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  1. [Music]
  2. ments he made clear
  3.  
  4. that the Federal Council
  5. had to make decisions in the last few days, our top
  6. priority was to protect the interests of Switzerland
  7. and it was about making a contribution
  8. to stabilizing the international
  9. financial markets because protecting and protecting the Swiss financial center
  10.  
  11. to also protect our national economy
  12. a failure of CS would have resulted in serious
  13. economic upheavals in
  14. Switzerland and other countries
  15. already in the past few
  16. months and weeks, the
  17. financial debate, in close cooperation with
  18. the Federal Council and together with the
  19. Financial Market Authority and the
  20. Swiss National Bank, has examined the situation
  21. closely followed on the financial market and
  22. various scenarios developed
  23. last Wednesday, March 15,
  24. due to the turbulent developments
  25. on the market, it then became clear that
  26. Credit Suisse's liquidity was no longer secured
  27. in coordination with the financial debate,
  28. SMB and SMB therefore attended
  29. the Un collateral on the
  30. market and the SNB
  31. made it clear that it would make
  32. liquidity available to CS if necessary
  33.  
  34. in order to ensure liquidity in the long term
  35.  
  36. First of all, last
  37. Thursday, March 16, he decided
  38.  
  39. to create the necessary legal basis so that the Swiss
  40. National Bank can guarantee the affected institution
  41. additional liquidity assistance. You
  42. heard that
  43. the Swiss National Bank
  44.  
  45. guaranteed the so-called
  46.  
  47. other countries, but we have expanded
  48. this option with this Federal Council ordinance
  49. so that the
  50. National Bank
  51. could provide additional liquidity. We did that
  52. on Thursday and it
  53. is also on Thursday entered into force
  54. the second measure that we
  55. took last thursday is that the
  56. SMB was also granted a selection guarantee
  57. for liquidity loans in the amount of
  58. 100 billion francs i will
  59. come back to this later
  60. so we both made these decisions
  61. on thursday at the same time as
  62. the To ensure liquidity,
  63. my department pushed ahead with work on a
  64. sustainable solution. First
  65. talks with UBS and CS
  66.  
  67. took place last Wednesday afternoon, March 15. In the
  68. days and hours that followed,
  69. negotiations were pushed ahead. The
  70. Federal Council was constantly
  71.  
  72. strengthening and pending questions
  73. I was also
  74. in daily contact with colleagues abroad,
  75. in particular my colleague Janet Yellen from
  76. the USA and Jeremy Hand in the UK Both
  77. financial centers are of course important and
  78. also play an important role in these financial centers now
  79.  
  80. the negotiation could now en between UBS and
  81. CS
  82. to achieve this solution was the goal
  83. of the Federal Council it is a solid
  84. solution which the Federal Council welcomes this
  85. solution is suitable now to stabilize the situation of
  86. CS and also
  87. to give the financial markets security
  88. for this merger Were
  89. further resolutions necessary, which we
  90. made today? Specifically, the
  91. Federal Council issued a guarantee of
  92. CHF 9 billion in order to
  93. reduce any risks for UBS.
  94.  
  95. This guarantee is about potential losses on a very specific portfolio that UBS assumes as part of the transaction but only comes
  96. into effect if any losses of
  97. UBS exceed a certain threshold,
  98. so you have to
  99. imagine that it is like an
  100. insurance policy that only comes into effect
  101. if there is actually a loss
  102. and first UBS would
  103. bear these losses and then in the second rank
  104. the Bund just would this
  105. Guarantee from now on,
  106. ladies and gentlemen, allow me to go into
  107. a few more remarks on the
  108. resolutions that the Federal Council
  109. already missed on Thursday to secure
  110. liquidity. These resolutions
  111. were necessary and consistent in order to be able to
  112. restore confidence in the market
  113. Secured
  114. liquidity loans from the SMB are
  115. linked to various conditions in order to reduce the
  116. risk of loss for the SMB and also for
  117. the state. This includes
  118. the bankruptcy privilege and a
  119. risk premium that the bank
  120. must pay on the loan. The President of the
  121. National Bank will
  122. make further statements here and explain the instrument
  123. this liquidity assistance
  124. was an internationally
  125. recognized instrument this is the
  126. so-called public liquidity bagster
  127. this instrument is
  128. already being used in other financial centers in
  129. Switzerland or has not yet been approved by
  130.  
  131. the Federal Council Its decided a year ago
  132.  
  133. to also introduce this instrument in Switzerland, which
  134. should have been implemented in the next few months as a sideline to the draft law.
  135.  
  136. After the situation has
  137. worsened in recent weeks and days,
  138. the Federal Council has
  139. now introduced this instrument for individual cases in
  140. all decisions of the Federal Council
  141. on Thursday and also today it is
  142. about emergency law that the Federal Council
  143.  
  144. has issued based on Article 184 paragraph 3 and Article 185 paragraph 3 of the Federal Constitution,
  145. but the constitution also stipulates that
  146. emergency law is limited, which means that
  147. ordinary law must be replaced
  148. and the Federal Council is planning
  149.  
  150. to submit a corresponding bill to Parliament within six months
  151.  
  152. for the state
  153. support service, a
  154. guarantee loan from the federal government is required the
  155. guarantee loan includes the selection
  156. guarantee for the liquidity support at
  157. the SMB, i.e. the guarantee The tie to the
  158. SMB and the limited loss guarantee
  159. to support the assumption of this
  160. commitment credit require the
  161. approval of the finance delegation of the
  162. federal chambers the
  163. finance delegation approved
  164. the commitment credits this afternoon
  165. and I would like to thank the delegation
  166. on behalf of the Bundesrat
  167.  
  168. the technical details of the
  169. Federal Council resolutions, we will
  170. then also answer these questions
  171.  
  172. sitting here in front of everyone who
  173. has worked day and night over the
  174. last few days that this solution
  175.  
  176. has become possible in favor of Switzerland I will conclude with this the
  177. Federal Council regrets that CS
  178. was not able to overcome the difficulties a
  179. Mastering it on your own would have
  180. been the best solution, we regret this,
  181. not least because many
  182. thousands of employees are affected,
  183. but we are convinced that
  184. employers will also give you certainty as soon as possible,
  185. this
  186. is also our expectation that you
  187. know how things are in The
  188. Federal Council also regrets that the bank,
  189. which was once a flagship institute in
  190. Switzerland and was part of our strong
  191. standards, was able to get into this situation at all.
