Georgia (International Law)

Introduction

The dissolution of the USSR at the end of December 1991 and the reunification of Germany were, without doubt, two of the most remarkable international events at the end of the 20th century. Analysis of the consequences of these events with respect to international law has proved challenging to international legal norms due to the fact that the kind of “micro cosmos” exemplified by these events served to highlight the principal sectors of international law. The consequences of the dismemberment of the USSR proved to be extensive and they were felt not only in Europe, but also in the rest of the world. The breakup of such a prominent strategic actor put an end to the restricted stability that characterized the bipolar nature of the Cold War. Thus, international society witnessed a period of instability in succeeding years marked by a renewed rise in issues such as the right of self-determination and the principle of uti possidetis. Therefore, events unfolding in the former Soviet Union, at times tedious and even tragic, led to the creation of a new international organization called the Commonwealth of Independent States, which tried to fill the “black hole” left by the breakup of the USSR as well as deal with the problems confronted by the successor states, notwithstanding its own deficiencies. Moreover, some disputes of a territorial, interethnic, or national character became very violent, such as those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in particular in Georgia. This article provides researchers with instruments to study the recurring problems in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008, and also treats the consequences of these crises in international law. Issues such as military operations, the cease-fire agreement, and the succeeding evolution of events are discussed. A section focuses specifically on important violations of international law that took place during the conflict, for which an international report was published. In addition, the consequences of the conflict are addressed with respect to NATO-Russia and EU-Russia relations while the effects of the conflict in the geostrategic and energy fields are also considered.

General Overviews

The accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the concepts of perestroika and glasnost to bloom and boosted the reemergence of nationalist movements among the diverse republics of the Soviet Union, in particular in Georgia. Apart from the Georgian nationalist movement that demanded secession from the USSR, secessionist movements also appeared in specific regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 30 November 1990 a referendum was held regarding independence in which approximately 90 percent of the population participated. Taking into account all the referenda held in the republics, the vote in favor of independence in Georgia registered 98.93 percent, which represented the second-highest percentage after that in Armenia. In consequence, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia proclaimed independence and appointed Zviad Gamsajurdia the new president of the Republic. Following a period of instability, which led to the dismissal and expulsion of Gamsajurdia in January 1992, the return of Eduard Shevardnadze, former minister of foreign affairs during the Gorbachev era, prompted big hopes for a country immersed in an economic and political crisis. Shevardnadze, who was designated president of the Council of the State, would later be validated as president of the Parliament by universal suffrage, thus becoming the highest authority figure in the country until the presidential elections of 1995. Shevardnadze attempted to take advantage of the prestige he had acquired in foreign affairs to advance recognition of Georgia by the international community. His efforts proved fruitful as the country joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as well as the United Nations. Nevertheless, the main focus of his work concerned the management of an increasingly grave internal crisis, including the incitement of uprisings supported by Gamsajurdia in western regions of Georgia and the rise of secessionist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This section provides an introduction to this article; therefore, the citations provide a general overview of the events surrounding the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of an independent Georgia. Weerts 1999 is cited regarding uti possidetis. Blanc Altemir 2003, Urjewicz 1995, and Forsyth 2013 analyze topics from diverse perspectives, including economic and social issues as well as taking into account international aspects. Additionally, Diasamidze 2008 summarizes the essence of the conflict in providing political and legal perspectives. Finally, Intskirveli 1996 treats the Constitution of newly independent Georgia, and Hille 2005 explores the kind of state most suitable in Georgia. See also Alexidze 2012.

Alexidze, Levan. International Law and Georgia, from Antiquity to Present: Selected Papers Published in 1957–2012. Edited by Keteva Khutsishvili. Tbilisi, GA: Tbilisi State University, 2012.
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The author of this work is the foremost authority in the field of international law in Georgia. Therefore, this collection represents a very valuable tool to study the problems with which Georgia has been struggling since its independence in 1991.
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Blanc Altemir, Antonio. Conflictos territoriales, interétnicos y nacionales en los estados surgidos de la antigua Unión Soviética. Valencia, Spain: Tirant lo Blanch, 2003.
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The author analyzes the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR, focusing mostly on territorial and interethnic conflicts. Therefore, it constitutes an excellent introductory reference to the topic. In Spanish.
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Diasamidze, Tamaz. Regional Conflicts in Georgia: The Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, the Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia, 1989–2011: The Collection of Political-Legal Acts. 2d ed. Tbilisi, GA: Regionalism Research Centre, 2008.
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This handbook includes the 802 most important political-legal documents dealing with developments in the conflicts in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Therefore, it represents a voluminous source of information regarding the conflicts.
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Forsyth, James. The Caucasus: A History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
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Forsyth analyzes the area from prehistory to the present. It is a very good tool by which to acquire an understanding of the roots of the conflict.
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Hille, Charlotte. “What Future Legal Status for Georgia?” Humanitäres Völkerrecht 18.1 (2005): 29–37.
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The first part of the article examines developments following the Rose Revolution, and the second analyzes what kind of state, whether unitary or federal, is the most suitable solution for Georgia.
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Intskirveli, G. Z. “The Constitution of Independent Georgia.” Review of Central and East European Law 22, 1 (1996): 1–8.
DOI: 10.1007/BF02743182Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This article constitutes an essential tool to acquire an understanding of the Constitution of Georgia immediately following independence.
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Urjewicz, Charles. “La Transcaucasie face aux fantômes de son passé: Le cas géorgien.” In Le Caucase post-soviétique: La transition dans le conflit. Edited by Mohammad-Reza Djalili, 35–47. Brussels: Bruylant, 1995.
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The author explains the evolution of domestic events in Georgia from an historical perspective. In French.
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Weerts, Laurence. “Heurs et malheurs du principe de l’uti possidetis: Les cas du démembrement de l’URSS.” In Démembrements d’états et délimitations territoriales. Edited by Oliver Corten, 79–142. Brussels: Bruylant, 1999.
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This edited volume is the result of a joint effort between specialists in international law and sociology. This chapter provides a very detailed analysis of the principle of uti possidetis with regard to the USSR.
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Recurring Problems from South Ossetia

Ossetia is a region that had been traditionally administered by Russia, not only during the 19th century when Armenia and Georgia were integrated into the Russian Empire, but also after the Sovietization of the Caucasus, a process in which the region played a very active role. In 1922, the autonomous region of South Ossetia was set up within the jurisdiction of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia and, two years later, the autonomous Republic of North Ossetia was founded within Russia. The different communities, primarily Ossetians and Georgians, who lived in the autonomous region of South Ossetia coexisted peacefully. However, at the end of the 1980s the demands by Georgian authorities for broader autonomy and the negative response that this provoked in the area of South Ossetia led to a progressive heightening of tensions. In September 1990 the federated Republic of South Ossetia proclaimed its independence from Georgia, followed by a call for legislative elections, which were boycotted by the Georgian minority. The Supreme Georgian Soviet overruled this decision and later dissolved the autonomous region, which resulting in outright civil war between the Ossetians and the Georgians. The intervention of Russian troops during the spring of 1991, a move made in direct support of the Ossetians, failed to halt the violence, which led to hundreds of casualties and thousands of refugees. Just before Georgia declared its own independence, coinciding with the ongoing process of dismemberment of the USSR, both parties signed an agreement in March 1991. In a compromise arrangement, they agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from South Ossetia, to progressively disarm the armed groups in the area, and to arrange for the return of the refugees. Nevertheless, signature of the agreement did not prevent the South Ossetian Parliament from proclaiming independence on 22 December 1991, which was supported in a referendum on 19 January 1992. Yakemtchouk 1993, Ilyin 2011, and Hewitt 2013 are excellent references to acquire a general understanding of the course of events in South Ossetia. The role played by the Russian Federation in the creation of the state and its efforts to retain influence there are dealt with in Summers 2012. Closson 2012 focuses on the challenges faced by those charged with creating the state. Finally, Garb 2010 addresses the conflict from an internal perspective, and the author treats the solidarity of Abkhazia with South Ossetia as a consequence of the conflict.

