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  1.  
  2. Taken together, the results indicate that the H5N1 viruses from
  3. human infections and the closely related avian viruses isolated in 2004
  4. and 2005 belong to a single genotype, often referred to as genotype Z,
  5. and can be traced back to viruses isolated in 1997 in Hong Kong and from
  6. geese in China.
  7.  
  8. Thus, viruses from the 1997 H5N1 epidemic may have been circulating
  9. in Asia since without causing any reported human infections until the
  10. two confirmed cases in Hong Kong in February 2003. Where and how have
  11. they been circulating?
  12.  
  13.  
  14. Intensive poultry farming & bird flu
  15.  
  16. In an earlier study, researchers found that H5N1 influenza viruses were
  17. isolated from apparently healthy domestic ducks in Mainland China from
  18. 1999 to 2002\;\s\sand these viruses were becoming progressively more
  19. pathogenic for mammals as time passed.
  20.  
  21. Twenty-one viruses isolated were confirmed to be H5N1 subtype, and
  22. antigenically similar to the virus that was the source of the 1997 Hong
  23. Kong bird flu haemagglutinin gene, and all were highly pathogenic in
  24. chickens (most causing 100% mortality, although the earliest isolates
  25. were less lethal). The viruses were increasingly pathogenic for mice
  26. the later they were isolated. The earliest seven isolates were non-
  27. pathogenic or of low pathogenicity, the next seven of relatively more
  28. pathogenic, and the last four highly pathogenic. All pathogenic viruses
  29. replicated in the lung.
  30.  
  31. The genetic findings suggest that H5N1 had been circulating among
  32. domestic fowl in Asia since the 1997 epidemic in Hong Kong. And while
  33. circulating in domestic ducks, H5N1 viruses gradually acquired the
  34. characteristics that make them lethal in mammals including humans. One
  35. possible explanation is the transmission of duck H5N1 viruses to humans,
  36. the selective evolution of the viruses in humans, and their subsequent
  37. transmission back to ducks.
  38.  
  39. Thus, commercial factory farming could be the reservoir, breeding
  40. ground and incubator for deadly epidemic viruses like H5N1, as
  41. consistent with other evidence (see "Fowl play in bird flu", this
  42. series).
  43.  
  44.  
  45. How likely is the bird flu pandemic?
  46.  
  47. Many experts are saying that the only barrier between a pandemic of bird
  48. flu among birds and one among humans is if the H5N1 mutates its HA gene
  49. to recognize the human-type cell surface marker rather than the bird
  50. type.
  51.  
  52. As it turned out, human cells deep in the lower respiratory tract do
  53. have the bird-type receptor, which is why the virus can enter those
  54. cells and cause severe pneumonia\;\salthough the progeny virus is less
  55. easy to pass on than if, like human influenza viruses, it could enter
  56. and replicate in the cells of the upper respiratory tract as well. Is
  57. that the only barrier that keeps away the bird flu pandemic?
  58.  
  59. Things are not that simple, according to the team of researchers in
  60. Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Left to its own
  61. devices, successful species jumps in nature are relatively rare. That
  62. is because complex adaptations are needed for a virus to get established
  63. in a new species and transmit from host to host within that species.
  64. These complex adaptations including genetic differences constitute
  65. biological barriers between species, which can only be breached by
  66. genetic modification. That is why genetic modification is dangerous, as
  67. I, and others have been warning since genetic engineering began. The
  68. SARS virus of the last pandemic did breach species barriers and was
  69. highly infectious as it passed from one human host to numerous others,
  70. it made many more people ill and caused many more deaths. There is
  71. indeed evidence that extensive genetic engineering of corona viruses may
  72. have been contributed to creating the SARS virus.
  73.  
  74.  
  75. What are the barriers preventing a virus to get into a new host?
  76.  
  77. First of all, there are barriers to prevent the virus from entering the
  78. body, such as mucus, alveolar macrophages, and epithelium (linings of
  79. organs and tissues). There are specific receptors governing the entry
  80. into cells. The HA on the viral coats of the avian influenza viruses
  81. preferentially bind to carbohydrate chains attached to the receptor
  82. protein ending in a sialic acid in a-2,3 linkage to a galactose, whereas
  83. the HA on human influenza viruses prefer an a-2,6 linkage. The lower
  84. respiratory tract cells in humans have carbohydrate chains on receptors
  85. ending in SA-a-2,3-gal, however, which is why fatal pneumonia can occur
  86. in humans infected with the virus.
  87.  
  88. Once within the cell, the virus must replicate. Many avian
  89. influenza viruses can infect mouse cells but not replicate\;\s\soften
  90. because the viral polymerase differs between avian and mammalian
  91. influenza viruses in residue 627 of the polymerase protein PB2, which is
  92. usually glutamic acid in avian viruses and lysine in mammalian viruses.
  93. So this might be another barrier. In experimentally infected mice, a
  94. glutamic acid to lysine mutation at this position in the PB2 protein of
  95. H5N1 virus results in increased virulence and in the ability of the
  96. virus to invade organs other than the lungs. Both H5N1 virus from human
  97. patients in Asia and H7N7 virus from a fatal human case in the
  98. Netherlands possess a lysine at this site. Lysine is also in the PB2 in
  99. H5N1 viruses isolated from the thousands of dead wild water-fowl in
  100. mid-2005 from Qinghai Lake in China.
  101.  
  102. The replicated virus must be released from the host cell to infect
  103. more cells or be shed from the host. In influenza, progeny virus
  104. particles are bound to host cell receptor carbohydrate chains by their
  105. haemagglutinin. Viral neuraminidase cleaves these carbohydrate chains,
  106. thus releasing the newly produced virus from the cell surface. Like the
  107. respective haemagglutinins, neuraminidases from avian influenza viruses
  108. have a preference for the SA-a-2,3-gal-terminated chains, whereas those
  109. from many human influenza viruses prefer the a-2,6 linkage.
  110.  
  111. Even if progeny virus exits one host cell, host innate immune
  112. responses may hinder the infection of other cells. Interferons may
  113. induce uninfected cells to enter an antiviral state that inhibits viral
  114. replication. The viral NS1 polypeptide acts as an antagonist to
  115. interferon induction in infected cells by sequestering double-stranded
  116. RNAs or suppressing host post-transcriptional processing of mRNAs. NS1
  117. also may help the virus to replicate in interferon-treated cultured
  118. cells.
  119.  
  120. In order to spread from the respiratory tract to other susceptible
  121. tissues, the virus needs to enter the lymph and/or blood system, and be
  122. successfully transported to other tissues. In poultry, whether
  123. infection is localised or systemic depends on the amino acid sequence at
  124. the cleavage site of HA. The cleavage is required for the
  125. haemagglutinin to become fully functional. Low pathogenic influenza
  126. viruses require extracellular proteases that are limited to the
  127. respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts to cleave the precursor
  128. haemagglutinin, whereas highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses have
  129. changes in the cleavage site that allow the precursor HA to be processed
  130. by ubiquitous intracellular proteases, resulting in fatal systemic
  131. infection. The HAs of H5N1 viruses all have this change, which is a
  132. motif of basic amino acids.
  133.  
  134. From their sites of replication, viruses need to be transmitted to
  135. new hosts. Dissemination of progeny viruses form the infected host
  136. occurs through shedding in respiratory, enteric, or urogenital
  137. secretions. Human influenza viruses replicate mainly in the upper
  138. respiratory tract and are usually readily transmitted via droplets
  139. formed during coughing or sneezing. By contrast, H5N1 virus typically
  140. infects human cells in the lower respiratory tract and so may be less
  141. easily shed from the infected patient.
  142.  
  143. Finally, it is well established in epidemiology theory that, as the
  144. proportion of susceptible hosts in the population, s, drops (as
  145. individuals become infected, then recover, or die), the number of
  146. secondary cases per infection, R, also drops, R = sR0. If R<1, as is
  147. currently the case for H5N1, an infection will not cause a major
  148. epidemic. But if R is even modestly greater than one, a novel infection
  149. may spread locally, with potential for further spread in the absence of
  150. control.
  151.  
