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Partisan Polarization in the US Congress

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Mar 12th, 2016
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  1. Introduction
  2.  
  3. The trend of polarization between the political parties in Congress is, perhaps, the most pronounced development in Congress since World War II. In the last few years, political scientists have described and analyzed this trend in a fairly comprehensive way. Indeed, the causes and consequences of partisan polarization have become a cottage industry among congressional scholars. The congresses after the 1964 election and into the 1970s were some of the least polarized in modern history. According to Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE, a statistic that summarizes voting in the House and Senate, the average Democrat was about 0.50 away from the average Republican in both the House and Senate. Because the total scale is 2 points, this gap represents about 25 percent of the entire scale. The infusion of Tea Party members in the 112th Congress and the losses suffered by the Blue Dog Democrats in 2010 only exacerbated the divide between the parties. In the 112th Congress (2011–2012), the divergence between the parties had more than doubled in the House to 1.07 and increased by more than 70 percent to 0.85 in the Senate. Nothing about the politics that the parties practice today suggests that the partisan polarization is going to slow down in the near future.
  4.  
  5. Review Articles
  6.  
  7. It took political scientists a long time to get interested in questions of party polarization, but once they became interested, a broad and deep literature developed. These review articles describe this vibrant literature. While Schaffner 2011 focuses almost exclusively on institutional polarization, Hetherington 2009 adds polarization within the electorate to the author’s analysis. Theriault and Moeller 2013 shows how the 2012 elections affected polarization in both arenas.
  8.  
  9. Hetherington, Mark J. “Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (2009): 413–448.
  10. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123408000501Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  11. Most scholars agree that polarization at the elite level not only exists, but is growing. There is more dispute about polarization in the mass electorate. Hetherington shows that the overall ideological mood of the American electorate has not appreciably changed, though the electorate has ideologically sorted itself.
  12. Find this resource:
  13. Schaffner, Brian F. “Party Polarization.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress. Edited by Eric Schickler and Frances Lee, 527–549. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  14. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  15. The author documents the growing divide between the parties and describes the literature that developed around this divide. He also analyzes the consequences of this polarization, though he argues that political scientists can do much more work on this dimension.
  16. Find this resource:
  17. Theriault, Sean M., and Megan M. Moeller. “The Effect of the 2012 Elections on Party Polarization.” In The American Elections of 2012. Edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier, 122–144. New York: Routledge, 2013.
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  19. The authors show the consequences on party polarization as a result of the 2012 elections. They argue that the parties and the voters supporting them have not only ideologically polarized, but also racially polarized. Nothing in the results of the 2012 election suggests that polarization will decrease in the near future.
  20. Find this resource:
  21. Historical Roots
  22.  
  23. An understanding of party dynamics in Congress during the 20th century helps illuminate the state of the polarized Congress today. As described in Bolles 1951 and Roger 1998, after Speaker Cannon was overthrown in 1910, the ideological differences between the parties began to fade. By the mid-20th century, the Democratic and Republican parties were as ideologically similar as they had ever been. Their similarities did not go unnoticed. The American Political Science Association 1950 is a report that criticizes the lack of an ideological distinction between the parties; Turner 1951 and Ranney 1951 offer contemporary criticisms of the report. Pomper 1971 and Sinclair 2002 assess the report and its suggestions in a historical context.
  24.  
  25. American Political Science Association. “The Need for Greater Party Responsibility.” American Political Science Review 44 (1950): 15–36.
  26. DOI: 10.2307/1950999Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  27. This report published by the professional organization for political scientists argues that the ideological similarities between the parties hurt their abilities to be democratic, responsible, and effective. It outlines steps and reforms that the parties should take.
  28. Find this resource:
  29. Bolles, Blair. Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon’s Experiment with Personal Power. New York: Norton, 1951.
  30. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  31. A biography of Speaker Joe Cannon.
  32. Find this resource:
  33. Pomper, Gerald M. “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System? What, Again?” Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 916–940.
  34. DOI: 10.2307/2128416Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  35. Examines the development of the parties in the twenty years after the APSA report.
  36. Find this resource:
  37. Ranney, Austin. “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary.” American Political Science Review 45 (1951): 488–499.
  38. DOI: 10.2307/1951475Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  39. Criticizes the report because the reforms suggested would hurt minority rights.
  40. Find this resource:
  41. Roger, Scott William. “Uncle Joe Cannon: The Brakeman of the House of Representatives, 1903–1911.” In Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership over Two Centuries. Edited by Raymond W. Smock and Susan W. Hammond, 33–62. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998.
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  43. A chapter in an edited volume that focuses on Speaker Cannon and the effect he had on the House of Representatives.