Closson, Stacy. “Georgia–South Ossetia Networks of Profit: Challenges to Statebuilding.” In Statebuilding and State-Formation: The Political Sociology of Intervention. Edited by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, 74–91. London: Routledge, 2012.
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The process of creating an independent state in a post-conflict atmosphere entails various requirements. The author focuses specifically on the challenges faced by South Ossetia.
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Garb, Paula. “The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze.” In War and Revolution in the Caucasus: Georgia Ablaze. Edited by Stephen F. Jones, 140–151. London: Routledge, 2010.
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The author offers a different perspective on the conflict, specifically one from Abkhazia, another region involved in a similar situation. Therefore, the added value of the chapter is that it reflects upon the solidarity of two parties, whose claims are similar, and the support they offered each other.
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Hewitt, B. George. Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian–South-Ossetian Conflicts. Eurasian Studies Library 3. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2013.
DOI: 10.1163/9789004248939Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author is a Georgian specialist and the aim of his work is to make Georgian sources to the conflict accessible to the rest of the scholarly community.
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Ilyin, Mikhail. “Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria: Secessions in the Post-Soviet Space.” In The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession. Edited by Aleksandar Pavković and Peter Radan, 529–534. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011.
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It is important to provide a study of the Russian approach to the issue and this Russian author offers a general review of the secession movement in South Ossetia.
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Summers, James. “Russia and Competing Spheres of Influence: The Case of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” In International Law in a Multipolar World. Edited by Matthew Happold, 91–113. London: Routledge, 2012.
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This chapter in an edited volume explains how the Russian Federation and the West try to retain their influence in the internal conflicts of Georgia.
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Yakemtchouk, Romain. “Les conflits de territoire et de frontière dans les états de l’ex URSS.” Annuaire français de droit international 39 (1993): 393–434.
DOI: 10.3406/afdi.1993.3136Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
In researching the origins and the first years of the conflict, this work by Yakemtchouk is essential because he dissects it in a multidisciplinary approach.
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Recurring Problems from Abkhazia

The region of Abkhazia, located in northeastern Georgia, suffered a considerable loss of population due to the expulsion of the Georgians and the ethnic cleansing that took place after the conflict of 1992. During the first half of the 19th century, Abkhazia was a protectorate of Russia. Three years after Georgia first proclaimed its independence (1918), the Soviet Republic of Abkhazia was founded, which later became an autonomous republic within Georgia. The Georgian government imposed a highly centralized regime that succeeded in provoking a certain degree of mistrust in the republic. At the same time, the central Soviet power supported the Abkhazian claims in a rather subliminal manner as, by so doing, it provided a means by which to impose Soviet control in Georgia. Following the declaration of sovereignty of Georgia in March 1990, Abkhazia did the same with respect to Georgia in August 1990, which led to heightened tension. Abkhazia insisted on its secessionist demands, which broadly included a restoration of the Constitution of 1925 and the signature of a treaty of union with Tbilisi. The arrival of Georgian troops in Abkhazia in August 1992 sparked the division of this republic into two distinct entities: one under the control of Georgia and the other with an Abkhazian government. The Abkhazian offensives that resulted, which were favored by a neutral Russian army and which were countered by a poorly prepared Georgian army, led to the reduction of the Georgian positions and to the conquest of the Abkhazian capital in October 1993, which occasioned the exodus of more than 300,000 persons. At the end of 1994, the Supreme Abkhazian Soviet adopted its own Constitution in which it declared Abkhazia a democratic, sovereign state. However, that status was not recognized by the international community. The declaration succeeded in raising tensions further, given the context of already difficult relations with Russia. The internal conflict has to be analyzed from different perspectives, including its origins and early developments, as is done in Ilyin 2011, Hewitt 2013, and Žoržoliani 2000. Radvanyi 1995 also offers an interdisciplinary approach. On the other hand, in addition to domestic considerations, the external implications and the efforts by the Russian Federation to secure influence must be examined, as is done in Lynch 1998 and Alexidze 2009. Summers 2012 does so also in providing a more recent perspective. Finally, the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population is analyzed in Alexidze 2008.

Alexidze, Levan. “Vital Role of OSCE in Condemning Ethnic Cleansing of Georgian Population in Abkhazia, Georgia, by the International Community.” Journal of International Law 1 (2008): 40–46.
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The UN General Assembly adopted an extraordinary resolution concerning the “Status of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia” (GA/10708) on 29 May 2008. This resolution marked the culmination of efforts by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to secure international attention regarding the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population in that territory.
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Alexidze, Levan. “The Failure of the UN Security Council in Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, Undermines the Fundamental of the International Legal Order.” Journal of International Law 1 (2009): 101–118.
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The entire international community, except for Russia, recognizes Abkhazia as a part of Georgia. The article covers the conflict and the international attempts to find a solution; the role of Russia is much criticized.
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Hewitt, B. George. Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian–South-Ossetian Conflicts. Eurasian Studies Library 3. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2013.
DOI: 10.1163/9789004248939Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author is a Georgian specialist and the aim of this work is to make accessible Georgian sources on the conflict accessible to the wider scholarly community.
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Ilyin, Mikhail. “Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria: Secessions in the Post-Soviet Space.” In The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession. Edited by Aleksandar Pavković and Peter Radan, 529–534. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011.
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This reference is also cited under Recurring Problems from South Ossetia and it is included here because the author also studies the secessionist movement in Abkhazia.
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Lynch, Dov. The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian “Peacekeeping” Policy. RIIA Discussion Paper 77. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998.
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The paper provides a detailed understanding of the Russian role in the Abkhazia conflict. Moreover, the author makes a valued contribution in suggesting new paths for the future role of the Russian Federation in the region with regard to its military influence.
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Radvanyi, Jean. “Les problèmes internes de la Géorgie à la lueur des mutations géopolitiques de la zone caucasienne.” In Le Caucase post-soviétique: La transition dans le conflit. Edited by Mohammad-Reza Djalili, 49–66. Brussels: Bruylant, 1995.
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The author explains that instability throughout the entire region of the Caucasus affected the internal situation in Georgia, in particular the two secessionist regions. His chapter broadens the general analysis while providing a very clear tool.
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Summers, James. “Russia and Competing Spheres of Influence: The Case of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” In International Law in a Multipolar World. Edited by Matthew Happold, 91–113. London: Routledge, 2012.
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Although this chapter is also cited under Recurring Problems from South Ossetia, it is also of importance here as Summers highlights the influence of Russia in Abkhazia.
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Žoržoliani, Georgij. Istoriceskie i politiceskie korni konflikta v Abchazii/Gruzija. Tbilisi, GA: Mecniereba, 2000.
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To provide sources from a wide range of authors, this contribution by a Georgian researcher is helpful in obtaining a full understanding of the issue.
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Adjara

