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Battle of Leipzig (Military History)

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  1. Introduction
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  3. Nineteenth-century Europe’s largest military engagement, the Battle of Leipzig, was fought from 16 to 19 October 1813 following a major preliminary clash on the 14th. The battle was the climax of the campaigns in Germany that began in the wake of Napoleon’s disaster in Russia in 1812. Early in 1813, Russian forces, soon joined by the revitalized Prussian army, pursued the defeated French into central Germany. Napoleon, however, assembled a large but raw army and won two incomplete victories in May 1813 before exhaustion led both sides to accept an armistice over the summer. The renewal of fighting in August saw another partial victory by the French emperor at Dresden, but his subordinates elsewhere suffered crippling defeats and, by mid-September, he was withdrawing to concentrate in a central position near Leipzig. Austria and Sweden had joined the coalition against Napoleon (the Sixth Coalition or simply the “Allies”) during the armistice and the converging Allied armies caught up with the French in mid-October. The congregation of troops was immense: the French and their various satellite contingents numbered more than 190,000, while the Allies brought some 350,000 to the field. These vast forces made Leipzig the largest European battle prior to the First World War. The colorful mix of armies quickly led observers to refer to Leipzig as the “Battle of Nations or Völkerschlacht. Leipzig was also unusual in its duration: a cavalry clash on 14 October being followed by four days of battle from the 16th to the 19th. Napoleon lost his only real chance for victory when fighting on the 16th proved bloody but inconclusive. After a pause on 17 October, the final two days consisted of concentric Allied blows against fierce resistance, but the French defense collapsed when the bridge that constituted the sole French line of retreat was prematurely destroyed. Thousands of men were trapped in the city and forced to surrender as Napoleon retreated towards the Rhine. Casualties in the four days of carnage were enormous, estimated at more than 60,000 killed, wounded, or captured on the French side against Allied losses of 46,000. The Allied victory was decisive. Napoleon’s empire in Germany was gone forever and he would abdicate only five months after Leipzig. Beyond its significance for the military-political history of the Napoleonic era, the battle became a central point in the “Wars of Liberation” (Befreiungskriege), a potent symbol in the development of German nationalism and political consciousness. Assigned different meanings by monarchists, constitutionalists, Nazis, and Communists over the years, the commemorative events on the 200th anniversary in 2013 transformed the grand bloodletting into a celebration of European unity.
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  5. Campaign and Battle Histories
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  7. Despite its size and significance, the number of relatively recent (that is, 20th-century) book-length studies specifically dedicated to the Battle of Leipzig is surprisingly small. Even the many works prompted by commemorations of the battle tend to be very general (placing the battle in the grand sweep of German history) or narrowly regional (e.g., stories of particular individuals or localities). To find detailed military accounts of Leipzig in most cases, therefore, the interested researcher must turn both to larger works covering the entire war of 1813 in Germany and to publications predating the First World War. Embedding Leipzig in its campaign context is a useful precondition to understanding the battle, but the relative paucity of focused studies (contrast this circumstance, for instance, with the innumerable books on Waterloo) means that important military details are often submerged or missing in broad-brush outline treatments. It is worth noting in this connection that the phrase “Leipzig campaign” is often loosely used as a rubric for the entire war from the spring through the autumn of 1813. A more precise and useful analytic approach is to consider the war as consisting of two broad phases (spring and autumn) divided by the summer armistice, with each phase including several campaigns of varying scope and duration; this approach is also more consistent with modern military terminology. Nonetheless, the literature on 1813 overall is enormous and the bibliographies Loh 1963 and Mannschatz and Walter 1988, though now sadly dated, can help locate many otherwise-obscure pieces on the Battle of Leipzig, especially within the vast sea of 19th-century military history and regional studies periodicals.
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  9. Loh, Gerhard. Die Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig: Eine bibliographische Übersicht. Leipzig: Der Deutschen Bücherei, 1963.
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  11. Well-organized and especially valuable for the listing of small but helpful pieces in recondite German periodicals from the 19th century as well as commemorative publications.
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  13. Mannschatz, Hans-Christian, and Ursula Walter. Sachsen und Leipzig in den Jahren 1806 bis 1815: Herausgegeben anlässlich des 175. Jahrestagung der Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig. Leipzig: Stadts- und Bezirksbibliothek und Museum für Geschichte der Stadt Leipzig, 1988.
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  15. Provides sources on the battle that were published after Loh 1963 as well as a broader coverage of topics related to Saxony during the entire period of its involvement with Napoleonic France (1806–1815).
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  17. Prussian and Austrian Histories, Pre–First World War
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  19. There are more books and articles on the campaigns of 1813 and the Battle of Leipzig in German than in any other language. The bulk of this substantial array was published in Prussia and Germany during the 19th century, but much may be discounted as patriotically tendentious accounts intended to glorify the Prusso-German defeat of Napoleon rather than serious treatments of a complex military engagement with enduring political implications. On the other hand, much of the most historically careful and analytically thoughtful scholarship on the battle and its antecedent campaign stems from German authors—Prussians above all—during this period. First among these for thoroughness and accuracy with minimal nationalistic bias is Friederich 1906, the third volume of the massive official history by the Prussian General Staff. This is a well-sourced narrative designed for the specialist, replete with excellent maps, order of battle details, and ample dissection of key operational issues. Friederich 1912 was an abridged form published just prior to the First World War. These comprehensive works are especially noteworthy as they benefited from full access to Prussian archives, many of which disappeared during or after the Second World War. Plotho 1817 and Förster 1858 also fall into this category with the additional consideration (both a benefit and drawback) that the authors were contemporaries or participants in the conflict. Pflugk-Harttung 1913 is especially valuable as it contains a host of archival material covering everything from high policy and battle reports to mundane but essential logistical matters. Austria-Hungary also produced a detailed official history with Hoen 1913 using archival material from a number of belligerents. As with the Prussian General Staff’s history, the exhaustive Austrian account is accompanied by excellent maps, official correspondence, and appendices on army organization. In another similarity with Prussia, the Austrian account Woinovich 1911 was a readable condensed version of its official history as part of a handy series covering the entire period from 1813 to 1815. The large cavalry battle on 14 October is covered in detail in Kerchnawe 1904 drawing on close study of Austrian archival materials.
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  21. Förster, Friedrich. Geschichte der Befreiungs-Kriege 1813, 1814, 1815. 3 vols. Berlin: Gustav Hempel, 1858.
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  23. The author used personal recollections of Prussian combatants and brings out a great deal of primary material in extended quotations, but non-Prussian sourcing is very limited.
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  25. Friederich, Rudolf. Geschichte des Herbstfeldzuges 1813. Vol. 3, Von der Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig bis zum Schlusse des Feldzuges. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1906.
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  27. Extremely detailed military history of the battle and antecedent campaign using Prussian and other German archives, excellent maps; remains the starting point for any military study of the battle.
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  29. Friederich, Rudolf. Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813–1815. Vol. 2, Der Herbstfeldzug 1813. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1912.
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  31. An abridged version of the 1906 study with less tactical detail, but still very thorough with many of the superb color maps.
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  33. Hoen, Maximilan Ritter von. Feldzug von Leipzig. Vol. 5 of Befreiungskrieg 1813 und 1814. Vienna: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 1913.
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  35. Comprehensive military account from the Austrian perspective based on Austrian, Prussian, and French archival material with excellent maps in a separate volume.
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  37. Kerchnawe, Hugo. Kavallerieverwendung, Aufklärung und Armeeführung bei der Hauptarmee in den entscheidenden Tagen vor Leipzig (2. bis 14. Oktober 1813). Vienna: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 1904.
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  39. Draws on close study of Austrian archival materials to portray the details of the large cavalry battle on 14 October (at least some 12,000 horsemen engaged).
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  41. Pflugk-Harttung, Julius von. Leipzig 1813: Aus den Akten des Kriegsarchivs des Grossen Generalstabes, des geheimen Staatsarchivs in Berlin, des Staatsarchivs in Breslau und des Ministeriums der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten in London. Gotha, Germany: Perthes, 1913.