  152. --
  153. ;From -8066292221520757068
  154. X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII
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  157. X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2003-04-22 01:49:04 PST
  158. Path: archiver1.google.com!news1.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!news-spur1.max
  159. well.syr.edu!news.maxwell.syr.edu!c03.atl99!news.webusenet.com!ngpeer.news.aol.c
  160. om!news.compuserve.com!news-master.compuserve.com!not-for-mail
  161. From: marcus@myrealbox.com
  162. Newsgroups: uk.business.agriculture
  163. Subject: Re: SARS update
  164. Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2003 09:52:47 +0100
  165. Organization: CompuServe Interactive Services
  166. Lines: 71
  167. Message-ID: <9k0aavoe4c2cghf93rcm7odc86ljrqpncd@4ax.com>
  168. References: <dOzobzAhTNp+Ew6Z@btopenworld.com>
  169. Reply-To: marcus@myrealbox.com
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  174. X-Trace: ngspool-d02.news.aol.com 1051001336 24422 217.44.218.52 (22 Apr 2003 08
  175. :48:56 GMT)
  176. X-Complaints-To: newsmaster@compuserve.com
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  178. X-Newsreader: Forte Agent 1.92/32.572
  179. Xref: archiver1.google.com uk.business.agriculture:97241
  180.  
  181.  
  182. Prof. Joe Cummins
  183.  
  184. e-mail: jcummins@uwo.ca
  185.  
  186. �Corona virus genetic engineering and the origin of SARS�
  187. The growing global epidemic of Severe acute respiratory syndrome
  188. (SARS).
  189.  
  190. Has been pinned down to a Corona virus. The disease has spread rapidly
  191. from its first appearance in China and impacted heavily on Hong Kong ,
  192. Singapore, Thailand and Toronto, Canada. The disease agent was
  193. identified as a Corona virus with a unique RNA sequence not directly
  194. related to known human and animal viruses (1) None of the early
  195. reports have acknowledged the large body of reports on the genetic
  196. manipulation of Coronas viruses in the laboratory nor have they
  197. considered the possibility that the unique virus arose as a laboratory
  198. accident or purposeful experiment. I have searched out a number of
  199. studies on the genetic manipulation of Corona viruses and describe a
  200. few such studies below.
  201.  
  202. Corona virus from a disease of pigs that produces symptoms similar to
  203. SARS has been manipulated to create a viral vector to propagate
  204. foreign genes (2). The Corona virus coat protein genes have been
  205. manipulated to alter the tropism (species attacked by the virus) of
  206. the virus (3). The gene for the pig corona virus coat protein
  207. (controlling viral tropism) was propagated in tobacco plants (4).
  208. Prodigene, a company specializing in production of crop
  209. biopharmaceuticals also produced an edible vaccine for swine corona
  210. virus (5) and information on whether or not that product was the one
  211. being field tested in a disastrous field test has been deemed
  212. confidential information.
  213.  
  214. These brief comments are musing on an ongoing investigation but might
  215. provide some useful background information to others.
  216.  
  217. References
  218.  
  219. 1)http://www.who.int/en/
  220. Coronavirus never before seen in humans is the cause of SARS
  221. Unprecedented collaboration identifies new pathogen in record time 16
  222. April 2003
  223.  
  224. 2)Journal of General Virology (2002), 83, 567�579.
  225. In vitro and in vivo expression of foreign genes by transmissible
  226. gastroenteritis coronavirus-derived minigenomes
  227. Sara Alonso, Isabel Sola, Jens P. Teifke, Ilona Reimann, Ander Izeta,
  228. Mo! nica Balasch,Juan Plana-Dura! n, Rob J. M. Moormann4 and Luis
  229. Enjuanes
  230.  
  231. 3)JOURNAL OF VIROLOGY, Apr. 2003, p. 4528�4538 Vol. 77,
  232. Switching Species Tropism: an Effective Way To Manipulate the Feline
  233. Coronavirus Genome Bert Jan Haijema, Haukeliene Volders, and Peter J.
  234. M. Rottie
  235.  
  236. 4)Immunogenicity of porcine transmissible gastroenteritis virus spike
  237. protein expressed in plants
  238. T. Tubolya, W. Yub, A. Baileyb, S. Degrandisc, S. Dub, L. Ericksonb,
  239. E� . Nagya,
  240. Vaccine 18 (2000) 2023�2028
  241.  
  242. 5) http://www8.techmall.com/techdocs/TS000215-6.html
  243. sept 2001
  244. ProdiGene is First to Demonstrate Vaccination With Edible Vaccines
  245. �Clinical trials Conducted by ProdiGene, a biopharmaceutical company
  246. in College tation, Texas, have demonstrated for the first time that an
  247. oral vaccine expressed in plants gives protection against a virulent
  248. viral pathogen in livestock. The trials were conducted on swine using
  249. an edible form of a vaccine for transmissible gastroenteritis virus
  250. (TGEV).�
  251.  
  252.  
  253. -----
  254.  
  255.  
  256.  
  257.  
  258.  
  259.  
  260.  
  261.  
  262.  
  263. -------
  264. "Colin Trunt" <colin@trunt.com> wrote in message
  265. news:uKQIl.89545$ga.53197@newsfe01.ams2...
  266. > Serious question.
  267. >
  268. > I imagine smokey bacon would be safer but I have no
  269. > scientific proof.
  270. >
  271. Generally Viruses need a living host, they die quickly in a dead one,
  272. and are vulnerable to heating. So unless you are eating raw pig
  273. that's alive, or has just been killed, you should be OK?
  274.  
  275. The real problem with this new outbreak of Swine flu
  276. is it has jumped to being human to human infectious.
  277. So watch out for people who look unwell and avoid contact
  278.  
  279. Good thing about quickly mutating viruses like this one,
  280. is they tend to mutate to a safe form within 6 months
  281.  
  282. Steve Terry
  283.  
  284. -----
  285. From 1250770940491672925
  286. X-Google-Thread: f6783,9fb0b3813bc86769
  287. X-Google-Thread: 10b88a,9fb0b3813bc86769
  288. X-Google-Thread: fcd43,9fb0b3813bc86769
  289. X-Google-Attributes: gidf6783,gid10b88a,gidfcd43,domainid0,public,usenet
  290. X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit
  291. Path: g2news1.google.com!news3.google.com!fu-berlin.de!uni-berlin.de!individual.
  292. net!not-for-mail
  293. From: %steve%@malloc.co.uk (Steve Firth)
  294. Newsgroups: uk.legal,uk.misc,uk.people.health
  295. Subject: Re: Can you catch swine flu from bacon?
  296. Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2009 14:44:01 +0100
  297. Organization: Firth Consulting
  298. Lines: 36
  299. Message-ID: <1iysayo.ohv697z7t5l2N%%steve%@malloc.co.uk>
  300. References: <uKQIl.89545$ga.53197@newsfe01.ams2> <gt1le9$em4$1@news.albasani.net
  301. >
  302. X-Trace: individual.net laEISwTc5rEBYNaccpnvxAWJqeRZd5NNInpctwiUk76mOU8TaS
  303. Cancel-Lock: sha1:f04bmyiqSYkxrcblvuW1EDHRTAE=
  304. X-Copyright: Copyright in the original content of this Usenet post is owned or c
  305. ontrolled by Steve Firth. The content may be distributed freely for non-commerci
  306. al use. Google and DIYBanter are forbidden from storing this post or displaying
  307. this post to third parties without the prior written permission of Steve Firth.
  308. User-Agent: MacSOUP/2.8.2 (Mac OS X version 10.4.11 (x86))
  309. Xref: g2news1.google.com uk.legal:140731 uk.misc:33541 uk.people.health:1453
  310.  
  311. Steve Terry <gFOURwwk@tesco.net> wrote:
  312.  
  313. > "Colin Trunt" <colin@trunt.com> wrote in message
  314. > news:uKQIl.89545$ga.53197@newsfe01.ams2...
  315. > > Serious question.
  316. > >
  317. > > I imagine smokey bacon would be safer but I have no
  318. > > scientific proof.
  319. > >
  320. > Generally Viruses need a living host, they die quickly in a dead one,
  321. > and are vulnerable to heating.
  322.  
  323. Generally, you're far from correct.
  324.  
