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- Re: [alpha] INSIGHT - GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN - German security company in Afghanistan
- Email-ID 5008523
- Date 2011-08-04 22:20:06
- From bokhari@stratfor.com
- To alpha@stratfor.com
- List-Name alpha@stratfor.com
- Good work, Hoor.
- On 8/4/11 4:10 PM, Hoor Jangda wrote:
- Kunduz isn't part of phase 1 of the handover so there are foreign forces
- still in the province.
- On Thursday, 8/4/11 3:10 PM, Kristen Cooper wrote:
- Is Kunduz among the initial areas where they are trying to hand over
- security to the Afghan forces?
- On 8/4/11 3:50 PM, Michael Wilson wrote:
- PUBLICATION: Check with Hoor first
- SOURCE: New source, DE1000
- ATTRIBUTION: Stratfor source
- SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Former intelligence analyst in Afghanistan.
- SOURCE Reliability : (new source not sure yet)
- ITEM CREDIBILITY: (not sure yet)
- DISTRIBUTION: Alpha
- SPECIAL HANDLING:
- SOURCE HANDLER: Hoor
- This is someone that I spoke to post the Kunduz attack (August 2) at
- the German security office. These are the main questions I asked
- after the attack: There is quite a bit here. If you have any
- questions you want asked let me know.
- Questions I asked:
- What do you think will happen with Kunduz? does it appear that the
- security situation will get worse? Any idea what the Taliban
- structure in Kunduz is currently looking like?
- His response :
- Dear Hoor,
- Many thanks for your reply. It's great to discuss analytical
- intricacies with someone at Stratfor, which I've been reading and
- greatly appreciating as a subscriber for some 9 years now.
- The company, LANTdefence, actually belongs to EXOP GmbH, a small
- German security and intelligence firm. The main client base
- consisted of humanitarian organisations active in Afghanistan and
- Pakistan, particularly German ones. I traveled a lot to and within
- Pakistan for a corporate client, building up an intelligence and
- early warning infrastructure for their project sites. I still have a
- number of good contacts in the humanitarian and security environment
- in Afghanistan. Later this year I might actually go back to
- Afghanistan for a few weeks on a consulting assignment.
- Re. the situation in Kunduz: I visited Kunduz several times in 2009
- and 2010, and even back then, the security situation was decidedly
- worse than in Mazar and even Kabul. International aid workers could
- only move around the city with local escort. Whether the escorts
- were armed or not pretty much depended on the approach of the
- respective humanitarian organisation/company: The Germans (GIZ) were
- generally travelling without armed escort, while the UN and actors
- like DAI (contractor of USAID) had different approaches. The main
- character of Kunduz City has long been the fact that it is basically
- surrounded by Taliban or Taliban-friendly insurgents, who have also
- been known to have a permanent if somewhat subtle presence in the
- city. Insurgent influence on the city was always palpable - e.g.
- when I spent a few days there in May 2010 it was a fact of life that
- cell phones didn't work between 6pm and 5am because the Taliban
- forced the providers to switch off networks during the night.
- Western nationals working with aid agencies could generally not be
- present beyond city limits. Even locals working for Western
- organisations were increasingly threatened.
- The current situation in Kunduz has further deteriorated, compared
- to 2010, according to my contacts in Kunduz and Kabul. The German
- Bundeswehr which is based near Kunduz airport has dramatically
- failed in their stabilisation efforts, largely due to not
- understanding the concept of COIN. (I have talked to many German
- officers every time I was in Kunduz, and have researched the German
- COIN approach in my 2008 dissertation at King's College London.)
- This does not bode well for the future security situation in Kunduz.
- US forces are largely dictating the pace and degree of pressure on
- the insurgents, but NATO forces in the area are on the backfoot as
- everyone is well aware that NATO will leave within the next 2-3
- years. Local power brokers (Taliban, arbaki, corrupt police, ANA,
- etc.) are preparing to fight for the power gap that NATO forces will
- leave behind when they will eventually draw back.
