On Authoritarianism in China (An Introduction)

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 brought forth a massive change to politics in China. Mao was the “Great Helmsman”, and through the Cultural Revolution, purged many in the party who might otherwise have posed a threat to his rule. Because of this, a power struggle emerged in the party that ultimately ended with Deng Xiaoping taking over the reins of power in 1978.

Deng Xiaoping, who had been purged by Mao during the Cultural Revolution, believed that China needed to liberalize its economy in order to improve its standing as a world power. To this end, he initiated a policy known as “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” that allowed private enterprise and foreign investment while at the same time retaining a greater level of control over the economy than in most market economies.

Due to the fact that he was purged, he also wanted the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to show a gentler face, allowing for a greater degree of freedom when compared to Maoist China: To this end, he curtailed the cult of personality that emphasized Mao’s era as the CCP adopted a more collaborative approach. Dissent, which previously had not been tolerated, was allowed to an extent.

It’s important to note, however, that this economic liberalization was not accompanied by political liberalization. The CCP still had a pre-eminent position, and maintained strict control over the press and media in China, and with its absolute authority, maintained an authoritarian system.

This led to backlash from hardliners in the party however, as more reformist and more traditionalist factions within the party competed for influence. This backlash, when coupled with the revolutions that spread across eastern Europe in 1989, in which long-standing communist governments were toppled largely through massive mobilizations and protests, led to a sense of panic amongst high-ranking party members when students began protesting in Tiananmen Square.

The protests were originally motivated by the sacking of a reformist party member by hardline factions within the party. The protestors called for his re-instatement and called for reforms. As days passed, however, the protests grew larger and larger, and the scope of the protests increased as well.

Party leaders, watching the revolutions that were taking place across eastern Europe, and holding on to memories of the mass popular political mobilizations of the Cultural Revolution, feared a descent into chaos. Since the protestors were peaceful, however, the party, for better or for worse, was at an impasse.

Since China had just opened up to the world economy, many in the party were reluctant to use force to crush the protests. At the same time, however, they saw how popular movements had led to the collapse of communist states in Eastern Europe, and did not want that to happen to them. Fierce debate raged on in the party, but in the end, the hardline factions of the party managed to convince Deng Xiaoping and the party leadership that a strong and decisive action was needed, or else, China could potentially collapse.

Ultimately, on 4 June 1989, tanks rolled down Tiananmen Square. In a flurry of bullets and acrid smoke, the protesters ultimately were cleared out. Despite the CCP’s effort to prevent news of the event from leaking out outside of China, the events still became known internationally, particularly the picture of “Tank Man”, in which a single man seemingly stared down a line of tanks rolling down Tiananmen Square.

Within China, a major crackdown began. The CCP became more authoritarian, and engaged in a new round of censorship to prevent information of the event from leaking out to the Chinese population, as well as creating a narrative of the event to suit its own terms. The Tiananmen Square protests, however, did mark the end of the hopes that civilian protests could convince the party to change its ways through protest.

Several years passed by, and Deng Xiaoping prepared to transfer the reins of power. Ultimately, however, Jiang Zemin took over the reins of the power.

However, as his position in the party was relatively weak, he wanted to strengthen his position in the party, and felt that if he could create a threat to the state, that he could obtain greater power than he otherwise would have been. There was just one problem—what sort of threat could he focus on?

The answer came in the form of a rising spiritual practice known variously as either Falun Dafa or Falun Gong. It had grown massively through much of the 90s as a reaction to the loss of the spiritual values that underpinned much of Chinese society during the Cultural Revolution. However, its massive growth led to concern from elements within the party, especially since many party members (even ones at high echelons within it) were also engaging in the practice.

Ever since the early days of the party, there was a fundamental principle—nothing outside the party could compete for the affection or loyalty of the Chinese citizen. This fundamental principle which underlined (and to this day still underlines) the party’s control of society, led to it co-opting religions to suit its own ends, as it did previously with Protestant Christianity and Islam with “associations” to manage them in ways that would benefit the state.

Falun Gong, however, refused to be co-opted, and as its popularity kept growing, Jiang Zemin and others in the party worried that it could surpass the party influence, and so, on 10 June 1999, a massive crackdown against the Falun Gong “cult” began, in which members across the country were rounded up and sent to detention camps. At first, members tried to engage in protests, hoping to encourage the government to change its mind, but these protests merely intensified the government’s desire to further repress the movement.

To this day, Falun Gong members are still frequently arrested and tortured, and though the reports haven’t been 100 percent confirmed (and are unlikely ever to be completely confirmed as long as the CCP remains in power), many of them are also harvested for their organs, as Falun Gong adherents tend to be healthier than those who aren’t adherents.

And that has so far been the trajectory of China into the present. Its tactics haven’t just been limited to Falun Gong practitioners and protestors, however. They have extended to the populations of Xinjiang and Tibet. These regions are considered to be integral to China despite their small populations, and as a result, the CCP have attempted to more tightly integrate them into the rest of China as a whole. In both areas, this has involved encouraging Han Chinese to move in and imposing Mandarin as the language of education, and in general, attempting to make the culture of these societies more Chinese, leading some scholars to argue that China have engaged in policies that amount to a veritable cultural genocide.

Their ire, however, has been particularly harsh on the Uyghur Muslims of Xinjiang. For various reasons, the Chinese government traditionally have distrusted Islam, and in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, justified its hostility to the Muslim population in Xinjiang by claiming that it was taking action against “terrorism”. Even though there are definitely terrorist groups that seek an independent East Turkestan (what these groups refer to Xinjiang as), they have also targeted peaceful protests and groups. In addition, they have attempted to weaken the Uyghurs’ faith by sending them to “re-education” camps, where they are forced to eat pork and drink alcohol and show loyalty to the CCP.

Along with all these things, China have maintained tight control over the Internet through the creation of a national firewall. With the recent imposition of a “social credit” system, wherein one’s ability to access goods and services is tied to one’s reputation as one who supports or opposes the party, and Xi Jinping recently overseeing the abolition of term limits, allowing him to remain in power indefinitely, as well as the purges currently taking place within the party in which Xi Jinping and his faction have purged rivals due to “corruption” charges,  and the recent protests in Hong Kong that have been motivated by China’s continual encroachment upon the freedoms granted to Hong Kong through the Joint Sino-British Declaration, it to me seems very much evident that China, despite its efforts to increase its pre-eminence on the world stage and to show a kinder, gentler face to the rest of the world, still very much remains an authoritarian state. So long as that is the case, any trappings of “democratic” engagements seen on a superficial level will remain just that—mere “trappings”—that do not change the fact that authoritarianism is still very much alive and well in China.

The same party that ruled China in the days of Mao still rules China, and even if it has liberalized the economy to a major extent, its control over the economy, and indeed, most aspects of Chinese society, still remain very strong—maybe not as strong as they used to be due to the advent of new technologies which the CCP have tried to co-opt—but China is still very clearly not a democratic society, and so long as the CCP continue to rule China, any ideas of China being in any way “democratic” will be as illusory as those phantasms that linger on in one’s dreams once one has awakened.