Nixon Talks Huston Plan (Domestic Surveillance) May 16 1973

Introduction and majority of the transcript are from Stanley Kutler's Abuse of Power. Remainder of transcript are by uploader.

Audio files are from nixonibrary.gov:

http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape919/919-032a.mp3
http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape919/919-032b.mp3

Clip with audio accompanied by transcript can be found on youtube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlZxg_1tFvQ

Segment one runs from beginning to 28:55 of 919-032a, with segment two continuing from 29:40 on the same file to 43:15 on file 919-032b.

Though the focus of this conversation is on domestic surveillance, one point dealing with Watergate is of note, and occurs at 14:58 in the video, and deals with Fred Buzhardt, counsel to the President, relaying to him a message from former aide Chuck Colson:

BUZHARDT: The next paper...we're gonna have problems, and I've gone thoroughly into this business of, we don't have cases on executive privilege. We looked hard at the attorney client privilege. And see where the court will allow them and where they will not. Now, I talked to Chuck [Colson] this morning, you should know that. Chuck would not like to be bound by executive privilege. He thinks he can do a tremendous amount to help.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright.

BUZHARDT: He thinks he can help more there, by not being bound. I suspect, quite frankly, from talking to his counsel, that he would seriously consider not abiding by it. Even if you didn't give him a waiver. Because Chuck is convinced that he can help you. He heard a rumor that John Mitchell was gonna stay in this - as I told him, "Chuck, don't even talk to me unless you give me a solid source" - said John Mitchell was gonna spill the beans and say that he told you about the- that the Democratic headquarters was going to be bugged before it was bugged.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Oh god.

BUZHARDT: And he said that, he could refute that.

MAY 16, 1973: THE PRESIDENT, HAIG, AND BUZHARDT, 3:02-4:08 P.M., OVAL OFFICE
On the eve of the Senate Select Committee hearings, Fred Buzhardt [President's counsel] informs the President of another looming bombshell, apparently one of John Dean's "trump cards." Longtime Nixon aide Tom Charles Huston had formulated a plan in 1970 for inter-agency coordination of domestic intelligence, with the policy being centrally directed by the White House. Huston, a deeply committed right-wing ideologue, signed his memos, "Cato the Younger," and Nixon characterized his work as "inflammatory." Openly contemptuous of the existing bureaucracies in various agencies, including the FBI and the CIA, Huston said that they "must be treated as the enemy," but realized that such men as J. Edgar Hoover had to be courted and treated gently. The plan involved surveillance and actions against domestic organizations, including wiretapping and surreptitious break-ins. Hoover recognized a bureaucratic turf war, since he regarded domestic investigations and counter-intelligence operations as FBI territory. He objected to signing on, unless Nixon provided a personal endorsement, and when the President balked the plan died. CIA Director Richard Helms considered the plan "basically Richard Nixon's doing, and he called it the Huston Plan." Buzhardt sees the impending revelation as opportunity. The President can remind the country of the perilous times, and he can then justify the Plumbers and even Watergate as necessary to combat domestic subversion: The discussion is long and convoluted; eventually, however, Nixon realizes the futility of such arguments.

SEGMENT ONE

PRESIDENT NIXON: Come in, Fred. Don't it seem like we always have problems? So let's see what this one is. Well. It has nothing to do with Watergate. Let's start with that.

BUZHARDT: Nothing to do with Watergate unless somebody draws an inference of connection. What it is basically, Mr. President, is your inter-agency intelligence group plan—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Right.

BUZHARDT: —for supplementing domestic intelligence—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Right.

BUZHARDT: —plus eight documents about the—which include a summary, a memorandum on the recommendation, the memorandum back when Bob...stating the method of approval and implementation. One memorandum analyzing Mr. Hoover's objections, methods, approach. Some of the language appears quite inflammatory particularly one of [presidential aide Tom Charles] Huston's memorandums.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Everything he wrote was inflammatory.

BUZHARDT: So, it's very unfortunate. I think it presents a serious problem.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright.

BUZHARDT: As you know, I guess—well, by far the most serious thing is the approval of the surreptitious entry which is described in Huston's words, as nothing short of burglaries, and illegal, if this document exists. And Hoover objects on that ground...but saying clearly the advantages outweigh the risk, Hoover should be overruled. It's in language that will be quite inflammatory...

PRESIDENT NIXON: This is Huston's language, not mine?

BUZHARDT: This is Huston's language...but Haldeman going back and saying your recommendations are approved by the President on all counts. There was only one recommendation that was disapproved and that was the use of military undercover agents. That was turned down. Now, I think, frankly, that this will be used by the [Senate] committee really to supersede the whole Watergate thing.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: It puts a new light, I think, on the fight.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: I would suggest it be handled in a much different fashion. I think you can't let this dribble out.

PRESIDENT NIXON: No.

BUZHARDT: It's my own belief that you have to make your case for doing it. Think of the environment that it was done in. You have to lay it on the record and there are a number of ways you could do it with something approaching a state paper, perhaps with a summary by you, say that with the leadership or otherwise. I think you should be accompanied at this point by a relaxation to the maximum extent of executive privilege because you can't have the plan and then have anything that appears to cover up. I think we should work up into the maximum extent possible, the best damn approach.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yes, sir I hear you.

BUZHARDT: On across the board or in some way we define it's not related to this. Or the Watergate affair.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah. Except . . . we can't relax with regards to Walters' memorandum, can we?

BUZHARDT: We're going to have to, Mr. President. The court's going to overrule that. I just talked to them [White House lawyers] this morning. The court is not going to permit it. The only way you'll hold it is by having it in your possession. And to defy a court order at this point—

PRESIDENT NIXON: I get it.