Domestic Georgian policy has traditionally been impacted by the repeated demands of regions and minorities, which have systematically questioned the authority of the central power. In addition to the issues already noted concerning South Ossetia and Abkhazia, mention must be made of the autonomous Republic of Adjara. Located in the southwestern corner of Georgia on the border with Turkey, Adjara includes an Armenian minority in the province of Samtskhe-Javakheti, located on the border with Armenia where another nationalist movement, the Yavaj, remains very active regarding its autonomous claims. It should be noted that the case of Adjara, unlike those of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, had proved problematic even before the disintegration of the USSR. After the dissolution of the USSR, Adjara became part of the Republic of Georgia. Nevertheless, its president, Aslan Abashidze, managed to retain autonomy for the region with the help of Russia, which sought to maintain its military base at Batumi. Adjarian autonomy manifested itself in diverse fields, particularly in politics and culture, but also in others, such as the judiciary. An example of the latter is the “Assanidze case” (European Court of Human Rights 2002). The new Georgian president, Mikheil Saakhasvili, advocated a reformist agenda in establishing objectives that included a fight against corruption and democratization of the country. It also proved highly nationalist in calling for a drive to promote Georgian identity, to achieve territorial reintegration, and to draw closer to the West, in particular to seek ties with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He called for a crackdown on separatism in Georgia. At the beginning his message resonated with Georgians, many of whom were poor and demoralized. Saakhasvili issued ultimatums and engineered mass protests, which forced Abashidze to resign. In 2004, the Georgian army was sent into the region and a new government was set up more closely linked to the interests of Tbilisi, while the autonomy of the region was retained. After several demands were made by Georgia, in 2007 Russia transferred the military base at Batumi to Tbilisi. Radvanyi 1997 explains that the issue of Adjara compelled Georgia to join the CEI, and notes that the European Court of Human Rights admitted a case where a detainee was held in prison in Adjara although the Georgian courts had acquitted him. Therefore, it is highlighted that a regional instrument of human rights protection had been monitoring certain aspects of the conflict. Radvanyi 1997, Zürcher 2007, and Pelkmans 2006 provide an overview of the conflict in Adjara.

European Court of Human Rights. Jurisprudence: Note d’information no. 47 sur la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. November 2002. Assanidze v. Georgia, Application No. 71503/01.
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This case deals with the retention of power by the authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara despite a pardon by the president of Georgia in first instance and acquittal by the Georgian central courts. It is considered important due to the interaction of the two legal systems.
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Pelkmans, Mathijs. Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
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The book examines the border region of Adjara; the author analyzes the issue and provides the historical background.
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Radvanyi, Jean. De l’URSS à la CEI: 12 états en quête d’identité. Paris: Ellipses, 1997.
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Georgia took no interest at first in the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] ; however, the conflicts that arose proved decisive in its application for membership. The situation in Adjara is one of the factors that motivated that decision and is studied in this work.
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Zürcher, Christoph. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press, 2007.
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Although this is study of the entire Caucasus region, reference is made to Adjara as a region that did not experience conflict.
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The Russian-Georgian Conflict in 2008

Following the diverse actions of different international organizations such as the United Nations, OSCE, and the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], the conflict showed alarming “defrosting” signs in 2007 due to a series of events and serious incidents that occurred, in particular the creation of a parallel pro-Georgian administration in South Ossetia, the increase of paramilitary activity of South Ossetians around the borders, and the holding of a new independence referendum in Ossetia. As at other times and in order to obstruct the Georgian government, which, under the presidency of Saakashvili, was endeavoring to draw closer to the West, Russia once again played the regional card, in particular by reactivating the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, Russia institutionalized its already close relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, compromising the legitimacy of its participation in the Peace Corps in the area. When an unmanned Georgian reconnaissance aircraft was shot down, Georgia abandoned the cooperative system of aerial defense in place under the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the growing transnational tension sparked the first attempts at mediation by the United States and the European Union, in particular through the so-called Group of Friends. Various military maneuvers with the participation of forces from the United States, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine on Georgian territory during the month of July 2008 did not succeed in abating tensions as they provoked a similar response from the other side of the South Ossetian border, including the participation of Russian troops. At the beginning of August 2008, tensions broke out at the border with South Ossetia when Georgian army units and rebel Ossetians engaged in a crossfire, leading to the first casualties and the first evacuations of civilians. The complex nature of the conflict requires that it be approached from several perspectives, one of them being its cause, and, for this reason, the actions of the international organizations that were involved must be considered. Mouritzen and Wivel 2012 deals with the entire conflict, including the events leading up to the crisis, the outbreak of military actions, the five-day war, the cease-fire, and the ensuing course of developments. Ghebali 1996 focuses on wider developments within Europe in the post-communist era and the institutionalization of the term security, mainly within the OSCE. Apart from the presence of the international organizations, the events leading up to the five-day war are covered in Arteaga 2008, Niedermaier 2008, and Robert-Cuendet 2008.

Arteaga, Félix. Los enfrentamientos entre Georgia y Rusia por Osetia del Sur. Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 95/2008, 26 August 2008.
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Arteaga analyzes the immediate events before the outbreak of the conflict, including the approach of Georgia to NATO and the EU in its efforts to diminish the influence of Russia. Therefore, it provides the reader with a summary of the causes that provoked the military operations.
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Ghebali, Victor-Yves. L’OSCE dans l’Europe post-communiste, 1990–1996: Vers une identité paneuropéenne de sécurité. Brussels: Bruylant, 1996.
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The author reinterprets the new European order after the Cold War and the new institutionalization put in place under so-called pan-European security, for which the OSCE constitutes its main institutional expression. One of the chapters of the book (pp. 492–545) deals explicitly with the actions of the organization regarding conflicts involving minorities.
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Mouritzen, Hans, and Anders Wivel. Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and the Russo-Georgian War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012.
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This volume reviews the Russo-Georgian war from its origins to involvement by the international community. The authors maintain that Russia’s objective was to thwart the New World Order.
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Niedermaier, Ana K. Countdown to War in Georgia: Russia’s Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Minneapolis: East View, 2008.
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This work serves as a study guide to the conflict, beginning with its origins in 1989, and it covers arguments made by both sides. The main characteristic of this reference source is that the author examines the facts mainly through newspapers articles.
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Robert-Cuendet, Sabrina. “Aspects historiques et juridiques de la crise d’août 2008: Des conflicts interethniques à la guerre ouverte avec la Russie.” Annuaire français de droit international 54 (2008): 173–195.
DOI: 10.3406/afdi.2008.4021Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Developments peculiar to Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be understood to fully understand the crisis in Georgia. Robert-Cuendet affirms that the Russo-Georgian war constituted just another phase of an ongoing conflict.
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The Outbreak of the Military Operations

