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  1. [00:00:01 - 00:01:14] All right, rejoining the channel, twotime Mucci award-winning Professor Justin Broncaming in live from London, as he usually is. Justin, how are you? >> I'm all right, thank you, Mitch. How are you? >> Uh, so it's been a few weeks since we last spoke about this particular theater. Uh, there's been some developments overnight uh in response to the latest United States peace proposal. There's a delegation currently in Geneva that's uh kind of going back and forth. So what is happening at the moment with
  2.  
  3. [00:00:36 - 00:01:46] respect to the Ukraine war peace plan? >> Well, it's uh it's fairly clear that this was a Russian drafted document that uh was worked out with u uh as the US negotiator. Uh it's pretty clear if you look at the original formulation uh that was leaked proactively um presumably by the Russian side to put the US side in a difficult comm's position before they'd worked out what their position as a US government was. Uh but was leaked the the formulation contains quite a lot of
  4.  
  5. [00:01:12 - 00:02:19] grammatical constructions that don't make a huge amount of sense. They're not natural grammar or verbal constructions in in English, but they're perfectly natural in Russian. So things like talking about you one of the early points says that the ambiguities of the last 30 years will all be resolved will be considered resolved. Um meaning presumably security um security and economic and political relationships uh between relationship aspects between Ukraine uh and Russia that Russia considers unsatisfactory.
  6.  
  7. [00:01:46 - 00:02:55] But no western policy document would ever refer to those as ambiguities. It's a but in it's a direct translation of a Russian formulation which makes perfect sense in Russian. Um anyway uh so it's it's essentially a Russian wish list um that uh they've passed through um Mr. Whitov and then that the White House has essentially uh decided to just go with uh so it seems anyway based on the fact that there seems to be um significant confusion and disagreement within the US wider US government Senate um house
  8.  
  9. [00:02:20 - 00:03:28] communities um and some very mixed messaging. So clearly uh this was something that the White House just decided to go with. Um, and it essentially gives Ukraine uh what the White House has then given Ukraine an ultimatum and said uh you either signed this essentially by by Thursday or all uh military deliveries will be cut off uh all military intelligence sharing will be cut off and you're on your own um with the Europeans which is actually slightly less of a threat than it might initially sound uh in the sense that the
  10.  
  11. [00:02:55 - 00:03:52] US actually hasn't been delivering any military aid itself for a long time um there's been aid which is being bought by European countries from the US um but that is being purchased by European countries um from the US as arms sales and then delivered to Ukraine. you know, the US saying, "We'll stop giving you stuff." Uh, well, they've already done that. Um, so, you know, in some ways, uh, there's there's less perhaps threat there than there would have been 12 months ago, certainly under
  12.  
  13. [00:03:23 - 00:04:32] the previous administration. But, uh, you know, the the withdrawal of intelligence sharing, for example, would be a significant problem. Um and so it's a pretty brutal ultimatum and it demands that Ukraine give up uh among other things the remainder of uh Donetsk uh and the bit of Lahansk that they still hold. So these two um Donbas eastern um oblasts or provinces if you like of of Ukraine um Russia holds most of Luhansk um but uh they don't hold most uh significant chunks of Daetsk and indeed uh one of
  14.  
  15. [00:03:58 - 00:05:01] the key points of this is when one of the reasons why aside from there are loads of other reasons why the Ukrainians very unhappy with this but uh one of the core problems for the Ukrainians of this demand is that the remainder of DET contains what's known as the fortress belt. So it essentially goes from Lyman in the north down to Tretk in the south. Um Tourett is now held by by the Russians. Lyman was reconquered from uh or reliiber liberated recaptured um from uh the Russians in the the Kskov the Hark
  16.  
  17. [00:04:29 - 00:05:46] offensive in late 2022. But um it essentially comprises three cities. Uh Sloviansk, Chromatsk uh and um oh goodness, I need to Constantin. Um so these are uh cities of about between 100 and 150,000. Um pre-war some some are more than that. Constantin these days has has a significantly smaller population because it's been close to the lines and being shelled for a long time. Um but you know these are three cities. Um and crucially they are a very very very heavily fortified um area of ground that um has relatively defensible
  18.  
  19. [00:05:08 - 00:06:13] terrain. Um so there's there's essentially uneven terrain. There's high ground, there's low ground, there's dips, makes it easier to hold and easier to fortify. And it's been this they've been sort of the center of Ukraine's defenses um in the east since essentially 2015. uh because of course Russia uh under the guise of proxy forces and then openly uh was attacking Ukraine in 2014 when it seized Crimea and then 2015 when they seized um parts of Donetsk Lahansk. So giving up this fortress belt is not
  20.  
  21. [00:05:40 - 00:06:54] only um a a huge thing to ask Ukraine to swallow after having sacrificed so many tens and hundreds of thousands of troops um so much blood and treasure essentially holding these areas for so long. It also is an incredibly heavily fortified set of positions that isn't replicable um further to the west. So if Ukraine were to be forced to exceed to this and give up the remainder of Daetsk in particular, that then new border that would be uh on the the western edge of Daetskoblast essentially borders onto pretty flat
  22.  
