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  4. <TITLE>CDT Testimony - Med Privacy (6/14/96)</TITLE>
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  7. <CENTER><A HREF="/index.html"><IMG SRC="/images/cdtlgo.gif" BORDER=1 ALT="CDT Logo"></A><BR>
  8. <P>
  9. <H2>Statement of<BR>
  10. <BR>
  11. Janlori Goldman<BR>
  12. Deputy Director<BR>
  13. Center for Democracy and Technology<BR>
  14. <BR>
  15. Before the<BR>
  16. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight<BR>
  17. Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology<BR>
  18. on <BR>
  19. Medical Records Confidentiality
  20. <P>
  21. June 14, 1996</CENTER>
  22. </H2>
  23. <BR>
  24. <HR>
  25. <P><A HREF="#overview">Overview</A><BR>
  26. <BR>
  27. <A HREF="#need">The Need and Demand for Federal Privacy Protection</A>
  28. <UL>
  29. <LI><A HREF="#consensus">Consensus Exists</A>
  30. <LI><A HREF="#misuse">Misuse of Personal Health Information</A>
  31. <LI><A HREF="#consequences">Consequences of Not Protecting Personal Health
  32. Information</A>
  33. </UL>
  34. <A HREF="#principles">Principles for a Health Privacy Policy</A><BR>
  35. <BR>
  36. <A HREF="#conclusion">Conclusion</A><BR>
  37. <BR>
  38. <A HREF="footnotes">Footnotes</A><BR>
  39. <BR>
  40. <HR><A NAME="overview"></A>Chairman Horn and Members of the Subcommittee:
  41. <H3>I. Overview</H3>
  42. My name is Janlori Goldman and I am the Deputy Director of the Center for
  43. Democracy and Technology (CDT). CDT is a non-profit, public interest organization
  44. dedicated to preserving free speech, privacy and other democratic values
  45. on the Internet and other interactive communications media. I appreciate
  46. the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of CDT in support
  47. of the need for strong, comprehensive federal legislation to protect the
  48. confidentiality of medical records. <BR>
  49. <BR>
  50. One of CDT's primary goals is the passage of federal legislation that establishes
  51. strong, enforceable privacy protection for personally identifiable health
  52. information. We believe that comprehensive legislation that protects the
  53. privacy of health information is critical. The public will not have trust
  54. and confidence in the emerging health information infrastructure if their
  55. sensitive health data is vulnerable to abuse and misuse. We commend the
  56. efforts of Chairman Horn and Representative Gary A. Condit for their leadership
  57. towards enacting legislation to protect the privacy of health information.<BR>
  58. <BR>
  59. Presently, there is no comprehensive federal law that protects peoples'
  60. health records. However, a Louis Harris survey found that most people in
  61. this country mistakenly believe their personal health information is currently
  62. protected by law. And most people mistakenly believe they have a right to
  63. access their own medical information. In fact, only 28 states allow patients
  64. access to their own medical records and only 34 states have confidentiality
  65. laws. Federal privacy policy is urgently needed to address the increasing
  66. demands for health information by those outside the traditional doctor-patient
  67. relationship. Information demands of insurance companies, managed health
  68. care companies, researchers, employers and law enforcement are eroding the
  69. doctor-patient confidentiality that is central to health care. CDT believes
  70. Congress must act to protect the privacy of personally identifiable health
  71. information so that our laws will finally conform, to some extent, with
  72. the American public's perception and expectation that their sensitive medical
  73. records are confidential.<BR>
  74. <BR>
  75. Technological innovations that allow medical records, data and images to
  76. be transferred easily over great distances, impacts our country in significant
  77. ways. The development of a national information infrastructure and information
  78. superhighway are changing the ways that we deal with each other. Traditional
  79. barriers of distance, time and location are disappearing as information
  80. and transactions become computerized -- few relationships in the health
  81. care field will remain unaffected by these changes. In the absence of any
  82. Congressional action, the collection and use of personally identifiable
  83. health information will continue to occur within electronic, networked environments
  84. without privacy protections.<BR>
  85. <BR>
  86. But while this information revolution may hold great promise for enhancing
  87. our nation's health, CDT and others believe that personal health information,
  88. in both paper and electronic form, must be protected by strong, enforceable
  89. privacy rules. Even useful technologies pose potential risks to privacy,
  90. where an individual's need to keep information confidential is forced to
  91. take a back seat in the drive to lower costs, increase efficiency and facilitate
  92. health research through automation. <BR>
  93. <BR>
  94. Last Congress, this Subcommittee held hearings on the Fair Health Information
  95. Practices Act, sponsored by Representative Condit, and co-sponsored by Chairman
