Battle of Kursk (Military History)

Introduction

The failed German offensive against the Kursk bulge in the summer of 1943 has two principal claims to fame. On the one hand, it is a candidate for the title of “turning point,” in World War II, because it represents both the first instance in which German mechanized forces failed to penetrate prepared enemy defenses operationally—and therefore were unable to launch a Blitzkrieg-style exploitation—as well as the last full-scale German offensive on the so-called “Eastern Front.” On the other, Kursk has entered into popular legend as the greatest tank battle of all time, involving thousands of armored vehicles maneuvering in an unmatched swirl of destruction. As this bibliography should make clear, however, this latter claim is the subject of much revisionist historiography. In particular, recent studies have demonstrated conclusively that the famous encounter at Prokhorovka on July 12, while certainly involving rather large mechanized forces, was neither as massive nor as decisive as earlier accounts portrayed it. Nor can one evaluate this confrontation solely in terms of the German offensive, which had clearly failed by mid-July. Instead, Operation Citadel must be considered in the context of Operations KUTUZOV and RUMIANTSEV, the twin Soviet counteroffensives against Orel and Khar’kov, which eliminated all German territorial gains while demonstrating the resiliency of the Red Army. To date, the most formidable obstacle to writing a balanced history of the battle of Kursk has been the unavailability of the German Ninth Army’s Kriegstagebuch, which the Red Army captured during the war and remains in Russian hands. The author of this article gratefully acknowledges the assistance of David M. Glantz throughout this bibliography, and especially in the section on Russian/Soviet Overviews.

General Overviews

Kursk attracts an endless stream of studies, both popular and scholarly, many of which repeat earlier accounts. Glantz and House 1999 attempts to counterbalance traditional German accounts with a more detailed look at the Soviet side, while Zetterling and Frankson 2000 (cited under British and Other Overviews) pioneers a more accurate study of daily strengths, both armor and personnel, that became the basis for most subsequent analyses. The most comprehensive of these works are Zamulin 2012 and Zamulin 2013 (both cited under Russian/Soviet Overviews). As the former curator of the Kursk museum, Zamulin has detailed the battle in the southern half of the Kursk bulge and at Prokhorovka and is now preparing, based on the German Ninth Army’s captured Kriegstagebuch, a new study on the fighting in the northern half of the bulge. Numerous overview entries, notably Citino 2012 (cited under American Overviews), Töppel 2002, and Töppel 2009 (both cited under German Overviews) offer the reader introductions to the evolving historiography of Kursk.

American Overviews

Although early American studies of Kursk generally follow the German interpretation of events, more recent studies, beginning with Glantz and House 1999, provide a fresh, more Soviet-oriented view. Glantz 1986 is a first attempt to compare that view with surviving German participants, while Glantz 2005 provides even more detail to reconstruct the battle from both sides. Citino 2012 does the equivalent job of placing Kursk within the larger trends of German warfighting, and both Clark 2011 and Dunn 1997 supplement our understanding of the Soviet context for the battle.

Citino, Robert M. The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012.
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In the course of discussing the entire European war in 1943, Citino not only deftly summarizes Kursk but provides an excellent introduction to the historiographical reasons for Soviet and Western distortions.
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Clark, Lloyd. The Battle of the Tanks: Kursk 1943. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011.
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In addition to consulting primary documents from both sides, Clark interviewed fifty-six survivors of both the German and Soviet forces. The focus of this book is more on the social and political context and less on the actual conduct of the struggle.
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Dunn, Walter S., Jr. Kursk: Hitler’s Gamble, 1943. Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1997.
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Dunn contends that the German failure to penetrate Soviet defenses was evident even on the third day of the offensive. Thus, he believes that the Allied invasion of Sicily only provided an excuse for Hitler’s justifiable decision to terminate the offensive. As is his wont, Dunn emphasizes materiel factors.
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Glantz, David M. From the Vistula to the Oder: Soviet Offensive Operations, October 1944–March 1945. In Art of War Symposium, 1986. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1986.
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Pages 215–366 in the 1991 edition describe the battles around Belgorod and Khar’kov during Operation RUMIANTSEV. Republished London: Frank Cass, 1991.
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Glantz, David M. Atlas of the Battle of Kursk (July–August 1943). Carlisle, PA: Self-published, 2005.
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Daily maps of the evolution of the struggle, providing the first detailed depiction of tactical positions on both sides.
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Glantz, David M., and Jonathan M. House. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
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This operational account provides immense detail concerning both order of battle and the course of the struggle. At the time it appeared, the Glantz and House study was the first major Western history to reassess the scale and significance of the Prokhorovka encounter.
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Showalter, Dennis. Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk, the Turning Point of World War II. New York: Random House, 2013.
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Showalter attempts to sift the various accounts and interpretations to understand the battle without engaging in the “war porn” (p. xiii) of heroism or horror. He contends that, although the Soviet defense was still unsophisticated, Kursk marks the crossover in terms of the capacities of each force and the strategic initiative.
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British and Other Overviews

Kursk arouses interest in many different minds for different reasons; this section is only a sample. These studies range from Speight 2011, which attempts to apply the Lanchester equations to the battle, to Zetterling and Frankson 2000, which establishes a baseline of the number of armored vehicles actually present; these figures have become the basis for most recent studies of the battle, such as Healy 2008 and Healy 2012. Piekalkiewicz 1987 predates these figures but nonetheless provides an excellent reconstruction from the German side, particularly concerning the development of new armored vehicles. Nipe 1996 offers one of the first sophisticated reassessments of the battle in the context of the 1943 campaign; Lopez 2008 illustrates how this and other revisionist ideas have permeated our understanding of the battle even in non-English studies.

