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11/29/22 Ukrainian General Update Language Learner

Nov 29th, 2022
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  1. 11/29/22 Update, day 279 of Russian invasion.
  2.  
  3.  
  4. Belarus:
  5.  
  6. Despite the presence of RU fighters, bombers, and drone launching sites in Belarus, there has been no observed threat from Belarusian or RU forces here.
  7.  
  8. Per the UA government, there is no formation of RU or Belarusian offensive groups, and in fact RU troops are being rotated out of Belarus towards areas in Ukraine such as Donetsk and Luhansk, after having been trained/equipped up at Belarusian expense.
  9.  
  10. The UA government has come out and stated that the rumors of another RU assault from Belarus towards Kyiv are an information warfare campaign to sow panic.
  11.  
  12.  
  13. Kyiv/ West Ukraine:
  14.  
  15. The UA government continues to warn about the threat of a possible imminent massive RU cruise missile strike against UA infrastructure in the coming days, especially with a large quantity of RU bombers being apparently loaded up with cruise missiles. While a number of RU bombers sortied out today, there were no reported mass missile salvos.
  16.  
  17. Per the Kyiv city military government, they stated that Russia is also trying to wear down UA forces by claiming specific dates for the next missile salvo, which then come and go, further increasing the sense of anxiety among residents.
  18.  
  19. The time for air launched cruise missiles to travel from the SE Ukrainian/Russian border once launched, is about 50 minutes. The RU heavy bomber radio communication channel, "Bearnet", can be used as an indicator of RU strategic bombers in the air. It can be monitored live by using web software-defined-radios, such as http://websdr.ewi.utwente.nl:8901/.
  20.  
  21. The Kyiv government has called on heating companies to immediately drain water from the radiators and heating networks in the event of a sustained power outage, if the temperature drops a few degrees below freezing. This is to prevent burst pipes and other secondary infrastructure damage.
  22.  
  23. Per the UA PM, there are 14 billion cubic meters of gas and 1.4 million tons of coals, enough for UA to get through the winter from a supply perspective.
  24.  
  25. Due to electric supply issues in Lviv, more then 80 blocks in the city lost water supply. It is expected to be restored promptly, although the reasons behind the loss of power at the pumping stations was not disclosed. Currently, there are about 12 hours of power cuts per day in Lviv.
  26.  
  27. Currently, some 70% of UA electrical consumption needs are provided, and there is a shortfall of 30% due to damaged power infrastructure.
  28.  
  29. Due to the heavy usage of generators, diesel consumption has increased by 5-15% across Ukraine. However, despite longer queues and burdens on Gas stations, there is no expected shortage of fuel. People are encouraged not to hoard fuel, or panic in expectation of a fuel shortage.
  30.  
  31. Unfortunately, due in part to the rise in usage of generators, especially indoors, there has been an increase in carbon monoxide poisoning cases.
  32.  
  33. Ukraine is beginning to formally process all UA soldiers in the war for veterans benefits, but states this will take some time.
  34.  
  35. UA cancelled customs duties and tariffs on Starlink internet terminals, and reportedly hopes to equip each "point of invincibility" rest station with one. There are negotiations underway for purchasing a large batch of Starlink terminals.
  36.  
  37.  
  38. Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv city:
  39.  
  40. Strikes continue along the border, with RU forces firing rocket salvos towards the Kharkiv border villages.
  41.  
  42.  
  43. Kupyansk/Kreminna/Svatove
  44.  
  45. The situation along the Svatove-Kreminna axis remains broadly unchanged in the last 24 hours, with duelling RU and UA strikes.
  46.  
  47. Per an RU officer in the Kreminna area, RU conscripts and the artillery behind them have managed to at least temporarily stall any massive UA offenses. While it is expected that UA brigade-level offenses could roll over these RU lines in 2-3 days, the RU forces expect that the casualty count via artillery would be high enough so as to be undesirable for UA commanders.
  48.  
  49. Per UA forces, an impediment has been the sheer amount of UA territory liberated in the Kharkiv offensive, and there was a great deal of time spent on securing said liberated areas and ensuring supply lines were stable, rather then rushing ahead.
  50.  
  51.  
  52. Siversk/Lysychansk.
  53.  
  54. There is no major change around Siversk/Lysychansk, with RU attempts towards the NE,E, and SE fronts. It appears that more RU forces have been redeployed here from Kherson.
  55.  