  192. Credit
  193. Suisse still has many solid
  194. parts today. It has very good employees.
  195. It has
  196. one in particular recognized Swiss bank, but
  197. unfortunately the loss of confidence on the part of the
  198. markets and customers could no
  199. longer be stopped with the takeover by
  200. UBS, this trust should be
  201. restored
  202.  
  203. rise However, the risks for
  204. the state for the taxpayers the
  205. taxpayers the financial center the
  206. business location for our country
  207. as a whole but also for
  208. international financial stability are
  209. significantly lower than in any other
  210. scenario I would like to
  211. repeat once again the failure of a globally
  212. systemically important bank would have serious
  213. economic upheavals in
  214. Switzerland but also worldwide
  215. Switzerland also had to assume its
  216. responsibility beyond its own
  217. national borders The
  218. Federal Council is convinced that the
  219. takeover of CS by UBS
  220. will create the basis for more stability
  221. both in Switzerland and
  222. internationally the bankrotsee superstitious
  223. system
  224.  
  225. Thank you very much Vice-Chancellor the
  226. Federal President Madam Federal Councilor,
  227. ladies and gentlemen, I
  228. would like to give you the perspective and the role of the
  229. SNB in ​​this extremely important and critical issue for our
  230. international financial center and the
  231. Swiss economy
  232.  
  233. i would like to briefly summarize the course of this crisis from
  234. our point of view
  235. we have been
  236. in an extraordinary situation since last week
  237. with the current us banking crisis
  238. the crisis of confidence at Credit
  239. Suisse has also intensified
  240. this had a direct impact
  241. on the liquidity situation of the bank in
  242. the outflows from the positive
  243. accelerated sharply therefore,
  244. since March 15, the Swiss National Bank has
  245.  
  246. made a large volume of liquidity available to Credit Suisse in order to
  247. help stabilize the situation.
  248. A significant part of this liquidity
  249. consisted of
  250. foreign loans
  251.  
  252. and to give Credit Suisse some breathing room
  253. they were necessary and to ensure the
  254. solvency of Swiss they
  255. offered the bridge for
  256. a stable solution which addresses the causes
  257. of the loss of confidence
  258. a bankruptcy of Credit Suisse would have addressed
  259. serious consequences for national
  260. and international financial stability and
  261. thus also for the Swiss
  262. economy.
  263. In the last few days,
  264. Bund Finma Essen
  265. Bee and the two banks have joined forces to develop a
  266. future-oriented solution
  267.  
  268. to support the successful
  269. implementation of the takeover announced today
  270. will the national bank now
  271.  
  272. provide expanded extensive liquidity which can be used if required
  273.  
  274. let me explain this briefly
  275. both banks have unrestricted
  276. access to the existing facilities
  277. of the SBB via which they can obtain liquidity from the
  278. national bank in accordance with guidelines on the
  279. monetary policy instruments
  280.  
  281. beyond and based Based on the
  282. Federal Council's emergency ordinance,
  283. Credit Suisse and UBS can obtain a
  284.  
  285. liquidity assistance loan totaling
  286. up to CHF 100 billion, secured by a bankruptcy certificate
  287.  
  288. In addition and based on the
  289. Federal Council’s emergency ordinance, the
  290. SNB can grant Credit Suisse a
  291.  
  292. liquidity assistance loan of
  293. up to CHF 100 billion secured by a default guarantee from the
  294.  
  295. Confederation
  296.  
  297. the new instrument for liquidity support
  298. the publicity the backstop corresponds
  299. to the internationally widespread standard
  300. it is explicitly a systemically relevant measure by the Financial Stability Board
  301. as part of the
  302.  
  303. tubecu-due disorderly failure
  304.  
  305. it was imperative
  306. that we acted in this extraordinary and
  307. urgent situation
  308. and found a solution
  309. Due to its
  310. size and global network, Credit Suisse is classified as a globally
  311. active, systemically important bank,
  312. i.e. as a bank
  313. whose failure could cause significant disruptions in the
  314. global financial system
  315. Serious direct
  316. and indirect
  317. consequences for Switzerland's reputation
  318. This reputation is central to the
  319. cross-border
  320. wealth management business of the Swiss
  321. banking sector and thus also to the
  322. economy. The current
  323. solution ensures
  324. that systemically important functions
  325. remain secure
  326.  
  327. their
  328. deposits, on the other hand, the ability
  329. to draw on open credit lines
  330. or to roll over maturing loans
  331. overall, it is a matter of supplying the
  332. Swiss economy with the necessary
  333. liquidity
  334. against this background, measures must be
  335. taken to reduce the risk of a
  336. disorderly failure of a
  337. systemically important bank and the
  338. burden for the public as
  339. low as possible
  340. the extensive provision
  341. of liquidity ensures that
  342. both banks have the necessary
  343. liquidity
  344. the National Bank thereby fulfills the um
  345. e r is fulfilling
  346. its mandate to
  347. contribute to the stability of the financial sector through the extensive liquidity assistance
  348. and continues to work
  349. closely with the federal government and the company for this purpose
  350.  
  351. This is an important step that serves to
  352. protect depositors
  353. and the reputation of the Swiss
  354. financial center.
  355. Since October 2022,
  356. social media triggers have led to massive
  357. outflows of customer deposits from
  358. Credit Suisse,
  359. but the bank has always met the
  360. minimum regulatory requirements
  361. both in terms of capital and in
  362. terms of liquidity
  363. this was only the case thanks to the high
  364. regulatory safety
  365.  
  366. buffers the bank was able to absorb these
  367. huge
  368. outflows
  369.  
  370. even though the fun damentanten
  371. were basically in order, the
  372. confidence of market participants,
  373. investors and customers in a
  374. successful future for the bank was increasingly
  375. lost
  376. the most recent banking crisis in the USA as
  377. well as concerns about a general
  378. financial crisis once again led to
  379. massive market editorials he set in a
  380. negative spiral the
  381.  