  325. Viruses have a range of thermal stability and those which have
  326. Archaebacteria as hosts have been found to be stable at temperatures
  327. closer to boiling than to 37C. SARS-associated corona virus has been
  328. determined to be infective up to 51 days post-mortem, and SVD, foot and
  329. mouth, bluetongue and other significant veterinary viruses have been
  330. discovered in pasteurised serum and cooked meats.
  331.  
  332. > So unless you are eating raw pig
  333. > that's alive, or has just been killed, you should be OK?
  334.  
  335. I wouldn't make such a statement, not even with the addition of a
  336. question mark, presumably indicating your real uncertainty about the
  337. apparently definitive statements you are making.
  338.  
  339. > The real problem with this new outbreak of Swine flu
  340. > is it has jumped to being human to human infectious.
  341. > So watch out for people who look unwell and avoid contact
  342. >
  343. > Good thing about quickly mutating viruses like this one,
  344. > is they tend to mutate to a safe form within 6 months
  345.  
  346. Bullshit.
  347.  
  348. --
  349.  
  350.  
  351. From: crystalviolent@aol.com (Crystalviolent)
  352. Newsgroups: bionet.microbiology
  353. Date: 20 Apr 2003 00:26:46 GMT
  354. References: <3ea17dc5.10926114@news.dsl.pipex.com>
  355. Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com
  356. X-Newsreader: Session Scheduler (Queue Name: usenet_offline-m07)
  357. Subject: Re: The SAR's virus?
  358. Message-ID: <20030419202646.18828.00000167@mb-m07.aol.com>
  359. Xref: archiver1.google.com bionet.microbiology:3323
  360. In article <3ea17dc5.10926114@news.dsl.pipex.com>, coroscant@hotmail.com
  361. (Christopher) writes:
  362. >the news about this virus I was just wondering that if a cure wasn't
  363. >found, could it kill off most of the entire human race,
  364. The mortality rate of SARS (a Corona virus) worldwide is 4.8%. (USA is 0%)
  365. Pandemics of viral influenza (a Myxo virus) are much higher and IT hasn't wiped
  366. out the human race.
  367. Simian herpes, on the other hand, is 99% fatal to humans. Good thing the
  368. manufacturers have great quality control/assurance on the green monkey kidney
  369. cells we use in the lab. ;-)
  370.  
  371.  
  372.  
  373.  
  374.  
  375. ---
  376. From: jrice@pomona.edu (Jeffrey Rice)
  377. Subject: HIV-1 Adaptation to host/various musings
  378. Date: 1995/10/18
  379. Message-ID: <4629pj$h07@epcot.pomona.edu>#1/1
  380. X-Deja-AN: 117752365
  381. organization: Pomona College
  382. newsgroups: bionet.immunology
  383. I was reading Robin Henig's _A Dancing Matrix_, and came across a
  384. couple ideas that didn't seem to work. (BTW- has anyone else read this
  385. book? I'm loving it...)
  386. Dr. Henig says that HIV-1 shows signs that it may have existed in a
  387. human host for several generations, as opposed to HIV-2 which shows signs of
  388. a recent cross-over. He bases this on comparisons to SIV, as well as case
  389. studies dating to the 50's, as well as historical suggestions.
  390. HIV-1 is also more lethal than HIV-2, in that I guess most patients
  391. infected with HIV-2 can be unaffected for two decades or more.
  392. Here's my thought/question:
  393. Since the viruses adapt to their hosts via mutation, selection,
  394. ect., why would HIV-1 become more lethal across generations? I guess I am
  395. making the assumption it originated with something like SIV, which causes
  396. symptoms more like HIV-2. Wouldn't natural selection favor a less virulent
  397. strain, to prolong host life and therefore transmission opportunities? Or
  398. can we guess from this that HIV-1 was MORE virulent historically than it is
  399. now?
  400. What got me started on this topic was the (correct) idea that the
  401. intention of a virus is not cell death, but replication. If that includes
  402. cell death of the host, this can be acceptable, assuming enough replication
  403. is a result and transmission to a new host is possible. Host death kills
  404. the parasite, usually. (Obviously we see with viruses like Ebola, ect. that
  405. much transmission occurs after death, since the victims have bled-out. This
  406. seems a less secure method to me, though...)
  407. Anyway, I'd be interested to hear people's thoughts on this. If you
  408. are interested in immunology or virology, I'd recommend Henig's book. It
  409. really is facinating, not only in its coverage of the emergence of HIV but
  410. also in other viruses.
  411. Jeff Rice
  412. ---
  413.  
  414.  
  415. From: holson@california.com (Howard Olson)
  416. Subject: Re: Why HIV-2 is less lethal than HIV-1?
  417. Date: 1996/11/07
  418. Message-ID: <3280d922.0@seashell.california.com>#1/1
  419. X-Deja-AN: 194994520
  420. references: <54uf66$ib4@chopin.inet.co.th>
  421. newsgroups: bionet.molbio.hiv
  422. Umnarj Paeratakul <umnarj@mozart.inet.co.th> wrote:
  423. >Dear friends,
  424. >I read an article saying that the HIV-2 is not
  425. >as "potent" as HIV-1. People do get sick and
  426. >die, but at the lower rate.
  427. >Do you know why?
  428. >Umnarj Paeratakul
  429. >Thailand
  430. Viruses sometimes evolve less lethality against their host as
  431. competition against another strain that is more lethal. By not killing
  432. the host as quickly they have more chance to spread their genes versus
  433. those of a more lethal strain.
  434. ---
  435.  
  436.  
  437. From: iayork@panix.com (Ian A. York)
  438. Subject: Re: Just another comment on purpose
  439. Date: 1996/09/13
  440. Message-ID: <51cv8c$1lc@panix.com>#1/1
  441. X-Deja-AN: 180486786
  442. references: <51cp4h$pnk@net.bio.net>
  443. organization: Panix
  444. newsgroups: bionet.virology
  445. In article <51cp4h$pnk@net.bio.net>,
  446. Martin Hewlett <hewlett@brahms.biosci.arizona.edu> wrote:
  447. >
  448. >I think that this is the key point of the "balance" argument. It seems
  449. >to me that a successfull virus must somehow allow for the presence of
  450. >"further hosts" in order to propagate. Therefore, it is difficult to
  451. >see how case fatality rates approaching 100% are consistent with this
  452. >need.
  453. Not so. First, as far as many non-fatal viruses are concerned, a host is
  454. a one-shot case anyway (i.e. after a host is infected, it becomes immune,
  455. and the virus's progeny have no practical chance of re-infecting it; that
  456. individual host is out of the pool of susceptible individuals). Since
  457. that host is of no more use to the virus, it cares not whether she lives
  458. or dies - it can't even detect the difference between a dead host and an
  459. immmune host. (Sorry for the anthropomorphizing. You know what I
  460. mean.)
  461. If the host dies, it leaves no more progeny; this might present a virus
  462. with a problem in the long run, but that's not necessarily the case.
  463. Hosts die anyway; individuals produce a more-than-replacement number of
  464. progeny. The key is that the virus maintains a roughly steady level
  465. within the population over time. A population can replace the ravages of
  466. a 100%-fatal virus.
  467. Analogy time: mice are preyed upon by owls. Damn few mice survive an owl
  468. attack - owls are close to 100% fatal for mice. But there is no selection
  469. pressure on owls to become less lethal on an individual basis; there is
  470. pressure on the owl population as a whole to not become more abundant
  471. than the mouse population can support - if they do, the owls starve to
  472. death, the mouse population recovers, and the status quo is restored.
  473. The situation is exactly the same for viruses. If a virus is 100% fatal,
  474. and it becomes too abundant, then each individual it infects is less
  475. likely to encounter (and re-infect) a new host; the virus becomes less
  476. abundant, the population recovers; now infected individulas are more
  477. likely to infect new hosts, the virus bounces back, and so forth.
  478. One strategy for the virus is to allow the host to survive longer, and
  479. that may let it encounter more potential new hosts. But there are many
  480. other also potentially successful strategies: it could survive longer
  481. outside the host, it could become more infectious (enhance the chance of
  482. infecting those new hosts it does encounter), it could cause the host to
  483. run around more to enhance the chance of meeting new hosts, and so on.