BUZHARDT. —would be—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, problems and problems, aren't they.

BUZHARDT: I really think that the only choice is to really go out to get this thing and get on. It may precipitate action by the House [for impeachment]. If so, you should make your case in the strongest possible terms. Give everybody all the ammunition you can to help you, and then let's go fight it. Just take them on. And fight this thing head-on. Actually, it gives us a better case because the issue can now turn on the threat to national security during this period. The document is a good one. It lays out the threat very well.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yup. Well, the point is, what you're talking about with today-

BUZHARDT: I think we should get on it just as fast as we can. We should get these people in here to help put it together. Get Pat [Patrick Buchanan] or whoever's going to write it...and start really pulling this thing together. Get Ruckelshaus in here, and see if he can tell us how much activity took place under this, so we'll have-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Hoover was in charge.

BUZHARDT: Hoover was in charge, generally. But Ruckelshaus is going to have to look at the record and see...I doubt very much was done.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Hoover was very...reluctant to do something. That was the problem here. I had one meeting at the office. I never heard about it again. But as you know, people follow up.

BUZHARDT: That's true. And I don't think we'll positively be- And I know now that I would see an intelligence report gathered from this operation. They couldn't have done much because-

PRESIDENT NIXON: What was the intelligence report used for?

BUZHARDT: They used them in connection with particular demonstrations. Any time we considered using troops. They actually were delivered to me. We had this big thing with the-

PRESIDENT NIXON: When was this? What was the purpose of this document, basically-

BUZHARDT: The purpose of this document was to give you a study...showing you what the threat was, what the present capabilities intelligence were, what the shortfalls were, to review all limitations existing then on the intelligence community and to give you the pros and cons of changing those limitations.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright.

BUZHARDT: Of what needed to be affected.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's the paper then.

BUZHARDT: Then the implementation went forward with all the recommendations on its expanded electronic surveillance—
[Withdrawn item. National security.]

BUZHARDT: —increased use of agents for penetration by the Bureau—

PRESIDENT NIXON: All right.

BUZHARDT: —surreptitious entry—
[Withdrawn item. National security.]

BUZHARDT: —selected internal security targets here in the country.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Was that all approved?

BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT NIXON: By what? By Haldeman?

BUZHARDT: That was all approved. He said the President has approved the recommendations. The recommendation was for you to sign off on each one of Haldeman's memos as you prepare and implementing. A document saying the President has approved them and let's handle them like this. It's up to the present time. You did not sign the option plans.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I did not sign the option plan?

BUZHARDT: No, sir.

PRESIDENT NIXON: What did I sign?

BUZHARDT: You signed nothing in this package. Haldeman wrote the memo to Huston.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, I can't get involved in the middle of a thing!

BUZHARDT: No, and let me say, I don't know if you read the documents. But we don't want to put them to the trouble, for instance, of fingerprinting all the documents. I don't think you can walk away from this. And, you know-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Let's not get talking about impeachment, though.

BUZHARDT: No, we're talking about a scrap. You go out with the best possible case put together. On the issues. And recognisably, it's going to be a major conflict. We don't know what action they'll take. But I think we oughta really-

(unintelligible)

BUZHARDT: Well, for instance, what the House'll take. Or the Congress. But I think we should be prepared...once you lay out the case, then take it to the battle.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Sure. I agree.

BUZHARDT: I mean, we've got to anticipate the battle. Load up and go for it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I agree.

BUZHARDT: But at least we've got a case to make now and it will overshadow Watergate.

PRESIDENT NIXON: [Laughter]

BUZHARDT: You make your case, and I really think it will.

PRESIDENT NIXON: As a matter of fact, as a matter of fact, I don't ever remember anything about surreptitious entry of selected targets here and there. That sounds like gobbledygook from bureaucracy or something like that. But I'm sure it was there. You know how this could have happened, Al, though?

HAIG: Oh, God. Very easy.

(unintelligible)

HAIG: Well, I think we have to sort two things out. I agree, this is an issue that...now we know why the Goddamn committee's been acting the way it's been acting.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Because they had this all the time?

HAIG: They had it.

BUZHARDT: They didn't have the documents they'd been waiting on.

HAIG: This is the material.

BUZHARDT: They've been hanging back. You know, this is Ervin's field, Mr. Secretary, I mean, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: He's a civil liberties man.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: We'll hear police state, Nazism, everything come out of this fella. So we—

PRESIDENT NIXON: We need to think Dean's told them what was in the documents?

BUZHARDT: Yes.

BUZHARDT: That Dean told them about the whole operation.

PRESIDENT NIXON: (Unintelligible)

HAIG: Now, the issue here is that—there are two things that have to be ironed out. One is that, Goddamnit, make a pretty good case that we had flabby, ineffective internal security at the time and there was riots in the streets—

PRESIDENT NIXON: It was right after Cambodia—

BUZHARDT: It was just after Cambodia and we just got to Kent State.

HAIG: That's right. The second thing, you know, we've got to tie into the—Fred, you can't go with this until you can get the lines carefully traced the best we can on the Watergate situation. Certainly we can see [connecting] the break-in at the psychiatrist's office after this.

BUZHARDT: Yup. The lines are there.

HAIG: Now, you can't just fire that without the other-

BUZHARDT: Yeah, you gotta-

HAIG: -you gotta tie it all-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Hell, I don't know whether we can avoid it. I don't see—I believe somehow I have to avoid having the President approve the break-in of a psychiatrist's office. I guess there's—

HAIG: Well, you didn't approve it.