  96. Horn, Representative Craig Thomas, and others. The bill, H.R. 435, was approved
  97. by the full Government Operations Committee as part of its ongoing consideration
  98. of health care reform.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_1">1</A></SUP> Testifying in support
  99. of H.R. 435 last Congress were industry representatives, privacy and consumer
  100. advocates and health policy specialists, including: Rep. Nydia Velazquez
  101. (D-NY); Nan Hunter, Department of Health and Human Services; Dr. Alan Westin,
  102. Columbia University; John Baker, Equifax, Inc.; Dr. Donald Lewers, American
  103. Medical Association; Fredric Entin, American Hospital Association; Joel
  104. E. Gimpel, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, representing the Workgroup
  105. on Electronic Data Interchange; Kathleen Frawley, American Health Information
  106. Management Association; Dr. Richard Barker, IBM Corporation; Dr. Martin
  107. Sepulveda, IBM Corporation; Robert S. Bolan, Medic Alert Foundation International;
  108. and Professor Paul Schwartz, University of Arkansas Law School. In January,
  109. 1995, Representative Condit reintroduced H.R. 435. Representative Jim McDermott
  110. (D-WA) recently introduced H.R. 3482, also aimed at protecting personal
  111. health information. Our testimony today outlines the need and demand for
  112. federal privacy protection, and key principles that should be embodied in
  113. any comprehensive legislation protecting health privacy.<A NAME="need"></A>
  114. <P><CENTER><HR WIDTH="50%"></CENTER>
  115. <H3><A NAME="consensus"></A>II. The Need and Demand for Federal Privacy
  116. Protection</H3>
  117. <STRONG>A. Consensus Exists</STRONG><BR>
  118. <BR>
  119. A consensus exists that federal legislation is needed to protect the privacy
  120. of personal health care records. In 1993, a conference in Washington, D.C.
  121. was co-sponsored by the U.S. Office of Consumer Affairs, the American Health
  122. Information Management Association, and Equifax. Panelists from the American
  123. Medical Association, CIGNA Health Care, the U.S. Public Interest Research
  124. Group, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and IBM urged policymakers
  125. to address the issue of health information privacy.<BR>
  126. <BR>
  127. At the conference, Louis Harris and Associations released their Health Information
  128. Privacy Survey, prepared with the assistance of Dr. Alan Westin, a privacy
  129. expert at Columbia University. The survey found that the majority of the
  130. public (56%) favored the enactment of strong comprehensive federal legislation
  131. governing the privacy of health care information. In fact, eighty-five percent
  132. (85%) said that protecting the confidentiality of medical records was absolutely
  133. essential or very important to them. Most people wanted penalties imposed
  134. for unauthorized disclosure of medical records (96%), guaranteed access
  135. to their own health records (96%) and rules regulating third-party access.
  136. <BR>
  137. <BR>
  138. Buttressing these findings, another 1992 Harris survey revealed that nearly
  139. ninety percent (90%) of the public believed computers make it easier for
  140. someone to improperly obtain confidential personal information. Twenty-five
  141. percent (25%) of the public believed they had been a victim of an improper
  142. disclosure of personal medical information.<BR>
  143. <BR>
  144. A number of studies have determined that a federal law is needed to protect
  145. peoples' medical records. Georgetown University Law Professor Larry Gostin
  146. concluded that a federal preemptive statute based on fair information practices
  147. was necessary to protect personal privacy as networked health information
  148. databases continued to grow.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_2">2</A></SUP> In 1994,
  149. the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) issued a report entitled Protecting
  150. Privacy in Computerized Medical Information, which addressed the consequences
  151. of computerizing medical records on individual privacy. In recommending
  152. comprehensive federal legislation, OTA found that:<BR>
  153. <BLOCKQUOTE>[t]he expanded use of medical records for non-treatment purposes
  154. exacerbates the shortcomings of existing legal schemes to protect privacy
  155. in patient information. The law must address the increase in the flow of
  156. data outward from the medical care relationship by both addressing the questions
  157. of appropriate access to data and providing redress to those who have been
  158. wronged by privacy violations. Lack of such guidelines, and failure to make
  159. them enforceable, could affect the quality and integrity of the medical
  160. record itself.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_3">3</A> </SUP></BLOCKQUOTE>
  161. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy of Science released
  162. a study that focused on the risks and opportunities associated with protecting
  163. the privacy and confidentiality of personally identifiably health data.