English, John A. “Of the Grey Coat Coming: A Historiographical Exploration of English-Language Sources on Soviet Army Operations.” Military Affairs 54.4 (October 1988): 185–191.
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One of the foremost tactical historians in the world surveys information available prior to the revisionism about Kursk and other operations.
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Healy, Mark. Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient, 5–17 July 1943. Stroud, UK: History Press, 2008.
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The 2008 version, which is significantly longer than the 2012 book by the same author, emphasizes the strategic context, development of new German weapons, and other aspects leading to the battle. Its German focus makes it a useful balance if read in conjunction with Glantz and House 1999.
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Healy, Mark. Kursk 1943. Stroud, UK: History Press, 2012.
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The author uses Zetterling and Frankson’s tank figures to minimize the extent of German losses, although concluding that, after Kursk, Germany no longer had the ability to win in the east. It contains numerous odd and clumsy phrases.
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Lopez, Jean. Koursk: Les quarante jours qui ont ruiné la Wehrmacht (5 juillet–20 août 1943). Paris: Economica, 2008.
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The author argues that, on the northern front, General Model had no skill in maneuver warfare, and that Rokossovsky was simply a more effective commander. In the south, Lopez reflects the revisionist arguments of those such as George Nipe that Vatutin mis-employed the 1st Tank Army and that the SS won a tactical victory at Prokhorovka.
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Nipe, George M., Jr. Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943. Winnipeg, Canada: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1996.
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Using SS records extensively, Nipe reviews the entire 1943 campaign. While asserting that the Germans won tactically, he was one of the first to downgrade the numerical size of battles around Prokhorovka (See Nipe 2011, cited under Prokhorovka Engagement.) Republished Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2012.
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Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Operation “Citadel”: Kursk and Orel: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War. Translated by Michaela Nierhaus. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987.
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Piekalkiewicz’s account, told primarily from the German viewpoint, is especially informative concerning the design problems of the new generation of German armor, including the Panther, Tiger, and Elephant.
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Speight, L. R. “Within-Campaign Analysis: A Statistical Evaluation of the Battle of Kursk.” Military Operations Research 11.2 (2011): 41–62.
DOI: 10.5711/1082598316241Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author attempts to apply Lanchester multivariate analysis to casualty data on the battle. He concludes that the Lanchester equations are not predictive when applied to overall casualties, because the structural details of the campaign, such as the prevalence of mines, are more important than overall force comparisons.
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Zetterling, Niklas, and Anders Frankson. Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000.
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The authors pioneered the use of detailed German archival records as well as Soviet publications to determine the actual strengths of the two sides. Their revised armor counts have become basic to Soviet and Western analyses of the battle. They conclude that a shortage of infantry battalions to protect the flanks was a major restriction for the Germans.
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German Overviews

German scholarly studies, especially Frieser, et al. 2007, have made major contributions to the historiography of the battle by introducing new archival records discovered since the demise of East Germany. Töppel 2002 and Töppel 2009 are excellent starting points for anyone interested in understanding how the historiography has changed.

Frieser, Karl-Heinz, Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schönherr, Gerhard Schreiber, Krisztián Ungváry, and Bernd Wegner. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 8: Dis Ostfront, 1943/44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten. Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007.
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Pages 81–208 offer the German official history of Kursk. This includes detailed comparisons of orders of battle and a sophisticated discussion of what Frieser terms “the Myth of Prohorovka” (pp. 119–139), which includes the groundbreaking work of V. N. Zamulin. Frieser also analyzes the classic questions such as Hitler’s decision to halt the offensive.
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Töppel, Roman. “Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung—Die Schlacht bei Kursk.” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 61 (2002): 369–401.
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Another excellent historiographic survey. Töppel contends that the image of Kursk as one of the turning points of the war is an artificial product of Cold War historiography. Instead, he argues that the steady drain of years of conflict, rather than any one battle, was responsible for the decline of German combat power.
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Töppel, Roman. “Kursk—Mythen und Wirklichheit einer Schlacht.” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57.3 (July 2009): 349–394.
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The author uses newer figures to discuss the extent of armor (both tanks and self-propelled guns) on both sides, and absolves Hitler of having chosen the site of this offensive. Töppel also attempts to place the battle into perspective in relation to other German projected operations.
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Russian/Soviet Overviews

The end of the Soviet Union and partial opening of its archives have enabled Russian historians to rewrite our understanding of the entire war. Foremost among the Russian historians of Kursk are A. V. Isaev (Isaev 2008), who provides a sophisticated analysis of the entire campaign, and V. I. Zamulin. Zamulin 2012 and Zamulin 2013 present the most important reassessment of the true nature of the battle from the Soviet side. Gončarov 2006, by contrast, gives the reader the benefit of the original Marxist analysis of the battle, updated with more accurate statistics. Zhilin 2003; Zamulin 2012; and Zamulin 2013 together provide a useful compilation of actual Soviet orders and documents from the battle.

