2) How did the United States Supreme Court become the protector of private property rights against the will of the majority in the first part of the 19th century?  Include a discussion of one pre-Civil War case.
During the first part of the 19th century, the foundations of classical legal thought established that the law was fixed and fundamental as a spate entity from the will of the majority.  Attorney-statesmen Rufus Choate trumpeted, “Law is not the transient and arbitrary creation of the major will, nor of any will.” He claimed the law to be “independent, superior reason, in one sense out of the people, in one sense above them.” By asserting the supposedly “objective” state of the laws, this allowed courts to justify making decisions that are not “the actual will of the existing generation.” (Wiecek, p. 43).
 Furthermore, the first part of the 19th century in the United States was marked by changing times.  Progress was embodied in this age by the mechanical beasts of burden of the railroads and steamships.  Many judges in this period were concerned in nation-building and were often in support of constructing national infrastructure and a healthy, resilient economy.  They came to see the will of the majority, who were being disadvantaged and exploited by large corporations as retardants to the advancement of the nation’s interests. “Courts cheerfully sacrificed the rights of individuals to social policy by liberal application of the concept of damnum absque injuria (injury without liability)” (Wiecek, p. 45)
This is pro-development (and anti-majority will) stance is well exemplified in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837).  The Supreme Court allowed the economic value of the Chares River Bridge to be destroyed by dissolving its monopoly as the singular toll bridge for the river.  Stanley Kutler stated that judges of this time period were not afraid to employ creative ways to destroy precedent of property rights if they believed that it would be for the common good.  The motto of the era perhaps was akin to “material progress was not to be held captive to disappointed landowners,” (Wiecek, p. 45-47).
Chief Justice of Massachusetts Lemuel Shaw in his Farwell v. Boston and Worcestor Railroad (1842) opinion safeguarded the railroads from legal action on behalf of work-related accidents forging the doctrines of the fellow-servant rule and assumptions of risk. (Wiecek p. 46).  Furthermore, in Ryan v. New York Central Railroad (1866), the New York Court of Appeals pardoned a railroad company in which one of their train engine’s sparks set the plaintiff’s building ablaze (Wiecek, p. 47).