  164. The IOM report recommended that Congress enact legislation to preempt state
  165. laws to establish a uniform requirement for the confidentiality and protection
  166. of privacy rights for personally identifiable health data. It also suggested
  167. that Congress create a Code of Fair Health Information Practices to ensure
  168. the proper balance between required disclosures, use of data, and patient
  169. privacy.<BR>
  170. <BR>
  171. Currently, the National Research Council (NRC) is preparing a report on
  172. health care organizational applications of privacy and security by analyzing
  173. the distribution and flow of health care information among patients, providers,
  174. and third-party institutions. The NRC plans to issue its report on organizational
  175. practices that support the security and confidentiality of electronic health
  176. care information by the end of 1996. <BR>
  177. <A NAME="misuse"></A>
  178. <P><CENTER><HR WIDTH="50%"></CENTER>
  179. <P><STRONG>B. Misuse of Personal Health Information </STRONG><BR>
  180. <BR>
  181. The unauthorized disclosure of personal health information can have disastrous
  182. consequences (see attached news stories and editorials). New York Congresswoman
  183. Nydia Velazquez won her House seat only after overcoming the results of
  184. an unauthorized disclosure. Her confidential medical records -- including
  185. details of a bout with depression and a suicide attempt -- were faxed to
  186. a New York newspaper and television stations during her campaign. In another
  187. instance, a journalist disguised himself as a doctor, obtained the medical
  188. record of an actress, and published that she had been treated for a sexually
  189. transmitted disease.<BR>
  190. <BR>
  191. More common, and in some ways more troubling than the well-publicized privacy
  192. invasions of public figures, are the consequences suffered by ordinary individuals
  193. whose privacy has been compromised by the disclosure of medical information.
  194. For instance, federal auditors demanded the names of patients seeking confidential
  195. AIDS treatment at a Boston clinic. Once the auditors obtained the names,
  196. they disclosed the information to other agencies.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_4">4</A></SUP>
  197. The Harvard Community Health Plan, a Boston H.M.O., admitted to routinely
  198. entering detailed notes of psychotherapy sessions into its computer records,
  199. which were then accessible by all clinical employees.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_5">5</A></SUP>
  200. In Maryland, eight Medicaid clerks were prosecuted for selling computerized
  201. record printouts of recipients' financial resources and dependents to sales
  202. representatives of managed care companies.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_6">6</A></SUP>
  203. Even more common are the practices of some H.M.Os of sending letters to
  204. employers detailing the health problems of their employees. Surprised individuals
  205. have also discovered that personal problems they discussed with employee
  206. assistance program counselors became common knowledge among their co-workers.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_7">7</A></SUP>
  207. There are a number of other well-documented instances of breaches of health
  208. privacy.<SUP><A HREF="#foot_8">8</A></SUP> Undoubtedly, there are millions
  209. of similar breaches that occur either without the knowledge of the individuals
  210. harmed or outside of the media's spotlight.<BR>
  211. <BR>
  212. The need for comprehensive federal legislation becomes more imperative as
  213. the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ruled that an employer's
  214. right to access their employee's health records outweighed the employee's
  215. right to privacy in their health information. In Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
  216. Transportation Authority,<SUP><A HREF="#foot_9">9</A></SUP> the court overturned
  217. a $125,000 jury's award to an employee who was taking the antiviral drug
  218. AZT and whose infection with HIV became known to co-workers due to a breach
  219. in confidentiality of the employer's prescription drug benefits plan. While
  220. the Court agreed that employees have a constitutional privacy right in their
  221. prescription drug plan records, it found the right was limited by their
  222. employer's interest in monitoring such plans to determine fraud, drug abuse
  223. and excessive costs. The majority's decision rested on the fact that this
  224. employee suffered no adverse employment action, such as harassment or demotion,
  225. as a result of the unauthorized disclosure. Dissenting in the decision,
  226. Judge Lewis stated, &quot;I hope I am wrong, but I predict that the court's
  227. decision in this case will make it easier in the future for employers to
