Marauding Mangan

Case No. 2-12-0688
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
People of the State of Illinois,		)    	           Appeal from the Circuit Court
Appellee - Plaintiff 		           )       		of the Nineteenth Judicial
				                	)                    Circuit Lake County, Illinois		    v.                                               )
	    		    			)		Gen. No. 07 CM 8549
Christopher Briggs,    			)		Honorable Michael Betar
Appellant - Defendant.		    	)		Presiding Judge
MOTION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO DECLARE ALL ORDERS NOT RENDERED BY A JUDICIAL OFFICER IN CASE 2-12-0688 VOID
	In our judgment, the extension of the doctrine of judicial notice to include facts which, while not generally known, are readily verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy is an important aid in the efficient disposition of litigation, and its use, where appropriate, is to be commended. People v. Davis, 65 Ill.2d 157, 165, 357 N.E.2d 792, 796 (Ill., 1976).
	Appellant requests and the Court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of orders in its own Court Record  that demonstrates all orders to date in case 2-12-0688 have been rendered by a non-judicial clerk: Robert J. Mangan.
	As a matter of law, any order that has not been rendered by a judge in a judicial proceeding is void ab initio.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 indisputably shows that no order has been rendered by a judge.
 	By operation of law all orders in case 2-12-0688 are void ab initio.
	Taking judicial notice of matters of record… in the same court is simply an application of the increasingly recognized principle that matters susceptible of judicial notice include facts ‘capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.’ People v. Davis, 65 Ill.2d 157, 161, 357 N.E.2d 792, 794 (Ill., 1976) quoting, McCormick on Evidence, at 763 (2d ed. 1972), see also 9 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2571, at 548 (3d ed. 1940), 1 Jones, Evidence, sec. 2.2 at 32 (6th ed. 1972), Rule 9(2)(d), Uniform Rules of Evidence, 4 Jones, Evidence 372 (6th ed. 1972); now codified as: Illinois Rules of Evidence, Article II, Rule 201(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
	Effective January 1, 2011, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Illinois Rules of Evidence. With the court's adoption of the Illinois Rules of Evidence, Illinois joins 44 other jurisdictions that have approved evidentiary rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Illinois Rules of Evidence as they pertain to judicial notice adopt every aspect of the Federal Rules of Evidence including following the federal rules' topical outline and numerical sequence. See, Illinois Bar Journal, Volume 98, Number 12, page 620 (December, 2010).
	Illinois Rules of Evidence Rule 201(b)(2) defines a judicially noticed fact as one that is “capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.” ILL. R. EVID. 201(b)(2) (West 2014).
	Illinois Rules of Evidence Rule 201 allows the court discretion to take judicial notice of factual evidence sua sponte when Rule 201(c) states: “When Discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.” ILL. R. EVID. 201(c) (West 2014).
	When a party supplies the necessary information and requests the court take judicial notice, the Illinois Rules of Evidence, which are binding on the court, eliminates a court’s discretion and makes the court’s taking of judicial notice mandatory.
	Illinois Rules of Evidence Rule 201 imposes a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty on the court requiring the court take judicial notice when Rule 201(d) states: “When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” ILL. R. EVID. 201(d) (West 2014).
	Appellant requests and the Court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact that the Appellate Court Record in case 2-12-0688 contains the necessary information and is capable immediately and accurately demonstrating evidentiary facts necessary to confirm the actions taken by the Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan, including rendering judicial orders.
	The term mandatory “ ‘refers to an obligatory duty which a governmental entity is required to perform.’ ” People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill.2d 507, 514, 922 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ill., 2009) quoting, People v. Robinson, 217 Ill.2d 43, 51, 838 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ill., 2005), in turn quoting, Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal.3d 901, 908, 559 P.2d 606, 610–11, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 255–56 (1977).
	It is well established that the supreme court rules "have the force of law and are binding on the court…” Nizamuddin v. Community Education In Excellence, Inc., 2013 WL ___, No. 2-13-1230, ¶ 15 (2 Dist., December 23, 2013) quoting, In re Meirink's Estate, 11 Ill.2d 561, 564, 144 N.E.2d 591, 592-593 (Ill., 1957) in turn citing, Harris v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 124, 127, 103 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ill., 1952), Biggs v. Spader, 411 Ill. 42, 44, 103 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ill., 1952).