  44. Find this resource:
  45. Sinclair, Barbara. “The Dream Fulfilled? Party Development in Congress, 1950–2000.” In Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution of American Political Parties since 1950. Edited by John C. Green and Paul S. Herrnson, 121–140. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
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  47. In this chapter, Sinclair looks back at the reforms suggested by the APSA report and assesses how the reforms have been implemented and their consequences.
  48. Find this resource:
  49. Turner, Julius. “Responsible Parties: A Dissent from the Floor.” American Political Science Review 45 (1951): 143–152.
  50. DOI: 10.2307/1950888Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  51. Criticizes the report because responsible parties would ultimately lead to less competitive local elections as regional candidates could not tailor their message to the electorate.
  52. Find this resource:
  53. An Unpolarized Congress
  54.  
  55. The Congress that the American Political Science Association 1950 (cited under Historical Roots) criticized has come to be known as what Shepsle 1989 calls “The Textbook Congress.” In it, members were, first, members of the chamber to which they were elected and, second, members of political parties, as described in Matthews 1960 and Asher 1973. While White 1956 praises this virtue of the Textbook Congress, Broder 1971 and Fiorina 1980 are more skeptical.
  56.  
  57. Asher, Herbert B. “The Learning of Legislative Norms.” American Political Science Review 67 (1973): 499–513.
  58. DOI: 10.2307/1958780Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  59. Describes the House during the Textbook Congress and the norms that operated in the House.
  60. Find this resource:
  61. Broder, David S. The Party’s Over: The Failure of Politics in America. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
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  63. Outlines the problem with having parties that ideologically overlap.
  64. Find this resource:
  65. Fiorina, Morris P. “The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics.” Daedalus 109 (1980): 25–46.
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  67. Describes the political parties during the 1980s and outlines some of the problems that continued to persist long after the 1950 report issued by the American Political Science Association.
  68. Find this resource:
  69. Matthews, Donald R. U.S. Senators and Their World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960.
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  71. Describes how the Senate operated in the Textbook Congress and the folkways that the senators operated under.
  72. Find this resource:
  73. Shepsle, Kenneth A. “The Changing Textbook Congress.” In Can the Government Govern? Edited by John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 355–368. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989.
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  75. Describes what the Textbook Congress looked like and why it changed.
  76. Find this resource:
  77. White, William S. Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate. New York: Harper, 1956.
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  79. A flattering look at how the Senate operated in the Textbook Congress.
  80. Find this resource:
  81. Measuring
  82.  
  83. The authors of Poole and Rosenthal 1984 first wrote about what would become the topic of party polarization in the modern Congress. The development of their DW-NOMINATE scores in Poole and Rosenthal 1997 helped compare members’ voting scores (and, hence, polarization) in one congress with their scores in another congress. Cox and Poole 2002, Fleisher and Bond 2004, Theriault 2006, and Theriault 2008, using different time periods and slightly different data, continue to assess the degree of polarization between the parties in Congress. Their conclusions are similar: the parties in Congress are diverging. These conclusions hold even when Bayesian estimation is used to summarize roll call voting. Clinton, et al. 2004 developed a Bayesian technique to make comparisons of voting scores. This technique, called IDEAL, generates observationally similar scores to those of DW-NOMINATE, according to Carroll, et al. 2009 and McCarty 2011.
  84.  
  85. Carroll, Royce, Jeffrey Lewis, James Lo, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. “Comparing NOMINATE and IDEAL: Points of Difference and Monte Carlo Tests.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34 (2009): 555–591.
  86. DOI: 10.3162/036298009789869727Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  87. The authors use Monte Carlo experiments to analyze the differences in observed estimates between the NOMINATE procedure and the IDEAL procedure. Some of these differences stem from the assumptions of each model while others stem from random issues in implementation. They conclude that neither the NOMINATE or IDEAL model has clear advantages over the other.
  88. Find this resource:
  89. Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data.” American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 355–370.
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  91. Develops a Bayesian procedure called IDEAL to estimate spatial models of roll call voting. This new procedure allows scholars to incorporate relevant auxiliary information regarding roll call votes into their analyses.
  92. Find this resource:
  93. Cox, Gary W., and Keith T. Poole. “On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877–1999.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (2002): 477–489.
  94. DOI: 10.2307/3088393Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  95. The authors find that polarization is greatest on procedural votes and votes organizing the House. They find strong evidence for the pull of political parties.
  96. Find this resource:
  97. Fleisher, Richard, and Jon R. Bond. “The Shrinking Middle in Congress.” British Journal of Politics 34 (2004): 429–451.
  98. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123404000122Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  99. Demonstrates that fewer and fewer members are cross-pressured between their constituents and their parties, which helps explain why the middle has shrunk.
  100. Find this resource:
  101. McCarty, Nolan. “Measuring Legislative Preferences.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress. Edited by Eric Schickler and Frances Lee, 66–94. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  102. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  103. Finds that Bayesian estimation techniques generate similar ideal point estimates to those using maximum-likelihood estimation. Polarization is therefore increasing according to either estimation technique.
