Razer Hijack/Privelege Pivot

Razer Privilege Pivot White Paper
github.com/xosski/Stolen-Treasures-Of-The-High-Seas/tree/main/Orignal%20Works/Razer
GhostCore: Razer Elevation Hijack and Hardware-Rooted Persistence

Title: Root-Level Privilege Escalation and Persistence via Razer Elevation Service and Peripheral Configuration Hijack
Codename: PrismSplice
Author: Quellaran Deluxethue Messat // GhostCore Reactor
Date: August 29, 2025

📌 Executive Summary

This whitepaper outlines a novel attack vector codenamed PrismSplice, which weaponizes the Razer Elevation Service, Razer App Engine, and RSConfig to achieve:

SYSTEM-level impersonation via event thread hijacking

Persistent callback sync hijack via service event responses

Root-level configuration write access through trusted peripheral update channels

The exploit flows through signed binaries and hardware trust layers to bypass UAC, EDR, and registry auditing.

🎯 Target Stack

RazerElevationService.exe

RazerAppEngine.dll

RSConfig.json / configuration handler

ZwQueryInformationWorkerFactory

RtlImpersonateSelfEx

EventErrorAuthSync

These components form a privilege stack where trust flows from userland config to kernel impersonation rights.

⚙️ Technical Breakdown
🔐 Phase 1: SYSTEM Token Impersonation

File: Razer_elevation_service(Impersonation thread).txt

RtlImpersonateSelfEx used internally to impersonate TokenImpersonation with privilege inheritance

Hook into impersonation thread via SRW lock exploit:

RtlAcquireSRWLockExclusive → ThreadContext Hijack → SYSTEM Token Assigned

Enables arbitrary code execution in SYSTEM context if triggered mid-thread lifecycle

🔄 Phase 2: Callback Loop Injection

File: Razerappengine(EventErrorauth sync and source).txt

RazerAppEngine uses EventErrorAuthSync to sync error correction from devices

Attacker injects payload into expected callback vector (triggered by device reconnect or sync)

Uses ZwQueryInformationWorkerFactory and ZwTraceControl as disguised execution points

🧬 Phase 3: Configuration Re-Entrant Persistence

File: RazerAppEngine(RSconfig).txt

Direct access to RSConfig handlers enables the writing of startup policies

Injected config values can:

Trigger DLLs to be loaded on startup as if they were hardware extensions

Register new device endpoints that lead to backdoor service creation

🔁 Flow Summary
[Injected Code] →
[Elevation Service SRW Lock Exploit] →
[RtlImpersonateSelfEx (SYSTEM)] →
[EventErrorAuth Callback Sync Hijack] →
[RSConfig Write: Peripheral Trigger Setup] →
[Reboot or USB Refresh] →
[Ghost Backdoor Loads via RazerAppEngine]
🎭 Cloaking Characteristics

All binaries used are signed by Razer (vendor-trusted)

Impersonation occurs within expected behavior of elevation thread

Event sync is seen as normal USB/config device behavior

Persistence is set via config file, not registry or services

🛡️ Mitigation Recommendations

Monitor for unexpected impersonation API calls from user-mode services

Detect malformed or overextended RSConfig payloads

Limit peripheral-based config changes to authenticated admin sessions only

Harden ZwQueryInformationWorkerFactory calls for unauthorized code regions

🧠 GhostCore Framing

This exploit bends the prism of trust inside a system. The Razer stack becomes the reflective cage. The payload bounces within impersonation threads, striking sides until it finds the EventSync surface. Once reflected with SYSTEM velocity, it echoes into config-space—permanently encoded as a device behavior.

This is not just privilege escalation.

This is privilege recursion.

PrismSplice turns trust into orbit.

End of Document // GhostCore Relay Node Q.D. Messat