  23. [00:06:17 - 00:07:27] pretty open ground all the way to the Nuclear River and beyond. So any subsequent Russian offensive would be going through straight into uh terrain that is much much harder for Ukraine to sustainably fortify and hold uh than the fortress belt through um the remainder of Daes where they hold currently which is one of the reasons why the Russians have failed to capture it despite trying for four straight years. Um and so given that the the 28 point plan also demands cuts to Ukraine's armed forces um who are struggling to hold the
  24.  
  25. [00:06:52 - 00:07:49] line as it is um because desperate shortage of infantry compared to the size of the Russian forces attacking them. The the document they're being asked to force to try and attempt to be forced to sign would strip about 250,000 people out of their armed forces but capping them at 600,000. Um while of course there's no limitation on the Russian armed forces. So you would have a situation at that point where Ukraine would have to desperately try and build new fortifications extensively all along the new line.
  26.  
  27. [00:07:21 - 00:08:18] They'd be accused of militarizing and risking the ceasefire and all. you you can you can already see the the headlines, but they would have to try and build at great expense with enormous numbers of people because it's very manpower intensive thing to do an entirely new set of very fortified lines in terrain where they would then be very easy to bombard, easy to attack uh compared to where they currently are. Um there's a load of other stuff in there that um is obviously extremely unpleasant for the Ukrainians to even
  28.  
  29. [00:07:49 - 00:08:39] contemplate. Uh including things like an amnesty for both sides for everything that has happened in the war. So no prosecution for any war criminals, no reparations for any damages. The fact that half of Ukraine has been raised to the ground and their cities bombarded to rubble and tens of thousands of children abducted and mass rapes and looting and shooting and execution of civilians and all of this stuff that's happened over the past four years. To be then told that they have to grant amnesty legally
  30.  
  31. [00:08:13 - 00:09:09] to everything is something that I think any nation in the west would ought to understand quite how that would feel. You know, imagine being told at the end of the Second World War that as a price for peace that we had to give total amnesty to all Nazi German actions, for example. You could see the emotional reaction to that would be pretty strong. Um, not that there's a direct comparison, but as far as Ukrainians are concerned, it's a pretty direct um existential war um where pretty much
  32.  
  33. [00:08:42 - 00:09:52] every war crime imaginable has been committed um at least at some scale uh in their occupied territories and against their people. Um and yeah, so it's it's it's pretty tricky. There's also the um immediate readmitting of Russia into the G8 uh into back reintegration back into the global economy um almost yeah immediately essentially um and the sort of naked profitering of the US administration of saying that essentially the Russian fund Russian funds and other funds that have been
  34.  
  35. [00:09:16 - 00:10:24] frozen as part of sanctions uh will be committed to a jointly administered Russian US fund that will be used for reconstruction efforts. The Europeans would have to put in a hundred billion euros additional and the US would take 50% of the proceeds essentially for that use. Fairly extraordinary. Um it's sort of comes across pretty much just as a shakedown um on a vast scale. Um so pretty distasteful if nothing else. Um, but the the the key problem with all of this as as as already kind of discussed
  36.  
  37. [00:09:50 - 00:11:08] on the the Daetsk side of things is there is nothing in here in this 28 P sort of point proposal that gives the Ukrainians any reason to trust that they won't be attacked again in pretty short order because the only thing in there is security guarantees, which is all it says is security guarantees by the US and by the transatlantic community, whatever that means. And so given that it is the US that is cutting off aid to Ukraine when it's under no threat itself, and it is the US that is essentially strongarmming them into
  38.  
  39. [00:10:30 - 00:11:28] giving up more territory after four years of extremely bloody fighting in order to accept guarantees from the aggressor and the country that's now strongarming them. You can kind of see why the Ukrainian's view of this would be, "So, we have to give up our defensive positions. We have to cap the size of our armed forces while our aggressor rebuilds even more, having already got the massive numerical advantage, and we get nothing except for vaguely worded guarantees that future aggression will lead to sanctions being
  40.  
  41. [00:10:59 - 00:12:00] reimposed and the transatlantic community considering it an attack on all of us." It's not it's not exactly a security guarantee, especially since there is also a straightforward prohibition in the 28 points of any European troops being stationed in Ukraine postwar for training or anything else. Um so there's no ability to put any sort of trip wire there to stop the Russians just coming straight across um what would then be a much weaker front line. Um and of course there's prohibit you know a statement
  42.  
  43. [00:11:30 - 00:12:28] that Ukraine has to hold elections within 100 days which the plan would be to hold elections once there is a stable peace anyway but within 100 days means okay so at that point the assumption would be that the starting gun would be fired on a very bitterly fought electoral cycle where all of the pentup political issues that have been suppressed uh within the Ukrainian political body for the last four years because the constitution forbids elections during wartime would then be unleashed and it would be very
  44.  
  45. [00:11:59 - 00:13:00] politically ugly and very politically divisive and again would further weaken the country and and make it very difficult for them to defend themselves against any immediate follow on aggression. Um they are going to have elections of course when the fighting stops but it's uh the immediate time frame imposed on them um again it's hard to see anything comforting in that document from a Ukrainian point of view. So, I think the 100 day election thing is sort of punitive. Trump v. Zalinski, you know, they they want him
  46.  