  484. Rabies is close to, if not at, 100% fatal. It's a highly successful
  485. virus, and its strategy hasn't changed over the centuries. Rabid animals
  486. run around a lot, increasing their chances of meeting new hosts; they
  487. tend to be exciteable and snap at things, enhancing the infection of the
  488. virus in the salivary glands; and so on.
  489. You're exactly right to say that the key point is one of balance. You're
  490. exactly wrong to assume that there is only one way of balancing things,
  491. and that that way is to become less lethal.
  492. Ian
  493. --
  494. Ian York (iayork@panix.com) <http://www.panix.com/~iayork/>
  495. "-but as he was a York, I am rather inclined to suppose him a
  496. very respectable Man." -Jane Austen, The History of England
  497. ---
  498.  
  499.  
  500. Very good point, Ian. I stand corrected. I especially appreciate the
  501. example of rabies. I was being much too simplistic in my approach.
  502. Martin Hewlett
  503. Dept. of Molecular and Cellular Biology
  504. University of Arizona
  505.  
  506. ---
  507.  
  508.  
  509. iayork@panix.com (Ian A. York) wrote:
  510. >Not so. First, as far as many non-fatal viruses are concerned, a host is
  511. >a one-shot case anyway (i.e. after a host is infected, it becomes immune,
  512. >and the virus's progeny have no practical chance of re-infecting it; that
  513. >individual host is out of the pool of susceptible individuals). Since
  514. >that host is of no more use to the virus, it cares not whether she lives
  515. >or dies - it can't even detect the difference between a dead host and an
  516. >immmune host. (Sorry for the anthropomorphizing. You know what I
  517. >mean.)
  518. Also, a virus being non-fatal is not necessarily a viral virtue,
  519. rather a feature of the host's immune system.
  520. >If the host dies, it leaves no more progeny; this might present a virus
  521. >with a problem in the long run, but that's not necessarily the case.
  522. >Hosts die anyway; individuals produce a more-than-replacement number of
  523. >progeny. The key is that the virus maintains a roughly steady level
  524. >within the population over time. A population can replace the ravages of
  525. >a 100%-fatal virus.
  526. Would you say that a finely balanced population (low early- and
  527. mid-life mortality, roughly equal birth and death rate) is at at
  528. particularly high risk of being decimated by aggressive pathogens?
  529. Modern humans spring to mind, they are also very slow reproducers,
  530. compared to viruses..
  531. >One strategy for the virus is to allow the host to survive longer, and
  532. >that may let it encounter more potential new hosts. But there are many
  533. >other also potentially successful strategies: it could survive longer
  534. >outside the host, it could become more infectious (enhance the chance of
  535. >infecting those new hosts it does encounter), it could cause the host to
  536. >run around more to enhance the chance of meeting new hosts, and so on.
  537. This is very well, what I have a problem understanding is how a virus
  538. lineage can adapt to, or even maintain, a less aggressive (wrt. host
  539. survival time or rate) strategy, at least if a reduced rate of virus
  540. replication is the way to go.
  541. Unless we have a cloning situation, i.e., all virus progeny within the
  542. host is produced from one (slow-replication mutant) infectious unit,
  543. then a slower-replicating genotype will lose out to its more
  544. aggressive cousins infecting the same individual and have a lower
  545. ---
  546.  
  547.  
  548. Olav Hungnes <olavhung@idgonline.no> wrote:
  549. >
  550. >Would you say that a finely balanced population (low early- and
  551. >mid-life mortality, roughly equal birth and death rate) is at at
  552. >particularly high risk of being decimated by aggressive pathogens?
  553. The way you phrase that, I don't think you can make that statement. At
  554. some timescale, just about every population is finely balanced - you may
  555. have to juggle with the scale a bit, though. (Snowshoe hare populations
  556. flucutate greatly, but within certain limits, over a moderately regular
  557. cycle [I think I've read that somewhere]); if you compare one year to the
  558. next, the population may be quite different, but if you take 7-year
  559. averages, the population might be quite constant.)
  560. I think I know what you mean, though: a population without the great
  561. swings in population numbers. I think that they might indeed be more
  562. susceptible to this, but I also think that the species with this
  563. characteristic tend to be ones with relatively small numbers anyway. (If
  564. there are lots of the individuals, then a boom/bust approach to population
  565. turnover is more safe, because the odds are that some one individual will
  566. survive the bust. If there aren't many individuals, then a
  567. slightly-higher-than-average bust cycle will put the population numbers
  568. too low to keep going.) So that boils down to the suggestion that if
  569. there aren't many individuals, the loss of some of those individuals is
  570. significant to the population as a whole - not very surprising.
  571. I don't think that either statement applies well to humans.
  572. >This is very well, what I have a problem understanding is how a virus
  573. >lineage can adapt to, or even maintain, a less aggressive (wrt. host
  574. >survival time or rate) strategy, at least if a reduced rate of virus
  575. >replication is the way to go.
  576. Think of it in terms of spread from one host to another, not in terms of
  577. spread within an individual host.
  578. Simplistic example: Aggressive virus "A" infects a host. It replicates
  579. rapidly and rapidly kills the host. Let's say it causes the host to shed
  580. 10 million viral particles over a period of one week. During that week
  581. the host comes into contact with one other susceptible individual and
  582. infects it. Host is now dead, and the virus has maintained its population
  583. level.
  584. Less aggressive virus "B" infects a different host. It doesn't kill the
  585. host; it causes the host to spread particles for two weeks - the same
  586. number of particles, but this host meets two new ones and infects them.
  587. By being less lethal, it has infected twice as many new hosts.
  588. Other things to think about: A healthier-feeling host might travel around
  589. more. Some species shun sick-looking individuals. And I'm sure there are
  590. lots of other points I'm missing as well - I know diddly about
  591. evolutionary theory.
  592. >Unless we have a cloning situation, i.e., all virus progeny within the
  593. >host is produced from one (slow-replication mutant) infectious unit,
  594. That's probably true, in many cases - I think that quite often a host is
  595. infected with a single infectious unit. It depends on the virus, of
  596. course.
  597. >then a slower-replicating genotype will lose out to its more
  598. >aggressive cousins infecting the same individual and have a lower
  599. I see no reason to assume that "slow-replicating" has anything at all to
  600. do with "lethality". There's no particular reason why the two should be
  601. linked. Some viruses which replicate very rapidly in vitro aer very
  602. innocuous (eg rhinovirus). But even if they are, it doesn't change the
  603. overall picture: the selection on the virus at any long-term level is at
  604. the level of spread between hosts, as well as within hosts. And the two
  605. are not necessarily tightly linked: those factors which enhance spread
  606. between hosts don't necessarily have a lot to do with the factors that
  607. enhance replication within a host. So the viruses which have adapted to
  608. replication in the host, are probably at a disadvantage compared to those
  609. who are adapted to spread between hosts.
  610. I do see your point, but don't think it really affects the overall
  611. situation.
  612. >cloning events, i.e., haploid gamete stages. Our scenario will often
  613. >be more like cancer, where a majority of cells with a "good strategy"
  614. >of controlled growth can be overthrown by a single cell lineage that
  615. >has escaped such control.
  616. But cancer is *only* adapted to replication *within* a host, so there's no
  617. longer-term selection for spread *between* hosts. That means it's a poor
  618. analogy for viruses.
  619. >Could one conceive an STD scenario with a virus/bacterium producing a
  620. >factor that stimulates mating behaviour? This could even result in
  621. >synergy.. Perhaps a virus could be the source of the ultimate
  622. >aphrodisiac? :-)
  623. I've sen this speculated by, I *think*, Richard Dawkins - the suggestion
  624. was that viruses are really good at inducing itches (nudge nudge wink
  625. wink). Maybe it wasn't Dawkins, but it's within that strict adaptationist
  626. philosophy. Cetainly it's possible, but I do think it's unlikely - I
  627. think that some things just happen (the "spandrels" theory proposed by
  628. Gould).
  629. Ian
  630. ---
  631.  
  632.  
  633. newsgroups: bionet.virology
  634. In article <4elafv$1rn@panix.com>, iayork@panix.com (Ian A. York) wrote:
  635. > In article <hasse-2901962357370001@hasse.dialup.access.net>,
  636. > Hans Andersson <hasse@panix.com> quoted:
  637. > >Ebola, like other RNA viruses, has an error-prone replication process,
  638. > >which would boost the frequenzy of mutations and thus the emergence of new
  639. > >strains. Sanchez says that the high mutation rate increases the chance
  640. > >that the disease could someday adapt a more contagious form."
