\documentclass[letterpaper]{article}
\usepackage{aaai}
\usepackage{times}
\usepackage{helvet}
\usepackage{courier}
\frenchspacing
\setlength{\pdfpagewidth}{8.5in}
\setlength{\pdfpageheight}{11in}
\setcounter{secnumdepth}{0}
\begin{document}
\title{Summary of Chapter 8 \\Extended Cognition}
\author{Marc Zeller\\
\\
Foundations of Cognitive Science\\
Homework Assignment 2\\
}
\maketitle
\begin{abstract}
\begin{quote}
The terms \textbf{\textit{extended mind}} and \textbf{\textit{extended cognition}} refer to a couple of different approaches which have been unified by Sven Walter in 2013 by establishing the so called extension thesis. In short the extension thesis (e.t) says that cognition is not only a matter of our brain and its functions, but also the environment we live in.

A fitting example that was made by Clark/Chalmers says that if a person who is affected by Alzheimer's disease wrote down his every thought, the sheet of paper he used would be just as much a part of his memories (and therefore his cognition) as the neuronal connections made by his brain.
\end{quote}
\end{abstract}

\noindent The extension thesis can be summed up by following subtopics:

\begin{itemize}
\item

Causal dependency and constitution: \newline
Sometimes it is argued that our cognition would be different if our environment changed,
implying a causal dependency of both. The extension thesis on the other hand says that there is more of a constitutional relation in form of hybrid cognitive processes which extend beyond the boundaries of our brain and into our environment. It is still debatable whether this can be classified as empirically fertile and if there is even a way to uniformly tell causality and constitution apart.
\item

Substance and vehicle:\newline
The e.t provides a thesis on the localization of the so called vehicle/implementation/material substrate of cognitive processes. It is characterized as vehicle-externalism, different and independent from what is called substance-externalism. The main point is not to individuate the substrate of mental states, but to show that the carriers of this substrate (ergo the mental states) are partially realized by brain external processes.
\item

System and processes:\newline
Boundaries of cognitive systems can be broader or tighter than usual dependent on the situation.
Similar to what has been said before it is still in question whether there is an empirically fertile way to describe what is referred to as a cognitive system.
\item

Modal status:\newline
Since it is neither impossible by formality nor impossible by the laws of nature for cognitive
processes/systems to be realized externally, the extension thesis as a pure possibility statement is widely uninteresting. A substantial thesis can only be set up, if it is assumed that there are at least some cognitive processes and or systems that actually reach beyond their boundaries.
\item

Cognition, mind, consciousness:\newline
The e.t is often reduced to cognition alone and therefore parted from the question if the human mind itself is extended.
\item

Different kinds of external recourses:\newline
The situational integration of internal neuronal processes and external resources (also called coupling) is the main reason most people talk about cognitive extension. Those resources can be of different kinds for example natural, social or technical. Natural resources would be counted as what is called embodied cognition whereby the social part can be classified as social/distributed cognition. This leads to the technical aspect being the only resource that can be used in the extension thesis.
\item

Duration and frequency of integration:\newline
Integrations can vary in terms of their duration and frequency. According to Wilson and Clark the spectrum reaches from a single and short integration, for example new technology dependent ways for solving a problem, to longer and more frequent ones like the use of smartphones to keep track of meetings and then all the way to almost permanent features like technical implants.
\end{itemize}





\end{document}