  382. the topic to fail precautions are
  383. strongly geared towards solvent problems,
  384. i.e. the solvency profile have, as I
  385. said, the real
  386. ability to absorb shocks,
  387. but ultimately the loss of confidence
  388. and the resulting problems were
  389. too great, so the authorities had to
  390. take measures,
  391. it is clear The company will
  392. continue to monitor the takeover process intensively, just
  393. as Credit Suisse has
  394. monitored and supported it particularly intensively since October,
  395. and will continue to ensure
  396. compliance with all regulatory
  397. requirements with the required
  398. intensity t and depth weeks, it
  399. is also clear that the requirements, which are
  400. now even greater,
  401. will increase in proportion to the bank,
  402. however, this will only be the case after the merger phase is over
  403.  
  404. is maintained at all times
  405.  
  406. the custody accounts and other
  407. services remain accessible in the usual
  408. way
  409. it shows that the players in the
  410. Swiss financial market the Confederation can find the
  411. National Bank
  412. solutions to
  413. face crises and overcome them
  414. the solution presented today the
  415. takeover of CS by UBS together
  416. with stabilizing measures by the federal government
  417. and Essen in matters of liquidity and the
  418. conversion of
  419. corresponding
  420. capital instrument capital ordered by the company, brings
  421. stability for the
  422. bank's customers for the financial center and for the
  423. financial markets in general e
  424.  
  425. ladies and gentlemen n
  426. today marks a clear turning point it is
  427. a historic, sad and very
  428. challenging day for Credit
  429. Suisse for Switzerland and the global
  430. financial markets since I took on the role of
  431. Chairman of the Board of Directors around
  432. a year ago, it has been clear
  433. that things cannot go on like this for
  434. good Uli Körner has been
  435. in office as CEO for seven months he acted decisively from day one
  436. and
  437. filled key positions he
  438.  
  439. worked tirelessly with his team on the cultural transformation and strategic realignment of Credit Suisse
  440. I have the utmost respect for Uli
  441. Körner and his leadership team
  442. Although we have achieved many of the goals we have set ourselves, we have
  443. no time to complete
  444. the restructuring of Credit
  445. Suisse in a controlled manner. The
  446. massive outflow of customer funds in
  447. October last year was a
  448. major setback
  449.  
  450. we started 2023 with a lot of vigor and energy
  451.  
  452. the most recent events from
  453. US banks hit us at the most unfavorable
  454. moment
  455. like last year we were able to
  456.  
  457. overcome the deep uncertainty on the markets
  458. but not this second time
  459. the accelerated
  460. loss of confidence and the escalation
  461. about the the last few days made it clear that
  462. Credit Suisse cannot continue to exist in its current
  463. form we are
  464. glad to have a solution that I am
  465. convinced will bring sustainable
  466. stability and security for our
  467. clients, employees,
  468. the financial markets and Switzerland
  469. it is one Extremely difficult and
  470. demanding situation, the
  471. decisions were not easy in the
  472. current situation, there is no cheap
  473. choice, but the solution presented is
  474. the best possible under the current
  475. circumstances,
  476. so it is clear that we now have to
  477. concentrate fully on the future, our
  478. clear focus is on our approx. 50,000
  479. Employees and employees, around
  480. 17,000 of them in Switzerland, they are
  481. committed day in and day out for our
  482. private customers, SMEs and corporate customers,
  483. we will again be a reliable,
  484. stable and competent partner for
  485. our customers,
  486.  
  487. UBS is an excellent and
  488. strong bank, I know it well, it will be
  489. together with kreditsuisse, meet the
  490. upcoming challenge with great
  491. discipline know-how and a feeling for what
  492. is feasible our employees
  493. need stability our customers
  494. need security and Switzerland and
  495. the financial market need calm and
  496. reliability
  497. ladies and gentlemen we are now
  498. looking ahead to the The merger
  499. with UBS will
  500. bring back the stability and security that is urgently needed
  501.  
  502. it was said that the Federal Council
  503. decided on Thursday
  504.  
  505. that it was necessary to restore trust,
  506. but he did not communicate it, so how should
  507. the effects then unfold or why are
  508. you only telling us this
  509.  
  510. evening that the crisis has become
  511. Swiss National Bank asked for this
  512. liquidity help and on
  513. Thursday we
  514. extended this liquidity help and also
  515.  
  516. decided this backstop,
  517. we were actually convinced that it
  518. was important to
  519.  
  520. get through to the weekend to
  521. ensure liquidity as trouble-free as possible and
  522. on Sunday that was our goal
  523. by Sunday at the latest to be able to present a package
  524. if we
  525. had come to Thursday and said yes, by the
  526. way, the Federal Council has approved another 50
  527. billion in liquidity for the
  528. National Bank and the Federal Council itself
  529. has also granted liquidity
  530. to the National Bank in the amount of
  531. 1 00 billion guaranteed there would have
  532. been uncertainty for the markets
  533. that was the unanimous opinion of the
  534. film at the National Bank and also the
  535. financial debates we
  536. discussed it and that would have led to much more
  537. uncertainty his
  538. salami tactics now come every day a little
  539. more 50 billion underground too
  540. 100 billion more that would not have
  541. been security if of course if
  542. it had been the case that the backstop
  543. would have had to be touched if the 100
  544. billion from the National Bank
  545. had already been used up then we would have
  546. communicated that is clear because then
  547. we would have provided security but that's how
  548. we were Opinion that this
  549. would have led to more uncertainty,
  550.  
  551. I have now understood correctly
  552. that the shareholders, the holders of
  553. convertible bonds, the obligatory
  554. lenders and so on, are now
  555. getting off scot-free, so that we are
  556. actually saving the Saudis, in particular
  557. their boss on Friday evening last The one who
  558.  
  559. is part of the
  560. regulation that is intended in such a way that
  561. the corresponding bonds, which are
  562. not held by investors
  563. but by parents and large
  564. investors, are
  565. then converted into equity and
  566. this Part of the fail regulation has
  567. now also been triggered here,
  568. so you also have a
  569. stake in those you mentioned.
  570.  
  571. That is of course a painful
  572. solution for those who
  573. hold such stakes, but it is a
  574. correct solution in terms of regulatory policy,
  575.  