	Therefore by the effect of Illinois Rules of Evidence Rule 201(d) the Court has no discretion and has a mandatory duty to take judicial notice of the very same facts in the Court Record which provide irrefutable evidence that Clerk Robert J. Mangan acts have exceeded the power of the Office of the Clerk.
	The legal effect of all orders to date in case 2-12-0688 not having been rendered by a judge is that as a matter of law all orders in case 2-12-0688 are void ab initio.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact that no order in case 2-12-0688 is signed by a judicial officer.
	A court will take judicial notice of its own records. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 66, 695 N.E.2d 391, 409 (Ill., 1998).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that no order to date in the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 makes any reference to any Appellate Court Judge, in any manner.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that all orders to date in the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 are not signed by anyone.
	There is a well-recognized distinction between rendering an order and entering an order. “The former is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing its ruling or finding in the controversy; the latter is the ministerial act of the clerk in preserving the record of that decision.” Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 Ill. 295, 299, 94 NE 2d 139, 141 (Ill., 1950).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that that the no order to date in the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 has been rendered by a judge.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that to date all orders in the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 appear in the name of Robert J. Mangan, Clerk.
	Judicial notice is proper where the document in question is part of the public record Muller v. Zollar, 267 Ill.App.3d 339, 341, 642 N.E.2d 860, 862 (3 Dist., 1994) citing, May Dept. Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 743, 64 Ill.2d 153, 159, 355 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ill., 1976); Village of Riverwoods v. BG Ltd. Partnership, 276 Ill.App.3d 720, 724, 658 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (1 Dist., 1995).
	Clerks of the circuit courts are nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch of state government.  Pucinski v. County of Cook, 192 Ill.2d 540, 545, 737 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ill., 2000), Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 18(b); Kane County v. Carlson, 116 Ill.2d 186, 200, 507 N.E.2d 482, 487 (Ill., 1987); Drury v. County of McLean , 89 Ill.2d 417, 420, 433 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ill., 1982)(We hold that under our constitution of 1970 the clerks of the circuit courts in this State …are nonjudicial members of the judicial branch of State government.).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that Appellant has filed motions in case 2-12-0688 and that Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan has rendered an order in response to each.
	“A void order … is one entered …by a court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the order involved.” Young America's Foundation v. Doris A. Pistole Revocable Living Trust, 2013 IL App (2d) 121122, ¶46, 998 N.E.2d 94, 105-106 (2 Dist., 2013) quoting, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 214 Ill.2d 371, 379–80, 827 N.E.2d 422,428 (Ill., 2005); Bundy v. Church League of America, 125 Ill.App.3d 800, 804, 466 N.E.2d 681, 685 (2 Dist., 1984) citing, City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Commission, 65 Ill.2d 108, 112, 357 N.E.2d 1154, 1155 (Ill., 1976) in turn citing, Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858, 861 (Ill., 1945) See also, People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged, 40 Ill.2d 91, 95, 237 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ill., 1968); Buford v. Chief, Park District Police, 18 Ill.2d 265, 271, 164 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ill., 1960); Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill. 334, 339, 16 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Ill., 1938).
	The clerk may certify that certain papers were filed at a certain date, and that a certain order was made at a certain time, in each case setting forth not his conclusion as to what the order was or the paper contained, but a copy of the paper or of the order. The clerk of the court is a record keeper, not a record maker or interpreter. Ruston v. Sonnberg, 107 Ill.App. 575, 579, 1903 WL 1487, 3 (1 Dist., 1903) (emphasis added).
	Any court order rendered by a non-judicial officer is of no legal effect, a legal nullity, void ab initio.
	Black's Law Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004), defines the word ‘void’ as “of no legal effect; null,” See, Bond Kildeer Marketplace, LLC v. CBS Outdoor, Inc., 2012 IL App 111292, ¶ 17, 977 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (2 Dist., 2012).
	“An order must be reduced to writing before it takes legal effect.”  56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 56 (November 2013).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that the Court Record to date does not show the name of any judge rendering any order in case 2-12-0688.
	The orders of the court, to be effective, must appear upon the records of the court. Williams v. Harper, 127 Ill.App. 619, 624, 1906 WL 2018, 3 (1 Dist., 1906).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that the Court Record to date does not show the signature of any judge on any order in case 2-12-0688.
