Today, I read a stutter of text that can only be described as an example of a supremely high form of gibberish. What it is the author is trying to convince us of is unclear, but he insists it has something to do with determinism; a perceived consensus on our literary board that the path of time runs straight and narrow has moved him to such an intense frustration that it has, in his own words, given to a 'rant' that would fracture this understanding which to him is anathema. Naturally, when looking for clear-headed analysis on a matter of philosophy as essential as determinism, a quick, combusting word like 'rant' reassures one that what will follow could only succeed in proving itself to be the best work of reason and enlightened view that humanity can afford. Yet what did proceed from that shining title, the great case for an indeterminate universe, astounded your humble writer as it dawned upon him, eyes battling downwards through the torn ligaments of crumpled arguments and bloody non-sequitirs, line by line hoping that the flag of peace and resolution would unveil itself ere the night of ignorance descended upon our indeterminate battle, that what had been titled so bravely could barely meet its own claim for an explanation of anything other than the auter's own folly; and in my great consternation I now put forward that 'rave' may have been better suited to head what appears to me as the philosophical equivalent of a pregnant cow choking on barbed wire. And so, with a gracious flick of the wrist, as I do dip my floral quill in the sooty ink, I prepare myself to enter the fray, perhaps merely to bring temporary pause to a violence of reason so hard to observe, yet not killing or becoming champion to any side in particular, hoping rather to rescue fair and bonny wisdom from the black claws of such an unseemly death.

Where does our madman begin? On stable ground, it seems at first: the principle of non-contradiction. He notes that "things are what they are, and can't be what they are not". This, of course, is non-specific, but I shall assume he means all concievable 'things' which can be held as representations in our own understanding. He continues on: "a thing is defined by its connections to the world around it, and were another thing to exist with the same connections it would, in effect, be the same thing". What a heroic declaration! To strongman this loony's study, we shall grant him this axiom; yet beware: such strong metaphysical definitions do not belong to 'modern science' and deserve a clarity of used terms and a length of justification not provided here. "given these we can reduce the experience of the soul,(the things we see, hear and feel) to a very very large series of numbers" My oh my, What a peculiar designation! Yet i do suppose we COULD allocate each unique experience, and associated representations, with unique integers, since there are infinitely many of them. There is nothing technically wrong with that.

It is at this point, however, that we begin a metaphorical liftoff; the plains of reason recede below us; our mistress, dear logic, flings herself from the left wing, leaving parachute in the emptied seat; we find ourselves in new, twisted airs of strange fact and ingrown truths. The auter claims:
"there is no wrong answer for what comes next (in the series of numbers representing experiences of the soul), only simple answers and complex ones. lets take a given sequence 1, 2. what could come next?
it could be that f(x)=x, and therefore 3, it could be that f(x) = 2^x-1, and therefore 4, but it also could be literally any other number, given we add complexity"
And here we meet the audacious jump. Where does it go? What has it travelled over? It is true that given a finite sequence of integers with no underlying rule or function provided, the next integer in that sequence could be ANYTHING. Any number, repeated or not. We are given the example: 1,2,?. That third term could be 3 or 1192 or 0, depending on what our function f(x) is and what the numbers preceding it (1 and 2 in this case) are. What is also true, however, is that you can logically sequence experiences of the soul in any such way as well. Say we have an arbitrary sequence of events: a star collapses, the fair coin is spun into the air, the isotope emits a beta particle,... What event follows? Just as the numbers, where there could be any function with any rule that gives any answer, and where changing any previous event may change that answer, we could have absolutely anything as the next term in our arbitrary, mutable series. So what is the point of introducing any numbers at all? The same logic used should apply directly to experiences. Why numbers and not shapes? There are infinitely many 2D shapes: we could allocate one to each experience and arrange them any which way. This whole process is arbitrary.

What allocating numbers does is distance from physical experience, and in doing so, provide some distance from our shared, irrefutable knowledge that the series of experiences that our soul is witness to IS determined by some KNOWN rules. That is, not any random f(x), but a known set of principles that our series must obey. Principles such as that of causality, of non-contradiction, of logical induction. Not only that, but unlike our choicely met, mutable series of numbers, "we" cannot go back and change terms to give us different answers. The determinist's argument entirely is that the past is fixed, and once known the present could be arrived at through determined rules (again, i take no sides). Just because you could state a different series with any other set of rules, it doesnt change anything about ours. For example, the coin flips in the air, and when it lands we know it cannot give us the jack of spades. The rules and facts of our established series of experience makes sure of this.

In this way our dear auter has attempted to sneak in his presupposition that reality is indeterminate, that there are no SET RULES in time, into the structure of his argument, and did his best to dress it in a poor mathematical elaboration to conceal its passing.

There is a spatter more of this jumble of thought:
"if a thing has no relations to you, direct or otherwise, it does not exist to you"
which seems to be neither here nor there, until:

"so, any details you will never perceive, never exist, and until the data for a fact about the world reveals itself, the fact does not exist"
yadayadayada "so in conclusion, there is not one truth to the world, until we find it, at which point there is" A faulty conclusion! No. What you have really said is that there IS truth, yet we cannot know it until we observe it empirically. This is called empiricalism, and it has been floating about in western thought since at least the 17th century. What significance it has in relation to determinism is beyond the wildest reaches of my thought.

In conclusion, sir, if you do happen to be reading this, I recommend that you READ, that you do some real MATH, picking up behind the great old masters in a humble manner until you have sharpened that wit and cut out the fat which led you to make this disaster. Perhaps someday you shall be well acquaitenced enough with hard, technical reading to approach the early-modern epistimologists on an equal footing and enlighten yourself by engaging in the highest calibre of this form of discussion. If you are so fortunate, I pray you shall SEE THE LIGHT and allow our lord and saviour IMMANUEL KANT to illume your sodden cortex and bring forth the integrity and multifoliate consequence of the pure, ineffable A PRIORI TRUTH.

-ANON