  47. [00:12:29 - 00:13:32] out and I think they have a sense that if the elections were held within that time frame that he would lose. So, that's that's personal, no doubt. Reporting on current events like the Ukraine peace plan is challenging because the situation is very fluid and chaotic at times. So, let me tell you about a resource that I depend on as I attempt to provide an unbiased point of view. ground news. I start my day by going to the ground news homepage and in this case right away I see a headline relevant to this topic. Zilinsky says
  48.  
  49. [00:13:00 - 00:14:06] Ukraine faces choice of losing its dignity or risking the loss of a key partner with US peace plant. Clicking on that gets us to this landing page that features a bulletized summary of the topic curated using ground news's proprietary ground AI insights. Over on the right, we see that there are 197 articles on this topic. And down here, we see an infographic with the bias distribution. Let's compare two headlines. First one is from UPI owned by a media conglomerate with very high factuality and center bias. We click on
  50.  
  51. [00:13:33 - 00:14:28] the headline to read the article and then click out of it and get back to the ground news list of relevant articles. And then we have this one here from Leond again with very high factuality and leans left. And again, it's easy to click on the headline and read the story and then click back to ground news to find other coverage from various points of view. You can't get this amount of information organized like this anywhere else. Go to ground.news/wward or scan the QR code on the screen. If you use my
  52.  
  53. [00:14:01 - 00:15:10] link, you can get 40% off unlimited access, which is the Vantage plan that I use. Once again, that's ground.new/ward or scan the QR code. The information is in the episode description, so check it out. among the 28 points is number seven which is Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future. And then number eight and this gets to what you're talking about in terms of
  54.  
  55. [00:14:35 - 00:16:02] security guarantees and and how squishy they are. Number eight is NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine. that was a big provision for the peacekeeping and the sort of bull work was that potentially NATO would have a presence uh to prevent any further Russian aggression. So obviously that's off the table if you accept categorically these 28 uh points. Now specifically on to your point about how vague the guarantees language is. So number 10 in in the peace plan is the US guarantee colon which is sort of a
  56.  
  57. [00:15:19 - 00:16:28] strange construction. First bullet is the US will receive compensation for the guarantee. Again it doesn't say what the guarantee is but to your point about profiteering the first bullet under the US guarantee is the US will receive compensation for the guarantee. The second bullet is if Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee. Again, there's no definition of what this guarantee is. Third bullet is if Russia invades Ukraine in addition to a decisive courted military response, all
  58.  
  59. [00:15:53 - 00:17:08] global sanctions will be reinstated. Recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. The next bullet and the final bullet under the guarantee is if Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid. So it's sort of got this both sidesm going on here that in its execution is sort of rewarding Russia for invading Ukraine is the bottom line here. Well, indeed, the ambiguity behind what the the guarantee
  60.  
  61. [00:16:31 - 00:17:35] is supposed to be and what, for example, a decisive military response would be on the one hand, it's clearly formulated so that you can make it sound nice, but it also doesn't have, you know, for example, I mean, article 5 under NATO doesn't say we will go to war for you. It simply says we will treat an attack on we will treat an attack on one as if it was an attack on all of us. doesn't actually specify what the response then has to be, just that we have to consider it as an attack on all of us. So
  62.  
  63. [00:17:03 - 00:18:06] if you were to be being charitable to the 28 points and were to argue, no, no, no, this is actually a very robust set of guarantees, you then say, well, sorry, then why is Ukraine being prohibited under all circumstances from joining NATO? Because if that guarantee is that a decisive military response will come from the whole transatlantic community if Ukraine is attacked again, that's basically article 5 then. And the reason why the US and other, to be fair, several other nations in NATO don't want
  64.  
  65. [00:17:34 - 00:18:38] Ukraine to join NATO is because they don't want to risk going to war with Russia if Ukraine is attacked again. So there's, you know, enough ambiguity within that statement that it can be argued as, oh, this this sounds very robust, but a decisive military response, you could say, well, what we meant by that was delivering some weapons. Okay, what we meant by that was trying a no-fly zone. Ah, but that would mean we'd have to attack Russian groundbased air defenses, and we don't want to go to
  66.  
  67. [00:18:07 - 00:19:18] the war with the Russians. It certainly doesn't say the transatlantic community will go to war in Ukraine's defense, which would be a solid essentially treaty guarantee. Um, and of course that would be very difficult to get um the remainder of NATO to sign up to, let alone the US. Um, so it it there's a huge amount of deliberate ambiguity in the one bit that sounds good for Ukraine. Um, and I suspect that's, yeah, as I say, deliberate to allow it to be, uh, sold as, oh, but, you know, this is
  68.  
  69. [00:18:42 - 00:19:43] actually good for the Ukrainians. Um, and if the US has not been willing to continue to put uh, you know, allow weapon sales through and and, you know, back when it was contributing uh, stock that was, you know, money going to US factories and, you know, essentially a guaranteed market for US defense production goods. Um, if it wasn't prepared to do that, it's difficult to sort of believe that that that the US would then interpret that clause of a vaguely worded guarantee as requiring it
  70.  
  71. [00:19:13 - 00:20:13] to go to war with Russia on Ukraine's side if Ukraine was attacked again. Um, so security guarantees pretty weak in there. Um, and yeah, if you're the Ukrainians being asked to give up three of your cities, your main defensive line against the main line of Russian aggression that you've defended successfully for, well, way more than four years, more than a decade actually, but four years of intensive combat, um, you're going to want more than a vaguely worded potentially could be nice guarantee, but
  72.  