	Of course, the only correct answer is that any order of a court becomes effective only when reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk for journalization. State v. Herder, 65 Ohio App.2d 70, 74, 415 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ohio App., 1979).
	Only judicial members properly occupying the bench have the power and authority to render judicial orders.
	The clerk has no judicial power. Livingston County Building & Loan Ass'n v. Keach, 213 Ill. 59, 60, 72 N.E. 769, 770 (Ill., 1904).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that to date all orders in the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 are rendered in the name of the Appellate Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan.
	The rendition of judicial orders is a judicial function beyond the authority of Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan.
	The employees of the Office of the Clerk simply fill clerical positions. see, Keim v. U.S., 177 U.S. 290, 293, 20 S.Ct. 574, 575 (U.S., 1900).
	Clerk Mangan’s official duties are strictly ministerial clerical work and therefore the Clerk Mangan does not have authority to render judicial orders.
	Judicial orders not rendered by judicial officers properly occupying the bench are void ab initio.
	An order entered without authority … is void and may be challenged at any time in any court, directly or collaterally. OneWest Bank, FSB v. Markowicz, 2012 IL App (1st) 111187, 360 Ill.Dec. 233, 238, 968 N.E.2d 726, 731 (1 Dist., 2012), citing Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 103, 776 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ill., 2002); Morey Fish Co. v. Rymer Foods, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 179, 187-188, 632 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (Ill.,1994); State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill.2d 294, 309, 497 N.E.2d 1156, 1162 (Ill., 1986), citing R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill.2d 304, 309, 489 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ill., 1986), Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill.2d 108, 112, 395 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill., 1979); City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Commission, 65 Ill.2d 108, 112, 357 N.E.2d 1154, 1155 (Ill., 1976); Barnard v. Michael , 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858, 861 (Ill., 1945).
	The act of rendering judicial orders in case 2-12-0688 is a willful usurpation of power by Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan exclusively belonging to judicial members of the judicial branch of State government.
	“[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (U.S., 1998), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (U.S., 1974).
	Illinois criminal Statute 720 ILCS 5/32-8 (West 2008), entitled Tampering with Public Records, provides in pertinent part:
	(c) A judge, circuit clerk or clerk of court, public official or employee, court reporter, or other person commits tampering with public records when he or she knowingly, without lawful authority, and with the intent to defraud any party, public officer or entity, alters, destroys, defaces, removes, or conceals any public record received or held by any judge or by a clerk of any court.
	(c-5) "Public record" expressly includes, but is not limited to, court records, or documents, evidence, or exhibits filed with the clerk of the court and which have become a part of the official court record, pertaining to any civil or criminal proceeding in any court.
	(d) Sentence… A violation of subsection (c) is a Class 3 felony. Any person convicted under subsection (c) who at the time of the violation was responsible for making, keeping, storing, or reporting the record for which the tampering occurred:
	(1) shall forfeit his or her public office or public employment, if any, and shall thereafter be ineligible for both State and local public office and public employment in this State for a period of 5 years after completion of any term of probation, conditional discharge, or incarceration in a penitentiary including the period of mandatory supervised release;
	(2) shall forfeit all retirement, pension, and other benefits arising out of public office or public employment as may be determined by the court in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Illinois Pension Code;
	(3) shall be subject to termination of any professional licensure or registration in this State as may be determined by the court in accordance with the provisions of the applicable professional licensing or registration laws;
	(4) may be ordered by the court, after a hearing in accordance with applicable law and in addition to any other penalty or fine 	imposed by the court, to forfeit to the State an amount equal to any financial gain or the value of any advantage realized by the person as a result of the offense; and
	(5) may be ordered by the court, after a hearing in accordance with applicable law and in addition to any other penalty or fine 	imposed by the court, to pay restitution to the victim in an amount equal to any financial loss or the value of any advantage lost by the victim as a result of the offense.
	Further, the Officials Convicted of Infamous Crimes Act 5 ILCS 280/1 states in pertinent part: “Any person holding office under the Constitution of the State of Illinois… who is convicted in any court of the State of Illinois or of the United States of a felony, bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime, as understood in Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution of 1970, shall be, upon conviction, ineligible to continue in such office.”