Gončarov, Vladislav. Bitva pod kurskom: Ot oborony k nastupleniiu. Moscow: AST, 2006.
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“The battle of Kursk: From defense to the offensive.” A modern edition of the Red Army General Staff’s multi-volume secret study, originally prepared in 1946–1947. Indispensable for its candor and accurate statistics.
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Isaev, Aleksei Valer’evich. 1943-i: Ot tragedii Khar’kova do Kurskogo proryva. Moscow: Veche, 2008.
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“1943: From the Kharkov tragedy to the breakthrough at Kursk.” As the title suggests, this study surveys accurately the entire 1943 campaign using Russian, German, and English language sources, including newer calculations of armor involved. However, it largely passes over the importance of the Central Front’s February and March offensive toward the Desna River, Orel, and Smolensk.
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Koltunov, G., and B. G. Solov’ev. Kurskaia bitva. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970.
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“The Battle of Kursk.” Issued in two editions, this was the standard Soviet account of the battle during the Cold War.
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Morozov, M. E. Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941–1945 gg. Kampanii i strategicheskie operatsii v tsifrakh v 2 tomakh, Tom II. Moscow: Glavarkhiv goroda Moskvy, 2010.
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“The Great Patriotic War 1941–1945: Campaigns and strategic operations in numbers in 2 volumes, Vol. II.” This recent statistical study of all of the Red Army’s operations in the eight wartime campaigns includes the combat strengths of all major formations, making correlation of force comparisons more realistic.
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Ognennaia duga. Moscow: “Evonnitsa-MG,” 2013.
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“The fiery bulge.” The Russian Federation’s Institute for Military History produced this thorough study. It includes surveys of Operations CITADEL, KUTUZOV, and RUMIANTSEV, biographies of major Red Army commanders, and orders of battle and recently released statistical information.
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Zamulin, Valerii Nikolaevich. “The Battle of Kursk: New Findings.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25.3 (2012): 409–417.
DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2012.705660Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This article is highly critical of the way that both Moscow and the Voronezh Front committed armored reserves prior to and at Prokhorovka. See Zamulin’s superb book-length analysis of this encounter in Prokhorovka Engagement.
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Zamulin, Valerii Nikolaevich. Sryv operatsii “Tsitade”: Kurskaia bitva—grif sekretnosti sniat. Moscow: “Eksmo” “Iauza,” 2013.
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“The disruption of Operation ‘Citadel’: The battle of Kursk—the secret classification removed.” This volume include massive numbers of recently released documents, together with careful analysis of the fighting in the southern half of the Kursk bulge.
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Zhilin, V. A., et al., eds. Kurskaia bitva: Khronika, fakty, liudi. Moscow: Olma-Press, 2003.
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“The battle of Kursk: Chronicles, facts, and people in 2 books.” This detailed documentary study includes daily operational summaries prepared by the Red Army General Staff and German OKH and OKW, newspaper releases, and statistics related to the entire battle.
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Popular Versions of the Battle

Regardless of their accuracy or level of detail, popularized accounts have historiographic significance because they form public perceptions of the battle and thereby influence its place in history. Jukes 1968 and McTaggart 1993 represent the common public perception of Kursk, characterizing uncritically it as the greatest tank battle in history. Porter 2011a and Porter 2011b demonstrate the value that a very specialized popular interest can bring in terms of detailed organization and equipment of an organization on each side. Rudel 1958 has been read by so many members of the general public that it has helped to define a very narrow, pro-German view of Kursk and indeed of the entire “eastern front,” contributing to a misunderstanding of the Soviet military.

Fowler, Will. Kursk: The Vital 24 Hours. Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount, 2005.
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In contrast to many popular studies of the battle, this book is well researched and expresses a healthy skepticism about the mythic scale of battle. Fowler includes a chapter on air operations as well, although the work is told more from the German than from the Soviet viewpoint.
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Jukes, Geoffrey. Kursk: The Clash of Armour. New York: Ballantine, 1968.
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This classic account, primarily from the German perspective, is now largely dated.
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McTaggart, Pat. “World’s Greatest Tank Duel.” World War II Magazine 8.2 (July 1993): 30–37.
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As the title of the article and the journal indicate, this is a popularized but very competent summary of Kursk, focusing on the traditional, pro-Soviet version of Prokhorovka. The author concludes, appropriately, that once the offensive was delayed the Germans should never have launched it.
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Porter, David. Visual Battle Guide: Das Reich at Kursk 12 July 1943. London: Amber Books, 2011a.
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This lavishly illustrated book provides enormous details, including the organization and equipment of almost every subordinate unit of the two organizations involved. In the case of 2nd SS Division Das Reich, for example, the author gives daily strengths of available armored vehicles and manpower losses, using sources such as Zetterling and Frankson 2000 (cited under British and Other Overviews).
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Porter, David. Visual Battle Guide: Fifth Guards Tank Army at Kursk. London: Amber Books, 2011b.
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As a companion to his study of 2nd SS Division, Porter gives the reader almost equal, absorbing detail about its opponent, Rotmistrov’s 5th Tank Army.
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Rudel, Hans-Ulrich. Stuka Pilot. Translated by Lynton Hudson. New York: Ballantine, 1958.
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Rudel’s oft-quoted account of using an experimental Ju-87G against Soviet tanks at Kursk actually occupies only five pages (84–88) of this book. However, it has heavily influenced a mistaken belief in the efficacy of Luftwaffe anti-armor attacks in the campaign. Numerous re-printings.
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Photographic Studies

In addition to their value in helping us visualize the nature of war, photographic studies often include useful details about units and weaponry. Lodieu 2007 is a typical example of such studies. Spezzano 2003 (for the German side) and Zamulin 2014 (for the Soviet) provide much rarer photographs and supplemental detail on the battle.

Lodieu, Didier. III. Pz. Korps at Kursk: The Part Played by 6. Pz. Div., 7. Pz., 19. Pz. Div. and S. Pz. Abt. 503 during Operation “Zitadelle” (Citadel). Translated by Alan McKay. Paris: Histoire et Collections, 2007.
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Although presented in “coffee table” format, this study offers considerable information, including combat news and propaganda reports, about the spearhead of Army Detachment Kempf.
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Spezzano, Remy. Waffen-SS: 1943 Kursk. Archives Series 3. Southbury, CT: RZM Imports, 2003.
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This is a collection of combat photos, with brief texts, from the SS divisions Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Totenkopf.
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Zamulin, Valerii Nikolaevich. The Battle of Kursk 1943: The View through the Camera Lens. Edited and translated by Stuart Britton. Solihull, UK: Helion, 2014.
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Alongside captured German combat photography, perhaps the foremost recent historian of the battle presents rare images taken by Soviet war correspondents.
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Formation of the Kursk Bulge