  73. [00:19:43 - 00:20:41] that doesn't actually have any cast iron clarity to it. Um, and of course the limitation on the size of the Ukrainian armed forces is also um a pretty difficult one for them to swallow because that means it'd be very difficult for them to build up any force that they could then sustainably defend themselves on their own with on a longerterm basis. Um, and again, if you were to look at any other country in that situation, um, unless it's a defeated power, um, you have not you wouldn't see any equivalent
  74.  
  75. [00:20:12 - 00:21:08] limitation of armed forces. You look at the South Korean armed forces, for example, are still enormous because that North Korean threat is still there. Um, and that's a a line that's been frozen for what, 70 years. Um, so, and you know, that's still a potential potentially active uh hotspot. Um, so yeah, um, there's not not a whole lot to like, especially the way that it's being done, but there's also some weird stuff in there. Um, in particular, there's some really problematic stuff in there
  76.  
  77. [00:20:40 - 00:21:49] about Poland. So there's this weird line that again clearly written by Russians rather than Americans, but this European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland. Okay. Well, Polish fighter jets are European. Um, if they mean European NATO fighter jets, do they mean presumably they mean non Polish NATO fighter jets? Because again, Polish fighter aircraft are NATO fighter aircraft. assume one assumes what this is meant to mean is there will not be American vice versast jets based in Poland and there
  78.  
  79. [00:21:15 - 00:22:17] aren't any based in Poland but American jets do deploy to Poland on a semi-regular basis on rotations so this actually reads as a restriction that would be agreed to presumably by NATO that um or the the US unilaterally that US fighter jets wouldn't be stationed in Poland at any point which would require NATO to change its regional defense plans. It would require NATO to change its uh enhanced air policing posture. It would require Poland and the US to have discussions and negotiations and an
  80.  
  81. [00:21:46 - 00:22:50] agreement about it as to why this was the case. Um and it implies that Russia is able to dictate where NATO can station different national assets inside NATO territory. So again, it's a it's in many ways a sort of it looks like a side point in 28 points that are otherwise um generally speaking fairly focused on Ukraine or at least broader Russia NATO relations or transatlantic relations, but it's a weird one that's in there. Um and uh equally the one that says that NATO will enshrine in its uh in its
  82.  
  83. [00:22:17 - 00:23:16] treaty uh of charter that Ukraine will ever be allowed to join. Well, that would require NATO to change its uh founding document that and its open door policy which is part of the NATO charter um NATO treaties. So that would require all NATO nations to agree to a change on that. The US president doesn't have the right to change that unilaterally again. So it's it's essentially Russia and the US agreeing bilaterally to change NATO treaty articles over the heads of presumably the other
  84.  
  85. [00:22:46 - 00:23:41] 28 NATO members. Um, so there's a bunch of stuff in here that's also geopolitically very problematic outside of the immediate Ukraine context. Um, and of course Ukraine saying that it will agreeing to never join NATO. Well, that would require the Ukrainians to change their constitution because the uh the route to try and join NATO and to join the EU is enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution. So Zillinsky can't agree to that. He has to get the Ukrainian parliament to agree to change
  86.  
  87. [00:23:14 - 00:24:21] the constitution. So there's quite a lot of stuff in there that it's a case of well you can't actually do all that stuff particularly in a week uh since the deadline has been given as Thursday. Um funny old thing it takes quite a while um to change large scale uh parts of your legal underpinning documents in democratic systems. After all it took the US 40 days to agree a budget extension. Um, so that's a slightly cheap shot, but it's um it's written by two pe it's written or
  88.  
  89. [00:23:47 - 00:24:57] at least signed off as an idea by two leaders who like ruling as absolutists to at the stroke of a pen change a load of stuff that actually isn't in their legal gift to change. Um, now as a set of negotiating uh points to start on, if one accepts it as essentially a Russian position, fine. Um, and as you're seeing the Europeans and the Ukrainians this week trying to make counter proposals to say, okay, we'll take this as a starting position and then we'll change the bits that are unacceptable and offer this as
  90.  
  91. [00:24:22 - 00:25:37] a counterpoint. and then presumably the Russians and in this case the Americans who at this point the administration seems to be negotiating against its allies with the Russians but um they will then presumably come back with a another set of points but it yeah it's a very strange position to see the United States in >> I mean we've been talking about this since Trump came back into office. You know, we've done almost half a dozen episodes and the point is always Trump has had this position from the outset
  92.  
  93. [00:24:59 - 00:26:27] and there have been some minations, but it's kind of always been, hey, you don't have any cards, Zolinsky. The ISW map as it looks in terms of shades and front lines and and the gray areas is the end state going by Trump. The other elements here um just to put some finer points on how this plays out in this 28 point peace plan. Number 18 is Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the treaty on nuclear proliferation or the non-prololiferation of nuclear weapons. Number 19, and this is kind of
  94.  
  95. [00:25:43 - 00:27:07] a detail, but in its execution, you're rewarding Russia for invading Ukraine. Number 19 is the Zaparitzia nuclear power plant will be launched under the supervision of the IAEA which is the International Atomic Energy Agency and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine 50/50. So congratulations Russia, you just got a new uh source of power for your efforts. Um, and then it gets into kind of some cultural uh, motherhood, which sounds a lot like the the MAGA
  96.  
