The rhetoric of virtue and moral superiority of the left reflected in the result of Sunday's election and prevents it from becoming a new left. This is the analysis made by Fernando Schüler, a political scientist and teacher at Insper, in São Paulo.

For him, the discourse of intolerance on the left is transvestite of a pride and airs of superiority that make part of the population feel excluded culturally by the political and cultural elite. The "lack of dialogue" with these sectors, as Mano Brown said at a rally by Fernando Haddad, which Schüler calls a "lack of connection", is the great problem of the Brazilian left today.

"The rhetoric that the other side is unnameable, the other side is the "coiso", the other side is the fascist. The very fact that I do not nominate the other, of calling the other unnameable means that somehow he should not exist, that he is not worthy to have his name mentioned. This is not compatible with democracy. Democracy supposes a liturgy and if you do not understand that, you turn democracy into a war, "he says.

For Schüler, intolerance was a common element in the two campaigns of the second round of the election. What changes, he says, is the aesthetic form as it has presented itself to society - one excluding, the other including the part that feels excluded. "Politically correct ends up being a cultural form of exclusion, because it is the language of the cultural elite and the elite of the middle class. Without judging the value of its content, it generates by itself a brutal sense of exclusion," he reflects.


 "On the Bolsonaro side, this is on a less rhetorical, less elaborate, less sophisticated level. It's as if on one side you heard a curse word and on the other side you heard a big virtue-signalizing text. One side is more vulgar, it is more aggressive. The other side is more presumptuous, it is a more refined intolerance, which calls the other fascist,"coiso", nameless. But the two sides express intolerance. "

The analyst does not bet on a reflection of the left on its posture and proposals, considered by him, old and dated of the 1990s. From now on it is very likely that the PT will "play dead" without self-reflection, renewal and recycling, keeping this disconnection with the population and betting on a crisis of the new government. Read the following interview:

Carta Capital: What does the result of the polls reveal about Brazilian society and the current parties?

Fernando Schüler:  I think we have a more complex democracy in Brazil, in the sense that it is better able to represent the sentiment of society. For 20 years Brazilian politics was polarized between PT and PSDB basically, two expressions in our social-democracy, different versions.

Today there is a very strong base in society, a large part of society that identifies with the so-called "cultural conservatism", there is a very strong presence of evangelical population - and here I want to say: with total legitimacy. I am not entering into the merits of people's choices, but into having them. No wonder Bolsonaro began his speech Sunday with a prayer, with a mention of the Bible. That is to say, the religion in this campaign played a very strong role and possibly the religious discourse will play a very strong role in the foundations of the speech, in the rhetoric of President Bolsonaro. This is new information. We have always had a strong evangelical bench in Congress and Brazil has a broad base of the religious population distributed in various nominations, but this has never had a majority expression in Brazilian politics.

The candidate Bolsonaro was the first one who clearly expressed this portion of the population identified with "conservatism of customs", but that does not explain everything. There are other factors. I think there has been a loss of cultural hegemony on the part of the left in society.  PT, to a large extent, has become a party of just the Northeast. In addition to having elected four governors there, it was the only region in which it won the election.

CC: What does this loss of hegemony mean?
FS:  When the ideas of a political party lose hegemony in the middle class, in the more urban class, in the sectors that have more information, it is a reflection that ideas somehow got old, ideas lost their connection with society.

Politics is made of cycles, often a political party occupies power space and accommodates itself, adapts to the state, ends up reflecting corporate interests, joins the most diverse interests. This all leads to a total detachment from society.

Society first watches silently, then begins to create antibodies, then you have a diffuse organization of a resistance in society ... then joins the internet and social networks. The 2013 move was that. It arose first in a disorderly way, but then they have a certain organicity. These are the ones who lead the impeachment process. Movements such as "Vem pra Rua" and the MBL, for example, are born from this new configuration of politics. I mean, more pro-market or more conservative in the cultural sense. They are born against the system, independent of the parties and this gives these movements an extraordinary force of connection to society. All this, so to speak, leads to a process of polarization in society.

CC: Was the electoral decision-making process of the Brazilian population based much more on the emotional than on rationality?
FS:I have no doubts. We see in the great democracies a new reality. We have millions of people participating in politics, giving their opinions through the internet and social networks. People bring to politics a different agenda, which is not one that institutions prioritize. They are much more interested in discussing gun laws, abortion, and gender ideology. This touches their sensitivities, excites and mobilizes more than the discussion about the public deficit in the Country, or on how to deal with the spending ceiling PEC and pension reform. This makes the cultural theme take center stage in democracy. And with that, a cold party, technocratic as the PSDB loses much of its attractiveness. It is not just a crisis on the left. It is a crisis of the traditional political system.

CC: A crisis of left-wing hegemony?
FS:  When I speak of the crisis of hegemony of the left is not of one or another party of the left, it is of the generically associated thought the left. For the good or for the bad, the left ended up being confused with the State of Brazil, with public corporations, with the rhetoric of rights, an idea against the Social Security reform, against the labor reform, against the modernization of the State. That ended up giving a worn-out face to the left.

