Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump ................. 15 1.
  Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia ..............
  16 2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails
  ........... 17 3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was
  Seeking to Aid Candidate Trump .................................................
  .......................................... 18 4. After the Election, Trump
  Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided
  his Election ................................ 21 B. The President's Conduct
  Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn .................. 24 1. Incoming
  National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with Russian
  Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
  ........................................................... 24 2. President-
  Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment of Russian
  Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-Interference
  Investigations
  ..................................................................... 27 3.
  Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to Incoming
  Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI
  ................................ 29 4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of
  Their Concerns About Flynn ............. 31 5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting
  About Flynn with Yates; President Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Corney
  ....................................................... 32 6. Flynn's
  Resignation ....................................................................
  .......................... 36 7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director
  Corney ................................... 38 8. The Media Raises Questions
  About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn ...............................
  ................................................................................
  ...... 41 9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness
  Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak
  .............. 42 C. The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the
  FBl's Russia Investigation .....................................................
  ............................................................ 48 I. Attorney
  General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation ..................... 48

RESULT: 31

PAGE: 214

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Attef'Ae:,? WElf'k Pt1Eltittet // Moy CElAtoiA
  Motet1iol Pt1eteeteti UAtier Feti. R. Ct1im. P. 6(e) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME
  II Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the
  President that related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the
  President's conduct towards the law enforcement officials overseeing the
  investigations and the witnesses to relevant events. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE
  OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION The key issues and events we examined include the
  following: The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump.
  During the 2016 presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian
  government's apparent support for candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released
  politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been
  hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia was
  responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials
  privately sought information about any further planned WikiLeaks releases. Trump
  also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late
  as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a
  skyscraper to be built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election,
  the President expressed concerns to advisors that reports of Russia's election
  interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election.
  Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017,
  incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice
  President, other administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to
  Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on
  Russia for its election interference. On January 27, the day after the President
  was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar
  statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Corney to a private
  dinner at the White House and told Corney that he needed loyalty. On February
  14, the day after the President requested Flynn's resignation, the President
  told an outside advisor, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over."
  The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue. Later that
  afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting
  with Corney. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said,
  "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He
  is a good guy. T hope you can let this go." Shortly after requesting Flynn's
  resignation and speaking privately to Corney, the President sought to have
  Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating
  that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.
  McFarland declined because she did not know whether that was true, and a White
  House Counsel's Office attorney thought that the request would look like a quid
  pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered. The President's reaction to
  the continuing Russia investigation. Tn February 2017, Attorney General Jeff
  Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from related
  investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign. Tn early March, the
  President told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing.
  And after Sessions announced his recusal on March 2, the President expressed
  anger at the decision and told advisors that he should have an Attorney General
  who would protect him. That weekend, the President took Sessions aside at an
  event and urged him to "unrecuse." Later in March, Corney publicly 3

RESULT: 32

PAGE: 226

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice AUerney Werk Pwdttet ,',' M!t)1 Centain Material
  Preteet:ecl Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION
  INVESTIGATION This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We
  first provide an overview of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential
  campaign, and how candidate Trump responded. We then tum to the key events that
  we investigated: the President's conduct concerning the FBI investigation of
  Michael Flynn; the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's
  Russia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of
  FBI Director Corney; efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to
  curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation; efforts to prevent
  disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between
  Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General
  unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses. We summarize
  the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory
  obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and
  intent. We focus on elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has
  "jurisdiction ... to investigate ... federal crimes committed in the course of,
  and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as
  perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
  witnesses." 28 C.F.R. ? 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to
  investigate federal obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to
  the elements of those crimes and analyzed them within an elements framework-
  while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether crimes were
  committed, for the reasons explained above. This section also does not address
  legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those
  defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section III, iefra. A. The Campaign's
  Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump During the 2016 campaign,
  the media raised questions about a possible connection between the Trump
  Campaign and Russia.7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released
  politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been
  hacked by Russia. Trump responded to questions about possible connections to
  Russia by denying any business involvement in Russia-even though the Trump
  Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late as June 2016.
  Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same
  time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any
  further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted
  about possible links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect
  continued to deny any connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns
  that reports of Russian election interference might lead the public to question
  the legitimacy of his election.8 7 This section summarizes and cites various
  news stories not for the truth of the information contained in the stories, but
  rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context. Volume I
  of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that
  were reported on by the media during the campaign. 8 As discussed in Volume I,
  while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties
  to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign,
  the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign
  conspired or coordinated with representatives ofthe Russian government to
  interfere in the 2016 election. 15