- I am not too sure about the insurgent structure in Kunduz at the
- moment - at least I don't have a complete picture. However, I know
- from conversations with local police and foreign intel people there
- that apart from the local Taliban structure, foreign fighters have
- always posed a particular problem in Kunduz. There has always been
- talk about 'the Uzbeks', referring to Islamist militants from
- Uzbekistan who have been known to live in local safehouses in the
- city. Also, Kunduz police chief Aqtash told me in a 90-min meeting
- last year that there is a hotspot village about 20km northwest of
- Kunduz City where according to his estimates around 100 Haqqani
- militants or sympathisers are based. Furthermore, recent information
- from German authorities (and Youtube videos) show that there is a
- small but seemingly constant stream of jihadi fighters with German
- passports who join the insurgents in the Kunduz area. From what I
- know these are German militants who first take the usual route
- Turkey-Zahedan (Iran)-Pakistani tribal areas and are then moved on
- to Northern Afghanistan via Kunar/Nuristan and Badakhshan.
- Lastly, a few words on the 02 Aug attack in Kunduz. I agree with you
- in considering this a particularly interesting event. While it is
- not unheard of that local guards employed by international orgs get
- injured or killed in attacks, direct attacks on Western security
- companies are quite rare in Afghanistan according to my reading. The
- January 2011 attack on the 'Finest' supermarket in Kabul was such an
- attack, but in that case an individual XE employee had been tracked
- and assaulted while shopping at the supermarket. The attack now on
- LANTdefence (and their local partner Kabora) is therefore a
- significant thing in my view. Such a suicide attack after just one
- year of presence in Kunduz is certainly a setback - other Western
- security companies have operated in Kunduz for years without getting
- hit. The fact that the Taliban have hightlighted the attack in their
- claim of responsibility as being against a 'German intelligence
- centre' leaves no doubt that it was LANTdefence/EXOP that was the
- intended target. The problem for LANTdefence/EXOP were always the,
- let's say, close ties to German intelligence that did certainly not
- go unnoticed among local house staff, local guards and drivers etc.
- Plenty of opportunities for the Taliban to gather target intel, if
- the right sort of pressure is put on the families of local staff,
- for example. On the other side, almost all foreign security
- companies are rumoured to have intelligence ties, so the Taliban
- could very well have only done some guess-work.
- The attack was apparently meant to be a strong warning against the
- company, but was not actually designed to annihilate it completely.
- (The main LANTdefence office is in Kabul anyway.) I know the
- compound in Kunduz pretty well, and any attacker could have expected
- to run into resistance from anything between 6 and 10 armed guards
- and their German ex-army supervisors. Still, only two insurgent
- gunmen stormed the house after the initial blast that opened the
- main gate. They were not killed by responding police, but detonated
- their explosives belts themselves after 1-2 hours of firefight.
- The attack will certainly have implications for the security of
- foreign aid workers, especially Germans in the area and probably
- country-wide. As I said before, LANTdefence, partnering with Kabora,
- is responsible for all GIZ physical security all over Afghanistan.
- Now that LANTdefence themselves have become the target of an attack
- and have been singled out by Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid as
- 'German intelligence', the company will be forced to drastically
- step up their own security measures, which leaves less bandwidth for
- protecting their clients. Also, if for example the Kabul HQ of the
- company would be attacked, the neighbouring GIZ building on one
- side, and the other neighbours, the French NGO ACF, would be
- severely affected as well. It is surely a problem when a security
- provider becomes a security risk themselves.
- Anyway - I could go on forever but have to cut short now. I hope my
- info is useful for you to even better understand the local context.
- As I said in my initial message, if you plan to incorporate some of
- the more sensitive info into your analyses, such as the background
- on LANTdefence/EXOP, that's fine, but please do not hint at whom you
- have it from. If you have questions on the above or on anything
- else, don't hesitate to get back in touch.
- Thanks and all best,
- --
- Hoor Jangda
- Tactical Analyst
- Mobile: 281 639 1225
- Email: hoor.jangda@stratfor.com
- STRATFOR, Austin
- --
- Michael Wilson
- Director of Watch Officer Group, STRATFOR
- Office: (512) 744 4300 ex. 4112
- michael.wilson@stratfor.com
- --
- Hoor Jangda
- Tactical Analyst
- Mobile: 281 639 1225
- Email: hoor.jangda@stratfor.com
- STRATFOR, Austin
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