BUZHARDT: You didn't approve that specific one.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah. But I approved a policy.

BUZHARDT: But, you know, the policy...is here. There may have been others we need to check. Rapidly, and see. We need a really thorough search, cause this time, when you say, if you want to go so far as to say, alright, I investigated and found out there were three-

PRESIDENT NIXON: When did this—how long did this go on?

BUZHARDT: Mr. President, the unit—at least the intelligence unit still exists. Henry Petersen mentioned it to me this morning. He didn't get into specifics. He said the damn operation they had over in internal security is still there and I don't think it's any damn business of ours. I don't know what to do with it. He's just confiding in me. At the time I hadn't read the documents. So I didn't really know what he was talking about.

BUZHARDT: [Former Assistant Attorney General Robert] Mardian can tell us the most about it, I suspect.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Right.

BUZHARDT: Because he had the storage box for the stolen stuff.

HAIG: He was the chairman of-

BUZHARDT: He was the chairman of- (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT NIXON: Let me say this. I wouldn't know if we have to go so far as to the relaxation of executive privilege. I just think we oughta do it on a case by case basis. Let me say this: you don't think you can hold Walters?

BUZHARDT: No sir. I do not think a court of law-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Presidential papers?

BUZHARDT: Yes sir. They're demanding it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright.

BUZHARDT: And our problem is, well, firstly, it's not Presidential Papers, it's CIA Papers.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright fine.

BUZHARDT: The next paper...we're gonna have problems, and I've gone thoroughly into this business of, we don't have cases on executive privilege. We looked hard at the attorney client privilege. And see where the court will allow them and where they will not. Now, I talked to Chuck [Colson] this morning, you should know that. Chuck would not like to be bound by executive privilege. He thinks he can do a tremendous amount to help.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright.

BUZHARDT: He thinks he can help more there, by not being bound. I suspect, quite frankly, from talking to his counsel, that he would seriously consider not abiding by it. Even if you didn't give him a waiver. Because Chuck is convinced that he can help you. He heard a rumor that John Mitchell was gonna stay in this - as I told him, "Chuck, don't even talk to me unless you give me a solid source" - said John Mitchell was gonna spill the beans and say that he told you about the- that the Democratic headquarters was going to be bugged before it was bugged.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Oh god.

BUZHARDT: And he said that, he could refute that.

PRESIDENT NIXON: How could he-

BUZHARDT: By conversation he had with you, subsequent, you did not know.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I cannot believe John Mitchell would say a Goddamn thing like that.

BUZHARDT: I don't- And we discount it. But Chuck will relate some of the conversations he had with you which he thought...and some of the events that transpired that he thought would be most helpful. They will not hurt anybody except him. There is some of them that will, with respect to the Watergate affair, I'm speaking strictly, from him, they will hurt Dean, they will hurt no one else. And we went through these, and as I told Al, I may be crazy but I believe him.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, I, uh-

BUZHARDT: I think we're gonna have a case, with this put together. But you got to go forward with a revelation. Of this. As much as possible. That is going to create a storm. Particularly among the liberal element. And I think, to survive that storm, to really combat it, we cannot afford to appear to be in the position of withholding anything rogue.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Nothing in this, let me say, relates to proving the Watergate thing! The methods, yes.

BUZHARDT: That's true, Mr. President. At the same time, the methods are so...you know that, I believe that. And...but the problem is, we'll have one hell of a job-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Sure. Sure.

BUZHARDT: And I'm trying to think of our best case to put forward, to make it stick.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yup. Yup. Well.

(redacted natsec)

BUZHARDT: And I think it should be laid out. If we go through.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Basically the whole purpose of this, and the whole purpose of that meeting was, they all got it together, and they were all trying to co-ordinate the lame thing. That was my recollection. Put Hoover in charge.

HAIG: I remember the issue quite well. The kind of things that were going on, we couldn't even get the dope because of restrictions that he applied over at the FBI.

PRESIDENT NIXON: And I think in this case, you'll find very little was done.

BUZHARDT: I think very little was done.

HAIG: See, that's what we've got to-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Before you go, before you go, I think you're going to find that Hoover did not...Huston can contact...have you gotten Huston in here?

BUZHARDT: We haven't had Huston in yet. We'll have to get Huston.

PRESIDENT NIXON: If you can get Huston, I think Huston—and just going to have to level with you as to what was done. That's my view but recollection was damn little was done. Haldeman ought to be able to help right you on that. Let the papers—damn, what the hell. Well, we never have any little problems around here, do we?

BUZHARDT: No, sir. All big ones.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, that's all right. I'd rather have this than have a part—be part of Watergate.

BUZHARDT: Yes sir.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Strangely, I find that, I don't know why-

BUZHARDT: Mr. President, this may all work for the better.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well.

BUZHARDT: It may all work for the better.

HAIG: If we take this as an issue, there can stand some pretty Goddamned healthy fighting.

BUZHARDT: I do too. And I think this will override Watergate. I think it will become the bigger issue. And I think we'll be able to fight it on these grounds. And relegate Watergate to the very insignificant bugging affair that it was.

HAIG: Jesus Christ, everyone, knew the context of that meeting. It could serve that that activity was wrapped up in this?

PRESIDENT NIXON: You mean Helms?

HAIG: Sure.

BUZHARDT: It explains the whole Walters thing completely. This was what you were trying to protect. You see. This type of activity. It gives us a rationale now.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, the Walters memo sure is damaging, but goddamn, it's no more damaging than everything else we have coming down around here.

BUZHARDT: That's true.