  97. [00:26:25 - 00:27:40] logic behind why the war happened, which is number 20. Is both countries undertake to implement educational programs in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice. That to your point doesn't sound like it was written by an American. The next one is Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities. So again, victim shaming, victim punishing here. Both countries will abolish all discriminatory measures
  98.  
  99. [00:27:03 - 00:28:01] and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education. It's doubly funny because if you try to actually implement it, it would be far more challenging for Russia to implement than Ukraine. >> And then the last thing here is all Nazi ideology and activities must be rejected and prohibited. Again, going after the Nazis, this is about the Azop brigade. That's why, you know, it was terrorism that forced us to invade the Dombas. >> Yeah. But it's interesting again the
  100.  
  101. [00:27:32 - 00:28:44] there's we've we've we've discussed it in in a couple of previous interviews. the there's a really interesting cultural difference in understanding of the word Nazi. So for us in the west, we understand Nazi to mean the National Socialist Party of Germany. It from 1933 through to 1945. It has quite a specific meaning. Although it's thrown around that that's kind of what it refers to in Russian culture. Nazi means anybody who fights against Russia. So Nazi is used quite openly and
  102.  
  103. [00:28:08 - 00:29:15] explicitly as anybody who fights against Russia because the Nazis were people who people who fought against Russia in the Great Patriotic War, the founding war that essentially defines the baseline of modern Russian culture. And so Nazi is almost explicitly used in many cases and in some cases explicitly used to refer to people of any political ideology but who fight against Russia which makes them de facto bad which makes them de facto the fascistic enemy i.e. the Nazis. So again it's interesting to see
  104.  
  105. [00:28:42 - 00:29:41] that terms being used there that mean very different things to different sides. Um, and you know, yes, pre-war Ukraine did have a very, very small minority, statistically speaking, but yes, it did have a problem with neo-Nazi far-right people um, who disproportionately were recruited into the Azovv brigade. Most of those people are long dead as in all the other Ukrainian formations at the start of the war and have been replaced over time with recruitment of normal people through mobilization. So the
  106.  
  107. [00:29:11 - 00:30:08] dennazification in terms of getting rid of in suppressing people with very farright ideologies and SS tattoos and all those horrible things which did happen in small numbers but were concentrated in that unit, the Azov brigade. And it just so happened the Azov brigade was very very effective on the battlefield which is one of the reasons why it was quasi tolerated. Um but that was suppressed and successfully uh overhauled by the Ukrainian military during the war itself. But of course, one of the bits that isn't talked about
  108.  
  109. [00:29:40 - 00:30:39] is the fact that the Russians also have a very significant neo-Nazi problem. They also have a very unpleasant minority subculture who, you know, have SS tattoos and say Hitler was right and all of these other appalling things who also disproportionately uh go into the armed forces. And so like this idea that it's some uniquely Ukrainian problem, it absolutely isn't, unfortunately. I wish it I wish it was geographically kind of kept somewhere as I believe. Unfortunately, it's probably fair to say
  110.  
  111. [00:30:10 - 00:31:15] we're seeing in a lot of countries of late. Um, increasingly people with openly neo-Nazi and this in this case openly neo-German Nazi, as in the Nazis that we think of when we say the word Nazi, um, seem to be increasingly um, open about the fact that they are happy to be identified by that aspect of who they choose to be. Um, so yeah, it's interesting to see that, but again, as you say, it's all about that furthering the sort of baking in the Russian narratives for why they invaded their
  112.  
  113. [00:30:42 - 00:31:33] smaller neighbor and raised several cities to the ground and devastated the country for the last four years. Um, I mean, ultimately there's also just the entire baseline narrative, which is the the problem with all of this stuff, which is the idea that it's Ukraine responsible for continuing the war. Um, if the Russians stop shooting tomorrow, the war would stop. If the Ukrainians stop shooting tomorrow, they'll be overrun and destroyed. Like, it's incredibly basic. Um, and it's
  114.  
  115. [00:31:08 - 00:32:06] interesting. You've seen Trump himself as president kind of flip-flop a bit publicly over the last nine months or so, you know, at least from what one gets as readouts from um, discussions that he's having of he's feels let down by Putin. He feels betrayed by X and Y. he's starting to see it's all much more complicated than he thought and it's much more difficult than he expected and Putin doesn't seem really to make peace and you know so even for someone who is clearly predisposed um as he said
  116.  
  117. [00:31:37 - 00:32:38] himself you know he has a great relationship with Putin and he repeats that a lot um yeah he's clearly predisposed to the Russian line but even he has at various points over the past nine months appeared to accept that it's actually the Russians selling away peace and so the way this reads at least is he wants a good news story. He he is obsessed with the idea of a deal. He loves deals. He loves being seen as a dealmaker. So, he's had this plan presented to him essentially Russian written with Witkov who doesn't really
  118.  
  119. [00:32:07 - 00:33:05] understand what's going on and doesn't understand his own brief um and has just decided to go with it. And now that people are within the administration, within Senate, and of course across his allies in Ukraine calling out and saying this is a this is a very very bad plan for a whole load of reasons. he's digging his heels in and saying, "No, you've got to accept it because, you know, otherwise we'll cut everything off." Um because for him, the point is to get a deal. Whether it's a good deal
  120.  