  228. disclose their employees' private medical information, obtained during an
  229. audit of the company's health benefit plan, and to escape constitutional
  230. liability for harassment or other harms suffered by their employees as a
  231. result of that disclosure.&quot;<SUP><A HREF="#foot_10">10</A></SUP> <BR>
  232. <BR>
  233. Errors found in medical records have also been difficult to correct and
  234. control. For instance, Mary Rose Taylor of Springfield, Massachusetts was
  235. denied health insurance for over a year because of a computer error at the
  236. Medical Information Bureau (MIB), a database of medical information used
  237. by insurance companies. MIB reported that Ms. Taylor had an abnormal urinalysis,
  238. even though she had only taken a blood test. Ms. Taylor was forced to go
  239. to the insurance commissioner of her state to correct the error -- and it
  240. was only then that she finally received health insurance.<A NAME="consequences"></A><BR>
  241. <P><CENTER><HR WIDTH="50%"></CENTER>
  242. <P><STRONG>C. Consequences of Not Protecting Personal Health Information</STRONG><BR>
  243. <BR>
  244. Despite the public and private horror stories about breaches of privacy,
  245. many Americans trust that the information they share with their doctor is
  246. kept confidential. Indeed, the traditional doctor-patient relationship is
  247. intended to foster trust and to encourage full disclosure. However, once
  248. a patient's information is submitted to a third-party payor, or to any other
  249. entity, the ethical -- and sometimes legal -- relationship between doctor
  250. and patient evaporates, putting patient privacy at risk. In fact, in a Harris
  251. survey, 93% of those termed &quot;leaders&quot;, including hospital CEOs,
  252. health insurance CEOs, physicians, nurses and state regulators, believe
  253. that third party payors need to be governed by detailed confidentiality
  254. and privacy policies.<BR>
  255. <BR>
  256. Within our current health care system, many individuals engage in tactics
  257. to avoid potential threats to their privacy. Some people routinely ask doctors
  258. to record a false diagnosis because they fear their employer may see their
  259. health records. Some people withhold information from doctors, for fear
  260. of losing control over sensitive information. In psychiatric practices,
  261. it is common for patients to ask doctors not to take notes during sessions,
  262. fearing the danger that such records, if in the wrong hands, could ruin
  263. a job opportunity, harm their reputation, or prevent them from changing
  264. insurance companies. Numerous people take the simple -- if costly -- step
  265. of paying for medical services out-of-pocket to avoid the creation of insurance
  266. records, even though they are entitled to, and have paid for, insurance
  267. coverage.<BR>
  268. <BR>
  269. A few insurers have been candid enough to concede that their primary business
  270. relationship is with the employer and not the employee/patient. These insurers
  271. may be reluctant to disclose individually-identifiable health information
  272. if requested by an employer, but they will comply if pressed. Most patients,
  273. of course, believe the fiduciary relationship is between themselves and
  274. their doctors, and don't realize that a third party with no direct relationship
  275. to their medical treatment actually controls the information. It is intolerable
  276. to support a system in which an employer's payment of a portion of employees'
  277. health care premiums, amounts to employers' unfettered access to employee's
  278. health records.<BR>
  279. <BR>
  280. Advances in technology exacerbate the lack of uniform, federal privacy protection
  281. for identifiable health information. For example, at the state and local
  282. levels, employers, insurers, and health care providers are forming coalitions
  283. to develop automated and linked health care systems containing lifetime
  284. health histories on millions of Americans. The primary goals of these projects
  285. are cost reduction and improved quality of care. State coalitions are attempting
  286. to address the privacy, confidentiality, and security of health data by
  287. crafting internal guidelines, regulations, and contracts. In addition, in
  288. those states where the automation of health care information is seen as
  289. a key component of a state's health care reform package, state legislatures
  290. and public agencies are attempting to enact legislation that establishes
  291. a right of privacy in protected health information. These states are also
  292. attempting to design effective enforcement penalties and oversight mechanisms
  293. to monitor the information practices of these newly created health data
  294. systems.<BR>
  295. <BR>
  296. While some attempts are being made to address privacy concerns, the lack
  297. of a comprehensive policy protecting individual's privacy across all health