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  43. An invaluable collection of more than three thundred archival items relating to the battle and the larger campaigns; includes battle reports of Prussian units and other Prussian material lost during the Second World War.
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  45. Plotho, Carl von. Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich in den Jahren 1813 und 1814. 3 vols. Berlin: Carl Friedrich Amelang, 1817.
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  47. The first comprehensive history of the war and battle, this remains valuable for the detailed information provided and the author’s personal observations as a staff officer to the Prussian king.
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  49. Woinovich, Emil von. Kulm, Leipzig, Hanau 1813. Vol. 3 of 1813–1815: Österreich in den Befreiungskriegen. Edited by Alois Veltzé. Vienna: A. Edlinger’s Verlag, 1911.
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  51. This summarized Austrian version is a useful overview by a respected military historian, but lacks sourcing and detailed maps.
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  53. German-Language Histories, Since 1945
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  55. Leipzig has continued to attract attention from German-language authors since the end of the Second World War, particularly within the larger ambit of German nationalism. Few of the works published since 1945, however, qualify as detailed battle histories. The most recent publications have focused more on interpreting the significance of the battle and the Wars of Liberation in terms of Germany’s subsequent political evolution rather than updating or broadening our understanding of military operations. They have thus remained at best in the realm of campaign overviews as opposed to specific analyses of Leipzig as a battle, and none have surpassed the grand Prussian and Austrian official histories. Donath, et al. 1953 as well as the essays collected in Straube 1963 and Hoffmann, et al. 1967 bring some interesting insights and should not be neglected owing to their origin; however, they are primarily of interest because they were published in East Germany during the Cold War and thus reflect the prevailing Communist ideology. These authors freight their analyses with obligatory references to Marx, Engels, and Lenin to present the Befreiungskrieg of 1813 as a righteous “people’s war of liberation” against oppression and a direct precursor to East Germany’s struggle against the “imperialism” of NATO and the United States. These works also pay obsequious homage to the role of Russian troops at Leipzig and throughout 1813. The 200th anniversary of the battle in 2013 prompted the publication of a number of new books ranging from lapidary and often lushly illustrated overviews such as Poser 2013 and Fesser 2013 to more scholarly analytic studies. Most of the latter, however, only discuss the battle in very general terms within the broader scope of the era and stress instead its significance for later developments in Germany and Europe; Krause 2013, Platthaus 2013, and Thamer 2013 are examples. The operations around Leipzig have been of particular interest to Saxon historians and a number of the recent books highlight Saxony’s role as the principal field of the battle during the 1813 campaigns in Germany (e.g., Fesser 2013 and Poser 2013).
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  57. Donath, Fritz, Ernst Engelberg, Heinz Füßler, and A. M. Uhlmann. Leipzig 1813. Leipzig: Veb Bibliographisches Institut, 1953.
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  59. Title notwithstanding, this is a comprehensive overview of the wars against Napoleon starting in 1792 from a Communist perspective with emphasis on Leipzig and vicinity.
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  61. Fesser, Gerd. 1813: Die Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig. Jena, Germany: Verlag Bussert & Stadeler, 2013.
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  63. An overview aimed at the non-specialist readership, this small book provides some useful contemporary material and highlights local history but lacks sourcing.
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  65. Hoffmann, Peter, Karl Obermann Heinrich Scheel, and Fritz Straube. Der Befrieungskrieg 1813. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1967.
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  67. Academic papers from a conference of East German and Russian historians that include serious assessments of strategic, operational, and historical questions as well as panegyrics to the East German–Soviet “alliance of comrades in arms” (Waffenbruderschaft).
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  69. Krause, Arnulf. Der Kampf um Freiheit. Stuttgart: Theiss, 2013.
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  71. Describes the battle in only the most superficial terms as part of a discussion of the Befreiungskieg as a key step towards Germany’s freedom and unity; notes that subsequent mythologizing does not detract from Leipzig’s significance in the war against Napoleon.
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  73. Platthaus, Andreas. 1813: Die Völkerschlacht und das Ende der alten Welt. Berlin: Rowohlt, 2013.
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  75. A well-written popular history with many illuminating contemporary anecdotes and a contemplative concluding chapter, but maps are inadequate and military operations are only described in broad stokes.
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  77. Poser, Steffen. Die Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig: “In Schutt und Graus begraben.” Leipzig: Stadtgeschichtliches Museum Leipzig, 2013.
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  79. A swift, tidy summary of military events in October 1813 by the curator of the military collection in the city museum; stresses local history, but lacks sourcing and maps.
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  81. Straube, Fritz, ed. Das Jahr 1813: Studien zur Geschichte und Wirkung der Befreiungskriege. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1963.
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  83. A collection of essays covering the Wars of Liberation as the authors attempt to cope with its complexities within the framework of a Cold War–era Marxist approach.
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  85. Thamer, Hans-Ulrich. Die Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig: Europas Kampf gegen Napoleon. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013.
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  87. Deals with the battle more directly than most of the other recent publications, but the focus is its political significance for the ensuing 200 years of Germany’s evolution as a national polity; good introduction at the undergraduate level for students possessing a reasonable facility with German.
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  89. The Russian Role
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  91. Russians made up the largest portion of the Allied army at Leipzig. Indeed, there were approximately twice as many Russians as Prussians on the field overall. Russians predominated in three of the four Allied armies: there were more Russians than Swedes or Prussians in the Army of the North, the Army of Poland was almost entirely Russian, and Russians outnumbered their Prussian allies by nearly two to one in the Army of Silesia (even though it was commanded by Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher and is thus normally considered a “Prussian” force). Russians also comprised some 17 percent of the Allied Army of Bohemia (or “Main Army”), but the tsar’s presence with this command meant that Russian influence was always a major factor in policy, in strategy, and sometimes in tactics. Unfortunately, there is no true Russian official history of the campaign (unlike the voluminous data available on 1812) and much detail remains to be either uncovered or refined and verified from older accounts. Bogdanovich 1863 is what may be considered the closest to an official history, while Beskrovnyi 1964 contains a wealth of primary documents. Additionally, Buturlin 1818 and Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky 1837, both authored by veterans of 1813, are campaign histories that include the Battle of Leipzig. Given the paucity of histories, these early participant narratives may be supplemented by select memoir literature such as Langeron 1902 and Württemberg 1907. Both were by senior commanders and shed light on the operations around Leipzig, albeit largely limited to the authors’ own actions and observations. Similarly, though dated, Bernhardi 1866 brings keen strategic judgment to bear on the Allied situation leading up to Leipzig as well as analyzing the course of the battle in a biography of Russian General Karl Friedrich von Toll; the work also contains a number of primary documents. The starting point for any investigation of the Russian role, however, must be Lieven 2009. Among its many virtues, Lieven’s monumental work depicts the continuity in Russian strategy from 1812 through 1814 with 1813 as the centerpiece in a long series of campaigns that began with Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and concluded with the Allied occupation of Paris. Lieven devotes a substantial chapter to the Battle of Leipzig and credits Tsar Alexander with several key tactical decisions on 16 October that may have been instrumental in avoiding a serious Allied setback.
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  93. Bernhardi, Theodor von. Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des kaiserl. russ. Generals von der Infanterie Karl Friedrich Grafen von Toll. Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1866.
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  95. Well beyond a biography of Toll, a key staff officer in the Army of Bohemia, this work offers insightful analysis of strategy and operations with a solid grounding in Russian sources and the published material of the day; Volume 3 covers Leipzig and includes a number of archival reprints.
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  97. Beskrovnyi, Liubomir G., ed. Pokhod Russkoi armii protiv Napoelona v 1813 g i osvobozhdemnie Germanii: Sbornik dokumentov. Moscow: Institut Istorii, 1964.
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  99. A valuable collection of primary materials on the entire war, including Leipzig.
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  101. Bogdanovich, Modest I. Geschichte des Krieges im Jahre 1813 für Deutschlands Unabhängigkeit. 2 vols. Saint Petersburg, Russia: G. Hässel, 1863.
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  103. Two thick volumes based on access to Russian archives and the available published material of his day; he includes considerable primary material.