In the aftermath of the Red Army’s encirclement of Stalingrad in November 1942, Stalin and his commanders attempted to widen this success into a strategic offensive along most of the front. After successful offensives in the Voronezh and eastern Donbas regions during January, the Stavka expanded attacks into the central and western Donbas and Khar’kov regions in early February. The strategic offensive culminated in late February with an additional drive toward the Desna River, Orel, and Smolensk by General K. K. Rokossovsky’s Central Front. In a brilliant series of maneuvers, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein defeated these offensives during February–March 1943, ending the Soviet strategic effort and setting the stage for the Kursk bulge by creating the southern shoulder around Khar’kov. Official Soviet histories generally ignored the various attacks in the Donbas and Khar’kov regions known collectively as the Voronezh-Kastornoe strategic offensive, as well as the Central Front’s failed offensive. However, the demise of the USSR opened some of the archival records of these offensives. Glantz 1996, Glantz 2005, and Glantz 2009 all provide overlapping views of these preliminary operations, enabling us to understand the Soviet viewpoint of how the Kursk bulge developed. Bundesverband der Soldaten der ehemaligen Waffen-SS 1976, Ose 1987, and especially Sadarananda 1990 focus on Manstein’s operational excellence during this period. As he has done in so many other cases, Zolotarev (Zolotarev 1997a and Zolotarev 1997b) provides a rich level of Soviet documents and orders from this period.

Bundesverband der Soldaten der ehemaligen Waffen-SS. Befehl des Gewissens: Charkow Winter 1943. Osnabruck: Munin-Verlag GmbH, 1976.
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A detailed study of SS Panzer Corps’ operations in the Khar’kov region in February and March 1943, together with German archival maps and documents.
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Glantz, David M. “Prelude to Kursk: Soviet Strategic Operations, February-March 1943.” In Gezeitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkrieg? Die Schlachten von Char’kov und Kursk im Frühjahr und Sommer 1943 in operativer Anlage, Verlauf und politischer Bedeutung. Edited by Roland G. Förster. Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte, Band 15. Hamburg: E. S. Mittler, 1996.
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This article was originally presented at a symposium sponsored by the German Military History Institute at Nürnburg in 1993.
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Glantz, David M. “The Red Army’s Donbas Offensive (February–March 1942 [sic 1943]) Revisited: A Documentary Essay.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 18.3 (2005): 369–503.
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Selected Soviet operational orders, primarily at front level, for the time period.
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Glantz, David M. After Stalingrad: The Red Army’s Winter Offensive 1942–1943. Solihull, UK: Helion, 2009.
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This exposes the full scope of Red Army offensives in the Donbas and Khar’kov regions and details the Central Front’s efforts to capture Orel, and, in conjunction with the Western and Briansk Fronts, the Smolensk region.
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Ose, Dieter, ed. Manstein’s Gegenangriff Fruhjahr 1943. Bonn: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, March 1987.
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This anthology contains papers presented by Colonel David Glantz and retired generals Graf von Kielmansegg and Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin on Manstein’s counteroffensive in the Donbas and Khar’kov regions at a symposium held at the German Führungsakademie in Hamburg on 6 September 1986.
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Sadarananda, Dana M. Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of Army Group Don. New York: Praeger, 1990.
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Based on a doctoral dissertation, this version emphasizes “the genius of Manstein” throughout the late winter campaign.
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Zolotarev, V. A., et al., eds. Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia: Preliudiia Kurskoi bitvy: Dokumenty i materialy 6 dekabria 1942 g.–25 aprelia 1943 g. T 15 (4–3). Moscow: Terra, 1997a.
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“The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic: Prelude to the battle of Kursk: Documents and materials 6 December 1942–25 April 1943. Vol. 15 (4–3).” This book, the last in Zolotarev’s series of operational studies, includes most of the documents associated with the offensives the Stavka mandated in February and March 1943.
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Zolotarev, V. A., et al., eds. Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia: Kurskaia bitva: Dokumenty i materialy 27 marta–23 avgusta 1943 g. T 15 (4–4). Moscow: Terra, 1997b.
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“The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic: The battle of Kursk: Documents and materials 27 March–23 August 1943. Vol. 15 (4–4).” As the title suggests, Zolotarev has transformed our knowledge of the Soviet-German conflict by publishing extensive archival documents.
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German Viewpoints/Memoirs

As in so many other aspects of the Soviet-German conflict, German accounts dominated the historiography of Kursk for three decades after the war. Although numerous accounts at the tactical level acknowledged the unlikelihood of German success in the battle, Manstein 1958 often held sway, arguing that, at Kursk as well as elsewhere, Hitler’s interference prevented victory. More recently, historians who viewed the battle from the German side, such as Newton and Manstein’s biographer Stein, have provided a wealth of arguments to cast the field marshal’s optimistic version into question. (See Newton 2002 and Stein 2007, both cited under Secondary Studies from the German Viewpoint.)

Primary German Memoirs

Guderian 1952 is one of the earliest critiques of the German claims to success at Kursk, while Mellenthin 1956 helps form Western conceptions of the tactical level of the battle. Manstein 1958 presents his own, biased explanation for the failure on the southern flank without offering significant additional detail. Other Germans, who served at lower levels, have fleshed out our understanding of their side in the battle. Memoirs by these men include Engelmann 1980, John 1993, and Raus and Newton 2003.