  104. Find this resource:
  105. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “The Polarization of American Politics” Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 1061–1079.
  106. DOI: 10.2307/2131242Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  107. Finds that senators from the same state and same party tend to have very similar voting records, whereas senators from the same state and different parties have records that are increasingly different.
  108. Find this resource:
  109. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
  110. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  111. A comprehensive study of voting in Congress. The authors show how the parties have become more polarized in more recent times.
  112. Find this resource:
  113. Theriault, Sean M. “Party Polarization in the U.S. Congress: Member Replacement and Member Adaptation.” Party Politics 12 (2006): 483–503.
  114. DOI: 10.1177/1354068806064730Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  115. Conducts a seat-by-seat congress-by-congress analysis to determine that most of the polarization comes about as a consequence of replacement, though more polarization results from adaptation than previously thought.
  116. Find this resource:
  117. Theriault, Sean M. Party Polarization in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
  118. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511790652Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  119. Examines a variety of voting summary scores in assessing the current state and historical trends in party polarization.
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  121. Asymmetric Polarization
  122.  
  123. While the first wave of party polarization studies did not explicitly differentiate between the Democrats’ march to the left and the Republicans’ march to the right, a newer variant explicitly considers the asymmetry with which the political parties have migrated to their ideological poles. Specifically, as Owens 2012 notes, the Republican Party has moved further to the right than the Democratic Party has moved left. Hacker and Pierson 2005 examines the asymmetry on a couple of key issues. Mann and Ornstein 2012 shows how it is pervasive throughout the entire process. Theriault 2013 adds a more quantitative look by focusing on the US Senate.
  124.  
  125. Hacker, Jacob, and Paul Pierson. Off-Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
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  127. The authors show that the American electorate was no more conservative in 2000 than it was in 1972 and yet American economic policy was substantially more conservative. They argue that this change in policy was driven by the conservative right—both inside Congress and activists in interest groups. In the process, the ideological middle has been abandoned.
  128. Find this resource:
  129. Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York: Basic Books, 2012.
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  131. The authors suggest that journalists and political scientists are being fair to a fault. While most pundits try to indict both parties for moving to the ideological extremes, the authors argue that the Republicans have moved much further to the right than the Democrats have moved to the left. Even more corrosive to the functioning in Congress, the authors document, the Republicans have invented new legislative tactics that have all but cemented gridlock into place.
  132. Find this resource:
  133. Owens, John E. “The Onward March of (Asymmetric) Polarization in the Contemporary Congress.” In Issues in American Politics: Polarized Politics in the Age of Obama. Edited by John Dumbrell, 98–121. London: Routledge, 2012.
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  135. Conducts an overview of the electoral and institutional causes and consequences of asymmetric polarization in Congress, noting that the Republican Party has moved further to the right than the Democratic Party has moved left. The author concludes that policy outcomes have become much more volatile as a result of polarization, and now the winning-ness of policy positions greatly depends on which party controls the chamber.
  136. Find this resource:
  137. Theriault, Sean M. The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  138. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199307456.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  139. According to the analysis in this book, the Democrats and the “Other Republicans” in the Senate act and vote pretty much the same as they always have. Those former House members who came to the Senate (and started their congressional careers after 1978) are at the root of party polarization and partisan warfare that currently grips the Senate.
  140. Find this resource:
  141. Causes of Polarization
  142.  
  143. The causes of party polarization are broadly (and roughly) broken up into two categories: changes in the electorate and changes in congressional procedures. The electorate’s changes can again be broken up into a number of subcategories: districting, sorting, and psychology.
  144.  
  145. Districting-Based Explanations
  146.  
  147. The favorite explanation for party polarization among reporters and political pundits is redistricting. While Carson, et al. 2007 and Hirsch 2003 find systematic evidence, McCarty, et al. 2009 finds less evidence. Furthermore, Abramowitz, et al. 2006a and Abramowitz, et al. 2006b find that redistricting also cannot be the explanation for less competitive elections. A slightly different tact in the districting explanation is that the primary electorate in the districts is more ideological and, hence, according to Brady, et al. 2007, produces more ideological choices for the general election. Evidence regarding the role of primary elections in polarization is mixed, however, as Hirano, et al. 2010 finds that primary elections do not contribute to polarization in Congress.
  148.  
  149. Abramowitz, Alan, Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. “Don’t Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections.” PS: Political Science and Politics 39 (2006a): 87–90.
  150. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  151. Argues that redistricting is the scapegoat for uncompetitive elections. Much bigger changes happen in between redistricting cycles.
  152. Find this resource:
  153. Abramowitz, Alan, Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. “Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections.” Journal of Politics 68 (2006b): 75–88.
  154. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  155. Argues that redistricting does not cause less competitive elections; party polarization and the incumbency advantage does.
