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12/16/22 Ukrainian General Update Language Learner

Dec 16th, 2022
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  1. 12/13-12/16/22 Update, day 293-296 of Russian invasion.
  2.  
  3.  
  4. Belarus:
  5.  
  6. There is currently no indication of RU forces forming assault groups in Belarus, or having the present capability to mount another assault into NW Ukraine.
  7.  
  8. However, concern continues to be raised about RU and Belarusian groupings of troops attempting another assault towards Kyiv or Northern Ukraine in the coming winter months. Both the UA defense minister Reznikov and CIC Zaluzhny have stated that RU is trying to train about 150k of the 300k recently mobilized soldiers to potentially launch another offensive towards Kyiv come Feburary.
  9.  
  10. While the RU A-50u Mainstay AWACS long range radar airplane was aloft during the missile salvo, there were no reported missile launches from Belarusian territory today.
  11.  
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  13. Kyiv/ West Ukraine:
  14.  
  15. There was another massive RU missile salvo launched on Friday the 16th across Ukraine, with 74 cruise missiles launched and 60 intercepted, a rate of 81%. These missiles were broadly targeting UA energy and civilian infrastructure across the country. This is the 9th such mass RU missile wave.
  16.  
  17. The bulk of the cruise missiles were launched by RU strategic bombers over the Saratov region of Russia, the Caspian sea, and over the Sea of Azov, as well as cruise missiles launched from the Black Sea Fleet.
  18.  
  19. As a result, 9 power plants were damaged along with power substations, which interrupted power generation from Nuclear power plants as well. Per Ukrenergo, the UA national power company, some 50% of Ukraines power grid was taken offline, although power is being broadly restored in some locales. While there was a state of emergency imposed by Ukrenergo due to massive power failures, it has now been lifted.
  20.  
  21. Of 40 missiles targeting Kyiv, 37 were succesfully intercepted, one of the largest salvos directed at the capital since the war began.
  22.  
  23. Power was broadly taken offline along with water and heating to the majority of Kyiv, with the metro suspending operations. A large group of busses are being temporarly deployed to make up for the suspension of rail service
  24.  
  25. Thankfully, some 40% of residents have had their power, and water restored, with the goal to broadly restore non-emergency power restrictions by tomorrow.
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  27.  
  28. Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv city:
  29.  
  30. RU shelled into the border communities of the Sumy region some 80 times today, including with drones dropping explosives.
  31.  
  32. Strikes continue into and from the border reasons, especially N of Kharkiv.
  33.  
  34. Emergency blackouts in Chernhihiv are already starting to be reduced, following the massive missile salvo early today.
  35.  
  36. RU forces shelled into downtown Kharkiv again with some 10 S-300 missiles launched from belgorod, critically damaging electrical infrastructure and suspending metro operations in the city. Overnight, reportedly some 85% of the city had power restored.
  37.  
  38.  
  39. Kupyansk/Kreminna/Svatove
  40.  
  41. RU forces appear to be somewhat on the assault towards UA positions N of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, with the exact situation remaining unclear as RU artillery increasingly targets the W bank of the Oskil here.
  42.  
  43. RU forces have increasingly targeted into Kupyansk with S-300 ballistic missiles, including hitting the river crossings nearby.
  44.  
  45. Along the highway to Svatove from Kupyansk, UA forces continue to skirmish around the RU strongpoint of Orlyansk and the former RU strongpoint of Kyslivka, with RU shelling working to keep UA forces from advancing across the fields and liberating more villages.
  46.  
  47. Further south along the highway, RU forces appear to be continuing to push UA troops away from the RU strongpoint at Kuzemivka, towards the contested area of Novoselivske, where fierce fighting has occured. RU troops are also firing artillery into the fields SW of here to disrupt UA operations. UA continues to shell into Svatove city proper.
  48.  
  49. SW of Svatove, RU forces have made some gains W of the highway, moving across fields to UA positions in Karmazynivka, which lies along the Zherebets river, and a highway there where UA forces have increasinly attempted to consolidate positions. RU has dedicated large quantities of artillery to this area, in an apparent attempt to blunt any UA offensive towards Svatove from this region.
  50.  
  51. Around Ploschanka, Chervonopopivka, and Zhytlivka, UA troops continue attempts to physically control the P-66 highway from Kreminna to Svatove, with artillery fire broadly limiting RU movement here already as UA SOF operates on both sides of the highway.