A message that says "let's unbureaucratize, let's support entrepreneurship" attracts and was seen in the Bolsonaro's victory speech.

My impression is that it is very difficult for the left to understand all this and to make a self-criticism. That'd means walking a lot towards a social democracy. In the last decade and a half there has been a huge change in Brazilian society. The rise of a new middle class, the technological revolution on the internet bringing much more information, the quality of public service deteriorated. We also had a brutal crisis in the last years of Public Security. So society has become more critical of the state, it believes less in the state and this largely explains a real fact: society has a very divided, more pro-market perspective.

Ten years ago no Brazilian politician competing for the presidency would speak the word privatization. Nowadays the word privatization has become a compliment. João Doria was elected Mayor of São Paulo in 2016 on that flag.

The Brazilian political culture has changed and I won't say it was for good or evil. All parties should reason about it, make self-criticisms review programs. Maybe it's the time, after the election, for that.

CC: You said that Brazilian democracy got more complex.
FS:  Yes. And digital democracy is here to stay. And democracy will henceforth be noisier and more polarized. I do not see how to change that. This brings into the political a series of consequences. Some of them: a rhetoric of exaggeration, a primacy of emotionalism because people manifest themselves without the filter of institutions.

What is the historical role of institutions in democracy - parties, trade unions, parliament, professional media? Is to make the filter. Nowadays, people express themselves without this verification that the institutions did. I mean, people put their anger, their passions, their prejudices. They have become, in digital democracy, fans. They act like fanboys, they adhere, cry and vibrate.

Digital democracy has another, perverse feature in my view, which is tribalization. People exclude people who disagree with them and end up communicating only with those who only share the same ideas. Thus, society is divided into bubbles and this leads to a radicalization.

In this election it was clear that there was a huge bubble with people who thought that the most important thing was to defeat a criminal organization that wanted to return to power, and in the other bubble were people trying to save the country from the dictatorship that would come with Jair Bolsonaro. The two bubbles are obviously irrational. No such rhetoric corresponds to reality. Both are overkill. It is the rhetoric of exaggeration, of victimization, of the us against them, of the rhetoric of fear. In a democracy there are no enemies, there are just opponents.


CC:  In your opinion, how was the PT and Haddad campaign? If there were any mistakes, what were the PT's and what were Fernando Haddad's?
FS: PT, in the point of view of electoral strategy, was right. It did well on the elections, considering the circumstances. The party knew how to do well the transfer of votes to Haddad, knew how to conduct this dramatization in the surroundings of President Lula's prison and in his attempt to be a candidate as far as possible. I do not think Haddad made any significant mistakes that I can analyze. Under the circumstances, he was the best candidate the PT could have. He acted in moderation, he sought support. There were some strident moments and tougher times, but it was a polarized campaign, so within limits he did his best.

Haddad had a hesitation on the night of the defeat. He should have called [to Jair Bolsonaro]. He, as a teacher, could have given a lesson and said, "I know the campaign has been polarized, that the time is difficult, but democracy has a liturgy that we cherish." It got bad. There is a moment that it is not enough to speak for the militancy, you have to speak for the Country. This example is symbolic of the crisis of the left. And it shows how Mano Brown was right in his speech at the Haddad rally, about how the left loses contact with society and speaks only to itself,only speaks to its converts.

For me, that night, Haddad should have remembered Barack Obama, of the enormous capacity that Obama had of always putting himself as the president of the Country, always with those phrases: "there are no red states or blue states", "there is no America Black and White America ". All of this cost him a lot, but in the end marked him as a great statesman. It lacked such greatness in Haddad. But he reflected, and the next day made a communication via the internet, I do not know if he solved it or not, but I prefer the Fernando Haddad from Monday than the one on Sunday.

CC:  Do you think he did not see himself as a future political leader?
FS: Haddad is a new positive leadership of the Brazilian left, which brings new elements. He has a very clear democratic rhetoric, it is a new generation. But he continues with the defects that I point out in the left and in the PT, of not talking to the population.

CC: Does he keep tied to that? FS: Yes, he continues with this rancidity, which I will call the rhetoric of virtue, rhetoric of moral superiority. The rhetoric that the other side is unnameable, the other side is the "coiso", the other side is the fascist. That the one who thinks differently from me is the fascist. I will call it Marcia Tiburi's rhetoric, that is to say: everyone who disagrees with me is fascist and I do exactly what I condemn in my book.

It is as if in a moment of time millions of fascists in Brazil have appeared, that only the set of idea that I defend is legitimate in the democracy. The very fact that I do not nominate the other, of calling the other unnameable means that somehow he should not exist, that he is not worthy of having his name mentioned. This is not compatible with democracy. Democracy supposes a liturgy and if you do not understand it, you turn democracy into a war. And war is the end of democracy.

Obviously this requires a whole personal revolution of the left  and that I think the left is not willing to do. The left goes much further on the Boulos line, which is a kind of living embodiment of the theory of virtue, of superiority, with the finger in the face, of rhetorical intolerance, there is that sense of moral superiority that no one else is worthy. This culture is absolutely incompatible with democracy. But let's make it clear that to a large extent the other side also has this. At the base of Bolsonaro there is authoritarianism, there is intolerance.