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  105. Buturlin, Dmitry Petrovich. Tableau de la Campagne d’Automne de 1813 en Allemagne. 2d ed. Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1818.
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  107. A slim but valuable volume by one of the tsar’s young staff officers giving an early military account from the Russian point of view, intentionally aimed to distinguish his work from Prussian and French narratives.
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  109. Langeron, Louis Alexander Andrault. Mémoires de Langeron. Edited by G. Fabry. Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1902.
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  111. Langeron commanded a corps in the Army of Silesia and his recollections provide a Russian perspective on what is often seen as a “Prussian” force; annotations by the French editor enhance the volume.
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  113. Lieven, Dominic. Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe 1807 to 1814. London: Allen Lane, 2009.
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  115. A superb yet readable piece of scholarship that draws on extensive archival research and deep reading within the secondary literature to present a composite picture of the continuity in Russian strategy from the French invasion of 1812 through the Allied victory in France in 1814.
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  117. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Alexander I. Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Feldzuge vom Jahre 1813. Dorpat, Tartu: C. A. Kluge, 1837.
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  119. Written by an imperial staff officer, this history is informed by the author’s personal experiences and also provides some primary material.
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  121. Württemberg, Prince Eugene. Journal des Campagnes du Prince de Wurtemberg 1812–1814. Edited by G. Fabry. Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1907.
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  123. Commanding a corps in the Army of Bohemia, Eugene had a key role in the opening engagements at Leipzig; respected French military historian G. Fabry edited the volume and provided a 350-page introduction focused on events prior to Leipzig.
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  125. Sweden’s Participation
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  127. Nearly 19,000 Swedish troops were present at the Battle of Leipzig as part of the Allied host, but controversy has dogged their role at the battle and in the larger war. In the first place, Sweden’s status in the constellation of European monarchies had declined drastically over the preceding century. The kingdom thus found itself allied to Russia in 1813, the power to which it had lost the province of Finland in a disheartening war between 1808 and 1809. At the same time, Stockholm’s elites had their eyes on prying Norway away from the crown of Denmark with the assistance of the Allied powers arrayed against Napoleon. The chapters “Sweden in the Continental Wars of 1805–1814” by Pär Frohnert (pp. 255–286) and “Greatness Eclipsed—Sweden 1780–1820” by Lennart Andersson Palm (pp. 17–31) in Sandstedt 2000 provide a comprehensive introduction to the country’s difficult international situation from 1805 to 1814. Most of the controversy, however, revolves around the personality of Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, former French marshal and, by 1813, the Crown Prince of Sweden under the name Karl Johan. In 1813 Bernadotte commanded the Army of the North, composed of approximately equal numbers of Prussians, Russians, and Swedes when it arrived at Leipzig. Many 19th-century Prussian authors criticize Bernadotte severely for sloth, braggadocio, and insufficient commitment to the Allied cause, accusing him of shielding his Swedish troops. These writers credit Russian and, above all, Prussian troops for the Army of the North’s battlefield successes; Plugk-Harttung 1913 provides a good summary. Swederus 1866 offers an often-passionate defense of Bernadotte, while Tingsten 1925 is more measured in his analysis. The most reliable work on the Army of the North is Quistorp 1894, an exhaustive study that made careful use of archival material from several sources as well as the then-extant literature. Where Quistorp concludes with a harsh appraisal of Bernadotte, Barton 1925 is generally favorable in his biography. As far as published documents are concerned, there is no Swedish official history of the 1813 campaigns (in contrast to the thorough work published on the 1808–1809 war with Russia), but Schinkel 1855 provides much useful, if selected, correspondence from the campaign. Recent Swedish works such as Ericson, et al. 2010 supply only the most superficial summaries of Leipzig and Sweden’s participation in the larger war. On the other hand, several of the essays in Sandstedt 2000 offer useful organizational background on the army. The Swedish role at Leipzig and during 1813 in general, therefore, is an area wide open for new scholarship, including an appraisal of Bernadotte’s military and political leadership.
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  129. Barton, Dunbar Plunket. Bernadotte Prince and King: 1810–1844. London: John Murray, 1925.
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  131. A thorough and thoughtful biography well grounded in research, but overlooks some of the controversies of 1813 and often appears excessively generous to Bernadotte.
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  133. Ericson, Lars, Martin Hårdstedt, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, and Gunnar Åselius. Svenska slagfält. Stockholm: Norstedts, 2010.
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  135. Includes an overview chapter on 1813 with discussion of Leipzig, but does little to advance understanding of or scholarship on Sweden’s role in the battle.
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  137. Plugk-Harttung, Julius von. “Zur Beurteilung Bernadottes 1813.” Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte 25 (1913): 191–209.
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  139. Reviews much of the commentary on Bernadotte and concludes with an overall negative assessment.
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  141. Quistorp, Barthold von. Geschichte der Nord-Armee im Jahre 1813. 3 vols. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1894.
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  143. Though inclined to a largely negative view of Bernadotte, this study is fundamental to any analysis of the Army of the North’s performance at Leipzig (Vol. 2); includes a massive volume of archival material (vol. 3).
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  145. Sandstedt, Fred, ed. Between Imperial Eagles: Sweden’s Armed Forces during the Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars 1780–1820. Stockholm: Swedish Army Museum, 2000.
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  147. This collection of well-researched essays covers Sweden’s political and security situation as well as military organization; excellent starting point for further research, but the tome’s brevity precludes in-depth analysis.
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  149. Schinkel, Bernt von. Minnen ur Sveriges Nyare Historia. 8 vols. Stockholm: Norstedt & Söner, 1855.
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  151. Schinkel was one of Bernadotte’s adjutants so the text is inclined in Bernadotte’s favor, but the author includes a wealth of valuable correspondence.
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  153. Swederus, G. Schwedens Politik und Kriege in den Jahren 1808 bis 1814. 2 vols. Leipzig: Fleischer, 1866.
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  155. A useful counterpoint to Prussian, Russian, and French historians of the early 19th century, but the author’s passion and disinclination to examine Bernadotte’s actions critically mar the analysis; helpfully includes a number of archival documents; Volume 2 covers Leipzig.
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  157. Tingsten, Lars Herman. Huvuddragen av Sveriges Krig och Yttre Politik August 1813–Januari 1814. Stockholm: Norstedt & Söners, 1925.
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  159. Now dated, but provides the most recent substantive narrative and analysis of Leipzig from a Swedish historian.
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  161. French-Language Histories
  162.  
  163. The French army undertook an exhaustive research and publishing program on the Napoleonic Wars during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, producing invaluable collections of original reports and statistics on the wars of 1805, 1806–1807, 1809, 1812, and early 1813. The First World War intervened before this program had finished the autumn campaigns of 1813, however, and this sort of splendid research asset does not exist for the Battle of Leipzig. Nor is there a comprehensive “official history” such as those several French authors prepared for the spring battles of 1813, Lützen and Bautzen. Fortunately, Berthier 1909a and Berthier 1909b give unparalleled insight into French strategy and operations as well as the inner workings of Grande Armée as they present the daily correspondence of Napoleon’s chief of staff, Marshal Alexander Berthier. On the other hand, until recently, there have been few well-rounded, complete histories of the Battle of Nations as such; most military analyses, such as Clément 2005 and Thiry 1972, embrace the entire war in 1813. Pelet 1826 is extremely valuable as it stems from the pen of an accomplished military historian who participated in the campaign as a brigade commander in the Imperial Guard and had full access to the French War Archives in his postwar career. His work, however, requires somewhat arduous pursuit of its various installments in the Spectateur Militaire of the 1820s and his admiration for Napoleon inhibits some of his analysis. Marmont 1857, though a self-serving memoir tainted by his later abandonment of Napoleon, provides the observations of an intelligent, experienced soldier who played a key role in the battle. Recent French scholarship, on the other hand, has produced three fine books focused on the battle. Bruyère-Ostells 2013 does not proffer a detailed account of the fighting, but his thoughtful analysis rejects the notion of Leipzig as a “battle of peoples,” that is, a popular uprising of the German people against Napoleon and portrays it instead as the “revenge” of Europe’s monarchs. Similarly, while acknowledging the gargantuan scale of the battle, he does not accept the equivalence sometimes drawn between Leipzig and the industrialized brutality of the First World War. Drawing on extensive archival research, Calvet 2013 adopts a “face of battle” approach to Leipzig in the style of John Keegan’s classic study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (John Keegan, The Face of Battle, New York: Penguin, 1983). The best battle history in any language is Colson 2013. Grounded in comprehensive research in French archives, the analysis is bolstered by excursions into Austrian, German, and Russian archives as well as exploitation of the available Prussian material and an impressive grasp of the published primary sources and secondary literature.