  156. Find this resource:
  157. Brady, David W., Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope. “Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32 (2007): 79–105.
  158. DOI: 10.3162/036298007X201994Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  159. The authors find that congressional candidates more often than not position themselves closer to the median voter of the primary electorate than the median voter of the general election electorate, which pulls candidates and, presumably, members further toward the ideological poles.
  160. Find this resource:
  161. Carson, Jamie, Charles Finocchiaro, and David Rohde. “Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives” American Politics Research 35 (2007): 878–904.
  162. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X07304263Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  163. Through a complex mapping of districts across time, the authors find that largely reworked districts elect the most polarizing members.
  164. Find this resource:
  165. Hirano, Shigeo, James M. Snyder Jr., Stephen Ansolabehere, and John Mark Hansen. “Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 5 (2010): 169–191.
  166. DOI: 10.1561/100.00008052Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  167. The authors examine the relationship between roll call voting and three variables: (1) the introduction of primary elections; (2) the polarization of the primary electorates; (3) the threat of primary competition. Their analysis of primary elections and roll call votes through 2006 finds little evidence that primary elections contribute to polarization in congressional roll call voting.
  168. Find this resource:
  169. Hirsch, Sam. “The United States of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting.” Election Law Journal 2 (2003): 179–216.
  170. DOI: 10.1089/153312903321578188Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  171. Argues that redistricting is making what should be the most democratic institution, undemocratic.
  172. Find this resource:
  173. McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (2009): 666–680.
  174. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00393.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  175. Find that redistricting causes very little of polarization. The overwhelming trend is that a Democrat would represent the same district exceedingly different from a Republican.
  176. Find this resource:
  177. Sorting
  178.  
  179. The sorting-based explanations for party polarization have two root causes. First, as argued in Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Brewer, et al. 2002; Goren 2005; Levendusky 2009; and Fiorina 2010, an ideological sorting has taken place so that ideological voters have gravitated to their natural political home. This explanation has focused primarily on conservative Democrats who have become Republicans. Second, as argued in Bishop 2008 and Oppenheimer 2005, residents have sorted themselves geographically so that Democrats, for a whole host of reasons, live by more Democrats and Republicans live by more Republicans. Jacobson 2012 argues that sorting alone can cause polarization in the electorate, even if partisans do not adopt ideologically extreme policy positions.
  180.  
  181. Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. “Ideological Realignment in the American Electorate.” Journal of Politics 60 (August 1998): 634–652.
  182. DOI: 10.2307/2647642Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  183. The ideological divergence of the parties at the elite level provided the electorate with a clearer choice between the parties. As a result, citizens became better able to choose a party identification consistent with their ideological preferences. The authors contend that ideology has become a stronger predictor of party identification as polarization has increased.
  184. Find this resource:
  185. Bishop, Bill. The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008.
  186. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  187. A book-length argument exploring the political consequences of geographic-based sorting.
  188. Find this resource:
  189. Brewer, Mark D., Mack D. Mariani, and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. “Northern Democrats and Party Polarization in the U.S. House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (2002): 423–444.
  190. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  191. Argues that the change that is occurring is not only in the South, but also the North.
  192. Find this resource:
  193. Fiorina, Morris P. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Longman, 2010.
  194. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  195. A more extensive look at the polarization in the electorate. The book contains a nice explanation of the consequences of ideological sorting on how scholars evaluate the electorate.
  196. Find this resource:
  197. Goren, Paul. “Party Identification and Core Political Values.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (2005): 882–897.
  198. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  199. Compares relative influences in the electorate of party identification and political values that are core elements in the political belief systems. Finds that partisan identification is more stable than political values. Party identification constrains political values; these political values do not influence partisan identities.
  200. Find this resource:
  201. Jacobson, Gary C. “The Electoral Origins of Polarized Politics: Evidence from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.” American Behavioral Scientist 56 (2012): 1612–1630.
  202. DOI: 10.1177/0002764212463352Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  203. Ideological polarization is not confined to political elites. Rather, polarization has occurred in the electorate to the extent that people are active in politics. Jacobson concludes that partisan sorting alone can polarize the electorate, even if sorted partisans do not hold extreme preferences on individual issues.
  204. Find this resource:
  205. Levendusky, Matthew. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
  206. DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226473673.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  207. The author examines not only how the American electorate has sorted, but also the ramifications of this sorting on public policy.
  208. Find this resource:
  209. Oppenheimer, Bruce I. “Deep Red and Blue Congressional Districts.” In Congress Reconsidered. 8th ed. Edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 135–157. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005.
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  211. A thoughtful examination of how constituencies have become more ideological above and beyond redistricting.
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  213. Psychological
  214.  
  215. A newer strain of the electorate-based explanations argues that Democrats and Republicans just think differently about politics. It is this different thinking, according to Hetherington and Weiler 2009 and Barker and Carman 2012 that has driven the parties apart.