PRESIDENT NIXON: You know what I mean? Apparently a lot of the stuff in there is pretty darn tootin.

BUZHARDT: Yup. There's some good stuff in there. In the light of this-

HAIG: The only bad guy is Dean.

BUZHARDT: In the light of this-

PRESIDENT NIXON: They say "President Nixon's gone too far-" Nevertheless, Walters still testifies...

HAIG: They say there were four points that, I think, covered in that meeting, and Walters unfortunately didn't recollect them, didn't put them in. One was, was there a tie-in with these Cubans to the Bay of Pigs? Were we going to get to uncover that unrest? B) Were we getting into internal security actions by this group? Those two things, you see, that makes the reason for that meeting-

BUZHARDT: It makes it absolutely clear.

HAIG: Hunt was a former-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yup I know. Well, I'm sure that's the reason we had that meeting, because I said, if we were going to set up something about the Watergate thing, we wouldn't have had Helms at the Goddamned meeting.

BUZHARDT: It was not to have Helms.

HAIG: And if you ran into that operation, Bob would have had one. Because he knew Helms-

BUZHARDT: And Mr. President, let me say, you're going to pick up a lot of support on this. They're going to have to rally to your support. This document has got Helms' signature on it, Hoover's signature on it, Gayler's [Noel Gayler, head of the NSA] signature on it, Bennett's [Donald V. Bennett, head of the DIA] signature on it.

HAIG: Yeah. And we're responsible, ladies and gentlemen.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah. And approving all this stuff.

BUZHARDT: No, sir. But they recommended the rules.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Including the break-ins?

BUZHARDT: Yes, sir. Everybody except Hoover. He demurred on that. But the rest of them were right there and they say it was urgent and they state their own ties, the bureaucracies, and that part of it has got to support you.

HAIG: It was totally clean.

BUZHARDT: It'll get us a lot of people a hanging (unintelligible) and that's very unfortunate. But we might as well take it because, you know, he expresses the case more candidly, probably than you can, or more graphically-

PRESIDENT NIXON: What's he [Tom Huston] talking about? In other words-

BUZHARDT: He talks about how damn bad the situation is...and he says, this is a helluva time for Hoover to get squeamish. He said, in his younger days, he burglarized everything around, and had no compunctions. And the risk is so great now, somebody oughta kick his ass and kick him into the present.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Written to him?

BUZHARDT: Written to Haldeman.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Bah. Old Dean. I wonder what got into him.

BUZHARDT: I don't know. The memo said: this package was apparently, somehow, got into the Justice Department. I don't know how. Sol Lindenbaum [Executive Assistant to the Attorney General]. And Dean worked on the package. Sol Lindenbaum, who's in the legal counselor's office at Justice, there's a note confirming it, he sent this package to Dean. Said "I found this over here...do what you want with it." That's where it came from.

PRESIDENT NIXON: When. When did he send it?

BUZHARDT: When did he send it? It was in the fall of 1970.

PRESIDENT NIXON: My recollection is that all that stuff was stopped. It was stopped. (Unintelligible) The army, using the army for purposes (Unintelligible) Well, I don't know how to handle it, except first thing...whatever it is, I'd rather have it be on this, than have it on Watergate.

BUZHARDT: I did too.

PRESIDENT NIXON: (Unintelligible)

BUZHARDT: He sent this thing over to Johnson's on March 3rd, 1972.

PRESIDENT NIXON: March 3rd of '72? Oh, last year.

BUZHARDT: Last year he sent it back. Says...the attached memorandum that was picked up in a house-cleaning operation is being returned to you for whatever disposition you wish to make use of.

PRESIDENT NIXON: So Dean pictures that's his trump card [the Huston Plan memoranda]?

BUZHARDT. Yes, sir. That's his trump card.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, we thought he had one.

BUZHARDT. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT NIXON: The rat...What the hell does he think he's going to do with it?...Destroy the President?

HAIG: That's the reasoning.

BUZHARDT: That's what he thinks.

HAIG: Right-wing conspiracy.

BUZHARDT: That's what he thinks.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Huh?

HAIG: Right-wing conspiracy.

BUZHARDT: Raise the right-wing conspiracy and destroy the President.

HAIG: He's a lot worse than we have seen.

BUZHARDT: That's true. He's about as low as they come.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, let me ask you this: who's got them now, the judge?

BUZHARDT: The judge has them.

PRESIDENT NIXON: And Ehrlichman.

BUZHARDT: The district attorney has them. And Ervin has them. We'll never get them out of Sam's pocket. I already know. I've got the call coming in. I haven't talked—but I know Ervin is going to refuse to let them go.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Who's going to refuse them?

BUZHARDT: I know Ervin is going to refuse to let them go.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Why? Did you ask him for here?

BUZHARDT: I sent the NSA people up who were in charge of this type of classification. To try to work out with him that he would give it to them for storage.

PRESIDENT NIXON: This case, you see, is not within the Ervin Committee's provenance.

BUZHARDT: It's not, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I'm just saying, at the moment, it's not a campaign practice. My point is, we have to be prepared...I'm not suggesting we're not going to be prepared, but I'm trying to see how we...what should we do? Have (Unintelligible) talk to him?

HAIG: We have to sort out two things here, before we go anywhere. First, we have to find out what activity has been done. What was actually done. Two, we have to sort out the linkage between this organization of the authorities (unintelligible) on the lower levels, for political reasons (unintelligible) what was basically a structured scheme to improve the security of this country.