  164.  
  165. Berthier, Alexander. Rapports du Maréchal Berthier à l’Empereur pendant la Campagne de 1813. 2 vols. Paris: R. Chapelot & Cie, 1909a.
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  167. These reports to Napoleon from his chief of staff, often multiple times each day, address everything from strategy to filling regimental officer billets, outlining the emperor’s scope of responsibilities as well as uncovering one of his most important sources of information; Leipzig is in Volume 2.
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  169. Berthier, Alexander. Registre d’Ordres du Maréchal Berthier à l’Empereur pendant la Campagne de 1813. 2 vols. Paris: R. Chapelot & Cie, 1909b.
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  171. Containing Berthier’s outgoing orders and messages to all elements of the army, these volumes supply irreplaceable data for understanding French operations; Leipzig is in Volume 2.
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  173. Bruyère-Ostells, Walter. Leipzig 16–19 Octobre 1813: La revanche de l’Europe des Souverains sur Napoléon. Paris: Tallandier, 2013.
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  175. Though arising from limited source material, this is a thoughtful modern analysis of the battle and its place in history, both political and military: argues that Leipzig was a battle of monarchs not peoples and rejects the notion the battle prefigures World War One.
  176. Find this resource:
  177. Calvet, Stéphane. Leipzig, 1813: La Guerre des Peuples. Paris: Vendémiaire, 2013.
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  179. A “face of battle” approach founded on extensive work in French archives; though sample size of some data sets is relatively small, this unprecedented research confirms some common assumptions (drastic impact of sickness on army strength) while calling others into question (presumed youth of the French soldiery for example).
  180. Find this resource:
  181. Clément, G. Napoléon en Allemagne: La Campagne de 1813. Paris: Le Livre Chez Vous, 2005.
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  183. A lavishly illustrated reprint of Clément’s rare 1904 study that includes numerous orders of battle not present in the original; though not annotated, it presents a clear picture of military operations from a French perspective.
  184. Find this resource:
  185. Colson, Bruno. Leipzig: La Bataille des Nations. 16–19 Octobre 1813. Paris: Perrin, 2013.
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  187. The best single-volume military history of the battle; comprehensive exploitation of French archival sources along with select Austrian, Russian, Prussian, and German material; however, begins abruptly with the battle and does not provide the context of the preceding campaign.
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  189. Marmont, Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de. Mémoires du Duc de Raguse de 1792 à 1832. 9 vols. Paris: Perrotin, 1857.
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  191. Marmont commanded a corps at Leipzig and his memoirs, though self-serving, offer insights of an intelligent, experienced soldier as well as some select correspondence; 1813 is in Volume 5.
  192. Find this resource:
  193. Pelet, Jean-Jacques. “Les principales opérations de la Campagne de 1813.” Spectateur Militaire 1 (1826): 48–61, 158–182, 246–276, 343–367, 457–488.
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  195. Continues in 2 (1827): 20–46, 152–193, 305–340, 517–550; and 4 (1828): 35–54. Pelet’s incisive mind, personal experiences in the field, access to the French War Archives, and extensive correspondence with veterans make his work invaluable, but his admiration of Napoleon and suspicion of France’s allies warrant a degree of caution in weighing some of his judgments.
  196. Find this resource:
  197. Thiry, Jean. Leipzig: 30 June–7 November 1813. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1972.
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  199. Well-written account of the war and battle, but military detail is sparse; bibliography notwithstanding, seems to make minimal use of archival material, drawing instead almost exclusively on published French sources.
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  201. French Allies at Leipzig
  202.  
  203. As had been increasingly the case since the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund) in 1806, the Grande Armée at Leipzig included a host of allied contingents. The most numerous of these were Poles from the Duchy of Warsaw (a political entity nominally under the King of Saxony’s scepter), followed by Saxons, Italians (Napoleon was King of Italy), and many of the Rheinbund states as well as a congeries of others. Combat, sickness, and varying degrees of desertion had reduced many of the satellite contingents to tiny remnants by the time they assembled at Leipzig (rather than its previous 9,200 men, the Württemberg “division,” for instance, could barely assemble a regiment of 1,200), but most of these troops performed well, if not brilliantly during the battle. A Württemberg cavalry brigade under General Karl von Normann and a large portion of the Saxon contingent defected to the Coalition Allies on 18 October, however, affording some French participants and subsequent historians a ready if specious excuse for the defeat. Larrass 1906 covers the Saxon issue in detail, while Duvernoy 1907 provides a thorough and sympathetic analysis of the Württemberg brigade changing sides. In a carefully researched work, on the other hand, Pfister 1897 examines the entire Württemberg contingent during course of the war and also offers insights into the general attitudes of other Rheinbund contingents based on reports in the Württemberg archives. Some French also condemned the Baden and Hessian contingents for poor behavior during the final defense of Leipzig’s walls on 19 October. Sauzey 1987 and Sauzey 1988 evince considerable understanding and sensitivity in describing the circumstances of the Baden and Hessian contingents, respectively. For troops outside the Confederation of the Rhine, see Ferrari and Giacchi 1914 for Italy and Łukasiewicz 1986 for Poland. Both of these contingents deserve more thorough research and analysis. Chapters by Jaroslaw Czubaty, John H. Gill, and Frederick C. Schneid in Fremont-Barnes 2011 offer comprehensive introductions to the armies of the Duchy of Warsaw (Poles), the Rheinbund, and the Kingdom of Italy, respectively.
  204.  
  205. Duvernoy, Maximilian von. “Die Württembergische Kavalleriebrigade Normann im Feldzuge 1813.” Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt (1907): 347–370.
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  207. Based on research in state archives, family papers, and other primary material, presents a sympathetic account of Normann’s painful decision to desert the French.
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  209. Ferrari, Giuseppe, and Niccolo Giacchi. Gli Italiani in Germania nel 1813. Città di Castello, Italy: Unione Arti Grafiche, 1914.
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  211. Published by the General Staff’s History Office, this work provides a thorough military history of the Italian involvement in Germany during 1813, including a number of official reports.
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  213. Fremont-Barnes, Gregory, ed. Armies of the Napoleonic Wars. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2011.
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  215. An edited volume comprised of comprehensive introductions to the armies of the era with careful attention to the often-neglected French allies; includes suggestions for further reading.
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  217. Larrass, Johannes Anton. “Zur Beurteilung der Überführung Königlich sächsicher Truppen zu den Verbündeten bei Leipzig am 18. Oktober 1813.” Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt (1906): 385–405.
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  219. Thoroughly researched and clearly presented, this gives a detailed account of the Saxon defection during the battle, including a reasonable estimate of the numbers of troops involved.
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  221. Łukasiewicz, Mariusz. Armia Księcia Józefa 1813. Warsaw, Poland: Ministry of National Defense, 1986.
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  223. Founded on detailed research, including Polish and French archives, this history of the Polish troops in 1813 contains an extensive discussion of their role at Leipzig.
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  225. Pfister, Albert. Aus dem Lager des Rheinbundes 1812 und 1813. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1897.
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  227. Comprehensive research and thoughtful analysis make this one of the most rewarding histories of a Confederation contingent (in this case Württemberg) within the context of the larger war and the political-social turmoil sweeping through Germany.
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  229. Sauzey, Jean Camille Abel Fleuri. Les Allemands sous les Aigles Françaises. Vol. 2, Le Contingent Badois. Paris: Terana, 1987.