  576. lessons of the financial crisis was that
  577. be no more public Pellets of banks
  578. and the fire one created and decision
  579. today Creator
  580.  
  581. in
  582. privates and this
  583.  
  584. if I understood you correctly
  585. before you said rumors
  586. against the CS had led to this situation
  587. and the weakening of the CS does that mean
  588. they actually say there was a
  589. campaign against en the CS and if so
  590. you know who is behind it
  591.  
  592. that wasn't in the sense of a campaign
  593. but I referenced this Twitter
  594. situation in October the
  595. Swiss was already weakened beforehand and
  596. then various rumors at the time
  597.  
  598. really fueled these capital outflows of liquidity
  599. behind it is music
  600. to be discussed the fact is that it was
  601. there at the beginning and then
  602. drew further spirals and then old ones to
  603. these really well-known and I think I have to say
  604. historical
  605. outflows felt and it
  606. is important to increase again that this
  607. this fact that that is critical
  608. this situation was like that back then in October
  609. that is
  610. due to the fact that we
  611. have a regulation with strict with high
  612. liquidity requirements the company
  613. also has the so-called Piller 2
  614. i.e.
  615. higher
  616. liquidity requirements specifically tailored to a bank the
  617. devices issue the itself has also
  618. held even more liquidity and
  619. all of this has contributed to
  620.  
  621. tomorrow
  622. morning the stock market prices will
  623. fall again, if at all, UBS
  624.  
  625. We really thought so
  626. and we were very
  627. committed to helping both sides
  628. liquidity to one side and
  629. finding a solution where it goes
  630. between the two private actors I
  631. think but you also have to see that we
  632. still take our time now I mean I
  633. think that is a very strong
  634. commitment today from Switzerland
  635. official Switzerland the authorities
  636. Bundesrat Fielmann and essen.de
  637. is not much stronger we just
  638. did everything we could do dami t
  639. that trust and stability
  640. can be guaranteed but of course
  641. that would have and we'll see
  642. what happens over the next few days months but I
  643. think we really did have a very strong solution in a
  644. situation that wasn't so easy, you have to
  645. say,
  646. and the first reactions Abroad
  647. my colleague had spoken about the
  648. contacts she had internationally
  649. I also
  650. had international contacts would be the solution the
  651. first reactions are very positive are
  652. very positive and we also have the
  653. commitment that people simply
  654. understand what we have done in
  655. others countries and the commitment was
  656. that they are very grateful that this was
  657. done and they will also
  658. help that is for the international
  659. part but back in Switzerland
  660. it is also extremely important in Switzerland that
  661. we present a good solution because
  662. it works not just about the stability of the
  663. financial center, it is primarily about Kai
  664. has to be about priva te the simply the simply
  665. Conti have given us loans for
  666. companies it's about the
  667. employees and it's really about
  668. payment transactions it's about a lot for
  669. our country that means we believe
  670. we are firmly of the opinion that it
  671. really brings a good solution
  672.  
  673. addition to it UBS has a very
  674. profitable business model a very
  675. robust business model we
  676. also have a business model with
  677. relatively low risks and through this
  678. it is possible to transfer the trust that
  679. the rupes are present to
  680. all activities from credit
  681. and that should bring
  682. stability here we also have
  683. the necessary funds to bridge the next few days
  684. so that should actually be
  685. a consequence i can also
  686. confirm that on the part of the
  687. central banks internationally all my
  688. colleagues from the relevant central banks
  689.  
  690. support this takeover from a
  691. supervisory perspective too so that also applies
  692. to the supervisory authorities who are
  693. in contact with us and we have
  694. a very well established,
  695. solid bank at UBS and are therefore convinced
  696. that we have found a very viable
  697. solution here and
  698. if we are convinced that we can really do it here in this
  699. way
  700.  
  701. Blumberg has also found a future-oriented model. I just understood Mr. Keller here
  702. to mean that UBS
  703. intends to keep the swissbank of the credits,
  704. so I'm wondering if there are
  705. n't
  706. problems with competition law because
  707. they have a
  708. very high market share in Switzerland, what about the
  709. second question?
  710. any options for UBS to
  711. withdraw from the deal or
  712. are there no options at all granted
  713. by UBS to
  714.  
  715. withdraw from the thing these two questions
  716. thank you
  717.  
  718. gives us the competence in this case in
  719. terms of financial stability then the
  720. competitive situation next to it to
  721. overwrite and d we have
  722. we have also
  723. made use of it here
  724.  
  725. I have a question about the
  726. paprika
  727.  
  728. the Federal Council
  729.  
  730. announced almost exactly a year ago that it
  731. wanted to introduce this instrument it would not have
  732. been appropriate because it was also about Above
  733. all, trust comes from the fact that this
  734. instrument
  735. was introduced last autumn, or why was
  736. n't it done? Has it been considered?
  737. Yes, the Federal Council is correct
  738. to say that a year ago it decided to have a
  739. service proposal drawn up by it through the
  740. financial debate
  741. and in In fact, at that time we were still under
  742.  
  743. discussion in the Federal Council under my predecessor Ueli Maurer, I say that and to
  744. be very transparent as to whether this should now be
  745.  
  746. accelerated
  747.  
  748. now suddenly so easy
  749. to come half a year earlier would have happened to be
  750. heard with this
  751. then that would certainly have
  752. raised questions and we then coordinated with the
  753. Federal Office of Justice and
  754. said if you should actually need it
  755. then
  756. it would be possible to make use of emergency law
  757. we will but anyway I
  758. said so By the way,
  759.  
  760. a week before the
  761. events in the USA I had an
  762. internal meeting where I
  763. had approved the work, so to speak,
  764. that we should now accelerate, but there
  765. were also reasons not to do it at the time, so
  766. we didn't accelerate it at the time
  767. in the Bundesrat so as not to
  768. unsettle one more question
  769.  
  770. just very briefly so it would
  771. not have stabilized at this time in October
  772. but had a destabilizing effect and
  773. now he actually has a problem
  774. that the authorities at the National Bank
  775. were not able
  776. to provide the liquidity but we had
  777. an extremely fast rapid n there was a
  778. loss of trust and
  779. the instrument was then
  780. additionally activated for that, so it would
  781. not have helped at the time, on the contrary, and
  782. now the instrument was available for a very short time
  783.  