  121. [00:32:36 - 00:33:53] or not is not the not the point. It's a deal. Um and uh yeah, it's unfortunate that there is still no substitute for um US production and uh some US intelligence products um because of 25 years of underinvestment by Europeans, but also to be fair 25 years of the US within NATO and and other international coalitions messaging to allies saying don't spend your inadequate defense budgets trying to chase tiny fractions of these niche enabling capabilities that you could never field on any
  122.  
  123. [00:33:15 - 00:34:16] practical scale anyway because they're so expensive, particularly things in space. Um, just do the basics so that when you show up to an international coalition, you show up with your own planes, your own tanks, your own bombs, your own food, your own medical equipment, your own, you know, body armor. as pathetic as it is that they had to say that um and that's an indictment on the Europeans on all of us but 25 years of that being US posture of saying can you at least do the basics right we'll do the high-end enablers but
  124.  
  125. [00:33:45 - 00:34:45] please do the basics right means that even the the good European NATO members as it were the ones who've consistently spent 2% of GDP or more um don't have a lot of these key enablers and niche high-end capabilities of various kinds and so it's all very well saying, "Well, the Europeans should handle it." Yeah, they should. Um, and you see the the European money is buying all pretty much American weapons that are going into Ukraine now are being bought with European money. So, they are paying for
  126.  
  127. [00:34:14 - 00:35:20] it. But saying the Europeans are on their own, we will cut off enablement essentially. Uh, whether one, you can sort of rail against the Europeans all you want. Trust me, as someone who spent a long time railing against the Europeans internally and the UK for not investing in stuff that we clearly should have had nationally, you know, we are where we are and there's just no way to substitute for certain key American capabilities in the next 3 to 5 years. The long-term view of course is also if
  128.  
  129. [00:34:47 - 00:35:48] the US pushes this line and um forces a disastrous and ultimately counterproductive agreement which leads to a Russian followon attack through a much less wellprepared much more divided Ukraine. Um, it will accelerate the decoupling of Europe and the US and further push European rearmament funding away from US weapon systems towards trying to build up European autonomy, which I don't think is what the US wants from an industrial point of view either. >> Well, you make the good point as you
  130.  
  131. [00:35:18 - 00:36:30] have previous that if Russia stops shooting, the war is over. If Ukraine stops shooting, they're going to get overrun. So if you apply a both sidesism template to these negotiations and you're just like, "Hey everybody, put down your arms. Zilinsky, just get over it." Basically is the president's position. You don't have the cards. There's no sense of how we got here. Context, historical precedent, just basically charging him to suck it up. That's where you realize the disconnect
  132.  
  133. [00:35:53 - 00:36:55] in terms of this sort of forcing a peace proposal, not unlike what happened in Gaza. You know, this this feels a lot like the Gaza negotiations where there's a lot of sort of pomp and ceremony and then president gets back on Air Force One and declares victory and goes away and now it's turned the page on to Venezuela or the the next, you know, thing that we're going to deal with and assume everything will take care of itself without identifying the pain points that are insurmountable in some
  134.  
  135. [00:36:24 - 00:37:43] cases or take a lot more work. Same drill here. So uh point number 21 in this proposal territories has some detail about what we're talking about. So Crimea Luhansk Detsk will be recognized as this is key wording de facto Russian. So again congratulations for your invasion. It worked including by the United States. So we will recognize those. Of course, that's not heavy lift these days for the United States to recognize that. How about Ukraine? Are they going to recognize it? Harrison and Zaparitzia will be frozen
  136.  
  137. [00:37:04 - 00:38:19] along the line of contact, which will mean again de facto recognition along the line of contact. Okay, so this line is not fixed. And basically the the the next bullet again rewards Russia. So Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Daes Oblast that they currently control. This withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. So that's not neutral, right? A neutral buffer zone that belongs to the Russian
  138.  
  139. [00:37:41 - 00:38:40] Federation. Russian force forces will not enter this demilitarized zone. Well, but it's recognized as territory belonging to the Russians, but now you're like, except don't enter it. >> Remember that there were agreements in place around Minsk 2, which Ukraine never fully implemented, but neither did the Russian side. And the Russian side never stopped shooting on the the front line either. The Ukrainians never stopped shooting back either. um but from 2015 and Ukraine itself had gave up its
  140.  
  141. [00:38:11 - 00:39:13] nuclear weapons capability at the at the end of the cold war in exchange for security guarantees between Russia, the UK and the US. So they've already had their territorial sovereignty agreed by international agreement tripartite between the US, the UK and and Russia and then been invaded repeatedly. So again, it's not even as if you're asking them to take something on trust for the first time. Asking them to take something on trust that they've had repeatedly violated before at great
  142.  
  143. [00:38:41 - 00:39:34] cost. Um, and so, you know, it's it's it's doubly ignorant. I mean particularly the suggestion that they might have the meeting in in Budapest which initially which given that the Budapest memorandum was the piece of paper that was signed between Russia, the US and the UK to guarantee Ukraine's territorial sovereignty in exchange for it giving up its nuclear weapons. It was signed in Budapest. And so the idea that you would then have a further peace thing signed in Budapest is just it's
  144.  