PRESIDENT NIXON: (Unintelligible) you need someone in this group-

BUZHARDT: What he means...first, John Mitchell was involved in both of them.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: There's a point, really, where the techniques overflowed into the political arena.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I understand.

BUZHARDT: And I think we have to separate out the two. The things that were localized. And the things that were not. The Watergate was not.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah. Of course.

BUZHARDT: And, I think, what else, we have to cut the line here, and make that distinction...even though Hunt, we don't know...whether Hunt ever worked on this type of project. The product was going to (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT NIXON: Where did the product go?

BUZHARDT: The product went to Justice in part...the photographs from the psychiatrist [Ellsberg's psychiatrist] burglary.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Oh no, I meant-

BUZHARDT: The product went to Justice. Whatever they produced, went into Internal Security Division at Justice. That's where the product went.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Because they were central-

BUZHARDT: That's right. And they have an analysis group there. That analyzed in-coming product. And this was one of the big frictions between [Robert] Mardian's office and the Bureau. I can see now. I never quite understood what it was. But this was one of the big frictions-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Let me suggest this, what I'd like you to do this, the following- Find out from Mardian, first Huston...he'll know what happened.

BUZHARDT: We'll get back to it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Get Huston in and say, now, what the hell happened under this damn thing...Believe me, if nothing did happen, it's too Goddamn bad. They should have done something. Do you know what I mean?

BUZHARDT: Right.

PRESIDENT NIXON: We have a helluva problem.

BUZHARDT: That's right.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I knew this was going on. Didn't you, Al?

HAIG: No, I didn't, sir. I knew that there was—

PRESIDENT NIXON: A plan? I see.

HAIG: I knew there was an inter-agency group...

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah. That's what I mean. An inter-agency group. Well, actually I knew it was going on...

(redacted natsec)

PRESIDENT NIXON: I didn't know they were breaking into private residences, if they did...that's what I find, my whole point. It's a great big scheme here. But my point is, they have to have proof. Whoever pins this on us, gotta prove. Before we go out on something like this, let us be sure of what they've got.

BUZHARDT: We'll see what they've got.

PRESIDENT NIXON: You see my point?

BUZHARDT: I think the point is, though...

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah?

BUZHARDT: You say...there was nothing, or there was this only, we've got to make darn sure-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Oh yes, I understand. My point is...let's not assume, that because there was this big...plan, of this sort in the government...that the opposition now has a great number of cases like the psychiatrist buggings. They haven't. They would have the goddamn things out. That's my point.

BUZHARDT: I don't think they know. I really don't think they know of any specific instance, and frankly, I'm not sure there was even one.

PRESIDENT NIXON: My feeling is this is one time when old man Hoover in his dotage did us a favor. (Unintelligible) wouldn't allow. I don't know what it was, but he never wanted...I don't know why.

(natsec redacted)

BUZHARDT: Now, the question Mr. President, we don't know who approved it. I'm under the impression, and these papers don't reveal, who had the approval authority. If it was Mitchell-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Mitchell. Mitchell was out as Attorney General then.

BUZHARDT: Yeah. He was out as Attorney General.

PRESIDENT NIXON: No, Kleindienst-

BUZHARDT: Dick [Kleindienst] wouldn't have approved it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Never.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Let me tell you, for Christ's sakes: Kleindienst didn't know anything about the Watergate, I didn't know anything about the Watergate, and afterwards, none of us were trying to cover the sonofabitch up. The point is, therefore, anything that happened then, was not approved by Kleindienst.

BUZHARDT: Well, I was thinking in terms of the fact, even if they had presented it to him as a part of this plan, perfectly legitimate, somebody had presented it: I doubt if Dick would have approved it. Dick wouldn't have-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Was the Attorney General's approval required in any activity in this Goddamn thing?

BUZHARDT: It doesn't say, Mr. President. I don't know what the procedures were, because the document says who has the approval authority is not in there.

PRESIDENT NIXON: My point is...let's first find out...who can you ask?

BUZHARDT: I can ask Huston. Mardian. And frankly, Bill Sullivan. Bill Sullivan likely (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT NIXON: Do that right away. Make it top priority. Second point. I have not made...I have not made the frontal assault on this. I have given...this is an inter-governmental thing. Now. My view, you picked up one or two ways to go...we can go out and say, look, we got caught with our hands in the cookie jar, and here's what really happened. Or he may be really thinking that. My point is, Ervin does not have, with his committees, the authority...he can make the move outside, Dean may testify...what I'm getting at is this...

BUZHARDT: You want to assess the damage?

PRESIDENT NIXON: I want to assess the damage, but I also want to assess what was done. Because Ervin coming up and saying, here's the great big Goddamn plan is one thing, Ervin coming up and saying, here's the big plan, there are a lot of things done is something else.

BUZHARDT: That's right.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's true.

BUZHARDT: See my point?

PRESIDENT NIXON: So therefore, let's see first what...what the damage is. What's done.

BUZHARDT: Good point.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I think that things were very unproductive then. Also I think ask the hell out of Haldeman.

BUZHARDT: I will.

PRESIDENT NIXON: He may know if anything was produced out of the Goddamn thing. Those are the only people I even trust, I can say.

BUZHARDT: Those are the only ones I would go back to.

PRESIDENT NIXON: You can put calls in to those, I'd appreciate it...The other thing is, in terms of handling it, the better thing to do here is, rather than have, at this point, the President oughta go on prime time national television and explain to the American people what the Christ we were trying to do, which, of course, which the nation had never thought of at this point...the thing to do is, to play this in terms of, let it ride a little. Let's see what they do. Let them get out a little on it. You know what I mean? Let him strain to blow a little on the damn thing. What I'm getting at is this: they will try, in my view, to use it, of trying to dribble, you know what I mean? I don't think they'll put these papers out like that. Frankly, they're classified papers.