  784. to create this bridge here, so that one
  785. had time until the weekend If
  786. you had found a solution beforehand,
  787. that wouldn't have helped here now,
  788.  
  789. of course, speculation, so you've
  790.  
  791. set up rescue companies for the energy industry, so
  792. that's just a side note, but I would like to be
  793.  
  794. able to ask Ms. Keller Sutter one more question You quantify the financial
  795. risk that the federal government
  796. has taken with all these measures what the
  797. financial risk is manageable
  798. maybe the President of the
  799. National Bank can say something again about that
  800. or I already said concern
  801. we don’t make any kind of cash we
  802. don’t give money to UBS or to the
  803. credit but it is a guarantee
  804. g compared to the National Bank for
  805. liquidity but one must also say that
  806. this perfect would also have
  807. come into play in other scenarios, for
  808. example if one
  809. had sought nationalization of the bank, if
  810. the federal government had taken over the bank, a
  811. tipi would have been
  812. needed or
  813. it would have been necessary for a restructuring, so this PLB,
  814. this temporary
  815. provision of liquidity would actually have been
  816.  
  817. thank you very much, this liquidity aid
  818. is equipped with a bankruptcy letter
  819. both for the National Bank
  820. and then for the tranche that the federal government
  821. guarantees the SBB for the federal government and that
  822. has to be seen relative to the capital
  823. that is then present on the balance sheet
  824. and there is a relatively large part
  825. that is first to absorb losses
  826. and then the bankruptcy privilege is
  827. set at a level because I the
  828. federal government and the National Bank ei n a
  829. manageable risk, as the
  830. Federal Councilor had previously said, is
  831. actually taken by this bankruptcy
  832. privilege being set relatively high up in the system,
  833. the risk is then
  834.  
  835. yes, thanks for the opportunity from SRF and
  836. Swisscom, I have one Question about the
  837. liquidity aid of the National Bank if
  838. the collateral has to be deposited
  839. and how
  840. high is the interest on it and secondly
  841. I would be surprised how high this
  842. in the company media release is the
  843. commitment premium called for the
  844. default premium guaranteed Bundeswehr
  845. is high because this commitment premium thank you very much
  846.  
  847. for this question, we
  848. have different types of liquidity
  849. that we make available to the banks
  850. in special situations, so to speak, the
  851. first tranche is traditional
  852. Ella or
  853. assistance, which is against collateral that
  854. the banks can deliver to us because
  855. mortgages or assets letters
  856. are delivered and then comes a
  857. second tranche that we call Ela plus
  858. that is where we
  859. face a bankruptcy letter then
  860. give this liquidity the banks do not provide
  861.  
  862. sufficient security for this
  863. loan is ensured by the privilege
  864. and then the tranche
  865. above where we then with the public
  866. liquidity the backstop
  867. can spend this liquidity there we have the
  868. guarantee of the federal government and the federal government
  869. also has the bankruptcies how many sets
  870. both Ela plus and
  871. the liquidity that we go with the public
  872. liquidity the backstop which is
  873. provided with a risk premium who are entitled to
  874. both the floor and the food
  875. then the corresponding
  876. thank you very much the two questions have been
  877. answered we can take the next
  878. Mr. Bühler how high are the interest rates
  879. sorry what are the interest rates look
  880.  
  881. back is always easy
  882. and put a finger somewhere it
  883. is simply a fact that we
  884. certainly since 2021 greensiel and
  885. arjados have not been out of the headlines
  886. we have simply been
  887. caught up in legacy issues they have been
  888. caught up in by risks that
  889. materialize last year we have been
  890. caught up in a
  891. business model that
  892. just doesn’t work in this market environment
  893. and many customers and Customers have
  894. been very loyal for a long time
  895. and
  896. last fall it was something about this
  897. social media storm that had an
  898. enormous impact, especially
  899. catfish people private customer market few
  900. institutional and the professional
  901. market and sometimes
  902. the drop just comes too much suddenly
  903. being too much or that's exactly the point at
  904. which we've arrived it's an
  905. accumulation of things that
  906. have built up over many, many years and
  907. that just materialize somewhere
  908. and all of a sudden the
  909. camel's back is broken
  910.  
  911. 20 minutes a little less technical
  912. question a lot easily then, Mrs. Federal Councilor
  913. Keller Sutter,
  914. what do you say to many, many
  915. people in the country who may have
  916. all their savings here with Credit Suisse
  917. and have been worried in the last few days
  918. whether their maybe
  919. 400,000 francs are really still safe,
  920. you can promise him that they will
  921. today can go to bed calmly when
  922.  
  923. the mortgage, so I have quite a broad
  924. customer relationship and I believe that
  925. what we have done now
  926. is really to protect exactly those
  927. people who have money, the
  928. criticism of the SMEs is to
  929. protect the continued payment of wages
  930. to keep all payment transactions going and also to
  931. secure the deposits,
  932. of course, there was also
  933. deposit protection or a hundred thousand
  934. francs, that is guaranteed, but that
  935. the bank really continues to function,
  936. that the salaries can be paid out,
  937. that the companies
  938. can and that the payment transactions
  939. work, that's just it through this
  940. solution That would have been
  941. very difficult in special scenarios
  942. I am grateful myself as a
  943. customer that it worked I
  944. also have an account with Robe as well as every
  945. Swiss woman and woman you have to
  946. diversify a bit so I’m also
  947. glad
  948.  
  949. Johannes Brinkmann from AWP had
  950. them couldn't have done it all cheaper
  951. if they had already voiced
  952. their support for CS last weekend
  953. when Janet yellen
  954. Joe Biden Olaf Scholz and others voiced their
  955. support for the financial system
  956. and then my
  957. second question would be when will the
  958. merger go through and the third
  959. question
  960. and then maybe we'll come
  961.  