	Rule 8.4(a)(3) forbids lawyers from committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on their trustworthiness, honesty or fitness as an attorney. 134 Ill.2d R. 8.4(a)(3). Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill.2d 214, 227, 730 N.E.2d 4, 14 (Ill., 2000). [repealed, now: Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Art. VIII, Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010, Rule 8.4(b).
	Constitutional due process requires, at a minimum, that motions filed with the court be heard and decisions be rendered by judicial officers properly occupying the bench and not the clerk.
	Appellants motions in case 2-12-0688 have been heard by ministerial clerk Mangan. Appellant has been denied his due process right to a fair and impartial hearing. Clerks have no authority to hold judicial hearings.
	Appellants motions in case 2-12-0688 have been heard by ministerial clerk Mangan. Appellant has been denied his due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal. A fair and impartial tribunal never includes a non-judicial clerk.
	Due process of law presupposes a fair and impartial hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal. Smith v. Department of Registration & Ed., 412 Ill. 332, 341, 106 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Ill., 1952) citing, Com'rs of Union Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 425, 84 N.E. 376, 378 (Ill., 1908).
	A fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464 (U.S., 1975) quoting, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (U.S., 1955); Scott v. Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, 84 Ill.2d 42, 54, 416 N.E.2d 1082, 1089 (Ill., 1981).
	Where Clerk/Attorney Mangan has willfully usurped judicial power and entered into the Court Record orders and other documents of his own creation, then logic will dictate that the opposite will also be true: that orders or documents rendered by Appellate Court Judges need to be destroyed, hidden, removed, or concealed from the public Court Record so as only entries rendered by Clerk Mangan will appear in the Court Record.
	The duties of the appellate court clerk are delineated in the Illinois Appellate Court Act, 705 ILCS 25. Section 3 of the Act states in pertinent part: “The clerk of each branch of the appellate court shall perform the duties usually devolving upon clerks of courts in this State”
	The Illinois Circuit Court Clerk Regulation Act 705 ILCS 110 at Section 1 states: “It shall be unlawful for any clerk or deputy clerk of a circuit court to prepare or draft any document which is to be filed or recorded in the court in which he or she is clerk or deputy clerk,…”. Section 2 of the Act states any person violating Section 1 of this Act shall be guilty of a crime.
	Appellant requests and the Court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact that the orders contained in a Certified Appellate Court Record certified by the Clerk on 1/21/2014 and attached to this motion as Exhibit 2 are the same orders that appeared in the Appellate Court Record. (viewed by Appellant on 1/21/2014.)
	Attached to this motion as Exhibit 1 are all fourteen orders rendered and mailed to Appellant by Clerk Robert J. Mangan.
	The fact that Appellant’s Exhibit 1 contains six orders mailed from the Appellate Court to the Appellate than does the Court Record as of 1/21/14 or the Certified Record as of 1/21/14 (Exhibit 2) confirms that Clerk Mangan does not enter all orders, non-judicial or judicial, into the Record as required by law.
	The Illinois Clerks of Courts Act, 705 ILCS 105 at Section 17 states: “If any clerk shall fail to keep any such docket, or record book, or any book required by law to be kept by him or her, or to make the proper entries therein at the time required by law, or, when no time is fixed, within a reasonable time, he or she shall be guilty of a petty offense and shall be fined by the court not exceeding $100, and for a subsequent offense he or she may be fined in a like amount, or proceeded against as for a Class A misdemeanor in office, and removed from the office.”
	Under the common-law doctrine of public official immunity, liability will be imposed upon public officials for the negligent performance of ministerial acts. See, Kirschbaum v. Village of Homer Glen, 365 Ill.App.3d 486, 491, 848 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (3 Dist., 2006) citing,  Long v. Friesland, 178 Ill.App.3d 42, 52, 532 N.E.2d 914, 920 (5 Dist., 1988); Bonnell v. Regional Bd. of School Trustees of Madison County, 258 Ill.App.3d 485, 488-489, 630 N.E.2d 547, 549 (5 Dist., 1994) (It is now well recognized that the Act provides immunity only for acts which are “discretionary” in nature but does not provide immunity for acts which are “ministerial” in nature.); Amy v. Desmoines County Sup'rs, 78 U.S. 136, 138, 1870 WL 12763, 3, 20 L.Ed. 101 (U.S., 1870) (The rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct. There is an unbroken current of authorities to this effect.)