RESULT: 33

PAGE: 228

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atterfle~? Werle Predttet // Muy Cefltttifl
  Mttterittl Preteeted Uf!eer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) National Convention about
  the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican platform's stance on
  giving "weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces."18 2. The Trump
  Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails On June 14, 2016, a
  cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the Democratic
  National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government hackers
  had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents.19 On July
  22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted
  thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations.20
  Soon thereafter, Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that
  Russia had hacked the DNC emails and arranged their release in order to help
  candidate Trump.21 On July 26, 2016, the New York Times reported that U.S.
  "intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have 'high
  confidence' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and
  documents from the Democratic National Committee.',22 Within the Trum Cam ai n,
  aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks.23 discussed with Campaign
  officials that WikiLeaks would release the hacked material. Some witnesses said
  that Trump himself discussed the possibility of upcoming releases~. Michael
  Cohen, then-executive vice resident of the Trum Or anization and s ecial counsel
  to Trum , recalled hearin Cohen recalled that Trump responded, "oh good,
  alright," 18 Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's anti-Russia stance on
  Ukraine, Washington Post, Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform
  events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, supra. 19 Bears in the Midst:
  Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15, 2016)
  (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing
  provided by CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated
  DNC, stole opposition research on Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016). 20 Tom
  Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about
  Clinton and internal deliberations, Washington Post (July 22, 2016). 21 Amber
  Phillips, Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats' emails to help
  Donald Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016). 22 David E. Sanger and Eric
  Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C., New York Times
  (July 26, 2016). 23 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at I. 24 Gates
  4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also Volume I,
  Section III.D. l, supra. 25 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section
  III.D. l, supra. According to Cohen, after WikiLeak~tolen DNC emails on July 22,
  2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the effect of,~ Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10.
  Cohen's role in the candidate's and later 17

RESULT: 34

PAGE: 229

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Attef'Re~? Wef'k Pl'etittet // May CeRtaiR Material
  Preteetetl UReef" Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) and Harm to Ongoing Matter 26 oke to
  Trump~;;;;~;~;~;;~;.,;~; ; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that Manafort
  should keep Trump u~ty campaign manager Rick Gates said that Man~ssure about
  -information and that Manafort instructed Gates~ status updates on u com in
  releases.28 Around the same time Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport ,
  and shortly after the call ended, Trum2 told Gates that more releases of
  damaging information would be coming.29 i:?jih??l?Uf?MhflrlfDiM -were discussed
  within the Campaign,3? and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a
  communications strategy based on the possible release of Clinton emails by
  WikiLeaks.31 3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking
  to Aid Candidate Trump In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22, 2016
  release of hacked DNC emails, the Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions
  that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted
  that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was "dealing with Trump"32 and that
  "[f]or the record," he had "ZERO investments in Russia."33 In a press conference
  the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized "this whole thing with Russia"
  as "a total deflection" and stated that it was "farfetched" and "ridiculous."34
  Trump said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven,
  but stated that it would give him "no pause" if Russia had Clinton's emails.35
  Trump added, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000
  emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded President's
  activities, and his own criminal conduct, is descriped in Volume II, Section
  ILK, infra, and in Volume I, Section IV.A. I, supra. 26 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8.
  27 . As explained in footnote 197 of Volume I, Section III.D. l.b, supra, this
  Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns with
  those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent. 28 Gates l 0/25/18
  302, at 4. 29 Gates I 0/25/ 18 302, at 4. 30 Bannon 1/18/ l 9 3 02, at 3.
  31Gates4/11/18302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18302, at2(messa~ formed in
  June/Jul timeframe based on claims b Assan eon June 12, 2016, ----. ).
  32@rea!DonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet. 33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16
  (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet. 34 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-S PAN
  (July 27, 2016). 35 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July
  27, 2016). 18

