12/2-12/5/22 Ukrainian General Update Language Learner

12/2-12/05/22 Update, day 282-285 of Russian invasion.


Belarus:

There is currently no indication of RU forces forming assault groups in Belarus, or having the present capability to mount another assault into NW Ukraine.

No missiles were reportedly fired from here today into Ukraine, meaning no air strikes (aside from possible Shahid-136 drones) were launched here in 2 months, since October 6th.

Shoigu did visit Lukashenko over the weekend, and they made some bellicose statements about defending against Ukranian or Polish invasion.



Kyiv/ West Ukraine:

Per Zelensky, as of 12/2/22, some 6 Million UA citizens were without power.

Today, there was a large salvo of sea and air-launched cruise missiles across Ukraine, targeting electrical infrastructure. With some 70 missiles (48 air launched/22 sea launched) and 60 interceptions, the intercept rate was approximately 85%. However, those remaining missile strikes caused substantial damage to UA infrastructure, especially in Kyiv, Vinnytsia, and Odesa. This is the 8th such large scale salvo. At least 4 people were killed, and more wounded.

Per the UK intel services, RU has lost more then 60 aircraft in this conflict so far, and there is likely to be a reduction in RU air force non-strategic attacks during the winter, for a variety of reasons ranging from poor weather to a degradation of missile stockpiles.

Half of the Kyiv region will be depowered over the next few days as repair efforts continue. Across the country, an emergency blackout regime will be in place.

An apparent S-300 air defense missile landed in Moldova, just across the border SE from Vinnitsya today, thankfully causing no damage or injuries. UA claims this is a Russian missile, despite the fact that the missiles used in todays attack were air and sea launched cruise missiles. There have been RU overflights of Moldova before, and the situation is not yet clarified. Moldova experienced power outages.

A major political development has been the continued pressure on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is a direct subsidiary of the RU Orthodox Church (and nominally divested themselves after the invasion begun). Following a number of tips regarding pro-RU behavior and SBU investigations, a number of alleged pro-RU cells have been discovered in these congregations. There has been recorded evidence of direct support to RU and Pro-RU militia formations, in the form of money and intel. And most recently, a senior ROC minister (just elevated to Bishop) was found in a compromising position with a 17 year old boy, although he denies the circumstances as a set-up.

RU and RU-affiliated politicians overseas have taken this as a sign of religious intolerance. There is legislation proposed to suspend the activities of the ROC in Ukraine. These allegations and recorded incidents of pro-RU support/aid have been recorded intermittently over the last several months.

Ukraine reports that its domestically produced suicide drone, with allegedly a 1000 km range carrying 75kg of explosives (similar to a Shahid-136), is entering final testing.

Ukraine received the first Hawk SAM system missiles from Spain, which will augment its air defense systems.


Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv city:

Strikes continue into the border reasons, depowering large areas.

An RU MLRS strike targeted a monastery along the border in Sumy.

Reportedly, all RU missiles over the Kharkiv region were intercepted successfully during the large RU salvo. The curfew was also shortened in Kharkiv, from 11 PM to 5 AM.


Kupyansk/Kreminna/Svatove

RU shelling increasingly has ranged into Kupyansk and the areas around it, on both sides of the river. It appears RU is trying to inhibit UA supply routes further E, and there are continued S-300 strikes between Kupyansk and Kharkiv.

RU attempts to counterattack to the NW of Svatove have reportedly been rather unsuccessful. The weather here is hindering both sides, and there are numerous allegations that heavy mechanized action is awaiting the ground to freeze first.

RU and UA forces continue to duel along the highway to Svatove, with RU attempts to counterattack to the NW of Svatove being broadly unsuccessful.

To the SW of Svatove, RU forces have increased their shelling around Ploschanka, as UA forces NW of Kreminna in this area are apparently making assaults on RU positions along the highway, with the intent of cutting it off. UA SOF are highly active in this area NW of Kreminna, including behind RU lines.

SW of Kreminna, RU and UA forces have been increasingly skirmishing in the forests, and UA strikes increasingly range into the city itself.


Siversk/Lysychansk.

There is no major change around Siversk/Lysychansk, with RU attempts towards the NE,E, and SE fronts. It appears that more RU forces have been redeployed here from Kherson.