  298. care settings will leave individual privacy vulnerable. The outcome of this
  299. piecemeal, state-by-state approach to protecting the privacy and security
  300. of health care information will lead to conflict among the states and ultimately
  301. set back the overall goal of privacy protection. Relegating the protection
  302. of health care information to the states' different guidelines, policies
  303. and laws leaves individuals subject to differing degrees of privacy depending
  304. on where they receive their health care. In some instances, this means that
  305. individuals traveling across county or state lines to receive necessary
  306. medical treatment may lose their ability to control how their personal medical
  307. information is used. Moreover, states and local governments with different
  308. rules governing the use of health care information may be prevented from
  309. sharing health care information contained in their systems with neighboring
  310. states that insufficiently protect privacy.<BR>
  311. <BR>
  312. Health care records, in both paper and electronic form, deserve privacy
  313. protection. But the vulnerability of information to unauthorized access
  314. and use grows exponentially as the computer makes possible the instant sharing
  315. of information. As a 1992 study by the Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange
  316. (WEDI) pointed out: &quot;The paper medium is cumbersome and expensive...Ironically,
  317. it is the negative impact of the paper medium...that has minimized the risk
  318. of breaches of confidentiality. Although a breach could occur, if someone
  319. gave access to health records or insurance claim forms, the magnitude of
  320. the breach was limited by the sheer difficulty of unobtrusively reviewing
  321. large numbers of records or claim forms.&quot;<BR>
  322. <BR>
  323. Nevertheless, technology itself is not the evil. Information systems can
  324. actually be designed to promote the confidentiality and security of personal
  325. information. For instance, a well-designed computerized system can more
  326. closely guard individual privacy, than paper filing systems. The key is
  327. to recognize technology's potential to enhance privacy, not simply to focus
  328. on the risks technology poses to undermine privacy. There is widespread
  329. agreement among privacy and security experts that protections must be build
  330. in on the front-end; it is too difficult and risky to enact them only after
  331. a major privacy breach. Privacy and security must regain their own place
  332. as cornerstones of the medical relationship. Only then can we achieve the
  333. potential for enhancing privacy and security.<A NAME="principles"></A><BR>
  334. <P><CENTER><HR WIDTH="75%"></CENTER>
  335. <H3>III. Principles for a Health Privacy Policy</H3>
  336. CDT believes that the following principles for protecting personal health
  337. information must be incorporated in any health privacy bill:
  338. <UL>
  339. <LI>Individuals must have the right to see, copy, and amend their own medical
  340. records;
  341. <LI>Individuals must control the disclosure and use of their personal health
  342. information -- rules must be established requiring doctors, insurance companies,
  343. and other &quot;health information trustees&quot; to obtain individual consent
  344. prior to the use and disclosure of personal health information;
  345. <LI>Safeguards must be developed for the use and disclosure of personal
  346. health information;
  347. <LI>All those who are given access to personal health information must be
  348. bound by comprehensive rules that ensure the protection of such information;
  349. <LI>A warrant requirement for law enforcement access to peoples' health
  350. records must be created; and
  351. <LI>Strict civil penalties and criminal sanctions must be imposed for violations
  352. of the legislation, and individuals must be given a private right of action
  353. against those who mishandle their personal medical information.
  354. </UL>
  355. Without comprehensive protections such as these, the widespread electronic
  356. transmission of records in a framework of piecemeal and incomplete protections,
  357. will produce the worst of both worlds -- confusion and red tape for legitimate
  358. data users, and debilitating fear and mistrust for people seeking medical
  359. care.<A NAME="conclusion"></A><BR>
  360. <P><CENTER><HR WIDTH="50%"></CENTER>
  361. <H3>IV. Conclusion</H3>
  362. <BR>
  363. CDT believes that the protection of personally identifiable health information
  364. is critical to ensuring public trust and confidence in the emerging health
  365. information infrastructure. Health care reform cannot move forward without
  366. assuring the American public that the highly sensitive personal information
  367. contained in their medical records will be protected from abuse and misuse.