RESULT: 35

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice AttorHey Work Protittet // Ma,.? CotttaiH Material
  Proteeteti UHaer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) advisors had developed a "party line"
  that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to Russia.45 In
  addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to
  reports of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to
  distance itself from Russian contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign
  policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation to Russian Ambassador Sergey
  Kislyak's residence because the timing was "not optimal" in view of media
  reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to
  resign amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political
  party in Ukraine and links to Russian business.47 And when the media published
  stories about Page's connections to Russia in September 2016, Trump Campaign
  officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and told the press
  that he had played "no role" in the Campaign.48 On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks
  released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence agency from
  Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.49 The same day, the federal government
  announced that "the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of
  e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political
  organizations."50 The government statement directly linked Russian hacking to
  the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering with the presidential
  election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have
  authorized these activities" based on their "scope and sensitivity."51 On
  October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating
  Russia's hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that
  the hacked emails were going to be released.52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike
  Pence was asked whether the Trump 45 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I; Cohen 9/18/18
  302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is described in greater detail in
  Volume II, Section Il.K, infra. 46 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to
  Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily
  knocking down a stream of false media stories"). The invitation and Gordon's
  response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7.a, supra. 47 See, e.g., Amber
  Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington
  Post (Aug. 19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with
  investigations into [Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in
  Ukraine."); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump Aide Paul Manafort
  Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events
  involving Manafort are discussed in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, supra. 48 Michael
  Isikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin,
  Yahoo News (Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon;
  9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at 2. 49
  @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet. 50 Joint Statement from the Department
  Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
  Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 51 Joint Statement from the Department Of
  Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on
  Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 52 John Wagner & Anne Gearan, Clinton
  campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians, suggests Trump had early warning,
  Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016). 20

RESULT: 36

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atteffl:e)' Werk Predttet // Ma:)? Cefl:ta:ifl:
  Ma:teria:l Preteeted Ufl:der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Campaign was "in cahoots"
  with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information and responded,
  "Nothing could be further from the truth."53 4. After the Election, Trump
  Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided
  his Election On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later,
  Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintained
  contacts with Trump's "immediate entourage" during the campaign.54 In response,
  Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign spokesperson, said, "We are not
  aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign
  entities before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders."55
  Hicks gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and
  Russia: "It never happened. There was no communication between the campaign and
  any foreign entity during the campaign."56 On December 10, 2016, the press
  reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded that Russia interfered
  in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the White
  House."57 Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "I
  think it's ridiculous. I think it's just another excuse."58 He continued that no
  one really knew who was responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the
  intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody. It
  could be somebody sitting in a bed some place."59 The President-Elect 53 Louis
  Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14,
  2016). 54 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump
  Allies, Diplomat Says, New York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy
  Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, "[t]here were contacts" and "[ cannot
  say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian
  representatives"); Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump;
  says contacts underway, Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov
  saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array of them supported
  contacts with Russian representatives"). 55 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials
  Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New York Times (Nov. 11, 2016)
  (quoting Hicks). 56 Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with
  Trump; says contacts underway, Associated Press (Nov. I 0, 2016) (quoting
  Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she spoke with
  Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably
  Kushner and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or
  pushback from any of them. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 4. 57 Damien Gayle, CIA
  concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports, Guardian
  (Dec. 10, 2016). 58 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with
  President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016). 59 Chris
  Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ
  Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016). 21

RESULT: 37

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice AttorRey Werk Pretiuet // May CoRtaifl Material
  Preteeteti URtier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e) a press conference and said that he
  removed Flynn because Flynn "didn't tell the Vice President of the United States
  the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn't acceptable to
  me."247 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with
  Kislyak, but "it certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have
  directed him to do it if I thought he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but
  I would have directed him because that's his job."248 In listing the reasons for
  terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him.249 The
  President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing
  to do with Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything."250
  The President also said he "had nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's publication of
  information hacked from the Clinton campaign.251 9. The President Attempts to
  Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's
  Discussions with Kislyak On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland
  that the President wanted her to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but
  they suggested to her that the Administration could make her the ambassador to
  Singapore.252 The next day, the President asked Priebus to have McFarland draft
  an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to
  call the Russian Ambassador about sanctions.253 Priebus said he told the
  President he would only direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were
  comfortable with it.254 Priebus called McFarland into his office to convey the
  President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not
  direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak.255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know
  whether the President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and
  she declined to say yes or no 247 Remarks by President Trump in Press
  Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 248 Remarks by President Trump in Press
  Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President also said that Flynn's
  conduct "wasn't wrong -what he did in terms of the information he saw." The
  President said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did
  something right." 249 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White
  House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9. 250 Remarks by President Trump
  in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 251 Remarks by President Trump
  in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 252 KTMF _ 00000047 (McFarland
  2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 16-17. 253 See
  Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11; see also KTMF _00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17
  Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 254 Priebus 1 I I 8/
  18 302, at 1 1. 255 KTMF _ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum for the
  Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 42