  56. Per RU sources, mobikis were thrown into the grinder here, and while on paper the situation is discussed as being a secure RU grouping following RU advances on Bilhorivka in recent weeks, the secondary lines of defense and organization are sub-par and unlikely to hold amid a sustained assault. The RU commanders are still apparently feeding information up the food chain that their commanders want to hear, rather then the actual situation on the ground.
  57.  
  58.  
  59. Bakhmut:
  60.  
  61. In Soledar, RU forces continue to skirmish with UA troops and shelling continues along the major line of contact. RU is apparently trying to maneuver further SW from here, along the highway near Bakhmutske towards Bakhmut city proper, at least judging on UA artillery strikes.
  62.  
  63. RU forces continue to skirmish in the fields to the NE of Bakhmut city, near the intersection right outside of town and its gas station there. However, the open fields likely mean RU does not have exhaustive control over this area, and is instead trying to find weaknesses in the UA line.
  64.  
  65. RU assaults to the south of Bakhmut, in an apparent attempt to flank to the city's west and menace/occupy supply lines, have been somewhat successful. RU forces are confirmed to have entered Ozarianivka, and are continuing to menace on the neighboring riverside town of Kurdyumivka. While RU forces are not demonstrably on the W side of the river here yet, and thus not presently likely to be moving along the highway, it is one of the most worrisome spots for UA defenders in the area.
  66.  
  67. 2 RU jets were shot down in this area today, an SU-24 and SU-25 (bomber and fighter). This is the first apparent usage of RU air strikes in this area for some time, and there is reportedly an uptick in RU air power here.
  68.  
  69. RU forces to the SE of Bakhmut have been apparently taken massive losses, with a unit apparently near the open mine E of Ivanrhad having lost half their composition, some 130 KIA and 250 WIA, in two days of attempts across the fields nearby. RU forces broadly abandon their dead in the field, and joke that "leaving them behind will create such unsanitary conditions as to get the UA soldiers sick"
  70.  
  71. Reportedly, RU losses here are as high as they were in Mariupol early in the war, with some 600 KIA and 1500 WIA over the last week in total. Per RU VDV in the area, Wagner group forces are increasingly dysfunctional, and are beginning to fail at basic tasks such as scheduled artillery coverage. The heaviest fighting in the entire battlefield is occurring here, especially S of Bakhmut.
  72.  
  73. Allegedly, RU forces are being prepared in Horlivka to reinforce RU troops S of Bakhmut in a full assault into the city, but they have been waiting for increased RU successes before being committed. This includes redeployed RU forces from the Kherson area.
  74.  
  75.  
  76. Donetsk/Luhansk occupied regions:
  77.  
  78. RU forces continue unsuccessful attacks towards Vodyane and to flank Avdiivka, and heavy shelling continues. Allegedly, both sides are growing tired of the muddy terrain, and await frozen ground for more mechanized activity.
  79.  
  80. RU forces continue to heavily fight in the SW Donetsk suburb of Marinka, with RU troops apparently in control of about half the town. Artillery fire seems to indicate the front lines here are a scant 500ft/150 meters apart. UA fresh troops were deployed here to reinforce.
  81.  
  82. RU is preparing for the mass closure of coal mines in the Donbas early next year, due to the mobilization of >65% of the workers, and the mines are essentially defunct and unprofitable. Coal mining was one of the largest sources of revenue in the Donbas region.
  83.  
  84.  
  85. Mariupol:
  86.  
  87. RU has begun to delete houses from its Yandex map service in Mariupol that were damaged or destroyed, in order to pretend they never existed in the first place.
  88.  
  89. Some 50,000 apartments do not have adequate protection from the elements, and cooking continues outside in the cold.
  90.  
  91.  
  92. Zaporizhia/Southern Axis :
  93.  
  94. RU and UA forces continue to skirmish around Vuhledar and Pavlivka, with a continued decrease in volume of RU fire. Given the lack of ground progress by RU forces, they may be either winding down this failed offensive attempt, or consolidating for a new push.
  95.  
  96. UA forces reportedly damaged a number of RU troop concentrations around Tokmak and Polohy, SE of Zaporizhia, wounding some 450 RU soldiers and destroying 50 units of equipment.
  97.  
  98. RU forces are reinforcing the area around Melitopol, out of concerns that a UA offensive here could bisect the RU lines all the way down to the Sea of Azov. These reinforcements are broadly recently mobilized, as well as some apparent former prisoners, and the morale/discipline is meager at best. Even RU media has had to touch on the increased number of assaults, robberies, and murders in this area. Drunkenness is an increasing problem.
