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  1. February 16, 2016 A Message to Our Customers
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  3. 美国政府此前对苹果公司的要求可谓史无前例,它将极大威胁用户安全。我们拒绝了政府的要求,因为这一要求背后的深意远大于这次恐袭案本身。
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  5. The United States government has demanded that Apple take an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order, which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand.
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  7. 我们呼吁公众对此进行讨论,也希望我们的用户和所有美国人都了解我们面临的是怎样的威胁。
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  9. This moment calls for public discussion, and we want our customers and people around the country to understand what is at stake.
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  11. 加密的必要性 The Need for Encryption
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  13. 以苹果手机为代表的智能机已经成为人们日常生活的必需品。人们在手机上储存大量个人信息,包括照片、音乐、备忘录、日程表、联系人、财务信息和健康数据,甚至曾去过的地方和目前的定位。
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  15. Smartphones, led by iPhone, have become an essential part of our lives. People use them to store an incredible amount of personal information, from our private conversations to our photos, our music, our notes, our calendars and contacts, our financial information and health data, even where we have been and where we are going.
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  17.   我们需要保护这些信息,避免黑客或者犯罪分子盗取或未经允许擅自利用它。用户同样也期待苹果和其他科技公司能竭尽所能保护其隐私信息,对苹果来说,我们也一直视保护用户数据为己任。
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  19. All that information needs to be protected from hackers and criminals who want to access it, steal it, and use it without our knowledge or permission. Customers expect Apple and other technology companies to do everything in our power to protect their personal information, and at Apple we are deeply committed to safeguarding their data.
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  21.   一旦我们在个人信息安全上作出妥协,势必将威胁到用户的人身安全——这也是加密程序存在的重要意义。
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  23. Compromising the security of our personal information can ultimately put our personal safety at risk. That is why encryption has become so important to all of us.
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  25.   一直以来,我们都使用加密程序保护用户的个人数据,因为我们坚信这是保证信息安全的唯一途径。这些数据甚至连苹果也无法取得,因为我们认为你iPhone手机里的内容与苹果无关。
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  27. For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers’ personal data because we believe it’s the only way to keep their information safe. We have even put that data out of our own reach, because we believe the contents of your iPhone are none of our business.
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  29. 圣贝纳迪诺恐袭案 The San Bernardino Case
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  31. 我们同样对去年12月圣贝纳迪诺的恐怖袭击感到既震惊又愤怒。我们为逝者默哀,同时也希望能为平白丧命的人们伸张正义。袭击发生后,联邦调查局向我们寻求帮助,我们也尽力地支持了政府作的努力。对恐怖份子,我们绝不姑息同情。
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  33. We were shocked and outraged by the deadly act of terrorism in San Bernardino last December. We mourn the loss of life and want justice for all those whose lives were affected. The FBI asked us for help in the days following the attack, and we have worked hard to support the government’s efforts to solve this horrible crime. We have no sympathy for terrorists.
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  35.   当联邦调查局向我们调取权限范围内的数据,我们亦一一提供。只要有合法有效的法院传票和搜索令,我们都会配合,正如圣贝纳迪诺案的情况。公司的工程师随时待命,为联邦调查局提供参考意见。另外,我们还为联邦调查局提供了一系列调查途径以供选择。
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  37. When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it. Apple complies with valid subpoenas and search warrants, as we have in the San Bernardino case. We have also made Apple engineers available to advise the FBI, and we’ve offered our best ideas on a number of investigative options at their disposal.
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  39.   我们十分尊重FBI的专业人员,也相信他们的意图是好的。但截至目前,在法律允许的范围内,我们已经做了最大努力去协助调查。现在政府却要求我们提供我们根本没有、也不可能去冒险创造的东西——建立一个可以越过iPhone手机加密系统的后门程序。
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  41. We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe their intentions are good. Up to this point, we have done everything that is both within our power and within the law to help them. But now the U.S. government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a backdoor to the iPhone.
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  43.   他们所设想的是一个新版的iPhone操作系统,能绕过数个重要安全屏障,可以直接安装到手机上,在加密的手机上进行数据恢复。这样的软件目前根本不存在,即使真的创造出来,一旦落入不法分子手中,就可能会被用来破解他人的iPhone。
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  45. Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.
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  47.   联邦调查局可能会用不同的方式来描述这一工具,但它的本质就是要建立一个可以绕过安全屏障的iOS系统,给手机留“后门”。尽管政府可能会辩称这个工具只会被用于特定的案件,可这样的保证并不绝对可靠。
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  49. The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control.