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that without any order in case 2-12-0688 being rendered by an Appellate Court Judge, the record is also silent as to any judicial hearing being accorded to Appellant’s motions contained in the Court Record and the Certified Record (Exhibit 2).
	The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings. Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 1765 (U.S., 1996) citing, Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 1876 WL 19687, 4, 23 L.Ed. 914 (U.S., 1876); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236, 20 S.Ct. 620, 622, 44 L.Ed. 747 (U.S., 1900); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436, 21 S.Ct. 836, 839, 45 L.Ed. 1165 (U.S., 1901).
	Procedural due process rights are triggered when fundamental right is being denied. East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. E. St. Louis School Dist., 178 Ill.2d 399, 422, 687 N.E.2d 1050, 1063 (Ill., 1997) citing, People v R.G., 131 Ill.2d 328, 342, 546 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ill., 1989), Tiller v. Klincar, 138 Ill.2d 1, 13-14, 561 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ill., 1990), Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 503 (U.S., 1985).
	The Due Process Clause requires provision of a hearing “at a meaningful time.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1496 (U.S., 1985), citing E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, (U.S., 1965).
	The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. People v. Weaver, 90 Ill.App.3d, 299, 309-310, 412 N.E.2d 1353, 1362 (2 Dist., 1980); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642 (U.S., 1961) citing, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-276, 68 S.Ct. 499, 509, 92 L.Ed. 682 (U.S., 1948), Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444, 71 L.Ed. 749 (U.S., 1927).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact that the Court Record to date in case 2-12-0688 is silent as to any judicial hearing of Appellant’s motions.
	The Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government officials “‘“from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.”’” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1716 (U.S., 1998), quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (U.S., 1992), in turn quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003 (U.S., 1998) (“ ‘ “to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,” ’ ” and “to prevent governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of oppression’ ”) (internal citations omitted), in turn quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670–671 (U.S., 1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1919, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (U.S., 1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result: to prevent the “affirmative abuse of power”).
	The “right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 (U.S., 1976) quoting, Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 646, 95 L.Ed. 817 (U.S., 1951).
	The due process clause grants “heightened protection against governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill.2d 309, 316, 769 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill., 2002), quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787 (U.S., 1997).
	A denial to a party of the benefit of a hearing would be in effect to deny that he is entitled to hearing at all, and a sham and deceptive proceeding altogether. See, Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-278, 1876 WL 19687, 4, 23 L.Ed. 914 (U.S., 1876).

      The principle stated in this terse language lies at the foundation of all well-ordered systems of jurisprudence. Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend, for the liability and the right are inseparable. This is a principle of natural justice, recognized as such by the common intelligence and conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 1876 WL 19687, 4, 23 L.Ed. 914 (U.S., 1876) (emphasis added).
      A void order is one in which the rendering court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. See, Eckel v. MacNeal, 256 Ill.App.3d 292, 296, 628 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1 Dist., 1993); Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 117 Ill.App.3d 512, 517, 452 N.E.2d 1383, 1388 (5 Dist., 1983); see also Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 163 F.3d 411, 423 (7th Cir. 1998), citing United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. From High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995); Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1998), citing Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 295 (7th Cir. 1981); Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 170 F.R.D. 441, 446 (N.D.Ill. 1996).
	State may not, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party named in the proceedings without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard  Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 1765 (U.S., 1996) citing,  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733, 1877 WL 18188, 12, 24 L.Ed. 565 (U.S., 1877); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46, 14 S.Ct. 1108, 1112-1113, 38 L.Ed. 896 (U.S., 1874); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423, 35 S.Ct. 625, 628, 59 L.Ed. 1027 (U.S., 1915).
	A void order is a complete nullity from its inception, has no legal effect and may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time or in any court. Jones v. Chicago Cycle Center, 391 Ill.App.3d 101, 107, 908 NE 2d 150, 156 (1 Dist., 2009) citing, Schak v. Blom, 334 Ill.App.3d 129, 134, 777 N.E.2d 635, 640 (1 Dist., 2002); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 214 Ill.2d 371, 379-380, 827 N.E.2d 422, 427-428 (Ill., 2005).