RESULT: 38

PAGE: 288

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Attorae:,? Work Proattet // May Coataia Mtt1:erial
  Proteetee Uaaer Fee. R. Crira. P. 6(e) was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower
  Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump was repeatedly briefed on
  the ro ress of those efforts.498 In addition, some witnesses said that ~s aware
  that ? ? . --at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence
  officials were behind the hacks, and that Trump privately sought information
  about future WikiLeaks releases.499 More broadly, multiple witnesses described
  the President's preoccupation with press coverage of the Russia investigation
  and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his
  election.500 Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a
  pretextual reason to the press and the public for Corney's termination. In the
  immediate aftermath of the firing, the President dictated a press statement
  suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ recommendations, and White House
  press officials repeated that story. But the President had decided to fire
  Corney before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the
  President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Corney regardless of
  the Department of Justice's recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials
  made clear to him that they would resist the White House's suggestion that they
  had prompted the process that led to Corney's termination. The initial reliance
  on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the President had
  concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence
  does not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both. E.
  The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel Overview The Acting
  Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting the
  President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney
  General Sessions had failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted
  his resignation, which the President ultimately did not accept. The President
  told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest, but
  they responded that those claims were "ridiculous" and posed no obstacle to the
  Special Counsel's service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly
  cleared the Special Counsel's service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that
  the President was being personally investigated for obstruction of justice and
  the President responded with a series of tweets 498 See Volume II, Section II.K.
  l, infra. 499 See Volume l, Section ITLD.1, supra. 500 In addition to whether
  the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI
  investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in
  firing Corney was connected to other conduct that could come to light as a
  result of the FBT's Russian-interference investigation. In paiticular, Michael
  Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the
  Trump Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts
  uncovered in the Russia investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S.
  Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, ultimately led to the
  conviction of Cohen in the Southern District ofNew York for campaign-finance
  offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President.
  See Volume II, Section II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not
  establish that when the President fired Corney, he was considering the
  possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that
  the President's intent in firing Corney was otherwise connected to a concern
  about these matters coming to light. 77

RESULT: 39

PAGE: 339

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atterttey Werk Pl'ea1:1et // May CentaiH Material
  Preteetea Uttaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Manafort."887 In an interview on November
  28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very brave" that Manafort did not
  "flip": If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff is
  terrible. You flip and you lie and you get-the prosecutors will tell you 99
  percent of the time they can get people to flip. It's rare that they can't. But
  I had three people: Manafort, Corsi-I don't know Corsi, but he refuses to say
  what they demanded.888 Manafort, Corsi . It's actually very brave.889 Tn
  response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President
  said, "It was never discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I
  take it off the table?"890 3. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm
  to Ongoing Matter :?? Harm to Ongoing Matter aHarm to Ongoing Matter IIIHarm to
  Ongoing Matter 887 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller
  investigation as details emerge, CNN (Nov. 29, 2018). 888 "Corsi" is a reference
  to Jerome Corsi, who was involved in efforts to coordinate with WikiLeaks and
  Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea offer
  fro~'s Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray & Eli
  Watkins,~ says he won't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018). 889 Marisa
  Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
  pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
  That same day, the President tweeted: "While the disgusting Fake News is doing
  everything within their power not to report it that way, at least 3 major
  players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang ofDems is viciously telling
  witnesses to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy
  Era!" @rea!DonaldTrump 11/28/18 (8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. 890 Marisa Schultz & Nikki
  Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
  pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
  Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to
  Ongoing Matter 128