  216.  
  217. Barker, David C., and Christopher Jan Carman. Representing Red and Blue: How the Culture Wars Change the Way Citizens Speak and Politicians Listen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
  218. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796564.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  219. The authors find that Democratic voters prefer to elect delegates, while Republican voters prefer to elect trustees. These fundamental preferences trickle up so that members in their respective parties offer a very different style of representation.
  220. Find this resource:
  221. Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
  222. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511802331Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  223. Argues that the polarization in politics is tied to how Americans are predisposed to authoritarian thinking.
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  225. Institutional Causes
  226.  
  227. Scholars have found that the electorate, alone, cannot entirely explain the party polarization in Congress. In addition to changes that have occurred in the electorate, changes have also occurred inside Congress itself that have increased the divide between the parties. Some of these changes are specific to the Republican Party. Harris 2006 shows how the Republican Party made explicit decisions to become a more ideological and confrontational party. Theriault 2013, using these arguments and data (as well as data from Highton and Rocca 2005), shows that this explicit strategy was used to a great degree in the Senate as well as the House. Other institutional explanations are not specific to either party. Smith 1989; Roberts and Smith 2003; Jenkins, et al. 2005; and Theriault 2008 find that the differentiation between substantive floor votes and floor machinations accounts for much of the polarization between the parties.
  228.  
  229. Harris, Douglas B. “Legislative Parties and Leadership Choice: Confrontation or Accommodation in the 1989 Gingrich-Madigan Whip Race.” American Politics Research 34 (2006): 189–222.
  230. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X05284408Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  231. Uncovers the secret voting that took place in the Gingrich-Madigan race, which was not only about ideology, but also confrontational politics.
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  233. Highton, Benjamin, and Michael S. Rocca. “Beyond the Roll-Call Arena: The Determinants of Position Taking in Congress.” Political Research Quarterly 58 (2005): 303–316.
  234. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  235. Examines non-roll-call-based measures to assess member behavior on the House floor.
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  237. Jenkins, Jeffery A., Michael H. Crespin, and Jamie L. Carson. “Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: An Examination of Differing Career Tracks.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 30 (2005): 365–390.
  238. DOI: 10.3162/036298005X201590Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  239. Finds that the influence of the party is most felt on procedural votes and in the majority party.
  240. Find this resource:
  241. Roberts, Jason M., and Steven S. Smith. “Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (2003): 305–317.
  242. DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00021Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  243. Argues that reforms that the House made in the early 1970s had a measured consequence on party voting, especially on procedural matters.
  244. Find this resource:
  245. Smith, Steven S. Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989.
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  247. An early look at how the legislative process changed in the 1970s and 1980s. Although the book is not focused on party polarization, it gives evidence that the other procedural-based explanations use in validating their arguments.
  248. Find this resource:
  249. Theriault, Sean M. Party Polarization in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
  250. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511790652Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  251. Argues that procedures cause the lion’s share of party polarization in both the House and the Senate. Procedural votes have become more frequent and are much more polarizing than past eras in congressional history.
  252. Find this resource:
  253. Theriault, Sean M. The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  254. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199307456.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  255. Maintains that the transformation of the Republican Conference in the House not only transformed the House, but the Senate as well because so many Republican former House members became senators and brought their House strategies with them.
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  257. Relationship to Unorthodox Lawmaking
  258.  
  259. Heightened ideological homogeneity within parties and increased ideological heterogeneity between parties, according to Rohde 1991, led the House to enact reforms in the 1970s that shifted power to party leaders. Sinclair 1997 argues that these reforms empowered party leaders to push ideological legislation in new ways. Using restrictive rules, for example, the majority leadership could exercise great control over legislation. Cooper and Brady 1981 concludes that power is also likely to be concentrated in leadership when party strength is high. As the parties continued to polarize, Brady, et al. 2008 argues, the majority’s incentive to use unorthodox tactics grew. By the early 1990s, Mann and Ornstein 2006 documents that the minority party had become largely excluded from the legislative process as a result of rules and procedures that further favored the majority party. The Republicans’ experience as the marginalized minority led them to impose additional reforms, as shown in Sinclair 2006, once they returned to power that further altered the legislative process and rewarded ideological behavior. Oleszek 2008 attributes many aspects of unorthodox lawmaking to ideological polarization between the parties; however, unorthodox lawmaking itself has also perpetuated polarization.
  260.  
  261. Brady, David, John Ferejohn, and Laurel Harbridge. “Polarization and Public Policy: A General Assessment.” In Red and Blue Nation? Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 185–233. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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  263. Tests the relationship between polarization and restrictive rules. The authors find that as polarization increases, the probability of open rules declines and the probabilities of the various forms of restrictive rules increases in general.
  264. Find this resource:
  265. Cooper, Joseph, and David Brady. “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn.” American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 441–425.