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  51. 对数据安全的威胁 The Threat to Data Security
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  53. 也许有人会认为,单纯只给一部iPhone创建后门程序不就可以简单解决问题了吗?这样的思路其实忽略了数据安全的核心,以及政府所提要求的本质。
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  55. Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple, clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and the significance of what the government is demanding in this case.
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  57.   在如今的数字世界,加密系统的“钥匙”是能够解锁数据的一段信息,只有在保证它的安全的前提下,才能保证系统的安全性。一旦这条关键信息被披露,或者绕行编码被外传,那任何具有相关知识的人就都可以破解安全系统了。
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  59. In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge.
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  61.   政府建议这个解锁工具可以仅仅针对特定的一部手机使用一次。但这是不现实的。一旦创造出了这样的技术,它就可以被重复使用到任何设备上,就像我们生活中的万能钥匙,可以打开成千上万的锁——不管是餐厅、银行、商店还是私人住宅。任何理性尚存的人都不可能接受这样的事情发生。
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  63. The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable person would find that acceptable.
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  65.   政府是在要求苹果公司入侵自己的用户,破坏数十年来不断升级的安全系统,让我们的顾客暴露在黑客和网络罪犯的面前,这其中还包括数千万美国公民。他们是在要求那些为iPhone建立了强大加密系统的工程师亲手毁掉自己的努力成果,让用户安全面临威胁,这是多么的讽刺。
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  67. The government is asking Apple to hack our own users and undermine decades of security advancements that protect our customers — including tens of millions of American citizens — from sophisticated hackers and cybercriminals. The same engineers who built strong encryption into the iPhone to protect our users would, ironically, be ordered to weaken those protections and make our users less safe.
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  69.   在美国历史上,我们也从未见过逼迫公司将顾客置于风险之中的案例。更何况近年来,密码破译学家和国家安全专家都在不断示警:如今的加密系统正在逐渐弱化。如果我们向政府妥协,只会伤害到那些依赖苹果公司来保护数据的、遵纪守法的善良公民。反倒是罪犯和那些心怀不轨的人会继续使用他们独特的加密方式,不受影响。
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  71. We can find no precedent for an American company being forced to expose its customers to a greater risk of attack. For years, cryptologists and national security experts have been warning against weakening encryption. Doing so would hurt only the well-meaning and law-abiding citizens who rely on companies like Apple to protect their data. Criminals and bad actors will still encrypt, using tools that are readily available to them.
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  73. 一次危险的尝试 A Dangerous Precedent
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  75.   联邦调查局没有选择通过议会寻求立法帮助,却提议以史无前例的方式诠释1789年制定的《全部诉讼法案》(All Writs Act),希望能据此合法扩展自己的权利。
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  77. Rather than asking for legislative action through Congress, the FBI is proposing an unprecedented use of the All Writs Act of 1789 to justify an expansion of its authority.
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  79.   如果该计划成功,那政府可能会要求我们移除安全屏障,为操作系统增加新的功能,允许电子输入密码。这样一来,只要有一台普通计算速度的电脑,然后尝试千百万次密码组合,就能轻易暴力解锁苹果手机。
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  81. The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer.
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  83.   政府提出的要求背后的暗示令人胆寒。如果政府可以用《全部诉讼法案》来破解你的手机,那它也可以用来侵入任何人的设备搜集数据。它还可以更进一步要求苹果公司创建监视软件,用以拦截你的短信、查询你的健康信息和财务数据、跟踪你的定位,甚至在你不知情的情况下调用你的麦克风或相机。
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  85. The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.
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  87.   我们严正地拒绝政府的要求。我们有义务告知公众,美国政府的行为已经严重越界。
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  89. Opposing this order is not something we take lightly. We feel we must speak up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the U.S. government.
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  91.   出于对美国民主的尊重和对这个国家的热爱,我们质疑联邦提出的要求。我们希望所有人都能冷静下来,认真地思考这一要求背后的深意。
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  93. We are challenging the FBI’s demands with the deepest respect for American democracy and a love of our country. We believe it would be in the best interest of everyone to step back and consider the implications.
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  95.   即使联邦调查局的意图是好的,政府也不能强迫我们为产品创建后门。最根本的是,我们担心政府的要求会破坏美国的民主和自由,而守护这二者其实正是政府的职责。
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  97. While we believe the FBI’s intentions are good, it would be wrong for the government to force us to build a backdoor into our products. And ultimately, we fear that this demand would undermine the very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.
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