  368. As the Harris surveys indicate, people are highly suspicious of large scale
  369. computerization and believe that their health records are in dire need of
  370. privacy protection. If people are expected to embrace and participate in
  371. this rapidly changing health environment, the price of their participation
  372. must not be the loss of control of sensitive personal information.<BR>
  373. <BR>
  374. Any system that fails to win the public's trust will fail to win the public's
  375. support. We risk having individuals withdraw from the full and honest participation
  376. in their own health care because they fear losing their privacy. Congress
  377. should not allow people to fall through the cracks of the health care system
  378. because the privacy of their health information is unprotected. We urge
  379. you to move forward with legislation that adequately protects health information
  380. privacy.<A NAME="footnotes"></A><BR>
  381. <P><CENTER><HR WIDTH="50%"></CENTER>
  382. <H3>Footnotes</H3>
  383. <BR>
  384. <A NAME="foot_1"></A><SUP>1</SUP> Last Congress, both the Senate Labor and
  385. Human Resources Committee and the Senate Finance Committee approved health
  386. privacy bills similar to H.R. 435. The Senate Labor Committee held a hearing
  387. on S. 1360, the Medical Records Confidentiality Act, introduced by Senator
  388. Robert Bennett (R-UT) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and co-sponsored by then-Senator
  389. Dole, Senator Kassebaum, Senator Kennedy, Senator Frist, Senator Simon,
  390. Senator Hatch, Senator Gregg, Senator Stevens, Senator Jeffords, Senator
  391. Kohl, Senator Daschle, and Senator Feingold. The Labor Committee plans to
  392. mark-up S. 1360 in the coming months.<BR>
  393. <A NAME="foot_2"></A><SUP>2</SUP> 80 Cornell Law Review 451 (1995). <BR>
  394. <A NAME="foot_3"></A><SUP>3</SUP> OTA Report, p. 44.<BR>
  395. <A NAME="foot_4"></A><SUP>4</SUP> Matthew Brelis, AIDS Alliance says US
  396. Violated Privacy, BOSTON GLOBE, April 3, 1996, at A1, A12; Tamar Lewin,
  397. Lawsuit Seeks to Bar U.S. From Access to AIDS Files, N.Y. TIMES, April 3,
  398. 1996, at A13.<BR>
  399. <A NAME="foot_5"></A><SUP>5</SUP> Tamar Lewin, Questions of Privacy Roil
  400. Arena of Psychotherapy, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at A1, D20.<BR>
  401. <A NAME="foot_6"></A><SUP>6</SUP> John Riley, Open Secrets, NEWSDAY, March
  402. 31, 1996, at A5 - A33. <BR>
  403. <A NAME="foot_7"></A><SUP>7</SUP> Tamar Lewin, Questions of Privacy Roil
  404. Arena of Psychotherapy, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at A1, D20.<BR>
  405. <A NAME="foot_8"></A><SUP>8</SUP> Other instances of unauthorized disclosure
  406. of protected heath information include: a physician at a large New York
  407. City medical school logged onto a computer system, discovered that a nurse
  408. was pregnant, and publicized that information. A Colorado medical student
  409. sold medical records to attorneys practicing malpractice law. In Jacksonville,
  410. Florida, a 13-year old daughter of a hospital clerk went to work with her
  411. mother. Left unattended, she accessed the names of patients from her mother's
  412. computer and as a prank, called seven patients and told them they had tested
  413. positive for AIDS.<BR>
  414. <A NAME="foot_9"></A><SUP>9</SUP> Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
  415. Authority, No. 95-1559, (3d. Cir. filed December 28, 1995). <BR>
  416. <A NAME="foot_10"></A><SUP>10</SUP> Id.<BR>
  417. <BR>
  418. <HR>
  419. <P>
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  423. <BR>
  424. <BR>
  425. <FONT SIZE=-1>Posted on June 14,1996 || For more information, contact <A HREF="mailto:webmaster@cdt.org">webmaster@cdt.org</FONT></A>
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