  52.  
  53. UA troops continue to skirmish with RU forces S of Kreminna, especially in the forests near Dibrova. RU troops here are very concerned.
  54.  
  55.  
  56. Siversk/Lysychansk
  57.  
  58. The situation around Siversk remains broadly unchanged, with UA forces liberating more territory SE of Bilhorivka. On the flip side of the coin, RU forces have regained some lost territory near Spirne.
  59.  
  60.  
  61. Bakhmut:
  62.  
  63. RU and UA troops continue to skirmish in E Soledar, with RU troops apparently making gains in the last several days in and around the Salt mine, with UA shelling in and around the open mine pit area, as well as the residential neighborhoods to its west.
  64.  
  65. A number of RU conscripts were succesfully captured by UA forces in Bakhmutske, where RU forces are attempting to surge down the highway towards Bakhmut, although UA artillery has broadly limited any RU advances in this area over the open fields.
  66.  
  67. NE of Bakhmut, RU forces have continued to skirmish around the crossroads and gas station, as they are apparently attempting assaults towards Pidhorodne. This suburb of Bakhmut city would allow for RU to entrench somewhat should they sucessfully take it, rather then their current positions fighting out of a large series of open fields. RU is apparently attempting to set conditions to either flank Bakhmut from the N, or to open up new lines of assault directly into the city itself.
  68.  
  69. Around Bakhmut city, RU forces continued efforts over the last several days to enter into the urban area, specifically from the SE direction of the city, with varying success.
  70.  
  71. Along the main E highway into Bakhmut, some long held UA defensive strongpoints have been withdrawn along Patrisa Lumumby street, from a furniture and ceramic factory long fortified. UA troops continue to hold fortified positions in a winery and massive concrete factory, immediately to the E of the river crossing leading into Bakhmut. It remains to be seen if RU forces can muster enough force to push the UA defenders out and cross the river here, although UA shelling has pulled back as far as the concrete factory outskirts.
  72.  
  73. As part of this RU assault, there has been an incursion into the Bakhmut residential neighborhoods SW of these major UA defensive strongpoints, with heavy UA shelling over essentially 2 blocks of territory. This is significant in that it is the first RU offensive to succesfully take territory in the Bakhmut residential area, and as such is likely to attract additional resources and manpower from the RU side.
  74.  
  75. To the S of Bakhmut, UA defenders are continuing to hold the line in the northern half of Optyne and Ivanhrad, where RU forces have been trying to open up another line of attack into Bakhmut city.
  76.  
  77. SW of Bakhmut, RU forces continue to heavily fight into Klischiivka, with air and artillery support, in an apparent attempt to encircle around Bakhmut to the W, and cut off supply routes there. While the fighting is hard, RU forces have not materially demonstrated significant gains on this front in recent days, although RU artillery fire has notably increased both on the frontlines here as well as the supply routes leading into Bakhmut from the west.
  78.  
  79.  
  80.  
  81. Donetsk/Luhansk occupied regions:
  82.  
  83. RU and UA forces continue to fight to the NW of Pisky, as RU troops are continuing to deal with a UA counter-offensive from Pervomaiske in recent weeks, also intruding on RU forces who are attempting attacks towards Vodyane. The RU goal here appears to be to cross the river and flank Avdiivka from the W, a long-contested city heavily shelled by RU forces, with no UA major loss of territory in several months.
  84.  
  85. To the S of Pervomaiske, it appears RU forces are making some gains across the open fields.
  86.  
  87. Heavy fighting continues in Marinka, with RU forces pushing further into the SW of the city, as they attempt attacks broadly in the direction of UA groupings in the Vuhledar/Kostyantynivka area.
  88.  
  89.  
  90. Mariupol:
  91.  
  92. RU Riot police from St. Petersburg have arrived in Mariupol, where they are being tasked with supressing dissent or any widescale protests. The situation remains grim in Mariupol, with power, medicine, and potable water in short supply.
  93.  
  94.  
  95. Zaporizhia/Southern Axis :
  96.  
  97. As part of the RU missile strikes across the country, the Zaporizhia energy infrastructure was heavily targeted by 21 RU S-300 ballistic missiles. Dnipro as well was hit hard, with the majority of heating and water supply facilities depowered. Work is ongoing to restore both, although emergency power cuts are in effect.
  98.  
  99. Around Vuhledar and Pavlivka, RU troops are continuing offensive operations, although based on UA artillery strikes, RU is not making any considerable gains.