  99.  
  100. UA forces hint that they are currently impeded from offensive operations here due to the weather, but once the ground freezes, plans will develop. If UA forces in the southern grouping have to redeploy to defend other areas, then the likelihood of a UA offensive diminishes considerably here.
  101.  
  102. The IAEA will reportedly increase its presence at all UA Nuclear power plants.
  103.  
  104.  
  105. Kherson:
  106.  
  107. Over 50% of Kherson was reconnected to UA power grids, although RU shelling continues unabated. UA shelling fires across the Dnipro in return.
  108.  
  109. There are expectations of a number of mass graves may be found in the villages along the riverbank between Kherson city and Nova Kahkovka, on the W bank of the river.
  110.  
  111. The Deputy mayor of Kherson, who assisted RU forces during the occupation, was arrested by the SBU today.
  112.  
  113. A digital map of bomb shelters and warming stations in Kherson is being put out by the local government for citizens.
  114.  
  115.  
  116. Odessa/Black Sea/Crimea:
  117.  
  118. RU is reportedly leery about having their ships venture further into the black sea recently, due to both storms and the threat of UA kamikaze naval drones.
  119.  
  120. A RU ship carrying at least 8 Kaliber missiles appeared in the Black Sea for the first time in several days of absence. OC "South" warned about the possibility of new massive RU missile attacks over the next few days. There are likely several more RU surface vessels in port sheltering from ongoing storms, but they can disembark and fire missiles within a few hours of orders.
  121.  
  122. RU is continuing to reinforce their positions in and around N Crimea, and there has been an increase in preparation for air defenses and shelters on the peninsula. The likelihood of an assault towards Crimea is currently dubious, as both RU and UA have referenced the potential threat of RU tactical nuclear weaponry being leveraged to stop such an attack.
  123.  
  124.  
  125. General:
  126.  
  127. Yesterday Ukrainian forces eliminated:
  128.  
  129. 480x soldiers (Total 88,380)
  130. 5x APC
  131. 3x tanks
  132. 2x Artillery (0x MLRS)
  133. 7x vehicles
  134. 2x Aircraft
  135.  
  136. Per UK intel services, Russia has basically entirely moved away from its Battalion Tactical Group model, and is returning to large combat groupings.
  137.  
  138. There will be meeting of NATO countries on November 29th and 30th in Romania, and the UA representative was blocked from participating at the request of Hungary. Per UA and western sources, NATO is running out of weaponry and ammo to provide to Ukraine, and are auditing all existing stockpiles for more equipment while allowing NATO members to draw down their own stockpiles beyond recommended limits.
  139.  
  140. RU prisoners in penal colonies are being sent to RU tank factories, doing basic machining. This is occuring at Uralvagonzavod, the main producer of T90 and T72 tanks, where the instituted a 24 hour cycle in August. This may indicate a shortage of workers or other production bottlenecks.
  141.  
  142. A RU soldier returning from the war to E Russia was almost immediately mugged after arriving at the railway station.
  143.  
  144. Polish PM urged Germany to provide UA with patriot SAM systems, and the USA is reportedly considering the possibility of sending such systems, but emphasized there are "currently no plans to supply them yet". The UA Air force stated that they are ready, willing, and able to commit to training and usage of Patriot systems, which can also intercept ballistic missiles.
  145.  
  146. The US is reportedly considering recognizing the Wagner group as a terrorist organization, which would allow for criminal proceedings and asset seizure worldwide.
  147.  
  148. A RU Wagner base in Mali was reportedly bombed by an unknown jet, and details are still very unclear. France has an interest in this area, and reported on the alleged strike.
  149.  
  150. France will provide 100 millions euros to Ukraine for an emergency loan.
  151.  
  152. Per the Spanish government, more air defense systems will be provided along with generators. The system, believed to be the Hawk, is the US predecessor to the Patriot batteries, and while antiquated from the 1970s, is technically capable of long range intercepts.
  153.  
  154. Slovakia transferred 30 BMP-1 to Ukraine, thanks to an agreement with Germany. In return, Slovakia will receive 15 Leopard 2A4 tanks and supplies for them.
  155.  
  156. Germany will purchase and transfer some 14 THeMIS drone APC's, designed for serving as a remote ambulance to evacuate casualties and carry supplies without human drivers. Russia has a bounty out on these.
  157.  
  158. Energy prices increased significantly in some European markets, and Moldova is expecting to have a shortfall of 74% of its electric needs, and possible blackouts.
  159.  
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