Military operations began during the night of 7 August 2008 with the ultimate aim of Georgia to recover the territories that were under the control of the rebels. Although the South Ossetia resistance was stronger than expected, the Georgian army occupied several places on the outskirts of Tsnjivali, the capital, and occupied some strategic points from which the capital and other localities could be attacked with tanks, artillery, and airplanes. Moscow took advantage of the situation in its efforts to regain its influence in the region by taking a rapid decision to intervene in favor of South Ossetia. Russian troops occupied the capital of South Ossetia and destroyed an airbase close to Tbilisi as well as those aircraft of the Georgian forces that remained operational and several Georgian infrastructures of strategic importance. At the same time, the UN Security Council met in an urgent session, but members failed to reach agreement on how to put an immediate end to hostilities, thus launching an extended diplomatic effort. Russian military operations inflicted heavy losses on Georgia. Russian airpower bombed the city of Gori, located forty kilometers from the Georgian capital, which marked the birthplace of Stalin. They also carried out various aerial operations in Abkhazia. The military situation deteriorated rapidly for Georgia following eviction of Georgian forces from the capital of South Ossetia. The Georgian troops retreated rapidly toward the south under pressure of advancing Russian and South Ossetian forces, and they retreated out of South Ossetia into Georgia proper. Concurrently, a demonstration of force took place in the Black Sea by the Russian fleet along the Georgian coast when Russian naval forces sank a Georgian minesweeper. The works selected in this section treat the conflict from a broad perspective. Cornell and Starr 2009, an edited collection, constitutes an essential reference in understanding that the five-day war was not an isolated event. The same argument is made in Cornell, et al. 2008. Moreover, Tangiashvili 2008 and García Guitián 2008 summarize the events of those days as well as their implications. Kropatcheva 2008 focuses on Russia’s response. Finally, Asmus 2010 and Cheterian 2010 provide two interesting points of view concerning the conflict. Asmus 2010 treats the weakness of European security arrangements, and Cheterian 2010 deals with the evolution of the conflict from a purely ethnic outbreak to an interstate war.

Asmus, Ronald Dietrich. A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
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The author makes a strong argument that the central cause of the outbreak of the war was the weakness of the European security arrangement. Additionally, he deals with the underlying aim of the Russian Federation to thwart what it perceived to be NATO’s effort to enlarge its membership to include additional members on Russia’s borders.
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Cheterian, Vicken. “The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars.” In War and Revolution in the Caucasus: Georgia Ablaze. Edited by Stephen F. Jones, 63–78. London: Routledge, 2010.
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This chapter emphasizes the change in the conflict from one that, in its origins, entailed a mass mobilization of the people in the Caucasus to one that centered on a defense of the border of both regions, which Moscow considered to be independent.
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Cornell, Svante E., Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson. Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World. Stockholm and Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2008.
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This paper summarizes in chronological order the periods before, during, and immediately after the five-day war. The authors examine the aggressive military intervention of Russia and the first reactions by the West, which they deem to have been insufficiently strong.
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Cornell, Svante E., and S. Frederick Starr, eds. The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2009.
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This edited volume provides the researcher with a study of the entire context of the conflict in August 2008 beginning with the demise of the USSR and continuing to the five-day war, and it examines the future implications and consequences of the crisis. The chronological timeline facilitates understanding the Russian, Georgian, and Western positions. Undertaken under the auspices of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.
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García Guitián, Elena. Georgia, 7 de agosto de 2008: La crisis en su contexto. Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 96/2008 (27 August 2008).
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The author affirms that to understand the war it is necessary to refer to its origins as well as to the domestic policies of Georgia, leading the author to state that the military operations were just another stage of a lengthy conflict.
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Kropatcheva, Elena. “Russia’s Response to Georgia’s Military Operation in South Ossetia.” OSCE Yearbook (2008): 45–61.
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Elena Kropatcheva focuses on the Russian response in examining the explanations of the official representatives of Russia and the mass media.
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Tangiashvili, Nodar. From Fomenting Secessionist Conflicts to Waging Wars: Russia’s Far-Reaching Georgia Policies. Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 98/2008 (3 September 2008).
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This paper not only analyzes the tensions before the war, but also covers the maneuvers undertaken by both sides, such as the occupation of Georgian territory, the situation in South Ossetia and the implications of this conflict at domestic, regional, and international levels, and finally the strong efforts made toward a negotiated settlement of the war.
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The Cease-Fire Agreement

The agreement negotiated by French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner and Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili was presented by French president Nicolas Sarkozy to Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow on 12 August 2008, and it was accepted by the latter. Although the agreement called for an immediate cease-fire, Russian troops and their South Ossetian allies continued their military operations in Georgian territory during succeeding days, provoking Georgia to accuse Russia of violating the cease-fire. The United States announced it would send military ships and planes with humanitarian aid to Georgia, while demanding that Russia cease its attacks and requesting an urgent meeting of NATO. On the other hand, the foreign affairs ministers of the EU member states agreed to send observers to verify that the cease-fire was duly in place. This move was also backed by US secretary of state Condolezza Rice. The document confirming the cease-fire was signed by Medvedev on 16 August. It included a six-point plan that called in its first three points for the prohibition of the use of force, a cease-fire, and provision of humanitarian aid. The fourth point mandated the withdrawal of the Georgian troops to their permanent positions, while the fifth point required withdrawal of the Russian troops to the lines where they were stationed prior to the start of hostilities. The sixth and last point, which had to be modified due to the refusal of the Georgian president to accept it because it contained an explicit mention of the future status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, referred in its final version to the opening of an international debate to search for mechanisms that could guarantee the security of both regions. The Security Council, in its session on 21 August, failed to reach a consensus in efforts to adopt a resolution on the matter due to disagreement among the permanent members. Nevertheless, the fact that two opposing views of the role of the EU in the resolution of the five-day war have emerged is important to note. On the one hand, Rodríguez Prieto 2010 argues that the success of the EU was based on a strong presidency and a common voice, while Whitman and Wolff 2012, on the other hand, maintains that the EU’s efforts proved insufficient, which reflected the fact that it remains a weak international actor. Moreover, Schmidt 2009 reviews the possible contributions of the EU to the conflict. Finally, Jahn 2009 offers different scenarios concerning South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the war.

Jahn, Egbert. “Optionen für die Politik der EU gegenüber Georgien, Abchasien und Südossetien nach dem August 2008.” In Die Sezessionskonflikte in Georgien. Edited by Erich Reiter, 299–322. Vienna: Böhlau, 2009.
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Jahn focuses on the path open to the EU regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the war.
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Rodríguez Prieto, María Victoria. “La UE ante el conflicto de Georgia éxito en la mediación y resolución.” In Estados y organizaciones internacionales ante las nuevas crisis globales: (XXIII Jornadas ordinarias de la Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales, AEPDIRI, celebradas en la Rioja el 10, 11 y 12 de septiembre de 2009). Edited by José Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, 745–754. Madrid: Iustel, 2010.
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The author examines the successful results of EU mediation regarding the resolution of the conflict.
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Schmidt, Peter. “Der georgische Knoten: Mögliche Beiträge der EU zur Beilegung des Georgienkonflikts.” In Die Sezessionskonflikte in Georgien. Edited by Erich Reiter, 323–329. Vienna: Böhlau, 2009.
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Schmidt explores the effort undertaken by the EU to secure a cease-fire.
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Whitman, Richard G., and Stefan Wolff. “The Limits of EU Conflict Management in the Case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” In The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager. Edited Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, 92–106. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012.
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EU-Georgia relations with respect to the conflict are the dominant focus of this work. This chapter outlines the EU’s lack of success in securing a resolution of the five-day war.
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The Post-conflict Evolution