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  231. Sauzey’s objective treatment of the Baden contingent is an excellent starting point for deeper research; this is a reprint of the 1904 edition.
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  233. Sauzey, Jean Camille Abel Fleuri. Les Allemands sous les Aigles Françaises. Vol. 6, Les Soldats de Hesse et de Nassau. Paris: Terana, 1988.
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  235. Information on the smaller Rheinbund contingents such as that of Hesse-Darmstadt can be difficult to unearth, making Sauzey’s tome a reliable first stop for further investigation; this is a reprint of the 1912 edition.
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  237. Saxony at Leipzig
  238.  
  239. Given that the battle occurred on Saxon soil in and around one of its major urban centers, it is hardly surprising that it has attracted close attention from Saxon historians over the subsequent 200 years. Interest in Saxony is accentuated by the peculiar circumstances of 1813, when the kingdom was allied with France as a member of Napoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund) and several thousand Saxon soldiers were thus on the field at Leipzig fighting on Napoleon’s behalf. Although some remained loyal to the French emperor through the end of the struggle, many of these men defected to the Allies on the third day of the battle (18 October), thereby handing the French a convenient excuse for the defeat. Moreover, the Saxon king, Friedrich August, was in the city during the fighting and remained there after Napoleon’s departure on the 19th to become a prisoner of the victorious Allies. As was the case with Prussia, several Saxon officers wrote first-class histories of the battle and the participation of the Saxon contingent in the 1813 campaigns: the authors of Cerrini de Monte Varchi 1821, Aster 1852–1853, and Funck 1930 all add their often pointed personal observations and sentiments to solid historical accounts. Larrass 1906 offers the most complete, albeit sympathetic, review of the Saxon defection on 18 October. Among more recent studies, Gülich 2008 portrays the organization of the army in 1813 after its drastic restructuring in 1810, while Töppel 2008 is an exhaustively researched book that addresses the crucial question of Saxon attitudes towards the French alliance both in the army and within the civilian population. Bonnefons 1902, though weakened by the absence of source notes, is a thoughtful, sympathetic portrayal of Saxony’s King Friedrich August and his painfully precarious situation in 1813. Intended more for the general public but still useful for the historical researcher is Walz, et al. 2008, a lively local history tracing Napoleon’s path through the former kingdom.
  240.  
  241. Aster, Karl Heinrich. Die Gefechte und Schlachten bei Leipzig im October 1813. 2 vols. Dresden, Germany: Arnold, 1852–1853.
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  243. Though not always smoothly assembled, this is a valuable study by a diligent former Saxon artillery officer drawing on research in Prussian and Austrian archives as well as diaries and verbal accounts from veterans and local inhabitants.
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  245. Bonnefons, André. Un allié de Napoléon: Frédéric-Auguste, Premier Roi de Saxe et Grand-Duc de Varsovie. Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1902.
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  247. A thoughtful, sympathetic portrayal of the Saxon king drawing on French and Saxon archives, but weakened by the lack of source notes; Leipzig is covered in Chapter 14.
  248. Find this resource:
  249. Cerrini de Monte Varchi, Clemens Franz Xaver von. Die Feldzüge der Sachsen in den Jahren 1812 und 1813. Dresden, Germany: Arnold, 1821.
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  251. A competent history by an officer who served in the Saxon contingent, it thus reflects the sentiments among officers and men torn between conflicting loyalties.
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  253. Funck, Ferdinand von. In Russland und in Sachsen 1812–1815. Dresden, Germany: Verlag C. Heinrich, 1930.
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  255. Trenchant insights into Saxony’s predicament during the war by an observant senior general who opposed the defection to the Allies at Leipzig.
  256. Find this resource:
  257. Gülich, Wolfgang. Die Sächsische Armee zur Zeit Napoleons: Die Reorganisation von 1810. 2d ed. Beucha, Germany: Sax-Verlag, 2008.
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  259. Very thorough analysis of the major changes instituted in 1810 to transform the Saxon army along French lines; sets the background, structure, and strength for the army at Leipzig.
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  261. Larrass, Johannes Anton. “Zur Beurteilung der Überführung Königlich sächsicher Truppen zu den Verbündeten bei Leipzig am 18. Oktober 1813.” Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt (1906): 385–405.
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  263. Thoroughly researched and well presented, this gives a detailed account of the Saxon defection during the battle, including a reasonable estimate of the numbers of troops involved.
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  265. Töppel, Roman. Die Sachsen und Napoleon: Ein Stimmungsbild 1806–1813. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2008.
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  267. Extraordinarily well-researched study of Saxon public and military attitudes towards the French alliance, including changes over time and the crisis in 1813.
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  269. Walz, Dieter, Reinhard Münch, and Wolf-Dieter Schmidt. Auf Napoleons Spuren durchs Sachsenland im Kriegsjahr 1813. Leipzig: Passage-Verlag, 2008.
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  271. A useful guide to key sites of operational importance during 1813, this well-illustrated tome provides contemporary and modern images of important places along with eyewitness accounts and insightful local history.
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  273. English-Language Histories
  274.  
  275. Despite its significance and inherent interest from both the military and political perspectives, the Battle of Leipzig has drawn only marginal attention from historians writing in English. As with those writing in other languages, most Anglophone studies approach the battle as part of the larger war, with the most recent, analytical, and best-researched being Leggiere 2002. The earlier histories Maude 1908 and Petre 1912 remain useful, however, for the insightful observations these two soldier-authors bring to the subject. Written by another serving British officer, Riley 2000 presents Leipzig and the various campaigns in Germany as part of what he describes as a “world war” in 1813, under which rubric he includes the combat in Spain and North America. Riley stresses the importance of coalitions in 1813, both on the Allied side and between Napoleon and his collection of satellite states. From a historiographical standpoint, the works by Maude, Petre, and Riley also illuminate the contemporary concerns of the British officer corps: the first two just before the First World War and the third in the period of NATO intervention in Bosnia and elsewhere. Nafziger 1996 is the most complete work in English on the battle itself. This has become the standard reference for the order of battle on both sides, but the book’s organization and dense text does not always admit to easy understanding of the combat and command decisions. Bowden 1990 also provides large amounts of data supporting analysis of the French Army in 1813. In a lively narrative Smith 2001 also focuses specifically on the battle action, but this work consists largely of lengthy quotes from participants and contains some serious factual errors. Finally, Whinyates 1897 provides a concise summary of the participation by the British rocket battery, the death of its commander, and his subsequent memorialization.
  276.  
  277. Bowden, Scott. Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813. Chicago: Emperor’s, 1990.
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  279. Large amounts of organizational data support analysis of the French Army in 1813 along with a campaign narrative.
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  281. Leggiere, Michael V. Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002.
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  283. Though focused on Napoleon’s concerns with the Prussian capital, this thoroughly researched volume includes a trenchant assessment of Leipzig including Napoleon’s strategic challenges and the deep fissures between the senior Allied leaders.
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  285. Maude, Frederic N. The Leipzig Campaign 1813. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908.
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  287. Thoroughly exploited the resources available at the time to present a thoughtful single-volume campaign analysis stressing themes of leadership and the natures of the armies, above all Napoleon and his Grande Armée.
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  289. Nafziger, George. Napoleon at Leipzig: The Battle of Nations 1813. Chicago: Emperor’s, 1996.
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  291. Diligent research, especially in French archives, has produced the current standard reference for the forces engaged.
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  293. Petre, Francis Lorraine. Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany: 1813. London: The Bodley Head, 1912.
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  295. Though dated, this book is well written and was well researched for its day; still provides an insightful single-volume overview of the war with particular focus on strategic decisions; poor maps detract from its value.
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  297. Riley, Jonathan P. Napoleon and the World War of 1813 Leipzig: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
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  299. Pursuing the theme of coalition warfare, expands the scope of analysis to embrace Spain and North America and addresses Napoleon’s coalition challenges as well as those faced by the Allies.
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  301. Smith, Digby. 1813 Leipzig: Napoleon and the Battle of Nations. London: Greenhill, 2001.