  641. >
  642. > Which is equally true for *every other RNA virus around*, of course, and
  643. > there are thousands - hundreds of thousands or millions - of them.
  644. > Including such things as influenza virus, which killed, 20,000,000 (that's
  645. > twenty million) people in one winter (European Journal of Epidemiology.
  646. > 10(4):455-8, 1994); but of course that's not an Exciting
  647. > New Virus that kills people in Excitingly Photgenic Ways, is it, so we
  648. > won't worry about that at all.
  649. >
  650. > Come on, Hans, think a little, would you?
  651. >
  652. > Ian
  653. >
  654. Ian.
  655. I just thought a little and this is the result:
  656. I believe that health authorites all around the world, including CDC, have
  657. their eyes on the possibility of a new and more lethal influenza virus
  658. strain. There's two chapters about it in Stephen Morse's "Emerging
  659. Viruses" and many others have brought up this concern. There's also
  660. international research, surveillance and prevention efforts for that
  661. possibility.
  662. Joshua Lederberg are discussing "the resurgence of a 1918-like flu
  663. pandemic", and other threats, in his article "Infection Emergent" in last
  664. weeks JAMA.
  665. This is what he says about Ebola:
  666. "There is an outside chance of a zoonosis like Ebola escaping more
  667. broadly, with increasing adaption to person-to-person spread, and perhaps
  668. some muting of mortality that would keep the virus from burning out before
  669. it spread further."
  670. JAMA, Vol. 275, No.3, Jan. 17, 1996, p. 244 (Editorial)
  671. It wasn't Joshua Lederberg who said that we shouldn't cover a
  672. "hypothetical mutation scenario" or that he "do not want to see money
  673. thrown at Ebola". It was
  674. you, Ian - and you're wrong! ("Re: The return to The Hot Zone", Jan. 18, 1996)
  675. Hans
  676. ---
  677.  
  678. From -7050536341627706118
  679. X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit
  680. X-Google-Thread: 103cc5,fda7f8b81815fa22
  681. X-Google-Attributes: gid103cc5,public
  682. From: iayork@panix.com (Ian A. York)
  683. Subject: Re: The Hot Zone & The New Republic
  684. Date: 1996/01/17
  685. Message-ID: <4dj6ij$860@panix.com>#1/1
  686. X-Deja-AN: 135757942
  687. references: <v01530501ad2201f8595c@[166.84.199.117]>
  688. organization: Panix
  689. newsgroups: bionet.virology
  690. In article <v01530501ad2201f8595c@[166.84.199.117]>,
  691. Hans Andersson <hasse@PANIX.COM> wrote:
  692. >
  693. >You have been downplaying the risks with filoviruses and trying to build a
  694. >case where newly emerging and highly fatal viruses aren't much of a
  695. >problem.
  696. Hans, please read what Ed has to say. The lethality of a virus has
  697. little or nothing to do with the potential public health problem. For
  698. example, diseases such as Creutzfeld-Jacob disease are lethal, but they
  699. are not of concern to the population as a whole because they're not
  700. particularly infectious.
  701. The worst case for an Ebola virus outbreak would be the appearance of the
  702. disease in an urban center in the third world, where identification and
  703. isolation of patients is difficult. Well, pay close attention: That's
  704. pretty much what happened in Zaire, and if you'll notice the world is
  705. still alive.
  706. >"These viruses could be on our doorstep tomorrow", as one virologist said in a
  707. >magazine article about budget cuts for CDC and USAMRIID.
  708. Look, nobody argues that we should not be paying attention to emergning
  709. viruses. But you've lost sight of the diseases that have already
  710. emerged.
  711. Should we ignore the risks of a highly contagious, air-spread disease with a
  712. long infectious period? Tuberculosis is predicted to kill thirty million
  713. people in the next decade. Why aren't you wetting your pants about
  714. that? That's infinitely more frightening than the Ebola scenarios you've
  715. proposed.
  716. How about a virus that is much, much more lethal than Ebola? That's
  717. widespread in North America, readily spread between animals (the
  718. reservoir) and humans? Rabies virus kills between 20,000 and 50,000
  719. people each year; it has a fatality rate of 99.999%.
  720. How about an immensely contagious viral disease ("the most
  721. transmissible disease known to man": Archives of Internal Medicine.
  722. 154(16):1815-20, 1994) that kills around one million children per year?
  723. Measles is a controllable disease; why aren't you lobbying to get the
  724. vaccine to the places that need it? And isn't it terrifying that people
  725. in North America think of measles as a mildly amusing childhood nuisance?
  726. These are not emerging diseases, Hans. These are diseases that have
  727. emerged. These three alone kill millions of people every year, and we
  728. don't have to postulate mysterious and hypothetical mutations. Ebola
  729. virus has killed some 500 people in the past ten years; that includes the
  730. worst-case outbreak last year.
  731. No realistic mutation you can propose for filoviruses can make it a worse
  732. killer than any one of these diseases.
  733. >From a virology point of view, I think that it's perfectly valid to express
  734. >support for virus research and surveillance.
  735. Absolutely. It helps to understand which diseases are more important.
  736. Everybody on this newsgroup agrees that virology funding should be
  737. increased. Until it is, let's use our knowledge to identify true
  738. menaces, not the flavour of the month.
  739. Ian
  740. --
  741. Ian York (iayork@panix.com)
  742. "-but as he was a York, I am rather inclined to suppose him a
  743. very respectable Man." -Jane Austen, The History of England
  744.  
  745. ---
  746.  
  747. From -6540797387061517408
  748. X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit
  749. X-Google-Thread: 103cc5,47f37c78567b14be
  750. X-Google-Attributes: gid103cc5,public
  751. From: iayork@panix.com (Ian A. York)
  752. Subject: Re: The return to The Hot Zone
  753. Date: 1996/01/18
  754. Message-ID: <4dmsjj$6gc@panix.com>
  755. X-Deja-AN: 135803743
  756. references: <v01530502ad236bb2b2c4@[166.84.199.117]> <4dm7mc$k4m@ixnews6.ix.netcom.com>
  757. organization: Panix
  758. newsgroups: bionet.virology
  759. I'm replying to Frank Eldredge's followup to Andersson's article, since
  760. the original hasn't hit my news spool - baffling since we're both on the
  761. same ISP. (I checked to see if Hans had cancelled his article, but didn't
  762. see his name in 'control', so I guess it's just Panix weirdness. Unless
  763. Andersson is using the mailing list instead of the Usenet groups for this
  764. discussion?)
  765. Frank says that both Hans and I have overstated our arguments. To be
  766. entirely honest, I don't know what Andersson's argument is. I went back
  767. and reread this thread (thanks to alta vista and dejanews) and, frankly,
  768. I'm not much further ahead - although I gather Andersson is a
  769. professional journalist, I'm quite honestly unclear on what he's trying
  770. to say here. So let me first explain my interpretation of Andersson's
  771. point, and then explain where I disagree with him.
  772. HA says that the filoviruses are deadly viruses on an individual basis.
  773. Nobody here has disagreed with that, so we have no argument there. If
  774. you get it, it's bad news for you.
  775. Where we do seem to disagree is two other points: (1) The present
  776. public-health risk of Ebola; (2) The risk of Ebola mutating to become a
  777. public-health risk at some time in the future.
  778. I maintain that Ebola *as it is now* is not a major public health risk.
  779. It certainly is of some concern, but our present knowledge of Ebola, and
  780. the Kikwit outbreak (and I repeat, that was the worst-case scenario)
  781. assure us that an Ebola outbreak is not going to destroy civilization;
  782. it's not going to destroy a city, even. The reason is that Ebola is
  783. simply not a particularly infectious virus, and the reason for that is
  784. that it kills people - and causes symptoms in people - too quickly. There
  785. is not a long contagious period during which the victims get around and
  786. spread the disease.
  787. HA doesn't address this, as far as I can see. He keeps repeating that
  788. Ebola is deadly, which is true but irrelevant. He says, "It's only in a
  789. world of theories that the lethality of a virus has little or nothing to
  790. do with the potential public health problem." But this isn't just theory,
  791. it's theory that's been confirmed by observation; Ebola burnt itself out
  792. in Kikwit, as predicted. All the 'theory' is coming from Hans.