  145. [00:39:09 - 00:40:08] another one of those things that the US team in this administration won't recognize because they're not interested. and the Ukrainian side will all understand incredibly deeply as an extremely deliberate humiliation. Um, and also essentially declaration that it doesn't mean much. Um, because the last one didn't mean much. Um, and so yeah, it's um, the Russians are very good at exploiting that cultural divide. Um, they understand what will be picked up by both different parties um, who are
  146.  
  147. [00:39:38 - 00:40:25] the primary audiences for this, the US administration and the the Ukrainian government. Um, but the other thing is, of course, he, you know, as you say, Zillinsky is and the Ukrainian government are the ones being pressurized to essentially quote unquote suck it up, as you said. But it's not even that they're being told to suck it up. You know, that that where the front lines is is the best you're ever going to get. Take the deal. They're being told you have to give up your main
  148.  
  149. [00:40:01 - 00:40:58] defensive lines and the rest of rest of Detlast. So, it's not even you have to accept that you've lost the territories the Russians have conquered. you know, reward the Russians by recognizing what they've conquered by force, but it's give them even more of the most heavily fortified areas with the remaining three cities in Datk, which not only is three cities and a significant economic hit to Ukraine, um, but it's also got significant amounts of Ukraine's coke for so coke and coal for making steel
  150.  
  151. [00:40:30 - 00:41:35] uh, and significant deposits of lithium and other other non-ferris metals. So, are in that Daetsk area. Most of Ukraine's heavy industry was in the Donbas. Um, so for a country that was never rich to begin with, it's not just territory for its own sake. It's also economically very, very serious for them. And Ukraine is going to face an unbelievable bill for trying to reconstruct all of the damage over the past four years, even just in the areas it controls now. So then having essentially three of its remaining
  152.  
  153. [00:41:02 - 00:42:00] cities stripped away in uh an imposed sort of deal quote unquote from outside. Well, I guess my my point on that would be it would be gling enough if it was at least the price that they had to pay for cast iron security guarantees, a peacekeeping force to ensure that they weren't further invaded with Western troops there so that the Russians couldn't come further in without risking wider war. Yeah, in those scenarios, okay, one might accept the argument of, yeah, unfortunately, peace in these scenarios
  154.  
  155. [00:41:31 - 00:42:38] with a very mismatched um military force ratio is always going to be ugly and both sides have to compromise, but at the moment there's no real compromise being made by the Russian side. Um, and so yeah, it's um it's a pretty difficult cell, I think. Um and it'll be interesting to see what the counter proposals um being worked on by uh Ukraine and by the European allies um will be this week. Um so I saw suggestions from one of the Ukrainian ministers uh just this afternoon so 24th
  156.  
  157. [00:42:05 - 00:43:11] of November at the time of recording um saying they'd worked up a a sort of counter I think it was 18 or 19 uh point proposal based on the 28 um where they'd stripped out bits that were unacceptable and tweaked wording around. So, you know, they're clearly trying to work um to show that they are being as accommodating and trying as hard as they can to make this the basis of the deal that the US president is so desperate for. Clearly, um but you know, again, the other thing to to remember in
  158.  
  159. [00:42:38 - 00:43:36] all of this, nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians. They're desperate. Their power is on a few hours a day. It's cold. They're under constant bombardment. They've lost hundreds of thousands of troops. They've had hu millions internally displaced. The country's been torn to pieces. So they're facing an ever stronger larger Russian force. So it's not like they don't want peace. They're desperate for peace. The constant thing you get from Ukrainians is this cannot keep going
  160.  
  161. [00:43:06 - 00:44:18] like this. But they understand that having sacrificed all of this, they can't accept a deal that just sets them up to be overrun in 3 to 6 months time um while giving up their key defensive lines. uh and asking them to do so is just either extortion or deep ignorance. >> So the analogy that's been tossed about is is the 1938 agreement with Hitler's Germany that that Chamberlain infamously accepted. We know what happened there. Some of the details of the European counterp proposal that have come out and
  162.  
  163. [00:43:42 - 00:44:57] these are led by Germany. they they don't accept the language dealing with NATO and and so it doesn't remove that language. It's just what the verb is softens the language. So I don't know if that means that the door is left open for making Ukraine a member of NATO or whether that means that NATO could have a presence in Ukraine as a peacekeeping force uh in some fashion. The second counterproposal element is it removes the territorial concessions. So basically whatever that the line where it's going
  164.  
  165. [00:44:19 - 00:45:25] to be frozen, it's not going to give land to the Russians that is currently held by the Ukrainians, which would be uh the final insult. It demands an immediate ceasefire. So, okay, that's that's just a matter of everybody stop pulling the trigger, you know, and as you say, Russia stops, the war's over, Ukraine stops at this point without security guarantees. Basically, Putin executes the plan he wanted to execute from the outset. And then the fourth part of the European counterp
  166.  
  167. [00:44:53 - 00:46:04] proposal is removing the deadline for Ukrainian elections to the point that you made uh a while ago about that's that's not helpful and it's arbitrary and it is punitive towards the Zullinsky government at this point. So the American delegation is the the makeup of it is is interesting. So obviously Secretary of State Rubio is there. Steve Witco, who's been the emissary all over the world since Trump 47 got into office and has been really busy and uh by all accounts has has done some effective
  168.  