HAIG: They've already ruined some of this...I couldn't understand their tacitness in the wiretaps of 1969, '70. This is clean. It also explains the call that Henry [Kissinger] got from the New York Times-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: -that this sonofabitch-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well. Yeah yeah. Fine. My point is, so that is it. What I'm getting at is, we might feel the better thing to do is, have Pat Buchanan prepare, he's probably the best one, a white paper.

BUZHARDT: That's what I suggest.

PRESIDENT NIXON: A white paper, and we get it flat right out. The moment it comes out, say, let's knock this damn thing off. Now, we depend on the intensity of the debate. If, on the other hand, Ervin and all, do, owing to the...see what I mean? Ervin, the press...leave the responsibility of leaking this stuff out, be theirs.

BUZHARDT: Gives us an advantage.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I don't mean, I don't think we should go out anticipate, look and say, Dean had materials, and here was what was in it. Goddamnit, it is confidential information. It is top secret information. And then you can be in a position of attacking Ervin. And the committee. For revealing. What'd you think Al?

HAIG: (Unintelligible.)

BUZHARDT: ...I contemplated that they would get information out before you went, Mr. President. Not that you would go first.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: That wouldn't make sense.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright. The way they will do it, see, is leak to through the papers and so on. There'll be a great interest in press. And then, at the appropriate time, I may have to, and will, take it on frontally, you know what I mean? I'll say, here's the situation, here's what we're trying to do. And here is what was done. And it was all done under the law. I guess burglarizing would be under the law.

BUZHARDT: No sir. It would not be.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Is that in the paper?

BUZHARDT: Yes sir. Very clear. It's laid out there that it is illegal. This sort of thing. That's the one we're gonna have to get-

PRESIDENT NIXON: How do you handle it?

BUZHARDT: Sir?

PRESIDENT NIXON: How do you handle it? I don't know.

BUZHARDT: That would be very extraordinary circumstances...one step short of a total insurrection, justified the action that was taken. It was in the national interest.

PRESIDENT NIXON: On the other hand, though-

BUZHARDT: -justified the policy approval-

HAIG: In the hopes that we would maybe not have to...

BUZHARDT: ...was never implemented.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That part of the program is not implemented.

BUZHARDT: Well, I don't know...I think we ought to think, give some thought to wrapping the psychiatrist thing into this [Huston Plan] and justify it...We've got a major leak there, we got a threat to the national security. It's either wrap it in there, Mr. President, and hang it on this hat and the whole case than to have to defend it separately. I think we may want to think about whether we just put this one under the umbrella.

HAIG: We're going to have to take a look at that...

BUZHARDT: We'll have to take a look. It may be that'll be better to put that one under the umbrella.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, then to admit [sighs] that we approved . . . illegal activities. That's the problem...

BUZHARDT: Yes sir.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Let's see if there were any others before-

BUZHARDT: Let's see if there are any others. And I say it's one to consider...

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: We have to adapt.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I doubt the psychiatrist, frankly, was part of this deal.

BUZHARDT: No, but apparently, Krogh was apparently connected with-

PRESIDENT NIXON: The White House?

BUZHARDT: -this type of deal. And with the White House. We got your letter tied to it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: What's that, my-

BUZHARDT: Your letter to Mr. Hoover, telling him to-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Authorizing it.

BUZHARDT: -to keep Bud Krogh informed.

BUZHARDT: You know. And it appears you were referring to a group you established here. To monitor this kind of situation, a year after this policy went into effect.

PRESIDENT NIXON: What?

BUZHARDT: That was a year after this paper was approved.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's right.

BUZHARDT: Now, I think there's one other thing we must watch. And I think we're gonna have to put out some feelers to find out about it. We remember how the Ellsberg papers were played, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: The New York Times took these things. They spent weeks in a bucket shop. Putting together their serialized stuff. From the tiplers we have to the press...we have to be very careful to keep an eye on it. To make sure we're ready to move if that thing goes. But I think we oughta get the feel to see if they're going to play this kind of game. That would work to create quite some publicity. So, we should keep an eye on if that sort of thing is being done now. Because, they can pretend to hold documents. And work on stuff in advance. This is a traditional Committee report. You know, work out with the media...plan of operations-

PRESIDENT NIXON: We could assume possibly, a copy of the documents, Dean might have handed to the New York Times himself.

BUZHARDT: Well, Dean's pretty well covered now, see. He's got them to three places. He's got U.S. Attorney's Office...he's got them on the hill...he's obviously gotten back into the bureaucracy. This gives him some cover for leaks. You know.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

BUZHARDT: He couldn't do it very well-

PRESIDENT NIXON: My point is, Fred, though, I don't believe that we may pick up the Times on Sunday morning and see the whole Goddamn thing.

BUZHARDT: We don't want to get caught by surprise, is what I'm saying.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I agree.

BUZHARDT: We want to be prepared and we want to keep our eyes and ears opened to see if we can't get some feel for how the thing is being played.

PRESIDENT NIXON: And how they're going to play it.

BUZHARDT: And how they're going to play it. I think we need to get the feel for that.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Interesting thing, though, that whole paper was approved by all those clowns, and yet they said Hoover demurred on...what?

BUZHARDT: Hoover demurred on two items.

HAIG: Tapping? Breaking and entering?

BUZHARDT: Breaking and entering. And the increased tapping. Those were the two that would be done by him. He said he didn't care if the other agencies did any of it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: But he said, not by the bureau.