Engelmann, Joachim. Die größte Panzerschlacht im Osten 1943. Friedberg, BRD: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1980.
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The author was an officer in the battle. His account provides unusual information such as the planned tactical objectives and exploitation routes for units of Army Group South.
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Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. Translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952.
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Guderian consistently criticized the Kursk offensive (pp. 302–312), perhaps because it wreaked havoc with his efforts to rebuild German mechanized formations. This is the source (pp. 308–309) for the conversation in which Hitler allegedly expressed grave doubts about the attack.
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John, Antonius. Kursk’43. Szenen einer Entscheidungschlacht. Bonn: H&H Konzpet Verlag, 1993.
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The author was a veteran of the battle on the northern flank. He suggests that, prior to the battle, German officials spoke openly of the coming attack as if seeking to attract and trap more Soviet troops in the bulge (pp. 24–27).
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Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Translated by Anthony G. Powell. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958.
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Manstein is the foremost exponent of the effort to blame the amateur Hitler for all German failures in the war with the Soviets. He is particularly critical of both delays in starting the operation and Hitler’s decision to halt the offensive at a point where (incorrectly) Manstein still believed he could win.
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Mellenthin, Friedrich W. von. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated by H. Betzler. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.
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General von Mellenthin’s memoirs were enormously influential in forming Western perceptions of Soviet warfare. At Kursk, he was chief of staff of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, on the left flank of II SS Panzer Corps in the southern penetration. He originated the concept of a Panzergloche (pp. 231–232), using Tigers as a shell to protect the more numerous Panzer III and IV vehicles.
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Raus, Edward, and Stephen H. Newton, comp and trans. Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2003.
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At the time of Kursk, Raus commanded XI Corps in Army Detachment Kempf, on the extreme right wing of Manstein’s southern penetration. Pages 194–212 recount this corps in the battle, including the Soviets creating a bridge across the Donets by deliberately sinking T-34 tanks.
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Secondary Studies from the German Viewpoint

A combination of the accessibility of sources and a fascination with the German armed forces has produced a number of useful secondary accounts of Kursk as seen by the attackers. In particular, Newton 2002 provides a wealth of different accounts from the Wehrmacht. Spaeter 1995 and Stadler 1980 allow the reader to look in more detail at the actions of individual German units, although inevitably this kind of narrow focus may distort the results. By contrast, Klink 1966 places Kursk within the problems of the “Eastern Front” in 1943, while Kurowski 2003 uses diaries and interviews to create a coherent view of the role of German tactical commanders in the battle. Finally, Stein 2007 provides an acerbic counterpoint to those participants and historians who excuse or ignore German errors.

Innocenti, Claudio R. “Operation Citadel (Kursk).” Cavalry and Armor Journal 123.3 (July–September 2014): 32–38.
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The author focuses on the German techniques of combined arms breaching, which he credits with considerable success despite their ultimate failure.
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Klink, Ernst. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation “Zitadelle” 1943. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966.
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An excellent account that places the German participation fully into context, including such issues as priorities for receiving scarce weapons and replacements, as well as the extensive German anti-partisan sweeps prior to the offensive. The map collection inside the back cover is particularly detailed and useful.
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Kurowski, Franz. Operation “Zitadelle,” July 1943: The Decisive Battle of World War II. Translated by Fred Steinhardt. Winnipeg, Canada: J. J. Fedorowicz, 2003.
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Although the author consulted basic Soviet sources such as Zhukov’s memoirs, this well-written study is primarily from the German viewpoint. The author interviewed and obtained diaries or other documents from a variety of senior German leaders, including Lemelsen, Manstein, Rendulic, Nehring, and Manteuffel.
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Mitcham, Samuel W., Jr. Blitzkrieg No Longer: The German Wehrmacht in Battle, 1943. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2010.
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This is a well-written overview of the challenges facing Germany in 1943. Kursk and its consequences compose Chapters 7 and 8, offering little more than the traditional summary. However, the author does place matters in a larger context concerning the conflicting strategic demands upon the German armed forces.
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Newton, Stephen H., ed and trans. Kursk: The German View: Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2002.
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Newton has assembled various German commanders’ accounts of the battle. Most of these accounts originated in the post-1945 US Army project to record the views of captured German generals, but the result is remarkably coherent and useful, with ample explanatory notes by the editor.
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Spaeter, Helmuth. The History of the Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland. Vol. II. Translated by David Johnston. Winnipeg, Canada: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1995.
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Unit history of the largest German mechanized division involved in the Kursk battle, controlling most of the new Panther tanks.
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Stadler, Silvester. Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943: II. SS-Panzerkorps als Stosskeil im Grosskampf. Osnabruck, FRG: Munin Verlag GmbH, 1980.
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This comprehensive account of SS Panzer Corps’ role in the battle contains numerous archival maps and documents.
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Stein, Marcel. Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janus Head, a Portrait. Solihull, UK: Helion, 2007.
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Stein is a scathing critic of Manstein, and his account of Kursk (pp. 171–212) is no exception. This extensive analysis of the battle includes a detailed summary of the German historiography on the battle.
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Soviet Viewpoint/Memoirs

If traditional German historiography has argued over the chances of German success, the equivalent Soviet studies, both classified and unclassified, were for many decades united in depicting Kursk as a great success, with heavy losses but few mistakes, for the Red Army. If anything, these Soviet accounts consciously or unconsciously exaggerate the German strengths in order to make their triumph appear greater. Zolotarev 1997a and Zolotarev 1997b (both cited under Formation of the Kursk Bulge) and Zhilin 2003 (cited under Russian/Soviet Overviews) have given historians belated access to Soviet documents at the time, although even some of these were less than accurate (see section on Prokhorovka Engagement.)

Russian Language Sources from the Soviet Viewpoint

This section includes both primary and secondary Russian-language sources that view Kursk exclusively from the Soviet viewpoint. Koltunov 1980 began the effort to provide accurate force ratios for the battle. In general, however, these accounts, especially Simbolikov 1950; Bel’diev, et al. 1982; and Koltunov 1980, were inhibited both by political considerations and by the conventional wisdom that the Red Army had performed superbly throughout the campaign. Despite this bias, these accounts still provide considerable information that is unavailable in German-oriented versions. Rokossovsky 2000 gives the reader an unexpurgated version of the author’s 1985 memoirs, and is therefore quite valuable concerning Kursk and other operations.