RESULT: 40

PAGE: 368

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atter11ey Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material
  Preteetee U11eer Fee. R. Cril'H. P. 6(e) Second, many obstruction cases involve
  the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying crime. Personal criminal
  conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper
  obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d
  Cir. 1988), or that he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see,
  e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of
  such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. See United States v.
  Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction
  sentencing guideline, that "obstruction of a criminal investigation is
  punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the
  investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime"). Obstruction of justice
  can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests, to
  protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a
  gray area, or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of
  the justice system is the same regardless of whether a person committed an
  underlying wrong. In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that
  the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election
  interference. But the evidence does point to a range of other possible personal
  motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that continued
  investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and
  potential uncertainty about whether certain events-such as advance notice of
  WikiLeaks's release of hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between
  senior campaign officials and could be seen as criminal activity by the
  President, his campaign, or his family. Third, many of the President's acts
  directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with the
  government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public view.
  While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were
  motivated by a corrupt intent, the President's power to influence actions,
  persons, and events is enhanced by his unique ability to attract attention
  through use of mass communications. And no principle of law excludes public acts
  from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to
  intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system's integrity is
  equally threatened. 2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete
  acts-e.g., the President's statement to Corney about the Flynn investigation,
  his termination of Corney, and his efforts to remove the Special Counsel-it is
  important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole. That pattern
  sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be
  drawn about his intent. a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the
  President that were capable of exetting undue influence over law enforcement
  investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction
  investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings
  in which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual
  channels. These actions ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to
  reverse the effect of the Attorney General's recusal; to the attempted use of
  official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect
  contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing
  the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example,
  the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was
  followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney
  General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective election-
  interference only-a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken
  with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. 157

RESULT: 41

PAGE: 400

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice At:t:orflc)' Work Proauet II Ma)' CoHtaifl Material
  Protcetca UHElcr Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c) APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY The following
  glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
  referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be
  comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of
  the report. Agalarov, Aras Agalarov, Emin Akhmetov, Rinat Akhmetshin, Rinat
  Aslanov, Dzheykhun (Jay) Assange, Julian Aven, Petr Bannon, Stephen (Steve)
  Baranov, Andrey Berkowitz, A vi Boente, Dana Bogacheva, Anna Bossert, Thomas
  (Tom) Referenced Persons Russian real-estate developer ( owner of the Crocus
  Group); met Donald Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped
  arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
  and Trump Campaign officials. Performer, executive vice president of Crocus
  Group, and son of Aras Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at
  Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Former
  member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for
  Ukrainian political pai1y, the Party of Regions. U.S. lobbyist and associate of
  Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
  between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. Head of U.S. department of
  the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active measures" social media
  campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Founder of
  WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen from entities
  and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party. Chairman of the board of
  Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential Transition Team in
  connection with anticipated post-election sanctions. White House chief
  strategist and senior counselor to President Trump (Jan. 2017-Aug.2017); chief
  executive of the Trump Campaign. Director of investor relations at Russian
  state-owned oil company, Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page. Assistant to
  Jared Kushner. Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 -Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy
  Attorney General (Feb. 2017 -Apr. 2017). Internet Research Agency employee who
  worked on "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016
  U.S. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses
  in 2014. Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a
  senior official on the Presidential Transition Team. B-1

RESULT: 42

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Attort1e:,? Work Pl'oEluet // Ma:,? Cot1tain Material
  ProteeteEI Ut1tler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Fabrizio, Anthony (Tony) Fishbein,
  Jason Flynn, Michael G. (a/k/a Michael Flynn Jr.) Flynn, Michael T. Foresman,
  Robert (Bob) Futerfas, Alan Garten, Alan Gates, Richard (Rick) III Gerson,
  Richard (Rick) Gistaro, Edward Glassner, Michael Goldstone, Robert Gordon,
  Jeffrey (J.D.) Gorkov, Sergey Graff, Rhona Partner at the research and
  consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates. He was a pollster for the Trump
  Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the
  election. Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent
  WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on September 20,
  2016. Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017-Feb. 13,
  2017). National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 -Feb. 13, 2017), Director of the
  Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012-Aug.7, 2014), and Trump Campaign advisor.
  He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about communications with Ambassador
  Sergey Kislyak in December 2016. Investment banker who sought meetings with the
  Trump Campaign in spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the
  election met with Michael Flynn. Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and
  subsequently personal counsel for Donald Trump Jr. General counsel of the Trump
  Organization. Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural
  Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He pleaded
  guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate U.S. laws, as well
  as making false statements to the FBI. New York hedge fund manager and associate
  of Jared Kushner. During the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev
  on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia. Deputy
  Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration. Political
  director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George Papadopoulos to
  others in the Trump Campaign. Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald
  Trump Jr. to arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia
  Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. National security advisor to the
  Trump Campaign involved in changes to the Republican party platform and who
  communicated with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National
  Convention. Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank, who
  met with Jared Kushner during the transition period. Senior vice-president and
  executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the Trump Organization. B-4