The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, a recognition that until now was accorded by very few states, added further tension to the already very tense relations between the West and Russia. Russian troops withdrew from Georgia after a new agreement that fixed the modalities of the application of the previous agreement through acceptance by Russia of a specific timetable for withdrawal, an arrangement previously agreed to during the visit of the EU Presidency to Moscow on 8 September 2008. Taking into account the agreement, the EU Council approved, on 15 September 2008, the formation of a Mission of Observation of the EU for Georgia (EUMM). It was agreed that three hundred observers would be sent to cover the security area on 1 October, who would act in coordination with the OSCE and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Meanwhile Russia proceeded with measures to ensure the establishment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance were signed on 17 September 2008, and they were followed by other agreements in April 2009. Russia played a major role in setting up the international borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia. Taking into account the agreement, conversations were initiated in Geneva on 14 October 2007, with mediation by the EU, the OSCE, and the UN. Two objectives were set: the stabilization of the territory and the return of the displaced population. After five years, the negotiations are ongoing in Geneva. They serve as the only platform for negotiations within the framework of the complex nature of the relations between Russia and Georgia. Rich 2010 employs coins the clarifying term “new cold war” in reviewing developments, while Nussberger 2009 is a study of how the right to secession can be used by both parties. Eberhardt 2008 focuses on the right to territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. With respect to Georgia, Havlik and Astrov 2008 highlights the deterioration of the Georgian economy. Scholars, in works such as Eberhardt 2008, German 2012, Kakachia 2010, and King 2008, perceive Russian intervention to have been motivated mainly by Moscow’s effort to preserve its area of influence, and actions were thus undertaken to warn the West not to advance its presence in the region. Finally, a possible solution to the conflict, namely the Cyprus model, is proposed in Halbach 2008.

Eberhardt, Adam. “The 2008 Russia-Georgia War over South Ossetia: The Policy of the Russian Federation and Its Consequences.” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 17.3 (Summer 2008): 52–63.
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This author addresses the issues arising with respect to the right to territorial integrity of a state and the right to self-determination of a nation. Moreover, as a consequence of the action taken by Russia, Eberhardt affirms that the Georgian war constitutes a dispute between the Kremlin and the West.
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German, Tracey. “Securing the South Caucasus: Military Aspects of Russian Policy towards the Region since 2008.” Europe-Asia Studies 64.9 (2012): 1650–1666.
DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2012.718418Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The main consequence of the 2008 conflict was that Russia retained and reinforced its influence in the region. German argues that Russia was motivated to act to counterbalance Western interests in its immediate neighborhood.
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Halbach, Uwe. “A Look Back at the ‘Five-Day War’: Dimensions and Implications of Crisis in Georgia.” Osteuropa 58.12 (2008): 12–65.
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Halbach affirms that the five-day war constituted another episode in increasingly strained relations between Russia and the West. The consequences were diverse, but the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by only Russia and a few of its allies demonstrates the lack of support for this action. Nevertheless, this article proposes a possible solution to the conflict, namely the Cyprus model.
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Havlik, Peter, and Vasily Astrov. “Economic Consequences of the Georgian-Russian Conflict.” Monthly Report 8–9. Vienna: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2008.
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The conflict carries not only political and military implications, but also economic ones. The political crisis worsened the delicate economic structure of Georgia. This commentary provides a macroeconomic analysis of consequences of the Russo-Georgian conflict.
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Kakachia, Kornely K. “Between Russian Assertiveness and Insecurity: Georgia’s Political Challenges and Prospect after the Conflict.” Uluslararasıİlişkiler: International Relations 7.26 (2010): 87–104.
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Kakachia asserts that Georgia was always the “rebellious republic” and, after its independence, its attempts to approach the West constituted a challenge to Russia. Following the Russian intervention and the reaction of the West, the author analyzes the political and security challenges facing the country.
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King, Charles. “The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow after the Georgia Crisis.” Foreign Affairs 87.6 (November–December 2008): 2–11.
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This is another article that stresses the widely held position that Russia’s decision to intervene in Georgia was intended to send a powerful message to the West, warning it not to intervene in its area of influence.
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Nussberger, Angelika. “The War between Russia and Georgia: Consequences and Unresolved Questions.” Göttingen Journal of International Law 1.2 (2009): 341–364.
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Treats the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia after Russia was condemned by the Council of Europe, which considered such a recognition as a breach of international law. The aim of the author is to examine the positions of both Russia and the Council of Europe with respect to the issue of the right to secession.
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Rich, Paul B. Crisis in the Caucasus: Russia, Georgia and the West. London: Routledge, 2010.
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This collection of essays provides an analysis of the consequences of the 2008 crisis at the geopolitical level for Europe and the Caucasus; the author coins the term a “new cold war” in reviewing ensuing relations between Russia and the West.
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The Publication of the Tagliavini Report

The Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, called the Tagliavini Report (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009), between Georgia and Russia regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia was published on 30 September 2009. It was written as a consequence of the decision of the European Union Council (Decision 2008/901/PESC) to seek such a report, which was adopted on 2 December 2 2008. The aim of the drafters of the document is clearly stated: “to investigate the origins and the course of the conflict in Georgia, including international law, humanitarian law and human rights, and the accusation made in that context. Heidi Tagliavini, a Swiss diplomat and an expert on the Caucasus, was appointed as head of the mission. She worked in complete independence in establishing the procedures to be followed and the working methods to be employed during the term of the fact-finding mission (from 2 December 2008 to 31 July 2009) as well as in choosing its members (lawyers, historians, military staff, and human rights experts). The costs of the fact-finding mission were set at EUR 1,600,000. The report, which was concluded after nine months of investigation by the nineteen experts, was delivered to the Council of the EU, the OSCE, and the United Nations. Encompassing more than one thousand pages in three volumes, the report provided a very detailed analysis of the fundamental causes of the conflict in Georgia, its evolution, in particular, the peace processes undertaken in the region over a period of fifteen years and their evident failure, as well as the repercussions regarding the already tense relations between Georgia and Russia and the relations between Georgia and the West. The contextualization of the conflict at the moment the crisis broke into the open is the focus of the first volume. International legal issues, such as the legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the right to self-determination and secession (chapter 3) are analyzed in a very lengthy second volume. Other issues of great interest also covered in this volume include the points of view of the parties (chapter 4), military operations (chapter 5), the use of force (chapter 6), and issues concerning international humanitarian law and international law on human rights (chapter 7). The materials utilized by the parties to the mission are included in the third volume. Lott 2012, Blanc Altemir 2009, Alexidze 2009–2010, Dubuisson and Langerwall 2009, and Corten 2010 constitute primarily analyses of the implications of the Tagliavini Report. Martin 2010 treats the involvement of the EU in Georgia.