There continues to be RU skirmishes to the NE, E, and SE of Siversk with the majority of RU fighting apparently in and around Bilhorivka, where RU forces are trying to dislodge UA troops and threaten potential UA bridgeheads across the river towards Kreminna.


Bakhmut:

In Soledar, RU forces continue to skirmish with UA troops and shelling continues along the major line of contact. RU is continuing attempts to push SW from this area towards Bakhmut city, via Bakhmutske, but are still impeded by UA artillery fire in the open fields.

NE of Bakhmut, the situation has become more concerning, with RU forces increasingly leveraging artillery fire both into the NE suburb of Bakhmut proper, as well as the exurb of Pidhorodne. UA artillery fire remains broadly along the highway and intersection/gas station, but has recently dropped back closer to Pidhorodne. Should RU forces manage to secure territory in the residential/forested areas here outside of NE bakhmut, they will likely require more effort to dislodge compared to the fields they have been attempting skirmishes through.

To the E of Bakhmut, RU shelling continues to heavily pound  entrenched UA defenses, with no observable RU territorial gains.

SE of Bakhmut, RU forces are also on offensive, with the situation remaining unclear. While RU forces appear to have been somewhat pushed out of territory along the SE outskirts of the city near a garbage dump over the weekend, it also appears this resulted in significant UA casualties. Somewhere in this area, a Georgian Legion unit was surrounded and took heavy casualities. I suspect that RU forces have broadly regained control of lost terrain here.

South of Bakhmut, RU forces continue to press on Optyne and Invanhrad, with RU forces and UA troops seperated by less then 750 m (2000 ft), as RU troops have taken up residence in an industrial/warehouse collection just across a forested region from the town proper where UA forces are bunkered down. It appears that RU is broadly recommitting more forces, or more recklessly with existing forces, towards assaulting into Bakhmut proper.

SW of Bakhmut, RU troops continue to consolidate their control over the riverside towns of Kurdyumivka and Ozarianivka, with further apparent RU movement on the W bank of the river. The RU goal here is apparently to press further N to flank the W approach into Bakhmut city. The rolling hills and open fields will likely supply little defense opportunities for them to charge up the highway and do so.


Donetsk/Luhansk occupied regions:

RU continues its attempts to strike out of Pisky so as to flank Avdiivka, although the volume of shelling here has noticeably reduced in recent days, as apparently more resources are being directed towards Bakhmut.

UA forces have pushed RU troops back towards Pisky from Pervomaiske, and also are re-allocating forces towards Vodyane, indicating direct pressure on the RU attempts here over the last several months, which are now being unraveled.

In the SW suburb of Marinka, fierce fighting continues, with RU and UA shelling a scant 2 blocks apart from each other, indicating the intensity of fighting in the suburban area.


Mariupol:

As cold begins to truly set into Mariupol, with rain and freezing temperatures anticipated, the lack of RU provided central heating (despite propaganda claims) is beginning to move from a concern to a crisis.

RU does not appear to be making any considerable moves to provide heating for people, and there are queues of several thousand UA citizens waiting for disbursement of space heaters. Fights broke out in the lines as the night fell and temperatures dropped.

There is a strong likelihood that given the humidity, the lack of protection from the elements, and the lack of effective medical care in Mariupol, there will be numerous causalities from the cold. UA citizens are broadly prevented from leaving Mariupol at this time.


Zaporizhia/Southern Axis :

The alleged RU withdrawal from this region has not manifested itself, with continued UA and RU artillery duels across the front lines.

The RU foreign minister stated that RU would not be relinquishing control of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, even with a security arrangement in place. She refuted IAEA claims that they would negotiate with Ukraine on such a matter, blaming UA for "provocations" at the plant.

The rumors are that RU would agree to abandon the site in exchange for allowing use of the Druzhba pipeline to transport its ammonia products to foreign markets. RU is the worlds largest ammonia producer, and the Druzhba pipeline is the largest single pipeline to transport it. It has been shut down since the invasion began.

RU forces continue attempts to assault into Pavlivka and Vuhledar, with RU aviation both helicopter and fixed-wing, making airstrikes. Given the position of UA artillery pushing further away from UA lines, it does not appear tht RU has considerable control over Pavlivka at this point, and is skirmishing in the fields NW of Mykilske at best.