RESULT: 43

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice AUor1rn)1 Work Prodttet // May Cm1taitt Material
  Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Malloch, Theodore (Ted) Manafort, Paul
  Jr. Mashburn, John McCabe, Andrew McCord, Mary McFarland, Kathleen (K.T.)
  McGahn, Donald (Don) Medvedcv, Dmitry Melnik, Yuriy Mifsud, Joseph Miller, Matt
  Miller, Stephen Millian, Sergei Mnuchin, Steven Miiller-Maguhn, Andrew Nader,
  George Netyksho, Viktor the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel
  sanctions on Russian officials. Chief executive officer of Global Fiduciary
  Governance and the Roosevelt Group. He was a London-based associate of Jerome
  Corsi. Trump campaign member (March 2016-Aug. 2016) and chairman and chief
  strategist (May 2016 -Aug. 2016). Trump administration official and former
  policy director to the Trump Campaign. Acting director of the FBI (May 2017
  -Aug. 2017); deputy director of the FBI (Feb. 2016 -Jan. 2018). Acting Assistant
  Attorney General (Oct. 2016-May 2017). Deputy White House National Security
  Advisor (Jan. 2017-May 2017). White House Counsel (Jan. 2017 -Oct. 2018). Prime
  Minister of Russia. Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
  who connected with George Papadopoulos on social media. Maltese national and
  former London-based professor who, immediately after returning from Moscow in
  April 2016, told George Papadopoulos that the Russians had "dirt" in the form of
  thousands of Clinton emails. Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the
  meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016.
  Senior advisor to the President. Founder of the Russian American Chamber of
  Commerce who met with George Papadopoulos during the campaign. Secretary of the
  Treasury. Harm to Ongoing Matter Member of hacker association Chaos Computer
  Club and associate of Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks. Advisor to the
  United Arab Emirates's Crown Prince who arranged a meeting between Kirill
  Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition period. Russian military officer
  in command of a unit involved in Russian hacand-release operations to interfere
  in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. B-7

RESULT: 44

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Att:erne)" Werle Prnelttet // Ma)' CeRtaiR Material
  Prnteeteel UReief Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Oganov, Georgiy Oknyansky, Henry (a/k/a
  Henry Greenberg) Page, Carter Papadopoulos, George Parscale, Bradley Patten,
  William (Sam) Jr. Peskov, Dmitry Phares, Walid Pinedo, Richard Podesta, John Jr.
  Podobnyy, Victor Poliakova, Elena Polonskaya, Olga Pompeo, Michael Porter,
  Robert Priebus, Reince Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of
  investment company Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early
  2017. Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory
  information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in May 2016.
  Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated Russian views and
  made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow. Foreign policy advisor to the
  Trump Campaign who received information from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had
  "dirt" in the form of thousands of Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to
  the FBI about his contact with Mifsud. Digital media director for the 2016 Trump
  Campaign. Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik. Deputy chief of
  staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential administration.
  Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general of the
  Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG). U.S. person who
  pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity fraud. Clinton campaign
  chairman whose email account was hacked by the GRU. WikiLeaks released his
  stolen emails during the 2016 campaign. Russian intelligence officer who
  interacted with Carter Page while operating inside the United States; later
  charged in 2015 with conspiring to act as an unregistered agent of Russia.
  Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's outreach
  about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 2016. Russian national
  introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud as an individual with
  connections to Vladimir Putin. U.S. Secretary of State; director of the Central
  Intelligence Agency (Jan. 2017-Apr. 2018). White House staff secretary (Jan.
  2017 -Feb. 2018). White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 -July 2017); chair of
  the Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011-Jan. 2017). Prigozhin, Yevgeniy
  Head of Russian companies Concord-Catering and Concord Management and
  Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency, which engaged
  in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
  presidential election. B-8