Alexidze, Levan. “Aspects of International Law of the Report of Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia.”:Journal of International Law 2.1 (2009–2010): 15–23.
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Alexidze provides a detailed analysis of the report and its results.
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Blanc Altemir, Antonio. “El conflicto entre Georgia y Rusia un año después (a propósito del Informe Tagliavini).” Revista española de derecho internacional 61.2 (2009): 556–566.
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The author provides a thorough analysis of the report and its context.
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Corten, Olivier. “Le rapport de la mission d’enquête internationale indépendante sur le conflit en Géorgie: Quel apport au jus contra bellum?” Revue générale de droit international public 114.1 (2010): 35–61.
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The conclusion of the article is that the report encompassed a classic vision of jus contra bellum; however, doing so has raised some important legal issues.
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Dubuisson, François, and Anne Langerwall. “Le conflict en Géorgie de 2008 au regard de jus contra bellum et à la lumière du rapport de la mission d’enquête internationale de 2009.” Revue belge de droit international 42 2 (2009): 448–498.
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This analysis is based on the report of the fact-finding mission. The authors focus on the arguments made by Russia, including the right to self-defense, the mission to maintain peace, and the responsibility to protect.
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Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. The Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. 3 vols. September 2009.
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This report is an important tool to which to refer in reaching conclusions about the 2008 conflict. It was presented to the authorities of Georgia, the Russian Federation, the EU, the United Nations, and the OSCE.
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Lott, Alexander. “The Tagliavini Report Revisited: Jus ad bellum and the Legality of the Russian Intervention in Georgia.” Merkourios 28.74 (2012): 4–21.
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An analysis of the report followed upon its completion. The author does not agree with the position that Georgia could have justified its initial attack under the right to self-defense because it constituted an excessive use of force. However, the Russian military intervention could not be justified on any grounds.
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Martin, Mary. “Crossing Boundaries: The European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia.” In The European Union and Human Security: External Interventions and Missions. Edited by Mary Martin and Mary Kaldor, 128–144. London: Routledge, 2010.
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This book presents a series of eight case studies of external interventions by the EU, covering the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, in illustrating the nature of the EU as a global actor. Martin also studies the case of Georgia.
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The Conflict and the Violations of International Law

Breaches of international law consequent to the conflict must be specifically taken into account as well as the recognition of the right to self-determination of the secessionist regions, although not the right to secession itself, as this is considered an issue to be dealt with in a colonial context. Regarding the Russian policy of granting Russian nationality and Russian passports to all the citizens of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and to recognize both areas as independent states, international legal rulings consider such actions as interferences in the internal affairs of Georgia and as constituting a breach of its territorial integrity. In relation to the central issue of the prohibition of the use and threat of force (Art. 2.4 of the Charter of the UN), the findings are that all the parties concerned breached international law. Georgia did so when its forces attacked the capital of South Ossetia, which provoked a widening of the war, an action that cannot be justified from an international legal standpoint, even though such action was taken only after a period of growing tensions, provocations, and incidents. Violations by Russia, on the other hand, stemmed from the disproportionate size of its military intervention, which could not be justified by the alleged necessity to defend the Russian peace forces located in Tsjinvali. South Ossetia also breached international law in taking actions that, though it deemed them to be in self-defense, continued to be carried out after the cease-fire agreement in areas having an ethnic Georgian majority. Abkhazia was found to be in violation of international law due to the annexation of the Kodori valley. Finally, it was determined that the norms of international humanitarian law and international law on human rights had been breached on an enormous scale by all the parties. However, the charge made by Russia and South Ossetia concerning genocide by Georgia against the Ossetian population was not accepted, since it was found that no intention “to destroy in total or in partial,” as required by international law, could be lodged against the Georgian government. Nevertheless, serious evidence exists of ethnic cleansing actions against ethnic Georgian inhabitants of South Ossetia and of the failure of Russian forces to prevent or stop violations of human rights by regular forces and irregular armed groups from South Ossetia that were perpetuated before and after the cease-fire. Thus, the breach of international law during the crisis is a topic that must be addressed. From a doctrinal point of view, Stefes and George 2010, Higgins and O’Reilly 2009, Gâlea 2009, Hernández Sierra 2010, Abramishvili 2008, and Petro 2009 address different issues, such as the use of force and the fulfilment of international obligations. Henderson and Green 2010 studies the results of the fact-mission with regard to international law. Toomey 2009 treats the Russian arguments for intervention.

Abramishvili, Nino. “The Russian-Georgian Armed Conflict and the Prohibition of the Use of Force in International Law.” Journal of International Law 2 (2008): 51–60.
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The paper examines the law on the prohibition of the use of force as it existed before 1945 and today; after this general review, the author presents his conclusions with regard to the Russian-Georgian conflict.
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Gâlea, Ion. “Aplicarea normelor dreptului international privind folosirea fortei in conflictui dintre Georgia si Rusia din 2008.” Revista română de drept internaţional 8 (2009): 67–93.
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This article is in Romanian (translation: Application of International Law on the Use of Force in the Georgia-Russia Conflict of 2008); it is included so as to provide a contribution on the topic from a wide international spectrum of opinion.
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Henderson, Christian, and James A. Green. “The jus ad bellum and Entities Short of Statehood in the Report on the Conflict in Georgia.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59.1 (2010): 129–139.
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589309990108Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The fact-finding mission was very active in meeting, visiting, and corresponding with the parties involved in the conflicts. The aim of this article is to assess the results of the mission with regard to international law, humanitarian law, and human rights.
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Hernández Sierra, Enrique. “Análisis sobre el respeto del cumplimiento del derecho internacional en el conflicto del Cáucaso.” In Luces y sombras de la seguridad internacional en los albores del siglo XXI. Edited by Miguel Requena, 469–491. Madrid: Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, 2010.
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The aim of this work is to examine the principal aspects of public international law in the Russian-Georgian conflicts and the degree to which the parties fulfilled their obligations with respect to complying with that law.
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Higgins, Noelle, and Kieran O’Reilly. “The Use of Force, Wars of National Liberation and the Right to Self-Determination in the South Ossetian Conflict.” International Criminal Law Review 9 3, (2009): 567–583.
DOI: 10.1163/157181209X457992Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors analyze the international legal framework regarding the use of force and the concept of intervention in order to protect nationals abroad concerning the events of August 2008.
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Petro, Nicolai. “The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia.” Fordham International Law Journal 32.5 (May 2009): 1524–1549.
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The military operations of Russia in Georgia were supported by legal arguments. The article discusses those arguments from the Russian perspective and points out that Russia’s actions marked the first step in the implementation of a new Russian foreign policy toward the region.
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Stefes, Christoph H., and Julie A. George. “The Battles after the Battle: International Law and the Russia-Georgia Conflict.” In Conflict in the Caucasus: Implications for International Legal Order. Edited by James A. Green and Christopher P. M. Waters, 153–176. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
DOI: 10.1057/9780230292413Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
In analyzing the breaches of international law during the conflict, the authors provide a complete overview. Numerous issues examined include the use of force, human rights, transnational litigation, and international law “rhetoric.”
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Toomey, Michael. “The August 2008 Battle of South Ossetia: Does Russia Have a Legal Argument for the Intervention?” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 23.2 (2009): 443–477.
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Toomey provides an analysis of the Russian arguments for the intervention.
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The Consequences of the Conflicts

Georgia applied for full membership in NATO in 2008, after having signed an association agreement with the organization in October 2004 (Individual Partnership Action Plan). The move engendered strong mistrust in Moscow because it was interpreted as an indication of the desire of Georgia to draw closer to the West and, as such, deemed to be part of a broader scheme on the part of the latter that included the expansion of the NATO and the EU toward the East. It also raised again the issue of an antimissile shield by Western powers, an action strongly opposed by Russia, and it provided additional evidence of the loss of influence by Russia in an area that had historically been a part of its political and geostrategic orbit. The United States became the principal supporter of this Georgian strategy. Russian pressure could delay the admission of Georgia but could not ensure that NATO would definitely reject the candidature, conditioned as it was to membership in the Action Plan-MAP. The NATO final declaration held out a promise of accession to the MAP and a posteriori to NATO without setting any fixed date. After the intervention of Russia, media sources speculated that if the proposal of the US president had been passed earlier, Russia would not have intervened as it did. It has to be pointed out that the effects of the invitation would not have been immediate due to the variable lapse of time, generally not less than a year, between the date of the admission and the entry into force of the effects after the deposit in Washington. Only the membership condition, and not the mere accession to the MAP and/or to the Partnership for Peace (PfP), would have allowed Georgia to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which mandated the possibility of collective assistance in case of an external attack. The aspirations of Georgia to join NATO were affected by the five-day war. The following references address the consequences of the freezing of the process. Malek 2008 explains the policy changes in NATO toward the regions as a whole. Yaniz Velasco 2008 reviews events leading to the meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of NATO regarding the decision of Action Plan. On another note, Herd and Flesch 2008 points out the implication of the crisis regarding the Partnership for Peace. Finally, Lazarević 2009, Verluise 2011, and Marchat 2008 affirm that the aspirations of Georgia amounted only to just that, aspirations, due to the reaction of Russia.