Bel’diev, Petr Mikhailovich, and S. M. Filippov. Kurskaia bitva: Vospominaniia, stati. Voronezh: Tsentralno-Chernozemnoe Knizhnoe izdva, 1982.
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“The Battle of Kursk: memoirs, articles.” As the title suggests, this is a collection of brief narratives, some previously published elsewhere, by Soviet participants.
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Iminov, V. T. Organizatsiia i vedenie oborony v bitve pod Kurskom na primere 13-i armii tsentral’nogo fronta (iiul’1943 g.). Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy, 1979.
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“The organization and conduct of the defense in the Battle of Kursk based on the example of Central Front’s 13th Army (July 1943).” Published just prior to the beginning of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s Glasnost (openness) policy, this presents the traditional pro-Soviet version of the victory at Kursk, including Prokhorovka.
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Koltunov, G. “Kurskaia bitva v tsifrakh (Period kontranastupleniia).” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 7 (July 1980): 58–68.
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“The Battle of Kursk in figures (the period of the counteroffensive).” Koltunov was one of the pioneers of more accurate force comparisons for the battle; despite the title, this article includes the earlier Soviet defensive phase.
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Rokossovsky, Konstantin K. Soldatskii dolg. Moscow: Golos, 2000.
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This is the unexpurgated version of A Soldier’s Duty. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985. The generally frank recollections of the commander of the Soviet Central Front, on the northern face of the Kursk bulge, especially the 2000 version that treats Zhukov more critically.
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Simbolikov, V. N. Kurskaia bitva, 1943 [The Battle of Kursk, 1943]. Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy, 1950.
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Like most traditional Soviet accounts, this analysis exaggerates German numerical strengths.
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English Language Studies from the Soviet Viewpoint

For the convenience of researchers, this section includes both Soviet-sponsored English accounts, such as Parotkin 1974 and Solov’ev 1979, based on Soviet memoirs, and Western accounts that tend to be more balanced. Studies such as Glantz 1986 and Zaitsev and Derkach 2005 offer tactical details on various aspects of Red Army operations. Shukman 1993 is an excellent group biography of the senior Soviet commanders involved in the war. By contrast, Merridale 2006 attempts to reconstruct the experience of the ordinary rank and file in the Red Army.

Glantz, David M. “Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943.” Combat Studies Institute Report No. 11. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1986.
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Diagrams of typical defensive dispositions.
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Glantz, David M. “Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of War (November 1942–December 1943: A Reappraisal.” Journal of Military History 60.1 (January 1996): 115–150.
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A well-documented account of Moscow’s strategic thinking prior to, during, and after Kursk.
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Merridale, Catherine. Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.
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Professor Merridale used letters, diaries, NKVD records, and more than 200 interviews in an effort to reconstruct the experiences of lower-ranking Soviet soldiers. Pages 202–225 focus on those experiences at Kursk, ranging from tank crews to medics.
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Orenstein, Harold S., trans. “The Battle of Kursk: The Defensive Battle for the Kursk Bridgehead, 5–15 July 1943.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 6.4 (December 1993): 656–700.
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An extract from the Collection of Materials on the Study of War Experience (Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta voiny) Vol. II (March–April 1944.) The first article describes the official version of Voronezh Front’s defense on the southern shoulder.
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Orenstein, Harold S., trans. “The Battle of Kursk (Continued): Tank Forces in Defense of the Kursk Bridgehead.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 7.1 (March 1994): 82–118.
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This continuation of the Red Army General Staff analysis includes detailed defensive techniques, focusing on anti-tank strongpoints.
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Parotkin, Ivan V., ed. The Battle of Kursk. Translated by G. P. Ivanov-Mumjiev. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974.
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A Soviet-era anthology of essays by the major Soviet participants, including Konev, Rokossovsky, Moskalenko. Although these articles address all aspects of the Soviet fight, they generally repeat the official version in which the Red Army skillfully defeated the Germans. For the original version see, I. V. Parotkin, ed. Kurskaia bitva. Moscow: Nauka, 1970.
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Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov. New York: Random House, 2012.
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Roberts’s favorable biography of Stalin’s deputy supreme commander discusses Kursk (pp. 184–193), including Zhukov’s efforts to restore his own role in the battle after Khrushchev suppressed it from official histories.
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Shukman, Harold, ed. Stalin’s Generals. New York: Grove, 1993.
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This account includes useful chapters on Novikov, Vatutin, Vasilevsky, and Rokossovsky, each of whom was instrumental in the Kursk campaign.
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Solov’ev, Boris Grigorevich. The Battle on the Kursk Salient: The Crushing of Operation Citadel. Moscow: Novosti, 1979.
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This slim volume was written to emphasize the overwhelming Soviet role in defeating Germany. The author therefore repeats the largest possible figures concerning the battle, and interprets all events from the point of view of the USSR helping the allies. It is even more one-sided than the same author’s 1970 study (see Koltunov and Solov’ev 1970, cited under Russian/Soviet Overviews.)
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Zaitsev, B. G., and V. N. Derkach. “Engineer Support in the Defensive Battle of Soviet Troops at the Battle of Kursk.” Voennaia mysl’ 14.4 (2005): 212–214.
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A standard, Marxist military analysis published in the Soviet General Staff’s house journal, Military Thought, filled with statistics about the organization and density of defenses. The article asserts that this battle became the model for subsequent Soviet methods of absorbing armored attack, including mobile obstacle detachments.
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Intelligence and Deception Aspects

In addition to overwhelming advantages in soldiers and weapons, the Soviets possessed a considerable advantage in terms of intelligence prior to the battle. Soviet partisans and long-range reconnaissance patrols provided a much more detailed understanding of the German rear area than the equivalent German intelligence, which was unaware of the true depth of their opponent’s defenses and manpower, as indicated by Eldridge 1989. Elder 1989 and Glantz 1989 provide different levels of detail concerning Soviet deception efforts. Glantz 1988 and Glantz 1989 represent two explanations of Soviet intelligence in 1943, with the latter being far more exhaustive. Mulligan 1987 is a useful critique of the legends concerning Soviet espionage within the German high command. Caircross 1997 makes a sensational, but undoubtedly exaggerated, claim that the author gave British signals intelligence information to Soviet intelligence prior to Kursk.