RESULT: 45

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Attorney \\'erk Prodttet // Ma)? C0Htait1 ~foterial
  Proteeted Ut1de1? Ped. R. Cri1T1. P. 6(e) Russian International Affairs Council
  Silk Road Group St. Petersburg International Economic Forum Tatneft
  Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism Unit 26165 (GRU) Unit
  74455 (GRU) Valdai Discussion Club WikiLeaks Russia-based nonprofit established
  by Russian government decree. It is associated with the Ministry of Foreign
  Affairs, and its members include Ivan Timofeev, Dmitry Peskov, and Petr Aven.
  Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing agreement to
  build a Trump-branded hotel in Georgia. Annual event held in Russia and attended
  by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. Russian energy company.
  European group that sponsored a summit between European Parliament lawmakers and
  U.S. persons. George Papadopoulos, Sam Clovis, and Walid Phares attended the TAG
  summit in July 2016. GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military,
  political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia.
  It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations, as well as
  the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order to interfere in the 2016
  U.S. presidential election. GRU military unit with multiple departments that
  engaged in cyber operations. It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons
  and organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in
  order to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Group that holds a
  conference attended by Russian government officials, including President Putin.
  Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online, including
  data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government entities. Released data
  stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. B-13

RESULT: 46

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atlef'fle)1 \ltet'k Pt1eclttet // Moy CeHtttiH
  Motet1iol Prnteetecl UHE:ier Fee. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) e. On October 7, 2016,
  emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by WikiLeaks. ? i.
  Where were you on October 7, 2016? ii. Were you told at any time in advance of,
  or on the day of, the October 7 release that Wikileaks possessed or might
  possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this,
  when, and what you were told. iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you
  or your campaign, including Roger Stone, reaching out to Wikileaks, either
  directly or through an intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes,
  identify the person and describe the substance of the conversations or contacts.
  f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
  Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with Wikileaks, Guccifer
  2.0, or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If
  yes, describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when
  you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts. g. From
  June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate
  with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
  i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to
  assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr. Stone? ii.
  Did Mr. Stone ever discuss Wikileaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with
  anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told,
  from whom, and when. iii. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he
  had with Wikileaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming
  releases of information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when. h. Did
  you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon
  or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the
  discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). i. Were you
  aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in
  Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the
  organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance
  with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). C-6

RESULT: 47

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atterfl:e)" \\'erk PreEiuet // May Cofl:taifl:
  Material Prnteeted UHEier Fee. R. Cri1fl. P. 6(e) with input from various
  outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including, in
  particular, information from the book CUnton Cash by Peter Schweizer. The Pulse
  Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June
  12, 2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more specifically
  to national security and terrorism than to the Clintons. That speech was
  delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of Politics in Manchester, New
  Hampshire, and, as reported, opened with the following: This was going to be a
  speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President, especially in these times of
  Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her former Secret Service Agent,
  who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress, has stated that she
  lacks the temperament and integrity to be president. There will be plenty of
  oppo1tunity to discuss these important issues at a later time, and I will
  deliver that speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the
  growing threat of terrorism inside of our borders. I continued to speak about
  Mrs. Clinton's failings throughout the campaign, using the information prepared
  for inclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7, 2016. Response to
  Question I, Part (h) I have no recollection of being told during the campaign
  that Vladimir Putin or the Russian government "suppotted" my candidacy or
  "opposed" the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However, I was aware of some reports
  indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements about me.
  Response to Question I, Part (i) I have no recollection of being told during the
  campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader had provided, wished to
  provide, or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign. II. Russian
  Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks a. On June 14, 2016, it
  was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the computer network
  of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian intelligence was
  behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 20 I 6, were you
  provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer
  systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign
  Committee (DCCC), the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals
  associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided this
  information, when, and the substance of the information. 10 C-15