Herd, Graeme P., and Daniel A. Flesch. “The Georgia Crisis: Implications for the Partnership for Peace.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 8.1 (Winter 2008): 1–10.
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The crisis of 2008 affected NATO’s Partnership for Peace and this article explains the impact of that crisis.
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Lazarević, Dušica. “NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 9.1 (2009): 29–65.
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This essay provides a comprehensive understanding of the reasons behind the aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia in seeking NATO membership, and the real perspective of NATO enlargement toward the South Caucasus.
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Malek, Martin. “NATO and South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 7.3 (Summer Supplement 2008): 30–51.
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The author reviews the initial policy of NATO in which the organization showed no interest in the growing crisis in the South Caucasus and then proceeding to a period of rapprochement; Russian reactions to NATO ocnisderation of the “frozen conflicts” in the area are considered.
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Marchat, Philippe. “La Géorgie entre la Russie et l’Occident.” Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 522 (October–November 2008): 618–625.
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An article that addresses the issue of Georgia’s membership in NATO and the reaction of Russia.
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Verluise, Pierre. “OTAN-UE: Quel calcul géorgien?” La Revue internationale et stratégique 82 (été 2011): 31–39.
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A summary of NATO-EU relations concerning Georgia before and after the conflict.
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Yaniz Velasco, Federico. El ingreso de Georgia en la OTAN: Una decisión bajo la sombra de la guerra fría en el Cáucaso Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 153/2008 (26 November 2008).
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This was written before the meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of NATO, a gathering at which they debated the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO’s Action Plan. The author focuses on the Russian objections to these NATO plans.
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The Relations of the Russian Federation with NATO

Russia’s decision to intervene in the conflict carried repercussions with respect to its relations with NATO. The most visible effects on bilateral relations were the discontinuation of collaborative endeavors of both parties, including Russia’s naval contribution to Operation Active Endeavour and its participation in the NATO-Russia Council at the general level as well as at the level of military representatives. Cooperative arrangements with respect to Afghanistan, which included an agreement granting permission for NATO forces to cross Russian territory, were not affected. Concurrently, it must be noted that even when the Atlantic Council held an urgent meeting of the NATO foreign affairs ministers after the Russian intervention, the ministers did not support a radical change in policy regarding the accession petition of Georgia. However, the decision was made to create a NATO-Georgia Commission much like the NATO-Ukraine Council and similar, in part, to the NATO-Russia Council, the only countries of the Partnership for Peace that were part of the additional forum 26+1. From that moment onward, the relations between both parties attained a degree of frostiness not seen since the end of April 2009, almost nine months after the Russian intervention in Georgia, when NATO announced the expulsion of two Russian diplomats from Brussels who were suspected of engaging in espionage activities. The Russian response came a week later when two members of the Canadian diplomatic mission were expelled from Moscow on charges of espionage. These facts worked to impede efforts to normalize relations between both parties, as was highlighted in the announcement that the Russian foreign affairs minister would not attend the ministerial meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, scheduled on 19 May 2009, a gathering that would have constituted the first meeting of ministers after NATO had suspended the meetings in reaction to the Russian intervention in Georgia. A posteriori, the relations between both sides returned to a more workable level. Gorman 2010 is an edited volume that provides a general overview of Russia-NATO relations. Since one of the reasons posited by Russia for its intervention in Georgia was to restrain the aspirations of NATO, the relations suffered in the wake of that intervention. German 2011, Khan 2008, Dorman 2012, and Asmus 2010 provide in-depth analysis of events. Nevertheless, interests in maintaining links proved stronger in the end and NATO-Russia relations subsequently entered a new phase, a development related in Ian 2012, Antonenko and Yurgens 2010–2011, and Ruiz González 2012.

Antonenko, Oksana, and Igor Yurgens. “Towards a NATO-Russia Strategic Concept.” Survival 52.6 (2010–2011): 5–11.
DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2010.540780Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The article explicates the new phase in NATO-Russia relations after the constraints consequent to the crisis in Georgia.
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Asmus, Richard. A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
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This book has been cited previously under the Outbreak of the Military Operations; it is also important to cite it here because it considers the future relations of Georgia, Russia, and the West.
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Dorman, Andrew M. “NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit: A Chance to Ignore the Issues Once Again?” International Affairs 88.2 (March 2012): 301–312.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01072.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The results of the NATO Chicago summit concerning Russia.
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German, Tracey C. “Georgia and the Transatlantic Relationship: The New Kid on the Block.” In The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice. Edited by Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman, 211–231. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011.
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This chapter deals with one of the main challenges in relations between NATO and Russia, namely the accession of Georgia to NATO.
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Gorman, Eduardo B. NATO and the Issue of Russia. New York: Nova Science, 2010.
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This is another book that provides a general overview of the evolution of NATO-Russia relations.
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Khan, Simbal A. “Russia-Georgia War and NATO: Implications for European Security.” Strategic Studies 28–29 (2008): 1–14.
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The expansion of NATO toward the Caucasus has centered on two issues: Russia and its right to be involved in the region and the Russia-Georgia conflict.
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Ian, Anthony. “NATO-Russia Relations: The State of Relations and Future Prospects.” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 21.1 (2012): 119–140.
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The author affirms that the future of NATO-Russia relations should be based on a genuine strategic partnership. After the conflict in Georgia these relations show some evidence of common interests but not concerning issues such as combating terrorism or piracy.
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Ruiz González, Francisco. NATO-Russia Relations after the Chicago Summit. Documento de Análisis 24. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (30 May 2012).
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The author examines relations between NATO and Russia during and after the summit and the mutual interests of both parties.
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The Russian Federation and the European Union