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  303. A lively popular history of the battle consisting largely of lengthy quotes from participants and eyewitnesses, but marred by serious factual errors.
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  305. Whinyates, Francis Arthur. “Captain Bogue and the Rocket Brigade.” Minutes of the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution 24 (1897): 131–136.
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  307. Details the actions of the lone British unit in the battle, a battery of rocket artillery commanded by Captain Richard Bogue; Bogue was killed in the fighting on 18 October.
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  309. Eyewitness Accounts
  310.  
  311. The Battle of Leipzig immediately generated an extraordinary number of first-person accounts by non-soldiers from a fairly broad swath of the population. In part this explosion of eyewitness reports resulted from the sheer scale of the battle and the contemporary recognition of its historical significance. In part, however, it may have been because the fighting occurred in a large, prosperous commercial town situated in a productive region where the level of literacy may have been higher than in other parts of Europe that were the scenes of major engagements. Moreover, a desire to memorialize the Allied victory became evident almost as soon as the fighting stopped and there was clearly a market for personal stories stemming from the struggle. One of the earliest and most frequently reprinted was Hussell 1814. First published anonymously in 1813, by March 1814 it was in its third edition. English and French translations also appeared during 1814 and it has been reissued periodically ever since. Many other accounts, however, initially appeared in obscure newspapers, periodicals, or commemorative pamphlets that are now difficult to locate. Fortunately, a number have been captured and republished in whole or in part in anthologies such as Börner 1988, Graf 1991, and Nabert 2012. There is some unavoidable overlap between Börner and Graf, but the variety of sources is rich enough that the limited duplication does not detract from either collection. Meissner 2001 is notable as it is the complete diary of a merchant with excellent annotation. Collecting a number of these personal accounts, Hagemann 2009 uses Leipzig as a case study to examine how warfare conducted by mass armies directly affected the everyday lives of local citizens living in and around the city. Brett-James 1970 presents a wide array of voices, principally combatants, in a lightly edited volume. Bertin 1896 consists of a collection of French-language accounts with no commentary; almost all those represented here are soldiers and most are French, but this volume also contains important insights from two key Russian generals who wrote in French. In addition to their inherent value as sources of personal recollections concerning the battle, the extracts supplied in these volumes can guide researchers to seek the original texts for additional insights and more extensive observations from the participants. They can thus help new scholars navigate the wide ocean of memoir literature from the Napoleonic era.
  312.  
  313. Bertin, Georges, ed. La Campagne de 1813 d’après les Témoins Oculaires. Paris: Flammarion, 1896.
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  315. Covers the entire war but includes a substantial section on Leipzig, albeit almost entirely from French military memoirs; notable for extended citations from two memoirs by Russian generals (in French); lack of annotation is a drawback.
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  317. Börner, Karl-Heinz, ed. Vor Leipzig 1813: Die Völkerschlacht in Augenzeugenberichten. Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1988.
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  319. A wide mix of military and civilian eyewitness ranging from senior commanders and junior officers of all nationalities to common citizens of the local area; while the German, Austrian, and Russian entries are enlightening, the author’s choices among French memoirists selected are much less felicitous.
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  321. Brett-James, Antony, ed. Europe against Napoleon: The Leipzig Campaign 1813. London: Macmillan, 1970.
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  323. Title notwithstanding, this tome focuses almost entirely on Leipzig, presenting military and civilian viewpoints from all sides with sufficient commentary to explicate the circumstances surrounding each extract.
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  325. Graf, Gerhard, ed. Die Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig in zeitgenössischen Berichten. Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 1991.
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  327. In addition to first-hand recollections from citizens and soldiers, this tome includes extracts from newspapers, sermons offering thanks in the aftermath of the battle, and the lyrics of several patriotic songs; thorough annotations enhance the volume.
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  329. Hagemann, Karen. “‘Unimaginable Horror and Misery’: The Battle of Leipzig in October 1813 in Civilian Experience and Perception.” In Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820. Edited by Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Randall, 157–178. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
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  331. Using Leipzig as a case study, this chapter examines numerous personal accounts to depict how warfare conducted by mass armies directly affected the everyday lives of local citizens living in and around the city.
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  333. Hussell, Christoph Heinrich Ludwig. Narrative of the Most Remarkable Events which Occurred in and near Leipzig immediately before, during, and subsequent to, the Sanguinary Series of Engagements between the Allied Armies and the French from the 14th to the 19th October, 1813. Edited by Frederic Shoberl. London: R. Ackermann, 1814.
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  335. In addition to Hussell’s account, English edition includes a letter from a Saxon nobleman forwarding manuscript to London publisher and relating the nobleman’s travails during the war; also valuable as an artifact of the anti-French vitriol prevalent in Britain at the time as evident in editor’s introduction.
  336. Find this resource:
  337. Meissner, Johann Carl. Leipzig 1813: Tagebuch und Erinnerungen an die Völkerschlacht. Edited by Holger Hamecher. Kassel, Germany: Verlag Hamecher, 2001.
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  339. As a diary, this work is especially valuable as it represents the immediate impressions recorded by a Leipzig merchant in the autumn of 1813; it is supplemented by diligent annotation.
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  341. Nabert, Thomas, ed. Zeugen des Schreckens: Erlebnisberichte aus der Völkerschlacht in und um Leipzig. Leipzig: Pro Leipzig, 2012.
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  343. Presenting well-annotated accounts from seven different male and female civilians, this volume also includes sketches of fifteen surrounding villages (or their ruins) made immediately after the battle.
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  345. Strategic Commentary
  346.  
  347. The massive scale of the forces involved, the scope of territory covered, the significance of the results, and the dramatic outcome have led many commentators to analyze the Battle of Leipzig and the antecedent campaign through the lens of military theory seeking to explicate the decisive defeat of one of history’s greatest captains. Authors such as Jean-Jacques Pelet are inclined to overlook Napoleon’s strategic errors and have sought their explanations in the numerical advantages enjoyed by his enemies and the weaknesses immanent in his newly constructed Grande Armée; see Pelet 1826. Others, similarly disposed towards the emperor, continue to express admiration for his military combinations while lamenting his manifold failures in the political realm. Auguste-Antoine Grouard, like many later writers, found these interpretations biased and inadequate; see Grouard 1897. Much of the discussion revolves around Napoleon’s use of a strategy of “interior lines” or “central position,” that is, placing his numerically inferior army in a central position from which it could strike out to repulse or defeat the divided forces of his numerically superior foes one by one. Antoine-Henri Jomini, one of the seminal interpreters of Napoleon (he was a participant in the 1813 campaigns first as a French officer, then as an advisor to the tsar), placed great weight on the virtues of this strategy; see Jomini 1862. Grouard, elaborating on Jomini, argues that Napoleon’s conception of strategy based on these principles was perfectly sound, but that the faults lay in execution. Similarly, Camon 1891 provides a detailed background to this strategy, explaining the defeat by citing a general decline in Napoleon’s subordinates combined with significant improvements among his enemies. The other early interpreter of Napoleon, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz, was also a veteran of 1813 but did not compose a history of the campaigns as he did for 1812 and other conflicts. Freytag-Loringhoven 1908, however, carefully compiles Clausewitz’s writings as they apply to the strategic decisions leading up Leipzig and adds the author’s own trenchant analysis. Yorck von Wartenburg 2005, long used as a textbook by western military educational systems, is a classic study of the strategic situations in Napoleon’s wars. It is now dated but remains valuable for the initiate and professional alike for its balanced assessments and introduction to key terminology. Leggiere 2002 highlights what the author perceives as the French emperor’s obsession with a geographical objective, namely Berlin, at the expense of his habitual focus on the enemy army. Telp 2005 contributes an updated study using the operational level of war as his analytic lens to create a broad comparison of the French and Prussian armies and their actions during 1813.
  348.  
  349. Camon, Hubert. “Campagne de 1813: Pourquoi Napoléon a Été Vaincu à Leipzig.” Journal des Sciences Militaires 43 (1891): 173–193, 437–456.