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  267. Concludes that the style and power of the House leadership is determined by the institutional context. When party strength is high, power is likely to be concentrated in the leadership. When party strength is low, power is more dispersed and leaders are more likely to engage in bargaining.
  268. Find this resource:
  269. Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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  271. Outlines the decline of deliberation in Congress as polarization and partisanship have become increasingly prominent features of the policy process.
  272. Find this resource:
  273. Oleszek, Walter. Whither the Role of Conference Committees: An Analysis. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008.
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  275. Notes that formal conference committees have become less common. Partisan polarization contributes to their decline.
  276. Find this resource:
  277. Rohde, David. Parties and Leaders in the Post-reform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
  278. DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226724058.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  279. Introduces theory of conditional party government. Describes the impact of legislative reforms of the 1970s and the resurgence of parties in the House of Representatives.
  280. Find this resource:
  281. Sinclair, Barbara. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997.
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  283. Describes the more varied and complex aspects of the legislative process in the House and Senate that have now become the norm.
  284. Find this resource:
  285. Sinclair, Barbara. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.
  286. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  287. Comprehensive explanation of how party polarization came about in Congress and examination of its effects on the legislative process.
  288. Find this resource:
  289. Partisan Warfare
  290.  
  291. Although the polarization of parties in Congress has certainly resulted in heightened ideological conflict between the parties, Mann and Ornstein 2006 argues that it has also fueled bitter partisan hostility. Sinclair 2006, Eilperin 2006, and Grimmer and King 2011 show how deliberation and compromise in Congress have declined, instances of partisan taunting have multiplied, and aspects of the legislative process have become as much a forum for partisan debates as for policy debates. Jessee and Theriault 2012 shows that, owing in part to the shared electoral risk of members within parties, the relative influence of the party institutions on member behavior has grown since the late 20th century. Conflicts rooted in competition for agenda control, attacks on a party’s integrity or competence, and presidential leadership have led members to engage in partisan warfare over their competing political interests, as Lee 2009 demonstrates. While the House has more often been a venue for partisan hostility, this type of partisan warfare in the Senate is quickly growing. Smith 2010 shows that once the Senate went down this path, it has gotten stuck in fighting procedural wars. Theriault 2013 argues that the wars have been increasingly initiated by a certain type of senator—those Republican senators who have formerly served in the House.
  292.  
  293. Eilperin, Juliet. Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship Is Poisoning the House of Representatives. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute, 2006.
  294. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  295. Contends that lawmakers’ use of strategic tactics and manipulation has taken the place of compromise in the House of Representatives.
  296. Find this resource:
  297. Grimmer, Justin, and Gary King. “General Purpose Computer-Assisted Clustering and Conceptualization.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (February 2011): 2643–2650.
  298. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1018067108Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  299. Using new techniques in computer-assisted clustering, the authors analyze the content of senatorial press releases. Their analysis reveals that members are spending a lot of time engaging in what they call “partisan taunting”—explicit, public, and negative attacks on another political party or its members.
  300. Find this resource:
  301. Jessee, Stephen, and Sean Theriault. “The Two Faces of Congressional Roll-Call Voting.” Party Politics 18 (October 2012): 1–20.
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  303. As party polarization has increased, so has the relative influence of party, compared to that of constituency, on members’ procedural roll-call votes. Suggests that partisan conflict has changed members’ relevant considerations for certain kinds of roll-call votes.
  304. Find this resource:
  305. Lee, Frances. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
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  307. Shows that party conflict in Congress extends beyond ideological disagreements. Members of congressional parties share electoral risk and so engage in partisan warfare over their competing political interests. Sources of party conflict include agenda control, attacks on the integrity or competence of a party, and presidential leadership.
  308. Find this resource:
  309. Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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  311. The authors contend that Republicans’ use of restrictive rules as a result of polarization has led to a decline in deliberation and an excessively rancorous and partisan atmosphere in the House.
  312. Find this resource:
  313. Sinclair, Barbara. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.
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  315. The exclusion of the minority party from the legislative process has fueled partisan hostility, Sinclair argues, even regarding topics that otherwise might be terrain for compromise. Committee hearings have become increasingly a forum for partisan debates.
  316. Find this resource:
  317. Smith, Steven S. “The Senate Syndrome.” Issues in Governance Studies 35 (2010): 1–30.
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  319. Shows how once the senators chose to break up their collegial relationship, the propensity is much greater to escalate rather than diffuse the partisan conflict.
  320. Find this resource:
  321. Theriault, Sean. The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  322. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199307456.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  323. Argues that Senate Republicans who have previously served in the House have not only made the Senate more ideological, but also more partisan. Their behavior has especially exacerbated partisan warfare in roll-call voting and negotiations, even compared to the behavior of other Republican senators.