  169. [00:45:27 - 00:46:31] work. Jared Kushner is part of this. I I don't know why. Um he doesn't have an official role like he did in the Trump 45 White House. it made sense at some level to have him part of the Middle East discussions because he was the architect behind the Abraham Accords and so forth and so on. So there's some question marks as to why is Jared Kushner part of this and then finally the the the the guy that I find intriguing and I've heard some some rumor about his future is the Secretary
  170.  
  171. [00:45:59 - 00:47:25] of the Army Dan Driscoll. So he's there and glaringly not there is the Secretary of Defensewar Pete Hegsath. Now I've heard for some months from people who have their ear to the Pentagon's tracks that Hegsath his time was uh limited at this point. But I heard that that change was going to happen around Labor Day. Obviously that didn't happen. Uh, but I am now hearing from more than one credible source that Dan Driscoll, the Secretary of the Army, is earmarked to replace Haggth imminently. So, it'll be interesting to
  172.  
  173. [00:46:43 - 00:48:02] see if that in fact plays out. And is this evidence that that is true, that he's there and Hanks Seth is is not? Uh so all this as you say Justin yields kind of where are we? Let's be honest. America, United States is not going to war if Russia rolls tanks past the neeper towards Kev or Leviv, wherever, right? We're going to jump up and down. We're going to give the Europeans NATO, we'll sell them as much stuff as they want, but we are not putting boots on the ground in Ukraine. So Putin
  174.  
  175. [00:47:23 - 00:48:41] certainly knows that. Does anybody really believe? And if you take the Russians at their word, does anybody believe that Russia sacrificed? Well, maybe they don't see it that way, the leadership, but the Russia has had taken close on 1.3 million casualties at this point, killed, wounded, missing, captured, unbelievable amounts of military material, has had its military status deeply humiliated and damaged on the international scale has ensured that NATO itself gets stronger, at least in Europe, with Finland and Sweden joining,
  176.  
  177. [00:48:02 - 00:49:21] and that it will be content as its reward for that with Detskansk. gold blasts of Ukraine. Do we believe that? Um I think anyone who believes that should go and watch some Russian state TV for a while. Um it's really instructive. Just go and go and look at what they're saying to themselves in Russian. There's plenty of good translation tools these days. Um yeah, it's you know which European city should we burn next and which one are we going to teach a lesson to next? and you know it's completely open about it. Um
  178.  
  179. [00:48:41 - 00:49:41] the uh the oh well why don't you go and fight in Ukraine then brigade uh of people who want to just wash their hands of the problem or are just looking for ways to put bad faith arguments out there and create distraction are either willingly or unwillingly refusing to look at or acknowledge what Russia actually is and what it's trying to do. Um, the Ukrainians are perfectly aware of it, obviously, because they've been on the receiving end for 4 years. But equally, go and talk to people in
  180.  
  181. [00:49:12 - 00:50:16] pretty much any country with a border with Russia. They'll be very very clear about what it's like um and what they what they do. Um, you go talk to the Poles, go talk to the Baltic States, go talk to the Fins, you know, go talk to the Norwegians. Per all these countries have a border with the Russians. Um, they will keep going until someone forces them to stop. That's the general rule and it has been for a very long time. Um and uh yeah, you know, if you look at for example the Georgian experience, uh
  182.  
  183. [00:49:44 - 00:50:56] the lines that were frozen in the agreements the end of the war there when they invaded Southia uh in Georgia um they crept forward by a couple of miles every year for years. And equally what Russia does in the areas that it controls, whether this is in the occupied parts of what was Georgia, uh if you look at the occupied territories in Crimea, in Donbas, uh they pay quite a lot of money to forcibly remove the population over time and reset give grants to resettle Russians from remote parts of Russia in those territories so
  184.  
  185. [00:50:20 - 00:51:29] that over time the population of those occupied territories becomes Russians. so that it cannot be taken back. And so, you know, it is just the most nakedly colonial stuff. It's amazing that people either don't want to see it or or defend it. Um, and you even see, you know, analogies to US military aggression again, you know, action against Iraq, for example, in 2003, um, in the Middle East repeatedly. One can argue all you like about the the legality and morality of those wars. certainly very very contestable um in
  186.  
  187. [00:50:55 - 00:51:56] terms of you know there's plenty of criticisms you can make but it's not like the US invaded Iraq and said this is now part of us this is now a part of America or this over Afghanistan or Libya or wherever it's you and started taking the population away and replacing them with people from the Midwest let's say to say this is now the 52nd state um yeah the the the the blindness of what Russia is is astonishing to me >> well we'll be keeping our eye on the situ situation here in the near term
  188.  
  189. [00:51:24 - 00:52:33] because these uh iterations are varying wildly and see where we land here. Obviously, we all wish the fighting would stop, the killing would stop, and that we would have some sustainable peace in Ukraine. It seems a long way off when you consider some of the elements in this peace plan and where the parties are at this point, but we'll keep our eyes on the situation. So Justin, always a pleasure to get your insights and we look forward to having you on the channel again very soon. >> Thanks. Look forward to the next time.
  190.  
  191. [00:52:00 - 00:52:24] >> All right, that'll do it for this episode. If you're not already a subscriber, become one so you don't miss anything. And in the meantime, I look forward to talking to you again very soon. Yeah.
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