  793. Let's look next at his concern about mutation. He seems to feel that
  794. because Ebola has been shown to spread by aerosol then it might mutate to
  795. become as infectious as flu - or something like that.
  796. Well, let's look at a virus that's not as exciting right now as Ebola.
  797. And let's take HA's two main arguments: That a lethal virus is a major
  798. public health concern, and that things that have been shown to spread by
  799. aerosol are likely to mutate to spread like influenza.
  800. There are quite a few articles demonstrating that rabies virus can be
  801. spread by inhalation, and rabies is vastly more lethal than Ebola (see,
  802. Hans, I read quite a bit later than Jane Austen; you might actually try to
  803. read a little more yourself, to get a real understanding of the
  804. situation).
  805. Furthermore, there are tens of thousands of cases of rabies in North
  806. America each year (in animals - I put this in so that Hans won't be able
  807. to misinterpret as he did with my CJD example) - providing plenty of
  808. opportunities for mutation to respiratory spread. In case you missed it,
  809. it hasn't happened. Should we put the CDC on alert and throw money at the
  810. problem for fear that it will mutate to respiratory spread? -Or mutate so
  811. the vaccine doesn't neutralize it (more likely, since there's some
  812. selection pressure there)? I can come up with rabies scenarios all day
  813. that more more plausible than any of your Ebola scenarios.
  814. Of course, Richard Preston hasn't written any scary books about rabies;
  815. perhaps he doesn't care about the 50,000 people (and their families) who
  816. die of it, in excruciating pain, every year?
  817. In other words, I don't think anyone says that Ebola cannot possibly
  818. mutate to become a threat. (Read that carefully.) But the likelihood of
  819. that is the same as any of a thousand other viruses mutating to become
  820. threat.
  821. What if human cytomegalovirus incorporates a mutant p53 in its genome,
  822. Hans? Shouldn't we be preparing for that possibility? It's at least as
  823. likely as an airborne Ebola - Richard Preston's claim that "Ebola is a
  824. virus trying to break out - out of the jungle, out of the monkey species,
  825. and out of Africa" notwithstanding, Ebola is a virus: it doesn't have
  826. goals or intentions.
  827. But I do think (I won't speak for Ed here, my wrist is still sore from the
  828. last slap he gave it) that we have to assign our non-infinite resources -
  829. money, time, and manpower - rationally. That means assessing where the
  830. most likely risks are, and addressing them.
  831. If the only virus you know anything about is Ebola, then it's going to
  832. look like the biggest threat. But if you look at some of the established
  833. killers like TB (and yes, Hans, I know you said "*This* discussion just
  834. happens to be about Ebola", but you're wrong; this discussion is about
  835. public health risks, of which Ebola is one), measles, and polio, then it's
  836. hard to argue that resources should be withdrawn from them in order to
  837. cover the hypothetical risk of a hypothetical mutation. And if you do
  838. want to cover that hypothetical mutation scenario, than you should also
  839. cover the risk of rabies mutating, polio mutating, TB mutating, measles
  840. mutating ...
  841. Let me say it again: We KNOW that TB kills millions of people per year.
  842. We KNOW that measles kills another couple of million people per year.
  843. Ebola has killed about 400 people in the time these two diseases have
  844. killed some 40,000,000. There's no theory here, Hans, just facts.
  845. I'll tell you what I, personally, would like to see done. I'd like to
  846. see funding of a much better infectious disease surveillance program,
  847. worldwide - probably heavily based on the CDC, since they seem to have
  848. the most experience at it. Basically, an expansion of the programs the
  849. WHO is already working on.
  850. I do not want to see journalists advocating research on the latest flavour
  851. on the month. I do not want to see money being thrown at Ebola, because
  852. that money will come from somewhere else - and it will probably come from
  853. somewhere in the health care/research system, and people will die because
  854. they didn't get the measles vaccine that money was originally going to
  855. cover.
  856. And, as long as we're dreaming here, I wish that the CDC didn't have to
  857. use scare tactics based on the latest mobies in order to get some funding.
  858. I think this will be my last post on the subject of Ebola, so feel free to
  859. insult me some more, Hans; you'll have the last word.
  860. Ian
  861. ---
  862.  
  863.  
  864. New York Times
  865. April 27, 2003
  866. >From China's Provinces, a Crafty Germ Spreads
  867. By ELISABETH ROSENTHAL
  868. SHUNDE, China - An hour south of Guangzhou, the Dongyuan animal market
  869. presents endless opportunities for an emerging germ. In hundreds of
  870. cramped stalls that stink of blood and guts, wholesale food vendors
  871. tend to veritable zoos that will grace Guangdong Province's tables:
  872. snakes, chickens, cats, turtles, badgers, frogs. And, in summer,
  873. sometimes rats, too.
  874. They are all stacked in cages one on top of another - which in turn
  875. serve as seats, card tables and dining quarters for the poor migrants
  876. who work there. On a recent morning, near stall 17, there were
  877. beheaded snakes, disemboweled frogs and feathers flying as a
  878. half-alive headless bird was plunked into a basket.
  879. If you were a corona virus, like the one that causes severe acute
  880. respiratory syndrome, known as SARS, it would be easy to move from
  881. animals to humans in the kitchens and food stalls of Guangdong, a
  882. province notorious for exotic cuisine prepared with freshly killed
  883. beasts.
  884. Indeed, preliminary studies of early SARS victims here in Guangdong
  885. have found that an unusually high percentage were in the catering
  886. profession - a tantalizing clue, perhaps, to how a germ that
  887. genetically most resembles chicken and rodent viruses has gained the
  888. ability to infect thousands of humans.
  889. One of the earliest cases, last December, was a seller of snakes and
  890. birds here who died at Shunde's First People's Hospital of severe
  891. pneumonia. His wife and a several members of the hospital staff
  892. contracted it as well, setting off an outbreak that now sounds eerily
  893. familiar.
  894. "Oh yes, I heard that a guy here died of that pneumonia," said Li
  895. Songyu, a 40-year-old wearing a neat tan blouse, as she filleted live
  896. frogs and dumped them into a basket. "But it is very safe and sanitary
  897. now."
  898. Around the same time in December, Huang Xinchu, a chef, was admitted
  899. to the Heyuan People's Hospital, 100 miles to the north, ultimately
  900. infecting eight doctors there. On Jan. 2, another desperately ill chef
  901. was hospitalized in the city of Zhongshan, south of Shunde, setting
  902. off an outbreak.
  903. But if such early outbreaks present scientific hints about the origin
  904. of SARS, they also provide painful political lessons in how a disease
  905. that has spread worldwide could have been prevented.
  906. In early January, alarmed health departments in Shunde, Heyuan and
  907. Zhongshan all reported the strange pneumonia clusters to Guangdong
  908. provincial authorities, who concluded that they were facing a highly
  909. infectious pneumonia caused by a previously unknown agent.
  910. It is unclear whether that conclusion was passed on by provincial
  911. officials to the Ministry of Health in Beijing, or ever reported to
  912. international health agencies that might have conducted an early
  913. investigation into the problem. Instead, it would be another two and a
  914. half months before the strange pneumonia had a name, coined only after
  915. an Italian doctor working in Hanoi, Vietnam, alerted the World Health
  916. Organization about a similar new pneumonia he was seeing there.
  917. And it would be three and a half months before China's leaders would
  918. admit that their country had an epidemic of SARS. From January through
  919. the middle of March, doctors in Asia and Canada were encountering
  920. patients carrying a virulent and highly contagious germ, unaware that
  921. they were facing potentially lethal infection.
  922. During that period, hundreds of health workers fell ill. During that
  923. period, well-meaning doctors were placing SARS patients in ordinary
  924. wards - as they would patients with normal pneumonia - and those
  925. patients were passing the infection on to hundreds of others.
  926. Origins in Food Trade
  927. Scientists have always considered the teeming farms of southern China,
  928. where animals and people crowd together as ideal breeding grounds for
  929. new human viruses, which can jump between species under such
  930. conditions. So it was no surprise in March when the World Health
  931. Organization said it believed that SARS originated in Guangdong.
  932. But when a World Health Organization delegation went to look at data
  933. on the earliest SARS cases, they found few farmers among the victims.
