Some members of the Russian political class now claim that Russia would be able to inflict a crushing defeat on Ukraine in a few hours (shorter terms are mentioned) if a military conflict were to break out. Let's see whether such statements are true.

In the Russian expert community, the opinion that it will not even be necessary to introduce troops into the territory of Ukraine because the Armed Forces of this country are in a deplorable state has recently become quite firmly entrenched.

Some political analysts emphasize that a powerful Russian fire strike will destroy practically all surveillance and communication systems, artillery and tank formations. Moreover, some experts conclude that even one crushing blow from Russia will be enough to bring this war to an end.

As the cherry on the cake, some analysts emphasize the fact that no one in Ukraine will defend the "Kiev regime.

THERE WILL BE NO EASY WALK

Let us begin with the latter. To state that no one in Ukraine will defend the regime means, in practice, complete ignorance of the military and political situation and the sentiments of the broad masses of people in the neighboring state. Moreover, the degree of hatred (which is known to be the most effective fuel for an armed struggle) towards Moscow is blatantly underestimated in the neighboring republic. No one in Ukraine will welcome the Russian army with bread, salt, and flowers.

It seems that the events in southeastern Ukraine in 2014 did not teach anyone anything. At that time, they also expected that the entire left-bank Ukraine would turn to Novorossiya in a single movement and in a matter of seconds. They were already drawing maps, estimating the staffing of future city and regional administrations, and designing state flags.

But even the Russian-speaking population of this part of Ukraine (including such cities as Kharkov, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, and Mariupol) did not support such plans in their vast majority. The "Novorossiya" project somehow imperceptibly deflated and quietly died.

In a word, a liberation march in 2022, following the example and likeness of 1939, will not happen. In this case, the words of Arkady Gaidar, a classic of Soviet literature, are more true than ever: "Apparently now we're not going to have an easy fight, but a hard battle.

"WITH LITTLE BLOOD, WITH A MIGHTY BLOW".

Now about the "powerful Russian fire strike," which will allegedly destroy "virtually all surveillance and communications systems, artillery and tank formations of the AFU."

This expression alone shows that only political officers could say this. For reference: in hypothetical theater-scale hostilities, strikes are carried out against priority targets and massive fire strikes. Note that the epithets "powerful" (as well as "medium," "weak," etc.) are not used in operational-strategic planning.

Military science emphasizes that strikes can be strategic (this mostly applies to strategic nuclear forces), operational, and tactical. According to the number of forces and targets involved, strikes can be massive, group, and single. And other concepts, even in essays of a political science nature, are still better not to be introduced or used.

Strikes against priority objects and massive fire strikes can be carried out as part of a front (fronts on Russia's western borders have not yet been formed) or the main command of the armed forces in a theater (no such command has been created in the Southwestern strategic direction yet either). Anything less than this is no longer a massive strike.

And what, for example, is a massive fire strike (MFI) on the front? To begin with let us note that the maximum number of combat-ready forces and means of aviation, rocket forces and artillery, and REB means available to the commander of the front (operational-strategic association) is involved in a Massive Fire Attack. An MRI is one massive sortie by aircraft, two or three launches of MLRS and TR rocket systems, and several artillery fire strikes. It is good if the degree of enemy fire is 60-70%.

What is the most important thing about this issue in relation to the conflict with Ukraine? Undoubtedly, IEDs will inflict heavy casualties on the probable enemy. But to expect just one such strike to crush the armed forces of an entire state is simply unbridled optimism in the planning and conduct of combat operations. In the course of hypothetical strategic operations on the theater it will be necessary to inflict not one or two such strikes, but much more.

To this we must certainly add that the Russian Armed Forces' stockpile of advanced and high-precision weapons is not of any limitless nature. There are no hypersonic rockets of the "Zirkon" type in service yet. The number of Kalibers (sea-launched cruise missiles), Khingals, Kh-101 (air-launched cruise missiles) and Iskander missiles is measured in hundreds (dozens in the case of Khingals) at the very best. This arsenal is absolutely insufficient to wipe out a state the size of France and with a population of more than 40 million people. And these are the parameters that characterize Ukraine.

ABOUT AIR SUPREMACY

Sometimes it is claimed in the Russian expert community (by fans of the Due Doctrine) that since the hypothetical hostilities in Ukraine will take place in conditions of complete air superiority of Russian aviation, the war will be extremely short-lived and will end in the shortest possible time.