Kherson:

The situation in Kherson remains challenging, with RU targeting of civilian infrastructure resulting in casualties and many cold nights for those without power. Currently, 70% of residents have water and 85% have electricity, before todays strikes.

Some 3500 people voluntarily evacuated via train from the Kherson region.

A UA unit filmed themselves crossing the river and erecting a flag on the South bank. While this is not indicative of general UA control, it does appear that RU control over the S bank of the Dnipro is lacking in certain areas, and may have gaps which can be exploited.


Odessa/Black Sea/Crimea:

Odesa was targeted by at least 3 missiles today, with 2 locations of infrastructure being damaged. The water pumping stations were depowered, and as result

The Black Sea Fleet remains broadly in port, with concerns about both weather and UA kamikaze drones in the Black sea.


General:

Yesterday Ukrainian forces eliminated:

540x soldiers (Total 91690)
8x APC
2x tanks
6x Artillery (0x MLRS)
18x vehicles
1x Helicopter
9x UAV

There were apparent long range UA drone strikes against 2 airbases in Russia today, which host the RU Strategic bomber fleet, used for launching cruise missiles into Ukraine.

It appears that 2 bases were hit, with RU alleging the repurposed use of 1980's Soviet UAV's, the TU-124, which Ukraine is known to possess. These very strange looking craft (basically a large cruise missile with wings) could very well be loaded with explosives for a 1-way trip. They have a range of about 1000km, and this strike today was about 700km from UA held territory.

At one base, an RU fuel truck was apparently heavily damaged, with casualties. The TU22M3 bomber behind it was also damaged. There were about 60 of these bombers in use in the Russian air force before they invaded Ukraine, and it is the sole strategic bomber they used physically over Ukraine, as they bombed Azovstal and its defenders heavily.

The situation at Engels air force base, where there was a known large quantity of RU TU-95 strategic bombers, is less clear.

There is alleged satellite imagery of a missile strike at Engels a full kilometer away from the flightline. If so, then there are likely no substantive RU aircraft losses.

Per some RU reports, 1-3 TU-95 were damaged and there may have been casualties. This is a major part of the RU Nuclear triad, and there are two direct consequences (on top of potentially removing the aircraft from service):

RU is suffering a loss of face in its apparent inability to safeguard these important bases and assets. There is already statements going around decrying the poor state of RU air defenses, such as after the Moskva was hit.

Allegedly, under US/RU nuclear treaties, both sides are obliged to inform the other if there is a change in the number of their nuclear-weaponry capable strategic bombers. If such an agreement is upheld, then the US would received confirmation of potential losses. Personally, I suspect that more satellite footage will emerge of any damage, but Russia will obfuscate publicly.

Per the GUR, the RU FSB is planning to create a digital registry of RU troops, so as to better manage and control their movement. This is intended to block movement of conscripts, or those who have received summons, from leaving the country. It also potentially allows for freezing of bank accounts, and contacting of employers. This may be viewed, with increased rumors about another mobilization campaign in Russia, as a response to low levels of participation.

RU politicians in Putin's party are suggesting to restrict the rights of RU citizens who flee abroad to avoid mobilization, should they return.

The RU budget has been formalized for 2023, and planned for 2024 and 2025, with a full 1/3 of the expenses going to the military and security forces.

There is speculation that the IRGC provided Shahid-136 suicide drones are having issues with the cold weather in Ukraine, and as a result RU is using them less. While this is not confirmed, there have been a reduction in RU usage of them, though that could also mean they exhausted their most recent shipment from Iran.

The EU instituted the maximum price for RU oil exports at 60 USD per barrel. While Ukraine criticized this, asking for a $30-$40 USD price cap, this is already having effects. Under this agreement, RU ships cannot get insurance recognized by members of the sanction bloc unless they can show proof they were loaded under the price cap. As a result, the better part of a dozen RU ships were blocked from transiting the Bosphorus from the Black sea out today, as they "lacked insurance".

An RU MIG-31 crashed under unknown circumstances on a training mission, in Eastern Russia.

Additional threats were mailed to UA embassy workers in spain, with envelopes containing animal eyes.

The Ukrainian composed song, "Carol of the Bells" was performed at Carnegie Hall for the first time in a Century.