IT on essence and sifaat

Ibn Taymiyyah on the confusion between mental worlds (or mental existence) and real worlds (or objective existence):
> "The reasons behind their delusions [the philosophers'] is that they see that an object can be known and intended (yu'lam wa-yurad) before its existence and that it is possible to distinguish between what is possible and impossible.
> Consequently, they say that if this object were not existent, it would not be the case. They are also confused by the fact that we are able to speak about the substances of objects (i.e., their essences) irrespective of their existence in the external world, which leads them to think that these substances and essences are existent in the external world.
> But the truth is that all these are mental facts; and that mental constructions are larger in number than the real entities in the physical world. ...
> Thus the proper difference is that essence is the mental representation of an object, whereas the existence is its actuality in the extra-mental world."
~~~
from Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, p93


~~~

As for the statement: "If Ontological Attributes subsisted in Him, He would be dependent on them, and they would be dependent on Him; thus, the Lord would be in need of something other than Himself," this is akin to the [aforementioned] objection.

Therefore, it is said—first:
The claim that "If Ontological Attributes subsisted in Him, He would be dependent on them," implies the possibility of a substance [Jawhar] without attributes, and the possibility of an essence [Dhat] without attributes.

If either of these two options were impossible, this argument would collapse — how much more so when both are impossible?
Because the notion of an essence devoid of all attributes is conceivable only in the mind, not in external reality, just as the idea of absolute existence, which does not manifest in external reality; [is purely mental].

The term "Dhat" is the feminine form of "Dhu" [he who possesses,] and it is used only in conjunction with something else.
Thus, it is said:
"So-and-so [Dhu] possesses knowledge and power"
and "a soul [Dhat] possessing knowledge and power".
Whenever the term "Dhu" or "Dhat" appears in the Qur'an or in the Arabic language, it is always in a construct form, such as in the verse:
"So fear Allah and set things right between you"
   [Dhata baynikum] (Al-Anfal: 1),
or the verse:
"Knowing well the secrets of the hearts"
   [Dhati Sudur] (Aal Imran: 119).
And in the statement of Khubayb, may Allah be pleased with him:
"And that is for the sake of Allah..."
   [Dhati al-ilah] and the like.

However, when theorists spoke on this matter, they said: "It is said: an essence [Dhat] possessing knowledge and power."
Then they severed this term from its construct form and used it as a standalone noun, saying: "the essence," [The Dhat].
Which is a coined term not found in the speech of the pure Arabs.

Thus, a group of scholars, including Abu Al-Fath Ibn Burhan, Ibn Al-Dahan, and others, rejected it, arguing that it is not an Arabic term.
Others, such as Al-Qadi and Ibn Aqil responded to them.
The decisive statement is that it is not from the pure Arabic language but is instead a coined term, like the terms "existent," "Quiddity," "modality," and the like.

This term implies the existence of attributes, with the essence added to them, so it is said:
   an essence possessing knowledge, an essence possessing power, an essence possessing speech — and this is indeed the case.

It is impossible for something that exists by itself extramentally to be devoid of any affirmative attribute; assuming this in external reality is like assuming an accident ['Arad] that exists by itself, not subsisting in anything else.
The notion of an accident existing by itself with no attributes is as impossible as the notion of an attribute that does not subsist in something else.
Both are impossible.
Whatever exists by itself must have an attribute, and whatever is an attribute must subsist in something that exists by itself and is characterised by it.

Thus, even the opponents admit that they do not know of anything that exists by itself without any attribute, whether they call it a substance, a body, or anything else.
They assert that the existence of a substance devoid of all accidents is impossible.
Therefore, if someone posits the possibility of an existent that subsists by itself without any attributes, they are positing something whose existence in external reality is unknown and whose possibility in external reality is also unknown — how much more so if it is known to be impossible in external reality, outside the mind?

The [entire] view of those who deny attributes, implies that such existence is impossible. Rather, it is conceivable only in the mind, as the intellect entertains it, just as it conceives of impossibilities that it does not conceptualise their ontological existence or possibility.
Moreover, if the Lord, Exalted be He, can possibly be described with attributes of perfection, and what is possible for Him becomes necessary, then it is impossible for Him to be devoid of attributes of perfection.

The notion of His essence without His essential, necessary attributes is an impossible notion.

Thus, if it is universally and particularly impossible to posit the absence of these attributes, then the claim that He would depend on them, and they would depend on Him, only makes sense in the context of two [separate] things, where it is possible for each to exist without the other.
If this is impossible, then this hypothesis collapses.