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  351. Continues in 44 (1891): 57–83, 172–190; and 45 (1892): 86–108, 109–229. Crisp analysis of the campaign and battle that explains the defeat by citing a general decline in Napoleon’s subordinates combined with significant improvements among his enemies.
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  353. Freytag-Loringhoven, Hugo Freiherr von. Kriegslehren nach Clausewitz aus den Feldzügen 1813 und 1814. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1908.
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  355. Thoughtful application of Clausewitz’s theoretical writings to the strategic situation in the autumn of 1813 leading up to Leipzig; includes the author’s own insights as well as comments on Jomini as compared to Clausewitz.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. Grouard, Auguste-Antoine. La Campagne d’Automne de 1813 et les Lignes Intérieures. Paris: L. Baudoin, 1897.
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  359. Objective analysis arguing that a strategy of interior lines was appropriate in the autumn of 1813, but that Napoleon failed to master the challenges involved in executing it.
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  361. Jomini, Antoine-Henri. The Art of War. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862.
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  363. Extensive and early discussion of “interior lines” and the strategy of the “central position,” arguing that Napoleon’s failure at Leipzig does not diminish the value of the strategy.
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  365. Leggiere, Michael V. Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002.
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  367. Thoroughly researched volume that focuses on Napoleon’s concerns with the Prussian capital but includes a trenchant assessment of Leipzig including Napoleon’s strategic challenges and the deep fissures between the senior Allied leaders.
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  369. Pelet, Jean-Jacques. “Les principales opérations de la Campagne de 1813.” Spectateur Militaire 1 (1826): 48–61, 158–182, 246–276, 343–367, 457–488.
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  371. Continues in 2 (1827): 20–46, 152–193, 305–340, 517–550; and 4 (1828): 35–54. Though invaluable in many respects, Pelet’s admiration of Napoleon and suspicion of France’s allies undermines many of his judgments on the emperor’s strategy in 1813.
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  373. Telp, Claus. The Evolution of the Operational Art, 1740–1813: From Frederick the Great to Napoleon. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
  374. DOI: 10.4324/9780203339954Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  375. Uses the operational level of war as an analytic lens to create a broad comparison of the French and Prussian armies and their maneuvers during 1813, but addresses the other Allies only in passing.
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  377. Yorck von Wartenburg, Maximilian von. Napoleon as a General. 2 vols. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
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  379. Long a standard textbook in western military educational systems, this classic study offers balanced assessments and introduces key terminology; though now dated, it remains a useful introductory text for students and continues to have value for the professional as well.
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  381. Coalition Warfare
  382.  
  383. The battle and campaign of Leipzig form a classic laboratory for examining the problems of coalition warfare. Most analytic attention has been concentrated on the Allied side where three major monarchies (Austria, Russia, and Prussia) put large armies in the field along with a smaller contribution by Sweden. Bernadotte, however, played an important role in Allied councils, complicating them by his inhibitions and expectations as Crown Prince of Sweden and by his history as a marshal of France. All of these actors had differing views of the war, its prosecution, and the desired outcomes. Dwyer 2008 highlights the fundamental importance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the first time forming a true united front against Napoleon. He emphasizes Austria’s role and the central part played by Chancellor Clemens von Metternich in achieving this fragile unity. These continental powers, however, also had to consider London. Although Britain had almost no forces on the ground in Germany in 1813, it was the banker and arms supplier upon which all of the Allies relied and its voice was thus a crucial factor in Allied strategy (Muir 1996). These coalition problems are addressed, at least peripherally, in many works on 1813, but several specialized studies deserve particular notice. Craig 1965, in a nuanced analysis, focuses on the Allies, stressing how they coped with problems of command and control, conflicting war aims, matching political goals to military operations, and exerting adequate political control over military commanders. Riley 2000 not only broadens the scope of analysis to include Spain and North America but also considers a challenge often overlooked: the difficulties Napoleon faced as the leader of a coalition. The latter aspect is often ignored given Napoleon’s overwhelming authority vis-à-vis his satellites and nominal allies. It is important to remember, however, that he too had a coalition to manage and that imperial diktat, especially in 1813, was not always sufficient to achieve his ends. Vitzthum von Eckstädt 1910 also addresses both Allies and Napoleon. In his detailed examination of the various headquarters, the author moves beyond the dominant personalities of the monarchs and senior commanders to assess the functioning of the chief headquarters during the autumn of 1813, includes organizational tables listing the principal members of each staff.
  384.  
  385. Craig, Gordon. “Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance against Napoleon 1813–1814.” In Harmon Memorial Lectures Number Seven. Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1965.
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  387. An incisive assessment of the problems the Allies faced in command and control, conflicting war aims, matching political goals to military operations, and exerting adequate political control over military commanders.
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  389. Dwyer, Philip G. “Self-Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria, Prussia and Russia against Napoleon.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31.4 (August 2008): 605–632.
  390. DOI: 10.1080/01402390802088440Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  391. An insightful essay that illuminates the obstacles the Allies had to overcome to form a united front against Napoleon in 1813; pays particular attention to Austria and the role of Chancellor Clemens von Metternich in achieving this relative unity.
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  393. Muir, Rory. Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807–1815. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.
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  395. Though naturally focused on Britain’s direct involvement in the Iberian Peninsula, this sweeping, well-researched history provides essential background to London’s role in supporting the Allied campaigns in Germany in 1813 despite the lack of a significant British troop presence.
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  397. Riley, Jonathan P. Napoleon and the World War of 1813 Leipzig: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
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  399. Pursues the theme of coalition warfare by expanding the scope of analysis to embrace Spain and North America and addresses Napoleon’s coalition challenges as well as those faced by the Allies.
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  401. Vitzthum von Eckstädt, Karl Graf. Die Hauptquartiere im Herbstfeldzuge 1813 auf dem deutschen Kriegsschauplatze. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1910.
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  403. Moves beyond the dominant personalities of the monarchs and senior commanders to assess the functioning of the chief headquarters during the autumn of 1813; includes organizational tables listing the principal members of each staff.
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  405. Leipzig and the Wars of Liberation in Memory
  406.  
  407. Beyond its political-military significance, the Battle of Leipzig has been a central feature in the evolution of German national consciousness. The meaning of the battle, and of the Wars of Liberation more generally, however, has often been contested. Though commonly celebrated as the apotheosis of German nationalism, two broad interpretations emerged almost as soon as the combat had ceased. Ruling elites, particularly in Prussia, portrayed it as a military triumph and reaffirmation of the existing order: led by their princes, Germans had evicted a foreign occupier; Prussia had resumed its proper place as a major power in Europe and taken a critical step towards asserting itself as the undisputed leader inside Germany. Others, seeking a more liberal political dispensation, cast the battle and the wars as a process of opening the door to new means of popular participation in governance. The eviction of Napoleon was to initiate a hopeful era of renewal in Germany. Leipzig thus became a battleground of a different sort in the internal German struggle to shape the memory of the wars against Napoleon and Germany’s political future. The tensions between the Wilhelmine monarchy and popular movements were in especially sharp evidence during the centennial events at Leipzig in 1913 when the great Völkerschlachtdenkmal (Battle of Nations Monument) was inaugurated. The literature on this collection of issues is vast, but the works cited here outline the central questions and serve as starting points for further investigation. Of first importance is Schäfer 2001, a comprehensive chapter that concisely summarizes the interpretations applied to the battle and its iconic monument. Not only are Hagemann 2006 and Clark 2006 excellent introductions to this field, but they also highlight the importance of the Wars of Liberation to the forms that Prusso-German nationalism took in subsequent years. Planert 2007, grounded in phenomenal research, explores the “mythos of the Wars of Liberation,” drawing important distinctions between Prussian reactions to the war and views in southern Germany. Clark 1996 probes the extent of efforts by private citizens to commemorate the battle during the early 19th century and contrasts these with state-sponsored interpretations. Smith 2000 looks at the “festive year” of 1913 to argue that the monarchy largely failed to turn major celebrations to its advantage. Dorpalen 1969 summarizes the view from Communist East Germany with its general emphasis on Leipzig and the Wars of Liberation as manifestations of the popular masses as the driving force of history. Schweitzer 2010 addresses an important but underappreciated aspect of the battles in memory: its reception in France from Napoleon’s last days through the Bourbon restoration to the reign of Napoleon III.