  934. Instead what jumped out was an odd preponderance of food handlers and
  935. chefs - about 5 percent of the first 900 patients, as opposed to less
  936. than 1 percent among patients with normal pneumonia.
  937. So far, studies are in their early stages and have yielded few
  938. specific conclusions. Even if food handlers turn out to be the
  939. conduits through which SARS passed from animals to humans, all
  940. evidence points to human-to-human transmission now.
  941. Still, for much of December and January, several small cities around
  942. Guangzhou were fighting - and often winning - localized battles with
  943. the strange pneumonia that would later be named SARS.
  944. In December, the 32-year-old chef from Heyuan was admitted to the
  945. Heyuan People's Hospital, having falen sick with pneumonia on his job
  946. near the boom town of Shenzhen. His family had him transferred to
  947. Guangzhou when his condition deteriorated despite medication. But when
  948. eight doctors and nurses fell ill with a similar untreatable pneumonia
  949. in Heyuan just a few days later, hospital officials became alarmed.
  950. On Jan. 1, they told the local health department of the cluster of
  951. cases. "On Jan. 2, we reported a new infectious disease to the
  952. provincial health bureau," said Dr. Ouyang Songhua, deputy chief of
  953. the Heyuan Public Health Department. "They immediately sent out an
  954. expert team to investigate it, deciding it was a pneumonia of
  955. previously unknown cause."
  956. Word of the disease spread among local doctors so that when another
  957. chef with pneumonia arrived at Zhongshan Hospital on Jan. 2, short of
  958. breath and feverish, doctors isolated him in intensive care.
  959. But not soon enough: 13 medical staff members were infected, who in
  960. turn infected 15 others in Zhongshan as well. Outbreaks in Shunde,
  961. Heyuan and Zhongshan peaked in January, and by February the virus was
  962. poised to move on.
  963. By early February, sick and frightened patients from small cities like
  964. these were traveling to more advanced hospitals in the provincial
  965. capital of Guangzhou - and that is when the surge of cases really
  966. began.
  967. >From Feb. 2 through Feb. 4, a very sick man from Zhongshan made the
  968. rounds of emergency rooms in Guangzhou as treatment failed to improve
  969. his condition, leaving dozens of health workers infected. At the time,
  970. emergency room staff members understood little about the new pneumonia
  971. that had been cropping up around the province. At first, they did not
  972. isolate the man and were wearing no protective gear.
  973. Unfortunately, the man was what is now known as a "super-spreader" -
  974. one of a small group of SARS patients who is highly infectious. Dozens
  975. of doctors and nurses fell sick at the Zhongshan No. 2 Hospital, where
  976. he was finally admitted.
  977. "He was very sick, but who knew there was something so terrible going
  978. around?" said a nurse named Mo at the Zhongshan No. 2 Hospital,
  979. recalling the long, frightening quarantine that followed in February,
  980. when nurses and doctors spent long weeks living in their units waiting
  981. to see if they will start to cough. In China and in much of Asia, more
  982. than 30 percent of SARS victims have been hospital workers.
  983. Hong Kong as a Gateway
  984. On Feb. 21, Dr. Liu Jianlun, a 64-year-old lung specialist from the
  985. Zhongshan hospital, attended his nephew's wedding in Hong Kong, even
  986. though he was running a fever. With what is now known about the
  987. disease, health care providers like Dr. Liu with such extensive
  988. exposure to SARS would be quarantined and forbidden to travel. But no
  989. such guidelines existed then.
  990. At the Metropole Hotel, where he stayed, he passed SARS on to a number
  991. of other guests, including two Canadians, an American businessman en
  992. route to Hanoi, a Hong Kong man, and three young women from Singapore.
  993. SARS, until then confined to the Chinese mainland, was unleashed on
  994. the world.
  995. At the Kwang Wah Hospital in Hong Kong, where Dr. Liu went when his
  996. breathing became labored, he advised shocked doctors and nurses of the
  997. mystery pneumonia that was ravaging his hometown, insisting that they
  998. isolate him behind double panes of glass and don protective gear
  999. before his exam. The doctor died several days later; no one at the
  1000. hospital was infected.
  1001. But the grisly story was not shared with other doctors in Hong Kong or
  1002. the rest of the world. And, with the new corona virus silently
  1003. breeding in their bodies, the nine guests at the three-star Metropole
  1004. Hotel dispersed on airplanes like bees carrying a deadly pollen,
  1005. seeding SARS locally and to far corners of the world.
  1006. The woman from Toronto, Kwan Sui-chu, died in a Toronto hospital on
  1007. March 5, but not before infecting her son and at least five health
  1008. workers. Canada now has identified at least 140 SARS cases, 15 fatal.
  1009. Johnny Chen, the American businessman, fell ill at a hospital in Hanoi
  1010. in late February, where he ultimately infected 20 health workers,
  1011. including Dr. Carlo Urbani, an Italian medical researcher who alerted
  1012. the W.H.O. about a new type of pneumonia and who also eventually died
  1013. of the disease. The Hong Kong man was admitted to a general ward at
  1014. the Prince of Wales Hospital, setting off a huge outbreak.
  1015. The three friends from Singapore fell ill after returning home in late
  1016. February and were admitted to three different hospitals from March 1
  1017. to March 3. While two of the women infected no one else, the third,
  1018. Esther Mok, another super-spreader, set off a chain of infection based
  1019. at the Tan Tok Seng Hospital, from which over 90 people fell ill,
  1020. accounting for more than half the cases in Singapore. Ms. Mok has
  1021. recovered, but many members of her family became ill, including her
  1022. mother and father, who both died.
  1023. On March 14, the World Health Organization formally issued its
  1024. worldwide alert about the new disease, which it called SARS.
  1025. A Focus on Prevention
  1026. Since then, countries visited by this new plague have taken
  1027. increasingly severe steps in order to control further spread of a
  1028. disease that has eluded many conventional infection barriers. Because
  1029. the disease remains difficult to treat and has a death rate of 5 to 10
  1030. percent, by far the most effective way to deal with it is to stop its
  1031. spread.
  1032. "On an individual level it is relatively low risk, but the proportion
  1033. of people who have a severe course is quite high," said Rob Breiman, a
  1034. virology expert who has worked for the World Health Organization on
  1035. the outbreak. "Until we know more about this disease, protecting
  1036. against exposure is extremely important."
  1037. In Canada, for example, even healthy travelers arriving from affected
  1038. areas are advised to go into a 10-day voluntary quarantine, where they
  1039. are advised to stay at home, take their temperature frequently and
  1040. sleep in a separate room from other family members. Ontario alone now
  1041. has 7,000 people under various types of quarantine.
  1042. But some people have resented the restrictions for what most often
  1043. proves to be nothing more than a fever from a common cold. On Easter
  1044. Sunday, one health care worker who had been exposed refused to stay at
  1045. home, attending church services and a funeral in Toronto. Health
  1046. officials are now considering a court order to keep him isolated.
  1047. Companies and governments in the West are drastically curtailing
  1048. travel to SARS-affected regions. Some are also are requiring employees
  1049. to stay at home for 14 days after visiting SARS-infected areas.
  1050. "I'm not too worried about the disease," said Jane Cowells, a resident
  1051. of New Zealand, as she arrived this week, unmasked, at Beijing Capital
  1052. Airport. "But the whole thing is a headache, since when I go home I
  1053. can't go back to work for 10 days."
  1054. In Vietnam, where the epidemic is now under control, officials said
  1055. they were considering sealing off the entire 800-mile border with
  1056. China to prevent sick tourists from reintroducing the germ.
  1057. In many Asian countries, airports have come to resemble bioterrorism
  1058. labs, as nurses in protective gear assess arriving passengers for
  1059. signs of disease. No place is more vigilant than Singapore.
  1060. Singapore's Drastic Steps
  1061. "Welcome to Singapore! Are you feeling well today?" chimes a chorus of
  1062. nurses, their faces covered by masks, their eyes by goggles, their
  1063. bodies by yellow hospital gowns. Passengers coming from other
  1064. countries with SARS are guided to pass through a high-tech thermal
  1065. scanner that picks up temperatures over 100. A bevy of masked soldiers
  1066. in camouflage uniforms are there to escort away those with fever.