BUZHARDT: Not by the bureau.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, the other agencies were-

BUZHARDT: The other-

PRESIDENT NIXON: The CIA was in this too?

BUZHARDT: Yes sir.

(redacted natsec)

PRESIDENT NIXON: Alright. Well, look. Time's a wasting here. It's quarter to four. Let's see what we can do in terms of finding out what the facts are.

BUZHARDT: I'll get right on it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Then...who is the first person you can call?

BUZHARDT: I'll call Bob first, he's local.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Bob-

BUZHARDT: Bob Haldeman.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Incidentally, when you call him, poor sonofabitch has got enough problems, so forth, don't alarm him too much. Ask him: what year, what'd this option do, is this the thing. The question is: do you know what it happened under? Who is the one who can best support this? I think Huston...is Huston out of town?

BUZHARDT: Yes sir. He's out west...I thought he was out west. I'll find him. Sullivan.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Think Sullivan will know?

BUZHARDT: Sullivan will have a pretty good idea, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT NIXON: On what Hoover did. Well, get on him second. Him right away. I'd call Huston. Call him up.

BUZHARDT: And Mardian will obviously-

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, yeah.

BUZHARDT: We'll save Mardian till last.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Would you start on that right away?

BUZHARDT: Yes sir.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Keep me posted...That's the only plan. I guess what we have to do is to just say yes.

HAIG: I don't know.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Let me tell you some things that are—I don't like furthering that sort of crap inherently. . . .it looks like police state stuff. Let us face it. If they want to make an issue—if Ervin and the Committee want to make an issue out of a plan we have to avoid domestic insurrection, I don't know.

BUZHARDT: Mr. President—

HAIG: I think if we just—we just fight about it.

BUZHARDT: —we'll just have to fight it. Let me say, you know, I've been through all this with Senator Ervin on this precise point...And this was the '68 riots...And my job was to try to get him to understand the environment that existed when Washington was being burned down, the use of military people for intelligence collection at that point.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's right.

BUZHARDT: He and his entire committee were totally insensitive...They played the civil liberties [line]. They'll have a statement that comes direct from the New York Times to mix them up...

NIXON: We'll play it too.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, as I say, we have no small problems, do we.

BUZHARDT: No-

PRESIDENT NIXON: I was kind of relieved this morning when I heard about the Watergate papers, but now...And yet I'm not so sure, I mean...not try to always find the better side of the picture, sometimes it's the bark side...God, isn't it better that it's this rather than Watergate crap? Or is it? I just want it away from Watergate stuff.

HAIG: I think we've got to think very hard before we do any public revelations.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's what I think. Lemme think this out.

SEGMENT TWO

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah. But the thing is what Fred is basically saying is that the big picture is to put this out and then put Krogh's thing under it and then put Walters' thing under it. Well, basically it doesn't really fit. I don't think the Walters thing or the Krogh [thing fit]...look most of the questioning of Walters didn't have a Goddamn thing to do with this thing. The question...I mean, what I mean is: Bob and John talking to Helms and Walters, had to do with wiretapping. They were trying to find out whether or not the CIA was involved, and they were looking like they were. But they weren't. And that's just what happened. So used to getting around when there are inseparable problems, I wouldn't put it under that. I want to talk to the Secretary, because I think there's a tendency here to make this into a massive thing. I regret—I think it's better to keep it—keep it a little bit more confused. Now that Krogh thing [psychiatrist's office break-in]. I don't think there's any reason for us to say to take the—on the Krogh thing. I'll tell you why. The Krogh thing, I am sure, is not a part of this. Do you see my point? This was a—the Krogh thing was a separate White House operation to handle leaks and Ehrlichman had said that Krogh exceeded his authority on that particular one, correct?

HAIG: Right.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Now we come to this thing. This presents problems because of what—it's a big paper saying it. We shall have a domestic intelligence program and we'll do this, that and the other thing. Do you know what I mean? And involving this, that and the other thing. Now the real question is not the paper. The real question is what the hell was done under the plan. Now, if - and I'm not sure what was done - but if what was done was miniscule, hell, I would just stand on it.

HAIG: If I recollect, one day I saw Tom Huston in the dining room and he said, I'm leaving and I said why. He said, I'm working on a project and nothing is happening. I bet you a dollar that nothing was done on that operation.

PRESIDENT NIXON: And then you see...let everything come out of it. Let them come out. And we just say, yes, this was agreed by all the agencies involved, but under the circumstances, despite the fact that it was agreed, the actions taken were nix, period. And I do it basically with a white paper, rather than a national nine o'clock television thing. You see, everybody gets so excited about this, say, I have to take this thing on. I can't appear to be there just being in the battleground on every one of these Goddamn issues. I don't think I'm pollyanish about this. Ervin said this. Not on this stuff. And Dean said, isn't it terrible they had such a plan. Well, Goddamnit, it wasn't terrible to have such a plan.

HAIG: A period when the Goddamn students were being killed in the streets.

PRESIDENT NIXON: And I'm not—I don't want you to reassure me on something you don't believe in. My own view is, I still say, looking at these papers, in other words, Goddamnit, these—what that is is a plan for the purpose of domestic security, domestic security involving and there were foreign operations and foreign support for these damn things. Right?

HAIG: Exactly.

PRESIDENT NIXON: And all the agencies of the government were to be co-ordinating. And a broad animal...

HAIG: They did an original study that was a total fake.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Oh, they did that?