  324. Find this resource:
  325. Policy Consequences
  326.  
  327. One of the most notable policy consequences of party polarization in Congress is that as the ideological differences between parties continue to expand, members of both parties will be less willing to maintain coalitions necessary to pass legislation. The result is legislative “gridlock,” according to Binder 2003, such that as polarization grows, legislative output from Congress declines, as McCarty 2007 and Jones 2001 demonstrate. Hacker and Pierson 2005 shows some concern that the laws that Congress is able to eventually pass are so ideologically extreme that they fail to gain the support of even the median member of Congress. Others, including Brady, et al. 2008, however, have found that the median voter continues to play an important role in passing legislation. Sinclair 2008 argues that whether or not polarization has negatively affected the quality of legislation remains to be seen.
  328.  
  329. Binder, Sarah. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003.
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  331. Congress is more prone to deadlock when ideological polarization is high and when the party in opposition to the president’s party controls at least one chamber of Congress, Binder argues. Polarization negatively affects the probability that a given agenda item will become a law.
  332. Find this resource:
  333. Brady, David, John Ferejohn, and Laurel Harbridge. “Polarization and Public Policy: A General Assessment.” In Red and Blue Nation? Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 185–233. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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  335. Argues that legislation passed, and not passed, in the House and Senate during 107th–109th Congresses seemed to meet the criteria of policy forced to attract the median voter of the respective chambers.
  336. Find this resource:
  337. Hacker, Jacob, and Paul Pierson. Off-Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
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  339. Notes that party polarization has allowed the most ideological extremes of the majority party to pass policy that fails to represent the median voter in Congress. Uses Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 as examples of policies unresponsive to the median voter.
  340. Find this resource:
  341. Jones, David R. “Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock.” Political Research Quarterly 54.1 (2001): 125–141.
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  343. Constructs a partisan model of legislative gridlock. Jones finds that divided government does not affect gridlock once party polarization and party seat division are taken into account.
  344. Find this resource:
  345. McCarty, Nolan. “The Policy Effects of Political Polarization.” In The Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism. Edited by Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, 223–255. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
  346. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  347. Maintains that polarization has negative effects on legislative productivity.
  348. Find this resource:
  349. Sinclair, Barbara. “Spoiling the Sausages? How a Polarized Congress Deliberates and Legislates.” In Red and Blue Nation? Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 55–105. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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  351. Sinclair says that an important question is whether polarization has had an impact on the quality of legislation, on whether the laws Congress passes are “good” public policy.
  352. Find this resource:
  353. Consequences for Congress’ Relationship with the President
  354.  
  355. The consequences of party polarization in Congress are not solely contained within the institution. The effects of polarization extend to Congress’ relationships with other branches of government. Especially in times of divided government, party polarization, as Sinclair 2006 shows, has somewhat impeded the president’s ability to influence the legislative process. Fleisher and Bond 2000 documents that fewer members are feasible targets for presidential persuasion, and Lee 2009 argues that presidential appointments have become terrain for hashing out party conflict. Not only is Congress less likely to confirm nominees, as Binder and Maltzman 2005 shows, but, according to Williams and Baum 2003 and Bond, et al. 2009, members of Congress are more likely to use dilatory tactics in the increasingly heated confirmation process as a result of polarization. In response, Kernell 2006 argues that presidents have developed new ways of “going public” in order to influence Congress. According to Rohde and Barthelemy 2009, the most salient legislation to presidents, Congress, and the electorate is increasingly subject to partisan conflict.
  356.  
  357. Binder, Sarah, and Forrest Maltzman. “Congress and the Politics of Judicial Appointments.” In Congress Reconsidered. 8th ed. Edited by Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, 297–317. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2005.
  358. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  359. Argues that party polarization means that presidential nominees are less likely to be confirmed.
  360. Find this resource:
  361. Bond, Jon R., Richard Fleisher, and Glen S. Krutz. “Malign Neglect: Evidence That Delay Has Become the Primary Method of Defeating Presidential Appointments.” Congress and the Presidency 36 (October 2009): 226–243.
  362. DOI: 10.1080/07343460903172788Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  363. As polarization in Congress has grown, members of Congress have employed the purposeful strategy of causing delay in the confirmation process. The authors state that those who use this technique intend to defeat presidential appointments by precluding a vote.
  364. Find this resource:
  365. Fleisher, Richard, and Jon R. Bond. “Partisanship and the President’s Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress.” In Polarized Congress: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. Edited by Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, 154–158. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2000.
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  367. Examines changing relationship between Congress and president. Increased polarization has led to fewer cross-pressured members in Congress. Polarization does not necessarily mean that the president receives more support from his party in Congress.
  368. Find this resource:
  369. Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. 4th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2006.
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  371. Presidents are now more likely to make use of veto threats and develop elaborate ways of “going public” to put pressure on Congress, Kernell argues.