  962. back to the third party I'll give you the floor again later, thank
  963. you, well, you just have to see the system in
  964. Switzerland, the process in
  965. Switzerland is such that if a bank
  966. has problems with liquidity, then
  967. it can get liquidity ie a major bank
  968. or in it can liquidity at the
  969. national bank b I note
  970. that Credit Suisse
  971. applied to the National Bank for Ela on Wednesday. That
  972. 's the procedure and afterwards the
  973. Federal Council increased these
  974. liquidity checkers, if you will, so
  975. these liquidity
  976. levels. It was in no way about that at the weekend,
  977. so it has to be
  978. not at all a question of the
  979. finance department but it is a
  980. question of the company or if the company
  981. has to tell women instead if
  982. the company comes to the conclusion together
  983. with the national bank that a bank
  984. is not viable then it is up to you
  985. to act but the cred its submitted its
  986. application to the National Bank on Wednesday,
  987.  
  988. the situation was such that it
  989. changed dramatically and on Monday it
  990. was actually still quiet in Switzerland,
  991. that only happened on
  992. Tuesday afternoon and then it got into the course
  993. of Wednesday, as I
  994. said before There has been a
  995. dramatic change
  996. spiraling down the
  997. system pulled and the
  998. liquidity agreements were massively increased and
  999. there you had to act with the liquidity
  1000. and then put together this package within these very
  1001. few days, also thanks to this
  1002. liquidity aid to
  1003.  
  1004. repeat once again so
  1005. we have many
  1006. regulatory requirements we have capital and
  1007. liquidity regulations
  1008. accordingly who are the
  1009. relevant key figures are to be
  1010. complied with if a
  1011. stressful liquidity situation such as
  1012. we just saw at the
  1013. beginning of this week to the middle of this week
  1014. then there is the possibility that the
  1015. bank will Cars can make the SMD
  1016. can tackle to get liquidity there
  1017. in a further step then the
  1018. company is active if it
  1019. should really come to the insolvency
  1020. or then just the
  1021. so-called point of no wayabili ty
  1022. then the company would then initiate appropriate
  1023. reorganization measures or bankruptcy,
  1024. but
  1025. this could be avoided here and
  1026. this solution was found beforehand
  1027.  
  1028. I would like to get back to the
  1029. point about the size
  1030. of the SMB publishes
  1031. this stability report every year
  1032. where you can see very nicely that the banks
  1033.  
  1034. are actually already two of the largest in Switzerland if UBS
  1035. now takes over CS you have a
  1036. size of about 200% or over 200% of
  1037. GDP as how big see You have
  1038.  
  1039. already emphasized this problem, that the fail
  1040. system already provides that if
  1041. a bank grows, whether
  1042. organically or through a
  1043. takeover, that this is then also reflected
  1044. in higher capital and
  1045. liquidity regulations, in addition to
  1046. capital and liquidity, there are also
  1047. corresponding ones Provisions for a
  1048. possible unbundling, so that in the event of a
  1049. crisis, n can
  1050. also unravel and split off the system-relevant parts accordingly
  1051. and
  1052. that is already provided for in the tubidual framework
  1053. in the sense that it is not
  1054. fundamentally new the only new
  1055. element here is now that we
  1056.  
  1057. can of course not install Monday, so to speak, but that there is
  1058. a transitional phase here conditionally
  1059.  
  1060. and then we'll take Mr
  1061. Jordan again first and then
  1062.  
  1063. of course an important and I think
  1064. if a bank exists on this scale
  1065. it's all the more important
  1066. to follow the aspects of financial stability closely it's
  1067. a job for the National Bank
  1068. and the company to do that and of
  1069. course that too It is important that
  1070. competition aspects are properly
  1071. taken into account, but I
  1072. assume that it is also in the interest of the
  1073. banks and UBS itself that they
  1074.  
  1075. behave correctly in this regard and I have already
  1076. said that it also depends on the
  1077. business model if you a
  1078. big bank have the in
  1079. asset management is where the risks are
  1080. well intentioned are manageable
  1081. then that is something different than when the
  1082. bank of the same size is just inactive
  1083. which are very volatile and
  1084.  
  1085. can also lead to rapid exit due to market changes or to
  1086. liquidity conclusions that I believe are
  1087. very important In addition to looking at the size of the
  1088. business model, there were
  1089. risks and then also the ability of a
  1090. naturally reliable company to
  1091. correctly assess this situation there has
  1092.  
  1093. never been a reorganization or
  1094. bankruptcy, you have to say, or a
  1095. resolution in management with the
  1096. splitting up of a part, or the
  1097. question always comes up, yes, why did
  1098. n't you just let the group
  1099. go bankrupt and
  1100. continued business in Switzerland, that's with a
  1101. systemically important one A bank of this size has
  1102. never happened before and I said it before
  1103. that would have had a major impact
  1104. on the Swiss financial center,
  1105. or the connection between UBS and
  1106. kreditsu is of course inherent
  1107. to the other banks and also to
  1108. the international financial markets
  1109. So I would say
  1110. almost certainly triggered a financial crisis,
  1111. but or the question is
  1112. interesting in that I've also
  1113. thought a lot about it in the last few
  1114. hours
  1115. and now you have a
  1116. case of this actually not
  1117. really clear conflict and actually
  1118. you can use these instruments until now on
  1119. at one or something that is intended almost
  1120. not apply and that simply shows
  1121. that there are always other
  1122. constellations where and that was
  1123. so difficult and you
  1124. had to quickly find another solution that just has a
  1125. stabilizing effect and causes the least
  1126. collateral damage but you know
  1127. You can trust them don't
  1128. regulate you can also
  1129. say don't regulate cultural mistakes
  1130. away
  1131. that's another
  1132. story,
  1133.  
  1134. of course, the difficulty that
  1135. all this took place in a very fragile
  1136. market environment,
  1137. so if it
  1138. had been in a different situation then
  1139. you would now have the usual framework of
  1140. a
  1141. process then also be able to assess differently,
  1142.  
  1143. from the federal government and up to 9 billion francs
  1144. for a portfolio,
  1145. what exactly is it about is the
  1146. tricky business, as you can
  1147.  
  1148. see, UBS has
  1149. carried out a diodeligence, but these legends could
  1150. not be carried out in depth
  1151. as is normally the case it would be usual,
  1152. she has found that there is also
  1153. a portfolio with stocks that
  1154. can be problematic, that have to
  1155. be written off, that
  1156. may just generate losses in value
  1157. and we have
  1158. agreed that the federal government comes in second
  1159. place in first place, UBS in
  1160. second place here a certain This loss
  1161. carries a risk of default but that happens it's
  1162. like insurance or it wo
  1163. n't appear
  1164. anywhere in the federal books it
  1165. 's a guarantee that would only come into play
  1166. if the case actually happened
  1167. how this portfolio
  1168. looks like maybe you can say something
  1169. about destructure
  1170.  