On the Bolsonaro side this is on a less rhetorical, less elaborate, less sophisticated level. It's as if on one side you hear a curse word and on the other side you hear a virtue-signalizing text. One side is more vulgar, it is more aggressive. The other side is more fancy, it is a more refined intolerance, which calls the other fascist, coiso, nameless. But the two express intolerance.


CC: So there are elements common in both campaigns?
FS: I have no doubt, it is no wonder that we are in a polarized democracy. In a process of mutual exclusion. This is classic in contemporary democracy that generically calls "identity politics" on the one hand, and "cultural conservatism" on the other.You have the rhetoric of the politically correct on the one hand and the politically incorrect on the other.

The middle class's veto to Bolsonaro came from much of its vulgarity, of his bad phrases, of its large set of prejudices that express themselves much more in aesthetic tone, tone of voice, phrases, expressions, humor, in jokes of bad taste.

Politically correct ends up being a cultural form of exclusion, because it is the language of the cultural elite, of the elite of the middle class. I do not judge its value, but the fact is that it generates a brutal sense of exclusion. This happened to Trump in the United States. There are immense sociological studies that show how part of society feels culturally excluded by the political and cultural elite.

CC: Do you believe that Haddad leaving PT would be a good thing? FS: No. It would not make any sense. Haddad is a leader within a system and would hardly be a leader out of this context. I do not see him as a public leader, as having a large part of society with which he has personal loyalty. He is not a kind of charismatic leader, personalist as is Bolsonaro and how is somewhat President Lula, with very different stories, of course.

I think Haddad is a modern, institutional politician who can talk to people who think differently of him. Now it works within this PT group, to bring the party to a much more positive rhetoric than that of the old party leadership.

The problem is that he has no strength and I do not know if he wants to do a more thorough review.

CC: Do you see the prospect of the emergence of a new Brazilian left?
FS: We had a great window of opportunity with Eduardo Campos. He really represented in Brazil a solid and consistent attempt to renew leftist thinking. We had another in the figure of Paulo Hartung, in Espírito Santo, who is a man who came from the left and went through a process. I think we had a rehearsal of this in the first Lula administration, with the Palocci economic team, and when a pension  mini-reform was done.

The left, to really get back to relevance, needs to get out of the gutter and I think this is Haddad's head, to talk to other sectors.

CC: So Haddad's figure is more modern, but does PT hold him back?
FS: I have not seen PT movements in recent years for a renovation. The original program that the PT presented in the first round is a program of the 1990s: end of the PEC spending ceiling, revocation of labor reform, media regulation. This is an old program of the left and I can not see any renovation on it.

CC: Will Haddad succumb to the PT or he can  get out of that rhetoric you describe?
FS: This is the dilemma that Fernando Haddad has from now on. For me this ambivalence from Sunday night to Monday morning has a symbolism. Recognize the democratic game rule or not? To play the game in the great politics or to remain like ideological party, half hegemonic?

For example: will PT assume the concept of fiscal responsibility or not? If PT were elected, would not it have to do a pension reform? Lula did a reform like that and the unions were totally against it. Of course with the ability he has, he managed to compose later. But from there emerged a new party that was  PSOL, which was against the reform.

If PT, when it was in power, understood the necessity of fiscal responsibility and reforms, such as that of social security, why this can not enter into the ideary of the left? The left can only be reasonable when it is in power in certain circumstances? Why does Lula bring Henrique Meirelles to be the president of the Central Bank? These are the real questions that must be asked.

Haddad has before him a possibility of attempting a reformulation of PT, a change of habits, an opening of dialogues. But the question is: does Gleisi Hoffmann and the PT elite want that? Does Lula want this?


CC: How do you see  PT's future?
FS: The PT can be a successful party with or without a review. It can play dead and hope for a brutal crisis in the new government. The word at the head of  PT's direction is resistance. And what does that word mean? Let's get entrenched in our traditional positions, let's get together with our unions and our social movements, let's take our bench, which has 57 deputies, and make a radical opposition and continue with the process for Lula's release and bet that there will be a brutal crisis, we will have elections in 4 years and we will win. Lula will be 77 years old, will be well and will be able compete or Haddad himself.

My impression is that the mind of PT is this. This may cause the left to be an alternative power, but it does not renew itself, it does not recycle.

If the Bolsonaro government is not a crisis as PT imagines, it can go through a crisis of relevance, of gradual isolation and dependency on the charisma of President Lula. Today what holds the united PT is former President Lula. If Lula leaves the scene, PT would become a common party, it would have a syndrome like the one that PSDB goes through.

PT is in a reactive position today. It knows that it has a potential of 30% of the Brazilian electorate, which is no small thing, it knows that it has the largest mass of militants, it has the highest number of seats in the Deputy Chamber, he has four governors in the Northeast and that's good. In addition, there is a very easy political motiff, which is to attack fascism in the people of Bolsonaro, anything he says will be fascism and every day will have a crazy Bolsonaro proposing a madness.

PT is not concerned with our discussion here, whether it will renew the agenda or modernize this and that. But that is the theme that has to be discussed.