  100.  
  101. UA forces fired rockets into RU positions in Tokmak, Berdyansk, and Melitopol in recent days, as well as the areas around Enerhodar following heavy RU shelling across the Dnipro river into Nikopol and surrounding areas.
  102.  
  103.  
  104. Kherson:
  105.  
  106. UA citizens in Kherson are asked to had over any weaponry recieved during the hasty defense of the city in late feburary, as well as any partisan cells there as well. No criminal charges are to be levied, regardless of quantity or type of weaponry possessed. The goal behind this act is to avoid any tense situations with law enforcement, military, or other government officials.
  107.  
  108. RU and UA shelling continues across the Dnipro here, with RU shelling directly into downtown Kherson resulting in casualities in recent days.
  109.  
  110. UA continues to prioritize firing on the riverside town and approaches to Hola Prystan, especially in the marshy islands immediately next to the town, which has sparked some RU worries about a potential UA assault attempt in the future here.
  111.  
  112. UA also is expending a lot of shells around Nova Kahkovka and the the approaches to it, which has resulted in RU withdrawing a number of forces from this area in recent weeks.
  113.  
  114. UA deep strikes abound into S Kherson, targeting large RU positions in Zalyzni port, Skadovsk, Chaplynka, and Novotroitske.
  115.  
  116. On the Kinburn peninsula, RU and UA forces exchange dueling artillery fire, with UA striking as deep as Heroiske as RU forces target the area around Ochakiv. The situation otherwise remains unclear in this area.
  117.  
  118.  
  119. Odessa/Black Sea/Crimea:
  120.  
  121. Aside from the RU black sea fleet launching Kalibr missiles as part of the massive salvo today, the situation in the black sea remains unchanged.
  122.  
  123.  
  124. General:
  125.  
  126. In the last 24hours Ukrainian forces eliminated:
  127.  
  128. 680x soldiers (Total 97,270)
  129. 6x APC
  130. 5x tanks
  131. 7x Artillery (4x MLRS)
  132. 4x UAV
  133.  
  134. A former commander from the Wagner Group, Andriy medvedev, stated that he knew of at least 10 cases where wagner mercenaries were executed for refusal to fight. He also reports that large quantities of Wagner fighters are not paid, nor are their families paid in the event of their deaths. He also speaks about high casualities, with only 3/30 people remaining in his platoon after a few days of frontal assaults towards UA positions. Medvedev is currently claiming to be on the run from Wagner representatives in Russia proper, after deserting.
  135.  
  136. Per Volya News, who has been tracking both RU and UA casualities via a number of sources since march:
  137.  
  138. RU, as of 12/8, had lost some 93.8k-98.1k soldiers (KIA/MIA/Captured) with another 177k-190.5k WIA, including lightly wounded (~40%). Over the period of Nov 8 to Dec 8th, RU took an average of 2156 casualities per day.
  139.  
  140. UA, as of 12/8, had lost some 47.2l- 50.3k soldiers (KIA/MIA/Captured) with another 89.6k-95.5k WIA, including lightly wounded (~50%). Over the period of Nov 8 to Dec 8th, UA took an average of 1066 casualities per day.
  141.  
  142. Volya additionally assert that these RU casualities, coming as the result of a few RU offensive operations such as at Bakhmut and near Pavlivka, demonstrate that RU will need significant manpower reserves for any further large scale action, and hence increasingly turn to mobilization efforts.
  143.  
  144. There was statistically one casuality every 20 seconds, accounting for both sides over the last month, in a 2:1 ration of RU:UA.
  145.  
  146. The US Senate approved the $858 billion national defense spending bill for 2023, which included $800 million in aid to Ukraine. The White House also plans to provide Ukraine with air defense equipment.
  147.  
  148. Greece has stated they are ready to provide S-300 air defense systems to Ukraine if the US supplies Patriot missile batteries in their place.
  149.  
  150. The EU has approved the 9th sanctions package targeting Russia, with control measures on dual use technologies, bans on aircraft engines and parts (including UAV engines from any 3rd party country). Additionally 4 RU mass media channels had their EU licenses suspended. The EU banned any new investment in RU's mining sector with minor exceptions, and prohibited EU citizens from holding any in the governing bodies of any RU state-controlled organization.
  151.  
  152. Cambodia will begin training UA sappers on demining operations next month.
  153.  
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