It is somehow forgotten that the armed formations of the Afghan opposition during the 1979-1989 conflict did not have a single plane or a single combat helicopter. And the war in this country dragged on for 10 years. The Chechen fighters did not have a single aircraft either. The fight against them lasted for several years and was very bloody and costly for the federal forces.

However, the Armed Forces of Ukraine still have some sort of combat aviation. As well as air defense means.

Incidentally, the Ukrainian anti-aircraft artillery forces (not the Georgian ones) considerably damaged the Russian air force during the 2008 conflict. After the first day of combat operations, the leadership of the Russian Air Force was quite shocked by the losses it had suffered. This should not be forgotten.

WEEPING IN ADVANCE

Now for the thesis "Ukraine's Armed Forces are in a deplorable state." Undoubtedly, the AFU has problems with aviation and modern means of air defense. But we must also admit the following. If before 2014 the AFU was a fragment of the Soviet army, then over the past seven years Ukraine has created a qualitatively different army, on a completely different ideological basis and largely based on NATO standards. And very modern weapons and equipment are now and continue to come to Ukraine from many countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

As for the weakest point of the AFU - the Air Force. It cannot be ruled out that the collective West can rather quickly supply Kiev with fighters, as they say, out of the armed forces' stock - simply put, used. However, this second hand fighter aircraft will be quite comparable with most of the Russian aircraft fleet in terms of their performance characteristics.

Undoubtedly, today the AFU is considerably inferior to the RF Armed Forces in its combat and operational capabilities. No one doubts this, neither in the East, nor in the West.

But one should not treat this army lightly. In this regard we should always remember the precept of Alexander Suvorov: "Never despise your enemy, do not consider him sillier and weaker than you.

Now, as for the statement that Western countries will not send a single soldier to die for Ukraine.

It should be noted that this is likely to be the case. However, this by no means excludes in the event of a Russian invasion massive assistance to the AFU by the collective West with the most diverse samples of weapons and military equipment and voluminous supplies of all sorts of materiel. In this regard, the West has already shown an unprecedented so far consolidated position, which, it seems, was not predicted in Moscow.

There is no doubt that reincarnation of Lend-Lease on the model and likeness of WWII will start in the US and NATO countries. The influx of volunteers from the West, which could be very large, can't be ruled out.

PARTISANS AND UNDERGROUND

Finally, about the duration of the hypothetical campaign. In the Russian expert community, several hours, sometimes even several tens of minutes are mentioned. It is somehow forgotten that we have already gone through all this. The phrase "to take the city by a single paratrooper regiment in two hours" has already become a classic of the genre.

It is also worth recalling that the mighty Stalinist NKVD and the multi-million dollar Soviet army fought the nationalist underground in Western Ukraine for more than 10 years. And now there is a possibility that the whole of Ukraine could easily go to the partisans. Moreover, these formations could easily begin to operate on Russian territory as well.

Armed struggle in large Ukrainian cities generally defies prediction. It is well known that a large city is the best battleground for the weaker and less technically advanced side of an armed conflict.

Serious experts point out that in a megalopolis it is possible not only to concentrate a group of thousands or even tens of thousands of fighters, but also to shelter it from the superior firepower of the enemy. It is also possible to supply it with materiel and make up for losses in men and equipment for a long time. Neither mountains, nor forests, nor jungles provide such an opportunity today.

Experts are convinced that the urban environment helps defenders, slows down the movement of attackers, allows a record number of fighters per unit area, and compensates for lagging behind in strength and technology. And in Ukraine there are more than enough big cities, including those with a population of millions. So the Russian army in a hypothetical war with Ukraine could face far more than just Stalingrad and Grozny.

CONCLUSIONS

All in all, there will be no Ukrainian blitzkrieg. The statements of some experts such as "The Russian army will defeat most of the units of the AFU in 30-40 minutes", "Russia is able to defeat Ukraine in 10 minutes in case of a full-scale war", "Russia will defeat Ukraine in eight minutes" have no serious basis in fact.

Finally, and most importantly. An armed conflict with Ukraine is currently fundamentally inconsistent with Russia's national interests. Therefore, some over-excited Russian experts should best forget about their cap-and-trade fantasies. And in order to prevent further reputational losses, never mention them again.