	Where Clerk/Attorney Mangan has willfully entered into the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 orders that have not been rendered by a judge, the law recognizes orders procured by fraud.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact that the Court Record, Exhibit 1 and 2 show Clerk Robert J. Mangan has to date has rendered 14 orders in case 2-12-0688.
	Both Illinois Appellate and Supreme Court case law have consistently held that a judgment or order is void where it is entered by a court or agency lacking personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, or the inherent power to enter the particular judgment or order, or where the judgment or order is procured by fraud. Juszczyk v. Flores, 334 Ill.App.3d 122, 125, 777 N.E.2d 454, 456-457 (1 Dist., 2002). citing, See, e.g., Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill.2d 108, 112, 395 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill., 1979); Siddens v. Industrial Comm'n, 304 Ill.App.3d 506, 511, 711 N.E.2d 18, 22 (Ill., 1999); Evans v. Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 302, 565 N.E.2d 724, 727 (2 Dist., 1990); Miller v. Balfour, 303 Ill.App.3d 209, 215, 707 N.E.2d 759, 764 (2 Dist., 1999).
	Though the State cannot be sued, its officers, whose acts were illegal and void, may be. Newton v. Mahoning County Com'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 560, 1879 WL 16536, 11 (U.S., 1879) citing, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U.S. 738, 837, 1824 WL 2682, 37, 6 L.Ed. 204, (U.S., 1824), Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 83 U.S. 203, 1872 WL 15325, 21 L.Ed. 447 (U.S., 1872); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice of the fact that Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan has not entered any judicially rendered order into the Court Record in case 2-12-0688.
	The well-settled maxim that a court of record can act only through its orders made of record, when applied to judicial proceedings, means that where the court must itself act, and act directly, that action must always be evidenced by the record. Bullitt County v. Washer, 130 U.S. 142, 149, 9 S.Ct. 499, 502 (U.S., 1889).
	Idem est non esse et non apparere. It is the same thing not to be, as not to appear. ● What does not appear on the record is considered nonexistent. Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Ed. (2009), Legal Maxims.
	Clerk Robert J. Mangan has a clerical duty pursuant to the Illinois Clerks of Courts Act, 705 ILCS 105/17, to enter any judicially rendered order into the Court Record in case 2-12-0688.
	Silence accompanied by deceptive conduct or suppression of material facts results in active concealment and amounts to fraud. Settlement Funding, LLC v. Brenston, 2013 IL App 120869, ¶42, 998 N.E.2d 111, 122 (4 Dist., 2013) citing, Russow v. Bobola, 2 Ill.App.3d 837, 841, 277 N.E.2d 769, 771 (2 Dist., 1972).
	Rule 8.4(a)(4) bars lawyers from engaging in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation. 134 Ill.2d R. 8.4(a)(4). Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill.2d 214, 227, 730 N.E.2d 4, 14 (Ill., 2000) [repealed, now: Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Art. VIII, Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010, Rule 8.4(c).
	The rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct. There is an unbroken current of authorities to this effect. A mistake as to his duty and honest intentions will not excuse the offender. Amy v. Desmoines County Sup'rs, 78 U.S. 136, 138, 1870 WL 12763, 3, 20 L.Ed. 101 (U.S., 1870) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
	Appellant requests and the court shall take judicial notice that Robert J. Mangan is a licensed attorney in the State of Illinois.
	Court will take judicial notice of fact that a particular person is a licensed practicing attorney. See, Weber v. Powers, 114 Ill.App. 411, 420, 1904 WL 1759, 4 (1 Dist. 1904).
	Rule 8.4(a)(5) prohibits conduct that is “prejudicial” to the administration of justice. In re Karavidas, 2013 IL 115767, ¶ 84, 999 N.E.2d 296, 314 (Ill., 2013) citing, Ill. R. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(a)(5) (eff. July 6, 2001).
	Orders and other documents delivered by the Judges of the Appellate Court to the Office of the Clerk for entry into the Court Record, concealed from the Court Record constitutes the felony of Obstruction of Justice.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 contains motions of Appellant.
	Documents delivered to the Office of the Clerk for filing and court determination, subsequently obstructed or concealed from view to the Judges of the Appellate Court constitutes the crime of Obstruction of Justice, a Class 4 felony.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 contains no judicially rendered orders related to motions of the Appellant.