RESULT: 48

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte~? \l/erk Proa1:1et // May Ce11tai11 Material
  Proteetea U11aer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released
  nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic party officials. 1. Prior to
  the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks,
  Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or
  planned to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt
  the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when,
  and the substance of the discussion(s). 11. After the release of emails by
  WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that WikiLeaks possessed or might
  possess additional information that could be released during the campaign? If
  yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were told. c.
  Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly,
  between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a)
  WikiLeaks, (b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Gucci
  fer 2.0, (e) representatives of Gucci fer 2.0, or (f) representatives of
  DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with this information, when you
  learned of the communications, and what you know about those communications. d.
  On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you're
  listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I
  think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press." 1. Why did you make
  that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, or individual?
  ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have
  with anyone else about the substance of the statement? iii. Were you told at any
  time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting to
  infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
  campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you
  were told. e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta
  were released by WikiLeaks. i. Where were you on October 7, 20 I 6? ii. Were you
  told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that
  WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes,
  describe who told you this, when, and what you were told. 11 C-16

RESULT: 49

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TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice AtterRey Werk Presttet // Ma)' Cm~taiR Material
  Preteetes UAser Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) iii. Are you aware of anyone associated
  with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks,
  either directly or through an intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes,
  identify the person and describe the substance of the conversations or contacts.
  f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
  Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer
  2.0, or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If
  yes, describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when
  you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts. g. From
  June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate
  with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
  1. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to
  assist your campaign, and what requests. if any, did you make of Mr. Stone? ii.
  Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with
  anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told,
  from whom. and when. iii. Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he
  had with WikiLeaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks. or about forthcoming
  releases of information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when. h. Did
  you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon
  or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the
  discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). i. Were you
  aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in
  Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the
  organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance
  with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). Response to Question II, Part
  (a) I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC
  had been hacked, but my best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or
  shortly after the time it became the subject of media reporting. I do not recall
  being provided any information during the campaign about the hacking of any of
  the named entities or individuals before it became the subject of media
  reporting. 12 C-17

RESULT: 50

PAGE: 433

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Atterfte)' Werk Pret:ittet // May Cm1taift Material
  Prnteetet:i lJFtt:ier Fet:i. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Response to Question U, Part (b) I
  recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable
  media reporting about the possible hacking and release of campaign-related
  information and there was a lot of talk about this matter. At the time, I was
  generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these issues with
  my campaign staff or others, but at this point in time -more than two years
  later -I have no recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred,
  or who the participants were. Response to Question II, Part (c) I do not recall
  being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals
  named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative of
  WikiLeaks or any of the other individuals or entities referred to in the
  question. Response to Question II, Part (d) I made the statement quoted in
  Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective
  observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing
  of the July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer you to the publicly available
  transcript and video of that press conference. I do not recall having any
  discussion about the substance of the statement in advance of the press
  conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts by
  Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary
  Clinton or her campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media repo11ing
  and I have no recollection of any particular conversation in that regard.
  Response to Question II, Part (e) I was in Trump Tower in New York City on
  October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told that WikiLeaks possessed
  or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of Mr.
  Podesta's emails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of
  being told that Roger Stone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone,
  or anyone associated with my campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October
  7, 2016. Response to Question II, Part (0 I do not recall being told during the
  campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my campaign had discussions
  with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or timing
  of release of hacked emails. Response to Question ll, Part (g) I spoke by
  telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no
  recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between
  June 1.2016 and 13 C-18

RESULT: 51

PAGE: 434

TEXT:

  U.S. Department of Justice Attert1ey Werk Preelttet // Mft)' CefttEtiH
  MEtteriEtl Prateeteel UHder Fed. R. Cri1fl. P. 6(e) November 8, 2016. I do not
  recall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of Mr. Stone
  having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign,
  although I was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and
  campaign-related discussion at the time. Response to Question II, Part (h) I do
  not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or
  action to benefit Julian Assange. Response to Question II, Part (i) I do not
  recall being aware during the campaign of specific effo11s by foreign
  individuals or companies to assist my campaign through the use of social media
  postings or the organization of rallies. III. The Trump Organization Moscow
  Project a. In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent," a copy of which is attached as
  Exhibit B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the
  "Trump Moscow project"). 1. When were you first informed of discussions about
  the Trump Moscow project? By whom? What were you told about the project? ii. Did
  you sign the letter of intent? b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached
  as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: "To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was
  never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three
  occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015." Describe
  all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump
  Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with,
  when, and the substance of the discussion(s). c. Did you learn of any
  communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government
  officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the
  Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this info1mation to you,
  when, and the substance of what you learned. d. Did you have any discussions
  between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip to Russia by you
  and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project? If yes,
  describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). e.
  Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow
  project 14 C-19