Caircross, John. The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two. London: Century, Random House, 1997.
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This is the autobiography, published posthumously, of a Scottish scholar who was accused of being part of the infamous Cambridge spy ring. As the title suggests, some have claimed that Caircross materially aided the Soviets by passing them Ultra signals intelligence prior to the battle of Kursk. However, even the author concedes that Soviet intelligence received similar information from other sources.
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Elder, James E. The Operational Implications of Deception at the Battle of Kursk. Master’s monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1989.
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A general overview of Soviet deception.
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Eldridge, Justin L. C. The Role of German Intelligence in the Planning and Conduct of Operation Citadel. Master’s monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1989.
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As the title indicates, this is a summary of the often-inadequate German intelligence concerning the Soviet defenses at Kursk.
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Glantz, David M. “Soviet Operational Intelligence in the Kursk Operation (July 1943).” Soviet Army Studies Office Report, 1988.
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Glantz argues that German intelligence was unaware of Soviet defenses and forces in the depths of the Kursk region, failing to identify ten field armies. By contrast, Soviet intelligence provided reliable information so that Red commanders could plan both their defense and the follow-on operations after Kursk.
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Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London: Frank Cass, 1989.
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Details specific deceptive measures the Soviets employed at Kursk (pp. 146–181).
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Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Intelligence in War. London: Frank Cass, 1990.
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An expansion of Glantz’s essay (Glantz 1988) with far greater detail concerning Kursk on pp. 172–283.
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Mulligan, Timothy P. “Spies, Cyphers, and ‘Zitadelle’: Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943.” Journal of Contemporary History 22.2 (April 1987): 235–260.
DOI: 10.1177/002200948702200203Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author compares the accuracy of Soviet human intelligence sources (Lucy) to British signals intelligence (Ultra) and concludes that the latter, while more accurate, was unable to provide more than a general warning. He suggests that tactical signals intelligence was more valuable, especially with regard to the Soviet counteroffensives.
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Air Aspects

While accounts of ground combat focus on the role of the new generation of German tanks, the Luftwaffe used primarily obsolescent aircraft. The one, perhaps exaggerated, exception was the first battlefield use, in small numbers, of the Ju-87G, armed with 30mm automatic cannon for use against Soviet armor. As argued by Muller 1992, even this weapon was limited both by shortages of aviation gasoline and by an increasingly competent and aggressive Red Air Force. Hardesty and Grinberg 2012 gives an updated view of how the Red Air Force developed throughout the war, an often-overlooked part of the story of Soviet victories. Hallion 1989 devotes a chapter to Kursk as part of a broader study of battlefield air support. Bergström 2007 is perhaps the most exhaustive study of the air battle at Kursk itself. Plocher 1967 and Kozhevnikov 1983 offer the official views of German and Soviet air commanders, respectively. Lucchesi 2007 provides little that is new in the understanding of this topic, but this work illustrates the worldwide fascination with Kursk in all its aspects.

Bergström, Christer. Kursk: The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham, UK: Classic, 2007.
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This rare study includes an extensive Russian and German language bibliography of its subject, as part of the author’s four-part study of the German-Soviet air struggle. He may over-emphasize the influence of air on the ground campaign, but overall this is an excellent work.
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Dalecky, William J. Battlefield Air Interdiction at the Battle of Kursk-1943. Master’s thesis. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1980.
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As the title suggests, this is an attempt to analyze the effects of airpower near but not at the line of contact, which was much more common than genuine close air support.
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Hallion, Richard P. Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911–1945. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1989.
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The discussion of Kursk (pp. 245–260) includes a balanced account of air operations, including the report that German forward air controller vehicles could not keep pace with the newer heavy armor in the battle.
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Hardesty, Van, and Ilya Grinberg. Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012.
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This superb revised edition of Hardesty’s classic discusses the air battle over Kursk (pp. 223–275), including the Red air order of battle. The authors assert that the Red Air Force practiced and improved its air-ground cooperation procedures during the battle, laying the foundation for later operations.
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Kozhevnikov, Mikhail Nikolaevich. The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. US Air Force Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 17. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983.
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The official, institutional account of Soviet air efforts at Kursk (pp. 125–143), including highly optimistic figures of German aircraft destroyed. Original published Moscow: Nauka, 1977.
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Lucchesi, Claudio. Kursk, 1943: Grandes Batalhas Aereas. Sao Paulo, Brazil: C & R Editorial, 2007.
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A short survey of the employment of air power at Kursk by a Brazilian aviation historian.
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Muller, Richard R. The German Air War in Russia. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishers, 1992.
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Muller places Luftwaffe support of ground operations into context, describing German operational attacks on the Gorki tank plants and other targets prior to the battle itself. He argues convincingly that concentration on the Ju-87G has given an exaggerated view of the very limited German air capability against Soviet armor.
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Plocher, Hermann. The German Air Force against Russia, 1943. New York: Arno, 1967.
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Originally written for the US government after the war, this account provides considerable detail about the German air fleets involved at Kursk. Plocher commanded 1st Flieger Division on the northern face of the Kursk bulge. See especially pages 77–83 concerning the fuel and other limitations on German air efforts.
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Prokhorovka Engagement

The encounter around Prokhorovka is the basis for the contention that Kursk was the largest single tank engagement in history. As such, this engagement is the center of much of the revisionist arguments, which contend that Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, the commander of 5th Guards Tank Army, embroidered and exaggerated the nature of this clash in order to explain the horrendous casualties suffered by his tank corps. In particular, Zamulin 2011 and Zamulin 2012 argue that this tank army, like 1st Tank Army earlier in the battle, was so badly handled that only two of Rotmistrov’s subordinate corps arrived at Prokhorovka on schedule, resulting in heavy losses and a tactical victory for the fragmented SS forces they met on 12 July. Zamulin’s two works contend that this 12 July counterattack was part of a larger, and equally uncoordinated, attempt to encircle all of II SS Panzer Corps.