  372. Find this resource:
  373. Lee, Frances. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
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  375. Argues that presidential leadership is one of the primary sources of party conflict in Congress.
  376. Find this resource:
  377. Rohde, David W., and Meredith Barthelemy. “The President and Congressional Parties in an Era of Polarization.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III. and William G. Howell, 289–310. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  378. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  379. Provides an overview of scholarship from the last two decades on the relationship between Congress and the president, focusing on presidential success in the legislative process, “going public,” and the consequences of divided government. The authors note that the legislation most salient to the president, Congress, and the public has, over time, become more likely to involve partisan conflict.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Sinclair, Barbara. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.
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  383. Contends that party polarization has made presidential leadership in the legislative process more difficult, especially when the other party controls at least one chamber of Congress.
  384. Find this resource:
  385. Williams, Margaret, and Lawrence Baum. “Questioning Judges about Their Decisions: Supreme Court Nominees before the Senate Judiciary Committee.” Judicature 90 (September 2003): 73–80.
  386. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  387. Confirmation hearings have become subject to greater controversy and more heated battles. This increased contention is evident in the heightened use of the filibuster to block judicial nominees, the authors note.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Relationship with the Electorate
  390.  
  391. Scholars remain divided about whether ideological polarization at the elite level has caused ideological polarization among the electorate. Fiorina 2010 claims that on the most controversial issues, the vast majority of Americans continue to hold moderate positions, while Abramowitz and Saunders 2008 finds that a significant segment of the public has, in fact, polarized. Meanwhile, McCarty, et al. 2006 argues that the most significant consequence of polarization is its relationship with economic voting and the growing economic inequality in the United States. At the very least, Hetherington 2001 suggests, most scholars do agree that polarization among elites has made the party cue more salient to the electorate. The increased salience of party and heightened consistency between voters’ ideological preferences and partisan identification is evident in the decline of split-ticket voting, as Jacobson 2000 documents. The heightened party competition resulting from elite polarization has also meant that parties have more to gain from an electoral victory and more to lose from a loss. Indeed, as Jones 2010 demonstrates, low approval ratings of the institution overall increasingly translate to larger electoral margins for majority party incumbents and smaller margins for minority party incumbents. Consequentially, the parties have escalated their mobilization efforts, which, as Hetherington 2008 shows, has led to increased levels of political interest, turnout, and other types of political participation, as well as the levels of trust in government becoming tied to whether one’s ideological kinfolk are currently in power.
  392.  
  393. Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. “Is Polarization a Myth?” Journal of Politics 70 (April 2008): 542–555.
  394. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  395. Tests Fiorina’s claim that ideological polarization has not occurred in the electorate. The authors find that the mass public has indeed undergone ideological polarization. The starkest divisions are among the most interested and informed, but polarization has occurred in a large proportion of the electorate.
  396. Find this resource:
  397. Fiorina, Morris P. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Longman, 2010.
  398. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  399. Finds that claims of ideological polarization in the electorate are overstated. Concludes that public opinion data on controversial political issues indicate that most Americans are relatively moderate in their political attitudes.
  400. Find this resource:
  401. Hetherington, Marc. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization.” American Political Science Review 95 (September 2001): 619–631.
  402. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055401003045Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  403. Finds that party has become more important and more salient to the mass public and that Americans’ ideological preferences and partisan identification have become increasingly consistent.
  404. Find this resource:
  405. Hetherington, Marc. “Turned Off or Turned On? How Polarization Affects Political Engagement.” In Red and Blue Nation? Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 1–53. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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  407. Parties have increased mobilization efforts, and political interest, turnout, and other participation has correspondingly increased. Argues that levels of trust in government have become increasingly correlated with ideology since the early 21st century. In 2004, when Republicans controlled both Congress and the presidency, levels of trust spiked among conservatives but plummeted among liberals.
  408. Find this resource:
  409. Jacobson, Gary. “Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection.” In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. Edited by Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, 9–30. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2000.
  410. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  411. Finds that the increased consistency between voters’ ideological preferences and partisan identification has led to a decrease in split-ticket voting.
  412. Find this resource:
  413. Jones, David R. “Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (April 2010): 323–337.
  414. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00433.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415. In contrast to pre-polarization findings that overall approval of Congress did not affect individual members’ reelection fortunes, Jones finds that low approval ratings of the institution translate to reduced electoral margins for majority party incumbents and increased margins for minority party incumbents. Party polarization increases the magnitude of this differential, primarily through heightened accountability of majority party incumbents.
  416. Find this resource:
  417. McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006.
  418. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  419. Suggests a causal relationship between economic inequality and polarization, as voters’ political preferences have been increasingly tied to their incomes. The authors describe this relationship as a “dance” in which economic inequality and increased levels of polarization affect each other in a self-perpetuating cycle.
  420. Find this resource:
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