  1067. Those who pass muster are given a card warning that they might have
  1068. been exposed to a deadly disease. Those who are feverish are whisked,
  1069. without apology, into a 10-day quarantine, and Singapore means
  1070. business. Video cameras will be installed in the home by a security
  1071. firm, to make sure patients do not stray. Those few who do are tagged
  1072. with an electronic wristband that records their movements.
  1073. But even in a small country, placing thousands on quarantine has been
  1074. a strain. Last Monday, after a case of SARS was discovered in a vendor
  1075. at Singapore's largest vegetable market, the Ministry of Health
  1076. ordered all 2,400 food sellers to report for quarantine, up from a
  1077. total of 467 quarantined before. Since 80 percent of the country's
  1078. vegetables pass through the Pasir Panjang Market, restaurants were
  1079. bracing for a shortage of greens.
  1080. "We do what we have to," said Dr. Balaji Sadasivan, a neurosurgeon who
  1081. is Singapore's minister of state for health. "I don't think we've seen
  1082. anything like this before and it is a global problem. For now this is
  1083. a battle that is being fought with the thermometer and quarantine."
  1084. Because of elaborate contact tracing, the Singapore outbreak is by far
  1085. the best defined in the world. All but 4 of the 188 victims were
  1086. infected in the hospital or by a family member at home. The four
  1087. exceptions are a child who got the disease from a classmate with an
  1088. infected parent, a flight attendant who served an infected doctor from
  1089. Singapore on a flight in Europe, a cab driver and a vegetable
  1090. salesman.
  1091. Dr. Sadasivan is unapologetic as he describes the increasingly
  1092. draconian measures his department has adopted to halt the spread of
  1093. the germ.
  1094. When the three young women from the fateful Hong Kong hotel brought
  1095. SARS to three different hospitals in Singapore in early March,
  1096. Singapore doctors were unaware of the odd pneumonia that was
  1097. hospitalizing dozens of patients each day in Guangdong and so admitted
  1098. them to ordinary wards. If the Chinese had publicized their severe
  1099. pneumonia in Guangdong, or if the Hong Kong doctors had more
  1100. aggressively reported the information about Dr. Liu, their response
  1101. almost certainly would have been different.
  1102. Two of the women did not pass on the germ, but one infected more than
  1103. 20 people, both patients and hospital workers. One of the nurses she
  1104. infected also proved to be a super-spreader, passing SARS to 26
  1105. others. One of the 26 was a patient in the cardiac intensive care unit
  1106. whose SARS was not recognized because of many other medical problems.
  1107. Within a month, 90 people at the Tan Tok Seng Hospital had the
  1108. disease. The Health Ministry dug up an old law that allowed them to
  1109. impose mandatory quarantines, with fines of 5,000 Singapore dollars
  1110. for those who disobey. They also essentially closed the 1,000-bed
  1111. hospital to other patients - hoping to contain the virus within its
  1112. walls.
  1113. But it escaped all the same. Some patients who had been at Tan Tok
  1114. Seng in March contracted the disease and later went to other hospitals
  1115. when they developed coughs - setting off secondary outbreaks. One went
  1116. to Singapore General for an endoscopy and was screened for SARS, but
  1117. did not run the telltale fever because he was on steroids that
  1118. suppress the body's response. Ninety people at the hospital were
  1119. infected.
  1120. After this resurgence, the Health Department instituted a policy that
  1121. every patient at every hospital be considered a potential SARS
  1122. patient. Nurses are always masked when seeing patients, who are
  1123. allowed only one visitor a day. Confirmed SARS patients are allowed no
  1124. visitors at all, though they can talk to friends and family on their
  1125. cellphones. Nurses may not work on more than one unit and patients may
  1126. not transfer from hospital to hospital.
  1127. "We used to have a health care system organized for efficiency," said
  1128. Dr. Sadasivan. "But now our hospitals are organized for SARS
  1129. prevention."
  1130. Outside of the hospitals, the ministry closed all schools for two
  1131. weeks to halt potential transmission of the virus. All cab drivers now
  1132. take their temperatures twice a day. Temperature checks and health
  1133. questionnaires are standard for those entering buildings.
  1134. At Tan Tok Seng Hospital last Monday, an ambulance arrived carrying a
  1135. vegetable seller who came under the market quarantine. Although he
  1136. felt well, the man said he had a fever, and so the driver told him he
  1137. might have to remain in the hospital. Approaching a cordoned-off
  1138. screening area, he was resigned, saying, "I don't think I could have
  1139. the disease, but I know I have to do it."
  1140. China's Slow Response
  1141. But Singapore's aggressive, open confrontation with a viral enemy is a
  1142. lesson that some other countries have been slow to learn, especially
  1143. China, the world's most populous country, where SARS emerged almost
  1144. half a year ago.
  1145. Although doctors in Guangzhou were well aware of the problem as early
  1146. as January, information about an epidemic was suppressed for months,
  1147. and only started dribbling out at the beginning of April, under
  1148. intense international pressure.
  1149. Only in the last week have numbers begun to emerge elsewhere in China,
  1150. and the task is still not complete. In Beijing, they already paint an
  1151. alarming portrait of an epidemic that is likely to dwarf that in
  1152. either Guangdong or Hong Kong.
  1153. At a news conference on April 10, He Xiong, the deputy director of the
  1154. Beijing Centers for Disease Control, was still delivering a calm
  1155. message, endorsing numbers that the government released at the time:
  1156. that in Beijing there were only 27 SARS cases, so people should not
  1157. worry.
  1158. "Of course they can travel, we think it's very safe," he said,
  1159. referring to an approaching national vacation when tens of millions of
  1160. Chinese would normally be expected to travel.
  1161. But that misinformation only fueled the spread of SARS, as people -
  1162. with fevers and coughs - continued to go to school and work, passing
  1163. the disease on to others. As the number of cases increased well into
  1164. the hundreds, the illusion proved hard to maintain in a city with a
  1165. world-class gossip network that spread rumors of overflowing SARS
  1166. wards.
  1167. By last weekend, everyone was skeptical, as a smattering of schools
  1168. and hospitals mysteriously closed. One People's Armed Police hospital
  1169. in Beijing was closed after five patients were infected. The
  1170. Zhongguancun No. 1 Primary School closed when a relative of a student
  1171. came down with SARS. The Beijing University Institute of Economics put
  1172. several dozen people on quarantine after a secretary's mother got
  1173. pneumonia.
  1174. More than a dozen of Beijing's universities had reported suspected
  1175. cases. At the Economics and Finance University alone, more than a
  1176. dozen students and faculty members were listed as suspected SARS
  1177. cases, resulting in the suspension of classes from April 17.
  1178. That day, the main gate of the Northern Construction University was a
  1179. panic scene, as masked students made arrangements to flee to their
  1180. hometowns in the wake of suspected SARS cases on campus. "I want to
  1181. get out of here as soon as possible," said one alarmed student, making
  1182. calls on her cellphone to borrow money for the trip home.
  1183. Then, last Sunday, the Chinese government fired both the health
  1184. minister and the mayor of Beijing, and started releasing alarming data
  1185. that confirmed these fears. As of Friday, there were close to 900
  1186. confirmed cases in Beijing, a number that is certain to strain the
  1187. resources of city hospitals and will make SARS far difficult to
  1188. control.
  1189. But can the lessons of prevention learned in a tiny, authoritarian
  1190. country like Singapore be applied in other countries, particularly in
  1191. a vast, chaotic place like China, with far more cases and a highly
  1192. mobile population?
  1193. In Singapore, with its aggressive system of identifying and isolating
  1194. SARS patients, no health care worker has been infected for over three
  1195. weeks. But in Hong Kong, 2 to 10 doctors and nurses are falling ill
  1196. each day, in part, health officials there say, because doctors are
  1197. still not identifying them as SARS victims early enough and are
  1198. admitting them to ordinary wards.
  1199. "There is so much we don't know about this virus - how long it will be
  1200. with us? Will it mutate and become more easily transmitted?" Dr.
  1201. Breiman said. "But it is a little frightening that something which
  1202. started in one location could spread so quickly around the world."
  1203. ============================
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