As explained in previous sections, the EU played a major role in the resolution of the Georgian conflict. From the onset of the crisis, France, as the holder of the presidency of the Council of the EU, acted in a rapid and determined manner. Thus, this fact together with the strong French presidency led to a more resolute effort made by the EU in confronting and resolving the conflict. The conflict, however, did have repercussions for Russia–EU bilateral relations. First, in response to a petition by the United Kingdom, the European Council agreed to revise relations with Russia due to latter’s military intervention in Georgia. In consequence, the European Council met in an extraordinary session in Brussels on 1 September 2008 and approved a postponement of the negotiations on the Cooperation and Association Agreement with the Russian Federation until the latter fulfilled the six points set out in the peace agreement proposed by the EU and accepted by both parties on 12 August 2008. The EU had approved in May 2008 the start of negotiations to renew the 1994 agreement, but these talks were now blocked by Poland and Lithuania due to the conflict in Georgia. During the bilateral EU-Russia summit, held on 14 November 2008 in Nice, the EU confirmed that Russia had fulfilled the core points of its commitments: the cease-fire, the withdrawal of practically all military forces, the deployment of observers, and the opening of a dialogue in Geneva. As a consequence, the president of the European Commission proposed to restart the negotiations on the Cooperation and Association Agreement, reaffirming the support of the EU regarding the accession of Russia to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Nevertheless, the Russian-Georgian conflict reinforced the impression among many that Russia sought to regain its lost influence in the region. Still, the EU opted for a more pragmatic position with regard to the conflict; in fact, the EU resumed its usual aptitude toward Russia by relaunching the negotiations for the agreement. The Russian Federation–EU relation is like a marriage of convenience in which neither of the two parties is fully committed but their mutual interests are sufficient to overcome obstacles. de la Cámara 2009; Moshes 2009; Moshes 2012; Dias Fernandes 2009; and Dembinski, et al. 2008 follow this line of argument. Blanc Altemir 2008 points out the importance of the EU-Russia relationships. Authored by several writers, Maxine, et al. 2011 deals with diverse themes with respect to the bilateral relations of the EU member states and Russia.

Blanc Altemir, Antonio. “Complejidad e interdependencia en las relaciones Unión Europea-Federación Rusa.” In Europa oriental: En la encrucijada entre la Unión Europea y la Federación Rusa. Edited by Antonio Blanc Altemir, 11–58. Lleida, Spain: Edicions de la Universidad de Lleida, 2008.
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The author explains how Russia-EU relations are both complex and interdependent. He affirms that both are two strategic actors that would like to become good neighbors.
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de la Cámara, Manuel. La seguridad europea y las relaciones UE-Rusia. Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 67 (August–September 2009).
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This article treats the Russian change of attitude in calling for a new European security strategy in which it would be included.
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Dembinski, Matthias, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, and Bruno Schoch. After the Caucasian War: Engaging, Not Containing, Russia. PRIF Reports 86. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2008.
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This report also confirms the argument made in Dias Fernandes 2009 that even after Russia’s adverse reaction to Western policy in the Georgian crisis, President Medvedev wished to start a new phase.
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Dias Fernandes, Sandra. Time to Reassess the European Security Architecture? The NATO-EU-Russia Security Triangle. Working Papers/EPIN 22. Brussels: European Policy Institutes Network, 2009.
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Dias Fernandes also analyzes the proposal of President Medvedev for a new security treaty.
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Maxine, David, Jackie Gower, and Hiski Haukkala. “The European Union and Russia.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011), 183–188.
DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580906Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This monograph outlines the basic elements of the EU-Russia relations, including national perspectives.
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Moshes, Arkady. Les relations UE-Russie: Une regrettable continuité. Question d’Europe 129. (February 2009). Brussels: Fondation Robert Schuman.
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At first impression, the new Russian president Medvedev appeared to bring a certain vitality to EU-Russia relations. Moshes affirms that the disagreement regarding Georgia and the gas crisis did not affect the mutual interests of both parties.
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Moshes, Arkady. “Russia’s European Policy under Medvedev: How Sustainable Is a New Compromise?” International Affairs 88.1 (January 2012): 17–30.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01054.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This article argues that there has been some evolution in Russia-EU bilateral relations.
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The Impact of the Conflict in Geostrategy and Energy Fields

Despite the efforts of the Russian Federation to consolidate the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the conflict as independent states, recognition of their independence by the international community has been strikingly limited. For its part, Georgia has experienced instability in its domestic politics and has failed as yet to recover the status it held in its foreign affairs before the conflict. Several conclusions can be drawn from the disproportionate size of the intervention by Russia in Georgia. First, Russia demonstrated that it is capable of recovering its former influence in the Caucasus, a region of continuing instability with several ongoing unresolved conflicts but one that remains vital to its interests. Second, the Russian military intervention in Georgia considerably increased the sense of vulnerability of some countries that were under Soviet control in the past, including some, such as the Baltic states, that are members of the EU and NATO. Third, the intervention by Georgia in South Ossetia afforded Russia the long-awaited opportunity to fulfill the threats it had made after the recognition of Kosovo by the majority of the Western countries. This recognition had negative repercussions as the Russians saw no difference between Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The conflict also demonstrated that, given a strong EU presidency, that organization is capable of acting effectively while it also pointed out the need for the EU to strengthen its ability to pursue an effective external policy, specifically regarding Russia. Doubtless, the EU in its bilateral relations with Russia must advocate on behalf of its commitment to democracy. It should also become more active in seeking to resolve conflicts in the southern Caucasus region since the area serves as an alternative source of energy in place of reliance on Russian supply lines. Apart from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) line, the only oil pipeline that services the EU goes through Russia, and it supplies around a million barrels a day. This fact provides an excellent basis on which to pursue closer connections between the EU and the southern Caucasus and Caspian Sea region, one that, by avoiding the path through Russia, would enhance European energy security. In a globalized world internal conflicts bring external consequences and, with respect to the geographic position of Georgia, energy and security are the main issues. Haddaji 2004, Berdikeeva 2008, Echeverría 2008, Aalto 2008, and Ruiz González 2012 deal with energy issues. Sanders 2009, Sinikukka 2011, and Fischer 2009 examine security issues.

Aalto, Pami. “Energy Dialogue and the Future of Russia: Politics and Economics in the Struggle for Europe.” In The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security. Edited by Pami Aalto, 43–62. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008.
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Contributors to this edited volume analyze EU-Russian relations with regard to energy.
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Berdikeeva, Saltanat. “Future of Energy Transportation in Eurasia after the Georgia Crisis.” Insight Turkey 10.3 (2008): 25–34.
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The author affirms that the Georgian crisis would not impede energy policy in Eurasia.
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Echeverría, Carlos Jesús. “Nabucco, Europa y gas del mar Caspio.” Política exterior 22.123 (2008): 135–142.
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Russian opposition to efforts by Ukraine and Turkey to join the EU has resulted in a larger importance placed by Moscow on the Caspian Sea countries.
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Fischer, Sabine. “The EU and Security in the Black Sea Region after the Georgia Crisis.” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9.3 (2009): 333–349.
DOI: 10.1080/14683850902934325Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author affirms that even though the efforts of the EU proved successful in halting the five-day war, the region remains unstable.
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Haddaji, Yasha. “Les hydrocarbures dans le Sud-Caucase: Grandes manœuvres autour des ressources de la Caspienne.” Le Courrier des pays de l’Est.1043 (2004/3): 12–23.
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The author analyzes the energy policy in the southern Caucasus and the agreements between private oil enterprises and national governments.
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Ruiz González, Francisco. El laberinto del gas en Eurasia: Proyectos, realidades y consecuencias geopolíticas Documento Análisis 30. Madrid: Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2012.
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The author provides a highly detailed analysis of the gas pipeline projects and their geopolitical consequences.
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Sanders, Deborah. “Maritime Security in the Black Sea: Can Regional Solutions Work?” European Security 18.2 (2009): 101–124.
DOI: 10.1080/09662830903433720Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author reviews cooperative security arrangements on the Black Sea, which the countries bordering the sea must pursue apart from any role played by NATO.
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Sinikukka, Saari, ed. Special Issue: Managing Distrust in the Wider Black Sea Region. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11.3 (September 2011), 215–225.
DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2011.589149Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This special issue addresses issues of security, trust, and stability in the region.
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