  408.  
  409. Clark, Christopher. “The Wars of Liberation in Prussian Memory: Reflections on the Memorialization of War in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany.” The Journal of Modern History 68.3 (September 1996): 550–576.
  410. DOI: 10.1086/245342Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  411. Examines the ways in which leading private citizens from Prussia (and other German states) attempted to promote non-monumental memorializations of the Wars of Liberation centered on 18 October in the immediate postwar years; contrasts these efforts to state-sponsored dynastic commemorations.
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  413. Clark, Christopher. Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of Prussia, 1600–1947. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006.
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  415. Monumental history of Prussia that includes comprehensive analysis of the Wars of Liberation and the political utility of their commemoration; superb introduction to the key issues.
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  417. Dorpalen, Andreas. “The German Struggle against Napoleon: The East German View.” The Journal of Modern History 41.4 (December 1969): 485–516.
  418. DOI: 10.1086/240444Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  419. Thorough review of how East German writings on the Wars of Liberation stressed key Communist themes, but noting that East German historians also unearthed important information and shed new light on aspects of the wars against Napoleon.
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  421. Hagemann, Karen. “Occupation, Mobilization, and Politics: The Anti-Napoleonic Wars in Prussian Experience, Memory, and Historiography.” Central European History 39.4 (December 2006): 580–610.
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  423. Excellent introduction to the literature and issues of nationalism and memory regarding the Wars of Liberation, stressing the anti-French themes fundamental to the promoted forms of Prussian nationalism; rich material in the extensive footnotes.
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  425. Planert, Ute. Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg: Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden: Alltag, Wahrnehmung, Deutung 1792–1841. Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007.
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  427. Explores the “mythos of the War of Liberation”; distinguishes between Prussian interpretations and views in southern Germany that tended to be both milder and determinedly particularlist; intensively researched with an exceptionally wide-ranging bibliography.
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  429. Schäfer, Kirstin Anne. “Die Völkerschlacht.” In Deutsche Erinnerungs-Orte. Vol. 2. Edited by Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, 187–201. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2001.
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  431. This comprehensive chapter concisely summarizes the interpretations applied to the battle and its iconic monument from 1814 to the beginning of the 21st century.
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  433. Schweitzer, Jérôme. “Leipzig: Mythes, lectures et relectures d’une bataille napoléonienne en France et en Allemagne (1813–1871).” Masters thesis, École des Chartes, 2010.
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  435. Unusual for addressing French views of the battle, traces the shifting interpretations from Napoleon’s last days through the Bourbon restoration to the reign of Napoleon III.
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  437. Smith, Jeffrey R. “The Monarchy versus the Nation: The “Festive Year” 1913 in Wilhelmine Germany.” German Studies Review 23.2 (May 2000): 257–274.
  438. DOI: 10.2307/1432674Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  439. Argues that the monarchy attempted to turn major celebrations to its advantage but enjoyed limited success overall and largely failed at Leipzig where tensions between the regime and the increasingly politically conscious public appeared in sharp relief.
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  441. The Völkerschlachtdenkmal, Grandiose Monument to the Battle
  442.  
  443. Plans to memorialize the “Battle of Nations” emerged almost as soon as the guns were silent. Some prominent nationalists began calling for a major memorial as early as 1814, but the monuments, plaques, and other memorials that pepper the battlefield today did not begin to appear until the mid-1800s. As a result of these efforts and some more modern supplements, Leipzig is now dotted with over 120 monuments, more than any other Napoleonic battlefield. Political considerations influenced commemoration from the earliest years. As Poser 1998 notes, Saxons, for instance, initially looked on the victory more in terms of rescue from the danger of further destruction than as some grand triumph over Napoleon. The culmination of commemoration came in 1913 with the opening of the Völkerschlachtdenkmal (Battle of the Nations Monument) in a grand ceremony. The largest such monument in Europe when it was inaugurated, this cyclopean structure with its frowning Germanic statuary dominates the landscape southeast of the city’s center. As Hoffmann 1994 points out, the Denkmal combines the three main elements of pre–First World War “sacred monumentalism” in the patriotic organization that promoted it, the monument itself and the political meaning of the inaugural ceremonies. Schäfer 2001 uses the monument as a lens through which to examine the contending meanings assigned to the Wars of Liberation by those who hoped for greater political freedom within Germany and those who saw the wars solely as a means to evict Napoleon and unite Germany under Prussian monarchical leadership. Keller and Schmid 1995 explores the monument as an example of “historical culture” and the essays in their volume trace the various ways in which different political groups have ignored or manipulated the monument. Rodekamp 2003 is not merely a collection of thoughtful chapters on the Denkmal and its significance; the authors also detail its construction and the importance of the souvenir culture as an element of historical memory of the battle and the monument. Rodekamp 1999, essentially a condensed but comprehensively annotated catalog of the museum that sits at the foot of the Denkmal, is a useful adjunct to investigations of the battle in popular memory. Finally, as exemplified by Leipzig 1813–1913–2013: A Landmark of European History, the bicentenary of the battle in 2013 sparked a host of commemorative activities in and near Leipzig, including a complete refurbishment of the Denkmal. As with many other Revolutionary and Napoleonic bicentennials, these events stressed European unity through the commonality of shared experiences. The official website of the exhibition is the gateway to this view of the titanic struggle as “a great European festival.”
  444.  
  445. Hoffmann, Stefan-Ludwig. “Sakraler Monumentalismus um 1900: Das Leipziger Völkerschlachtdenkmal.” In Der politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne, Edited by Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, 187–201. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994.
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  447. Discusses the Denkmal as an expression of the main elements of pre–First World War “sacred monumentalism” in the patriotic organization that promoted it, the monument itself, and the political meaning of the inaugural ceremonies.
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  449. Keller, Katrin, and Hans-Dieter Schmid, eds. Vom Kult zur Kulisse: Das Völkerschlachtdenkmal als Gegenstand der Geschichtskultur. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlg, 1995.
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  451. A collection of chapters exploring the monument as an example of “historical culture” and the various ways in which different political groups have ignored or manipulated the monument for their own ends.
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  453. Leipzig 1813–1913–2013: A Landmark of European History.
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  455. This colorful, multilingual website records the commemorative events of the bicentennial in 2013, “a great European festival” with stress on European unity through the commonality of shared experiences; includes numerous photographs of the renovated monument.
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Poser, Steffen. Bis hierher sollst du kommen und nicht weiter; hier sollen sich legen deine stoltzen Wellen: Denkmale erzählen über die Leipziger Völkerschlacht. Beucha, Germany: Sax-Verlag, 1998.
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  459. Traces the battle and subsequent commemoration through examination of the more than 120 monuments and memorials scattered through the city and surrounding villages.
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  461. Rodekamp, Volker, ed. Völkerschlacht. Leipzig: Stadtgeschichtliches Museum Leipzig, 1999.
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  463. This booklet, essentially a compressed catalog for the museum at the base of the gargantuan monument, is comprehensively annotated, including brief essays as well as numerous illustrations of items that reflect the era of transition from Napoleonic dominance through the great battle to contested visions of Germany’s future.
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  465. Rodekamp, Volker, ed. Völkerschlachtdenkmal. Leipzig: Stadtgeschichtliches Museum Leipzig, 2003.
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  467. Among the fine essays collected in this lavishly illustrated volume, those outlining the reception of the battle and monument for political purposes are especially insightful; the descriptions of the monument’s founding, funding, and construction also illuminate the challenges inherent in commemorating a battle of such contested political significance.
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  469. Schäfer, Kirstin Anne. “Die Völkerschlacht.” In Deutsche Erinnerungs-Orte. Vol. 2. Edited by Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, 187–201. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2001.
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  471. Well-argued chapter uses the monument as a lens to examine the contending meanings assigned to the Wars of Liberation by those who hoped for greater political freedom within Germany and those who saw the wars as a means to evict Napoleon and unite Germany under Prussian leadership.
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