Further, we may ask [the opponent]: What do you mean by dependency?
Do you mean that the essence is the cause of the attributes, creating them, or the reverse?
Or do you mean mutual necessitation, such that one does not exist except with the other?

If by "dependency," you mean the dependency of the effect on the cause, then this is false, because the Lord does not cause His essential attributes.
Indeed, He is not bound to do anything specific among His actions or effects; how then could His attributes be considered as effects caused by Him?
While His attributes are intrinsic to His essence and are not among His effects!?

But if you mean mutual necessitation, then this is correct.
Just as it is said: He does not exist without being eternal, necessary by virtue of His own self, nor is He knowledgeable and powerful without being alive.
Thus, if His attributes are intrinsic to His essence, this signifies a higher degree of perfection than the possibility of separation between them.

For if it were possible for Him to exist without attributes of perfection, then perfection would not be essential [necessary] to Him, but merely possible for Him, which would mean He would depend on something external to Himself, for Him to acquire such attributes, and that is a deficiency, which is impossible in His case, as previously explained. Therefore, it is evident that the mutual necessitation between the essence and the attributes of perfection, constitutes the pinnacle of perfection.

~~~
from Shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah be pleased with him) in Majmoo’ al-Fataawa, Vol6, p98-101


~~~
Summary paraphrased from Carl Sharif el-Tobgui's (https://bit.ly/aqlwanaql):

This “essential nature,”  reduces in the end to a question of a thing’s fundamental ontological status, and **specifically to whether its being, or its existence, is necessary, eternal, perfect, and indestructible, **on the one hand, or contingent, temporal, deficient, and subject to demise and non-existence, on the other.
The first set of qualities belong to God alone —and in fact constitute the principle elements by virtue of which He is God— while the second set of attributes apply to all entities other than God, whether they exist in the realm of the aisthesis (seen) or that of the anaisthesis (unseen). These four fundamental qualities define the “essential ontological reality,” (haqiqa) of any existing thing.
Now, as **this fundamental essence, as we have learned, is entirely inseparable (outside of the mind) from a thing’s attributes**, it follows that whatever **attributes possessed by an entity apply to that entity in a manner commensurate with its underlying ontological reality** as defined by this limited set of crucial traits.
Another way we may think about this is to say that **all other attributes of a thing are “colored,” or conditioned, by the ontological status (haqiqa) of the essence in which they adhere**, as determined by these four traits.

We affirm that God has “no parts, no counterpart, and no like,” this is true according to the consensus of all rational minds, and conveys indeed a (rationally and scripturally) valid meaning, namely,
the impossibility that God should separate into parts (yatafarraq),
degenerate (yafsud), or disintegrate (yastahil),
for He is indeed both “ahad ” (singularly and emphatically One) and “samad,”
this latter qualification carrying the meaning, for physical objects, of that which is solid and has no hollow center, as well as the more abstract meaning of a “master or lord whose sovereignty and power are complete and perfect”.

Yet they (innovators, speculative theologians, deluded and diseased philosophers) then superimpose upon this correct meaning
a negation of God’s being separate (mubayin) from and “above” the universe (‘uluwwuhu ‘ala khalqihi),
and other such attributes that they deny on the grounds that affirming them would entail that God is composite (murakkab)
and therefore divisible (munqasim),
rendering Him in this manner “like” (shabih) unto created things.
Yet those knowledgeable of the Arabic language and the context of revelation know that such meanings are simply not designated by the terms “composition” (tarkib), “divisibility” (inqisam), or yet “similarity” (tamthil, tashbih) in the commonly understood Arabic language in which the Qur’an has been revealed.

As for the precarious term “tarkib” (‘composition’), there may be cited several common everyday meanings of this word, including:
(1) that which has been put together or assembled by something else (ma rakkabahu ghayruhu);
(2) that which was disaggregate and subsequently came together (ma kana muftariqan fa-’jtama‘a); or
(3) that which can be disassembled or taken apart (ma yumkinu tafriq ba‘dihi ‘an ba‘d), such as a man, an animal, or a plant.