  1171. in this constellation the company has
  1172. the right to take the place of the alarm clock,
  1173. Weco is being consulted and in the
  1174. interest of financial stability the
  1175. company can approve this merger in the
  1176. interest of
  1177. financial stability
  1178.  
  1179. [Music]
  1180. can
  1181.  
  1182. cause problems and that means that now in
  1183. relation to any expectations of the
  1184. bank in terms of remuneration etc. I
  1185. 'm talking
  1186. about enormous opportunities that you have
  1187. thanks to this name,
  1188. yes, we are grateful to UBS,
  1189. but we are also grateful to CS
  1190. grateful to have this merger in
  1191. mind i have it said the stability
  1192. of the Swiss financial center the creditworthiness of
  1193.  
  1194. Switzerland for the stability of the
  1195. Swiss economy that this
  1196. merger has really come about now,
  1197. also internationally or that
  1198. one forgets that I would like to emphasize it again
  1199. that any other solution
  1200. would have
  1201. triggered a financial crisis in real entregime and that would have been very
  1202. difficult and it
  1203. took both or to show a willingness here
  1204. and it also took the federal government
  1205. to provide certain guarantees they
  1206. heard liquidity and so on,
  1207. we
  1208. think that was the only possible
  1209. solution I still want once simply that
  1210. you are aware of the scenarios
  1211. that you would otherwise have had to
  1212. pursue a tipi the
  1213. federal government would have bought Credit Suisse
  1214. imagine the fort at least
  1215. temporarily there are such there are
  1216. examples of tpos there are states that
  1217. are still sitting on their banks so
  1218. that would be a huge s been a risk for
  1219. the taxpayer then the restructuring
  1220. we have already talked about that
  1221. would have been difficult or even a
  1222. liquidation of the bank that would have really
  1223.  
  1224. put the Swiss financial center under pressure and also internationally as far as
  1225. remuneration is concerned yes well that is
  1226. of course I mean UBS not in
  1227. trouble or we ca
  1228. n't make any specifications here you know that
  1229. the specifications can only be made
  1230. if you help banks out of
  1231. trouble, so to speak, so the question is the
  1232. ban on dividends, i.e. if a
  1233. bank has to be rescued or the question
  1234. of remuneration for that is regulated, but
  1235. if a bank is solid like
  1236. UBS, it can decide for itself
  1237.  
  1238. I don't see that as being in debt at all,
  1239. we are grateful that
  1240. this merger
  1241. came about, UBS is a
  1242. solid bank, we heard it it's
  1243. doing well in the market it's resilient
  1244. it's actually lucky that we're on
  1245. the Swiss financial center has its bank,
  1246. which is now involved,
  1247. also in terms of Switzerland or I think
  1248. they are right, so I think there is
  1249. a chance of need and of course
  1250. for UBS in this deal too, but there
  1251. are also risks and I
  1252. say that's it not easy
  1253. to find each other here because it was it was there
  1254. were different interests
  1255. of course but in the end the
  1256. common interest of CS of UBS and
  1257. the authorities was that they want to stabilize the
  1258. Swiss financial center the international
  1259. financial centers the Swiss
  1260. economy and
  1261. that is it a clear commitment
  1262. to our economy and our
  1263. financial center a commitment to the
  1264. protection of savers we
  1265. want to ensure that
  1266. all payment transactions continue to
  1267. work wages are guaranteed
  1268. the whole Kai must introduce themselves
  1269. SMEs are important customers of
  1270. creditism or all that had to
  1271. be guaranteed and that would not be
  1272. guaranteed no other scenario
  1273. we could really
  1274. have guaranteed that and that is simply the higher
  1275. interest
  1276.  
  1277. the question how much has CS already
  1278. used this money is this
  1279. line of credit and will the brand disappear a lot
  1280. and to Ms Kelly Sutter
  1281. you said that is not
  1282. a state solution, nationalization was
  1283. seriously an option and it is but
  1284. you also said a
  1285. state guarantee that you ultimately
  1286. give here how should the risk
  1287. behavior of the banks ever change if
  1288. in case of doubt you know you have this
  1289. state guarantee you wanted do not
  1290. avoid that exactly 2018 with UBS
  1291. from last fall we do
  1292. n't need an extraordinary gridlimited by the
  1293. Swiss National Bank you saw
  1294. last week that was this week
  1295. we drew this 50 billion which
  1296. we also drew to
  1297. be careful that if you really need it
  1298. that it is just there and and that has
  1299. g I think it worked very very well
  1300. regarding the fire the creative is on fire
  1301. like being there until the transaction is closed
  1302. and then please UPS
  1303. have to decide what the brand is like and I think
  1304. come indication
  1305.  
  1306. something about this question is that a
  1307. state solution or not it's just
  1308. not a state solution we have a
  1309. private bank that buys another bank
  1310. in this scenario there is
  1311. liquidity support, yes, it would have
  1312. existed in all other scenarios and
  1313. this guarantee is a kind of
  1314. default guarantee, I have already said
  1315. something like an insurance policy if we
  1316. had done TPO that Talking to you
  1317. that also kicked me over tippiot
  1318. temporate public without what would you have
  1319. done then 15 years after the
  1320. financial crisis you would have said
  1321. we cannot really
  1322. use the instruments because they do not really
  1323. fit here but we are now taking over this
  1324. bank the federal government is also taking over this bank
  1325. all risks and that would
  1326. have been the state solution and that would then be
  1327. a In fact, then you would have
  1328. perverted the idea, but of course we
  1329. also examined this scenario
  1330. because we didn't know whether
  1331. this merger would come about
  1332. and we simply knew from the company
  1333. and the National Bank, and Mr. Lehmann
  1334. also said that this bank was no
  1335. longer viable is and what do you do
  1336. in such a situation or you
  1337. are right
  1338. when you say you don't want a
  1339. state solution yes that's why you made
  1340. the capital requirement, the
  1341. liquidity requirements and so on
  1342. and they also work
  1343. in principle and it would really be now
  1344. you would have really perverted it
  1345. if you now if the federal government is now
  1346. standing this bank you imagine the
  1347. federal government would have bought this big bank
  1348. now we have a private one who
  1349. bought it but it was needed it was
  1350.  