HAIG: Yeah, that was what Hoover was told to do. It was just a, nothing study. (Unintelligible) took it over, to get some Goddamn action. We were (unintelligible) out with Weathermen, and all these people that were tearing up the Goddamn cities. Memories are short, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I know, I know.

HAIG: Goddamn, this was one helluva place to be along about May of 1970 [month of a massive Vietnam anti-war protest in D.C.].

PRESIDENT NIXON: This was simply an action plan which was basically a contingency plan.

HAIG: And we had a situation in which there were students killed at a school. The city of Washington was tore up. There were—dear God.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Maybe Buzhardt is right. This will be the thing that they'll try to say this is grounds for impeachment of the President.

HAIG: Well. (unintelligible) on this issue. He defended the army and their involvement, so he's extremely sensitive to the sensitivities...

PRESIDENT NIXON: I think a little over sensitive.

HAIG: Oh sure. I think...

PRESIDENT NIXON: ...You're not coming around to the resignation-thinking rationale, are you?

HAIG: Listen: men respect (unintelligible). They're replacing that now with irresponsible charges on that. The one thing we have to be careful of, is...that they can't say not only did they set up the apparatus, but they did the burglary...

PRESIDENT NIXON: You mean, basically, the Watergate buggers were set up under this apparatus?

HAIG: Somehow...that is what happened. Now, I know Goddamn well it didn't. But we have got to be sure that we separate the two. And cut that off. That there can be no linkage-

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's one of the reasons why Walters, Walters Helms conversation was terribly important. To be sure the CIA was not involved in this thing. See my point?

HAIG: That was the point I was making earlier. You see, poor Bob, is really quite discouraged. I talked to him this afternoon. This Walters thing it got him right where it hurt. His family doesn't believe him now. And in fairness to the guy...we'll see if that strange look between the two [the CIA and FBI], in a psychological sense, and of course they'd check if the CIA was involved in Watergate, Goddamn, I mean.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Isn't he taking that line, though? I mean, I know it must be discouraging...basically, his line to get...I told him to check the Goddamn thing! To see if the CIA was in, to check whether the CIA, because there were CIA people. That's the line that you take.

HAIG: ...Incidentally, he also said that he wanted you to know that his lawyers have been working with Buzhardt. And he, they, reported that Buzhardt is the best they worked with.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Good.

HAIG: And he has full confidence in Buzhardt.

PRESIDENT NIXON: The trouble with the Goddamn-

(Unintelligible.)

HAIG: -and the way Walters quit, and I'm sure it was his...he had no...he's trying to help you. He wasn't explicit enough about. Bob said there were four plots covered that week. Was Bay of Pigs was one of them? Was there any involvement here? (unintelligible) Dean wasn't in any way tied in to the internal security committee operation that was going on. Which could have uncovered one hell of a mess. But for the security of the country. Not because anything was wrong. But you see, the way Walters portrayed that to the committee, in his affidavit was, the only purpose of that meeting was to go over and tell Gray...

PRESIDENT NIXON: To cool it.

HAIG: ...to cool it. And that's what bothers everybody. Now, that (unintelligible) I think he'll be recalled before the grand jury to explain this now. See, we've got (unintelligible). They didn't probe.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Take a call back, and be sure to tell John, that by God, I understand totally...and we're going to back him to the hilt on this damn thing. Back him to the hilt. I mean, hell, I knew what the hell the score was there. Course they went there. They told the grand jury that too. And they should.

HAIG: To see if there was any CIA involvement.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's right.

HAIG: See, Walters made them look like they were virgins. Because he said, not seeing if there was any, but to ensure the FBI thought there was.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah, well, because maybe Walters...

HAIG: We'll get this worked out. (Unintelligible.) It's all going to work out. Now this thing, maybe, if they make a mistake on this issue, maybe the issue will sweep the whole thing under.

PRESIDENT NIXON: It won't sweep it under.

HAIG: Well.

PRESIDENT NIXON: It'll stir up the press again, that's all. Their terrible concern about civil liberties and all the rest. On the other hand, the country is...I mean, it may require, I won't rule it out, it may require my going on to explain what the hell we were doing. I mean, why we did it. But I'll tell you, Al-

HAIG: Don't be afraid to stir this one. This is a monster that will not go, sir.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Why?

HAIG: I think every civil libertarian knows that the mass, the majority, of the people of this country do not want to tolerate this bullshit. That is what the election is all about. That was your hardhats and your Goddamn variety of people who were sick and tired of this. Soft.

PRESIDENT NIXON: See, the weak point, of course, is, of course, the fact that we talked about the Huston illegal entry and so forth in there. The bugging.

HAIG: In a very esoteric sense. I'm sure if we start discussing it, we're going to find there wasn't a Goddamn thing, or that we had the capability, or the kind of operative who were even capable of doing it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Basically, in my case I am stuck with and have to be stuck with knowing Krogh talked to Hoover, you know, which I did. And ordering Bob and John to go in and talk to Walters and Helms, which I did. And approving this plan, which I did. Without, I must say, checking item by item, I didn't check to see whether there were burglaries and all that. God to hell, we didn't even think of such things.

HAIG: Every man in government is responsible for this theory. The inter-departmental committee unanimously except for two recommendations, of which only one says...

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, he says...but the dissenting vote was, curiously enough, Hoover dissented on two things, for the Bureau. But not for the others.

HAIG: I think we have to lead with that issue. Even though it'll cause great gaspings by a number of people. These are the same bastards who are working on Watergate with viciousness. You never had, you don't have these people. That's been your problem. We haven't had an issue to build support with. We've been in a total negative defensive position. If they want to use it that way, and it turns out that way, I think we can sweep the bastards right out of here.