Now, it is no doubt true, that God is not “composite” in any of these commonly understood senses.
The philosophers however, have adopted the word “composition” (tarkib) as a technical term and endowed it with a number of meanings additional to its original connotations, among which is the notion that God must be devoid of all attributes so as not to be “composed” of His essence (dhat) and His would-be attributes (sifat).
This conclusion is based on the premise that “Every composite entity (kull murakkab) is dependent upon (muftaqir ila) its parts (ajza’ihi)” or, alternatively, “dependent upon other than itself (ghayrihi)” – on the assumption that a thing’s constituent parts are “other than” the thing itself taken as a composite whole. On this understanding, God’s would-be attributes are taken to be “parts” (ajza’) that are “other than” (ghayr) God Himself and upon which He would be “dependent” (muftaqir) if He were indeed to possess attributes. Not only would the possession of attributes, on this view, make God “composite” and not “one” (in the specialized philosophical sense of perfectly simple), but His alleged “dependency” on “other than” Himself would equally negate His perfection and divine self-sufficiency.

In this manner, the philosophers have negated God’s ontological reality (haqiqa) and attributes (sifat) thinking that, in doing so, they were preserving the unity (tawhid) of His essence (that).

In reality, however, the distinction between essence and attributes is a **purely mental one**, as the various attributes of a given entity can only be separated out by the mind for the purpose of rational analysis, yet can never exist as such —that is, separate from essence— in the outside world. [Though inseparable in extramental reality, the attributes are distinct from one another and distinct from the essence.]
(And it is only in this notional sense that one may legitimately describe an attribute as “other than” the entity as a whole or, indeed, “other than” – in the sense of distinct from – any of the entity’s other discrete attributes.)

In external reality, there can exist only the thing’s essence as qualified by the various attributes and properties concomitant to it.
In short, while the mind may make a logical distinction between essence and attributes, the ontological reality of any existent entity necessarily comprises both its essence and concomitant attributes as one (ontologically) inseparable and indivisible whole.

On this analysis, then, the philosophical maxim that “Every composite entity is dependent upon its parts” or “on what is other than it” can, once the rational meanings have been stripped from the technical jargon of the philosophers, be translated, **tautologously**, as:
“Any entity qualified by a necessary attribute concomitant to it can only exist along with its necessary attribute.”
And this meaning is true (in fact it is tautological) and conforms both with a sound rational analysis of the issue as well as with the numerous scriptural dicta that unambiguously affirm specific attributes of God – quite in spite of the fact that the philosophers have chosen to refer to the inseparable attributes of an entity as “parts of” or as being “other than” the entity itself, or to describe the ontological concomitance (istilzam, talazum) between the entity’s essence and its attributes as the “dependence” (iftiqar) of the former upon the latter, or to refer to the fact of an entity’s being qualified by necessary attributes concomitant to it a form of “composition” (tarkib).
The point being that, if these are the specialized, technical meanings the philosophers have given to the common terms “part,” “other,” “dependence,” and “composition,” then there is no rational or scriptural reason to deny the statement that God is “composed” (of His essence and attributes) and therefore “dependent” on “parts” that are “other than” Him on this interpretation of the terms – quite apart from the fact that such idiosyncratic meanings do not conform to what these words mean in the widely shared convention of Arabic speakers and are therefore likely to be misleading and to give rise to numerous confusions and errors, both in terms of rational analysis and of scriptural interpretation.

In the end, any given question must be decided on the basis of a sound rational analysis and a sound scriptural exegesis, once the terms of the discussion have been carefully analyzed and their various meanings separated, fully clarified, and judged for scriptural (as well as rational) integrity on an individual basis.
~~~

“quiddity [of God] is identical with its reality and its existence. As the existence (wujūd) of a particular created being out there is identical with its essence (dhāt) or reality (haqīqa), God is all the more identical with His existence (wujūd) in which nothing else
participates, and which is same as His quiddity that exists in itself” (ibn Taymiyya 1979, 1:29) / Dar 1:292-3.

In this passage, Ibn Taymiyyah appears to affirm a doctrine of simplicity to all beings, by suggesting it is true in all cases that the existence of a thing and the essence of a thing are really one and the same.
On the face of it, that reads strikingly odd, but in fact, it is drawn out from Ibn Taymiyya’s broader empiricist epistemology, and nominalist (or property dualist) metaphysics. For he contends that, There is no divine Essence out there [i.e. extramentally] without any attributes; in fact there is not a single essence out there stripped of all attributes … there cannot be any essence which is not a essence having an attribute such as knowledge, power, etc., neither in language nor in thought … not that they are over and above the divine Self, not at all.
On the contrary, the divine Self is ever qualified with those attributes which are inseparable from it.
Neither are the attributes without the Essence, nor is the Essence without the attributes (ibn Taymiyya 1995, 17:161–2)