  1351. said at the very beginning of this media conference that needs an overall package if
  1352. you want stability and security in the
  1353. want to enter the market then you need it also
  1354. the supervisory authorities, the
  1355. political authorities are needed to say yes, we
  1356. are behind this merger and
  1357. we are also providing this situation with
  1358. sufficient liquidity to stabilize the system,
  1359. this is an overall package
  1360. that you have to look at,
  1361. there are now, of course,
  1362. a lot of questions that we will still have
  1363. at some point we will come to a conclusion,
  1364. but we will take a few more questions
  1365. because then we can also
  1366. thank you very much online it is so
  1367. that almost all pension funds in
  1368. Switzerland are also involved in the afo AVV at the big bank
  1369. what happens now with
  1370. these very shares
  1371.  
  1372. but it a purchase price has been agreed upon
  1373. and the previous
  1374. shareholders get this purchase price and
  1375. perhaps it should be emphasized again here, of
  1376.  
  1377. course, the shareholders will
  1378. lose money compared to what
  1379. they had a few weeks ago or
  1380. a few years ago on the other
  1381. hand happens to the
  1382. stock price whom n a resolution like this
  1383. had been passed and if the
  1384. bank had been declared bankrupt on Monday,
  1385. everything would have been lost for the shareholder,
  1386. you can see that the
  1387. shareholder still gets this price here
  1388. and you don't have to compare it with
  1389. what he used to have but with
  1390. what he would have gotten if
  1391. this package hadn't been put together now
  1392. that I don't think that's the right
  1393. perspective and that actually applies to
  1394. all other capital instruments that
  1395. are also discussed in
  1396. exactly the same way
  1397.  
  1398. you can say whether tomorrow trading
  1399. with the cs share is suspended and the
  1400. second thing I would like to know was that it was
  1401. also a topic of discussion in the Federal Council
  1402. to what extent the management
  1403.  
  1404. Credit Suisse management remains in
  1405. place now there is a short time as
  1406. described by Keller for
  1407. the weeks leading up to the
  1408. closing of this transaction thereafter
  1409. the Credit Swiss Coop is a
  1410. subsidiary of the UBS Group and
  1411. UBS determines the management and
  1412. board of directors of this
  1413. subsidiary
  1414.  
  1415. times four days mainly simply to
  1416. find a solution and not taken so much time
  1417. to simply
  1418. take into account the
  1419. past so not made a
  1420. lot of effort here already in such a
  1421. huge job and very complex
  1422.  
  1423. Swiss television, which I still haven't
  1424. grasped, these 50 billion
  1425. are now another 100 billion
  1426. or is it a total of 100
  1427. billion that was given as liquidity aid
  1428.  
  1429. because that Helen mentioned and
  1430. Credit Suisse announced has been
  1431.  
  1432. given by means of traditional normal Ela, that is, the emergency liquidity,
  1433. we have for Credit Suisse
  1434. a total of 50 + 100, i.e. 150
  1435. additional billion liquidity that
  1436. we can use
  1437. 200 total if you that if you
  1438. already have the normal
  1439.  
  1440. i was a bit surprised If that
  1441. was said, you couldn't make any restrictions,
  1442. we now have a 200 billion guarantee from
  1443. the National Bank, 9 billion from the federal government
  1444. and then bonuses should continue to be
  1445. paid out without restriction from the
  1446.  
  1447. taxpayers who benefit from this guarantee and
  1448. taxpayers,
  1449.  
  1450. but these are instruments of the
  1451. patient national railway card, already mentioned,
  1452. which are available anyway, or
  1453. this Ela, this
  1454.  
  1455. liquidity support, a
  1456. bank can withdraw from any major bank at any time
  1457. in Switzerland it
  1458. may not be that common, but
  1459. abroad it may be possible
  1460. say it happens again and again that
  1461. maybe a bridging is needed
  1462. we have increased this liquidity a bit
  1463. you have to say
  1464. compared to other countries
  1465. the
  1466. national bank makes liquidity available rather restrictively
  1467. when there are bottlenecks
  1468. or it is like that, for example in the UK
  1469. or USA, that was also touched on somewhat,
  1470. the principle applies, for example, whatever it
  1471. takes, liquidity is simply
  1472. buttered in, so to speak, in order
  1473. to stabilize the problem and what we give is
  1474. a guarantee given to the national government,
  1475. not a guarantee to a
  1476. bank but to the national bank
  1477. and That's why it has
  1478. nothing to do with this question. It would be different if
  1479. the state now had to
  1480. save Credit Suisse in a way, then
  1481. these provisions on
  1482. dividends and also on remuneration would
  1483. have been applied, but this is about
  1484. one Guarantee to the
  1485. National Bank
  1486.  
  1487. Banking Act, i.e. if a
  1488. systemically relevant bank directly or
  1489. indirectly state aid
  1490. is granted from federal funds, the
  1491. Federal Council ordered measures in the area of ​​remuneration for the duration of the
  1492. claimed support at the same time,
  1493.  
  1494. so I actually think
  1495. state aid is already being granted here, at least indirectly,
  1496.  
  1497. but it is important to note that the
  1498. liquidity support given by a
  1499. central bank to a bank
  1500. cannot
  1501. be considered as such government intervention
  1502. central banks provide
  1503. liquidity support in the face of
  1504. liquidity shortages in the face of
  1505. market developments that is not
  1506. comparable to a
  1507. recapitalization or purchase of
  1508. certain
  1509. and so on that is a
  1510. liquidity aid that is either against
  1511. cholesterol now in this case
  1512. against a
  1513. privilege against a bankruptcy and
  1514. that is not comparable to what is
  1515. otherwise understood by a state aid
  1516.  
  1517. exactly
  1518. what the consequences of this merger will be for
  1519. jobs in Switzerland many
  1520. jobs are lost
  1521.  
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