Armstrong, Richard N. Red Army Tank Commanders: The Armored Guards. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1994.
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In his excellent biography of six tank commanders, Armstrong provides considerable detail on the employment of M. E. Katukov’s 1st Tank Army (pp. 57–63), A. G. Rodin’s 2nd Tank Army (pp. 123–125), and P. A. Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army (pp. 346–359). Although the author criticizes the employment of 1st and 2nd Tank Armies, he follows Rotmistrov’s account of Prokhorovka.
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Crow, Charles L. Operational Level Analysis of Soviet Armored Formations in the Deliberate Defense in the Battle of Kursk, 1943. Master’s thesis. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1985.
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A discussion of the commitment and employment of the tank armies; of limited utility.
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Lopukhovsky, Lev. Prokhorovka bez grifa sekretnosti. Moscow: Eksmo, 2005.
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“Prokorovka without the secret classification.” A sound and detailed account of the engagement based on newly released archival materials, generally following Zamulin’s argument about the botched and limited nature of the battle at Prokhorovka.
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Nipe, George M. Blood, Steel, and Myth: The II. SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka, July 1943. Stamford, CT: RZM, 2011.
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Nipe provides the German side of the revisionist approach to Prokhorovka, calculating that II SS Panzer Corps had only 232 operational tanks on 12 July, and lost no more than 54. This book includes numerous illustrations and details about tactical combat on the German side.
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Rotmistrov, P. A. Stal’naia gvardiia. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984.
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“The steel guards.” The commander of 5th Guards Tank Army describes the role his tank army played in this famous battle (pp. 162–231). Beginning shortly after the battle, Rotmistrov’s accounts have formed the accepted wisdom about Prokhorovka.
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Schrank, David. Thunder at Prokhorovka: A Combat History of Operation Citadel, Kursk, July 1943. Solihull, UK: Helion, 2014.
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A carefully researched integration of various recent studies of the battle.
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Zamulin, Valerii Nikolaevich. Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle of Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative. Translated and edited by Stuart Britton. Solihull, UK: Helion, 2011.
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The most significant recent work on Kursk. The author reconstructs events on the southern face of the Kursk bulge, and liberally criticizes most Soviet commanders. Zamulin not only argues against the mythical battle of 12 July, but also contends that the encounter was part of a botched counterattack driven from Moscow.
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Zamulin, Valerii Nikolaevich. “Prokorovka: The Origins and Evolution of a Myth.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25.4 (2012): 582–595.
DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2012.730391Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Zamulin attributes the exaggerated numbers of tanks involved to both Soviet intelligence failures and Rotmistrov’s desire to portray his heavy losses in the best possible light.
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Soviet Counteroffensives (Operations KUTUZOV and RUMIANTSEV)

While the Germans still strove in vain to penetrate the deep defenses around Kursk, on 12 July a Soviet counter-offensive (Operation KUTUZOV) struck against the reciprocal Orel Bulge, held by the German Second Panzer and Ninth Armies just north of Kursk. This attack forced the Germans to evacuate the area and abandon even the limited gains made on the northern shoulder of Kursk. More ominously for the Germans, the forces on the southern shoulder, which had apparently suffered serious losses during Manstein’s offensive, launched their own counteroffensive (Operation RUMIANTSEV) on 3 August, less than three weeks after the German offensive ceased. Again, the Red Army erased any German gains at Kursk and moved on to retake Khar’kov in early August. Bukeikhanov 2013 covers both of these operations thoroughly, while Pierce 1987 gives a brief overview of the effects of KUTUZOV and RUMIANTSEV on the overall Kursk campaign. Bagramian 1963 and Sandalov 1963 are heavily influenced by Soviet official historiography, but nonetheless provide contemporary accounts of KUTUZOV. Shchekotikhin 2009 and Shein 2007 are two excellent examples of how recent Russian historians have re-examined the forgotten Soviet counteroffensive in the north.

Bagramian, Ivan Khristoforovich. “Flangovy udar 11-i gvardeiskoi armii.” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 7 (July 1963): 83–95.
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“The flank attack of 11th Guards Army.” Bagramian commanded 11th Guards Army, the principal force in Operation KUTUZOV.
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Bukeikhanov, Petr. Kurskaia bitva: Nastuplenie: Operatsiia “Kutuzov,” Operatsiia “Polkovodets Rumiantsev” Iiul’–avgust 1943. Moscow: Tsentropoligraf, 2013.
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“The battle of Kursk: Counteroffensive: Operation “Kutuzov,” and Operation “Commander Rumiantsev” July–August 1943.” This is the most thorough study to date on Operations KUTUZOV and RUMIANTSEV.
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Pierce, Kerry K. Kursk: A Study in Operational Art. Master’s monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1987.
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Considers the role of the counteroffensives in the campaign.
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Sandalov, L. “Brianskii front v orlovskoi operatsii.” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 8 (August 1963): 62–72.
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“The Briansk Front in the Orel operation.” For its time (during the Khrushchev era), this was a frank discussion of KUTUZOV.
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Shchekotikhin, Egor. Krupneishee tankovoe srazhenie Velikoi Otechestvennoi: Bitva za Orel. Moscow: Eksmo, 2009.
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“The largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic [War]: The battle for Orel.” A very detailed and accurate account of Operation KUTUZOV, particularly the roles played by Soviet 3rd Guards, 4th, and 2nd Tank Armies.
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Shein, Dmitrii. Tanki vedet Rybalko: Boevoi put’ 3-i Gvardeiskoi tankovoi armii. Moscow: Eksmo, 2007.
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“Rybalko leads tanks.” This large-format book contains an excellent documentary treatment of 3rd Guards Tank Army’s performance in the Orel offensive (pp. 95–131).