	The Court must take judicial notice of the orders in the Court Record rendered by Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan. The orders rendered by Mangan furnish false information. By effect of law those orders are a fraudulent. The intentional acts of Mangan repeatedly furnishing false information in case 2-12-0688 has obstructed Appellant’s legal defense and constitutes the felony of Obstruction of Justice.
	Illinois' obstructing justice statute, section 31–4 of the Criminal Code of 1961, provides: “A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, he knowingly commits any of the following acts: (a) Destroys, alters, conceals or disguises physical evidence, plants false evidence, furnishes false information[.]” 720 ILCS 5/31–4(a) (West 2006). People v. Comag, 241 Ill.2d 139, 121, 946 N.E.2d 313, 315 (Ill., 2011).
	Obstructing Justice is a Class 4 criminal felony.
	Citizens have a constitutional right to heard. The right to be heard in a judicial proceeding is the right to be heard by the court. The bad acts of Robert J. Mangan, including creating orders, has obstructed Appellant’s due process right to be heard judicially.
	Federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice. Brown v. Western Ry. Of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70 S.Ct. 105, 106 (U.S., 1949).
	“For an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently unconstitutional.’ ” U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 103 S.Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (U.S., 1984) citing, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (U.S., 1978) quoting, Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33, n. 20, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 1986, n. 20, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (U.S., 1973).
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that the record is silent concerning any order rendered by any Appellate Court Judge, to date, in case 2-12-0688.
	The rendering of orders by Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan and entering them in the Court Record in case 2-12-0688 are criminal acts of tampering with the Court Record.
	Appellant requests and the court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that without any order in case 2-12-0688 being rendered by an Appellate Court Judge that factually the Court Record contains no judicial orders.
	Where Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan has entered into the Record orders that have not been written, rendered or signed by a judge, the law recognizes fraudulent tampering.
	Appellant requests and the Court mandatorily shall take judicial notice that in case 2-12-0688 all of the orders appearing in the Court Record and in Exhibits 1 and 2 have been rendered by Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan.
	At the risk of stating the obvious, it should be pointed out that the Court lacks jurisdiction, inherent power, or constitutional authority to delegate the rendering of orders to a ministerial, non-judicial clerk.
	To delegate the rendering of orders to a ministerial, non-judicial clerk would, at a minimum, violate a litigant’s due process right to be heard in a judicial manner.
	An act that is illegal is still illegal even if committed by a government official pursuant to an order of his superior. See, Chaney v. Department of Law Enforcement, 74 Ill.App.3d 424, 431, 393 N.E.2d 75, 80 (4 Dist., 1979).
	‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625 (U.S., 1955) quoting, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (U.S., 1954).
	The Illinois Appellate Court Act 705 ILCS 25/4 states about the clerk: “He shall also, before entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of clerk of the appellate court, according to the best of my ability. Which oath shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State.”
	Clerk Robert J. Mangan as an Illinois licensed attorney has violated his Oath of Office both as a clerk and as an attorney to support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois or to faithfully discharge his duties as either a clerk or attorney.
	The Illinois Attorney Act. 705 ILCS 205/4 states about an attorney: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability.”
	As our Supreme Court ruled in Slomer: “When he prostitutes his office to the attainment of private purposes, he is guilty of a violation of duty that deserves to be severely punished, and renders him unworthy of his office.” Slomer v. People, 25 Ill. 70, 70, 76 Am. Dec. 786, 15 Peck (IL) 70, 1860 WL 6501 (Ill., 1860).
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT INVOLVES
Article VIII. Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010, Rule 8.4. Misconduct states in pertinent part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
	Fraud includes anything calculated to deceive, including the suppression of truth and the suggestion of what is false. In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill.2d 417, 426, 515 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ill., 1987) citing, In re Alschuler , 388 Ill. 492, 503-504, 58 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ill., 1944).
	‘Unprofessional conduct on the part of an attorney involves a breach of the duty which professional ethics enjoin, and such a breach of duty may consist ‘in attempting by any means to practice a fraud, impose upon, or deceive the court.’ People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Johnson, 344 Ill. 132, 144, 176 N.E. 278, 282 (Ill., 1931) quoting, Ex parte Ditchburn, 32 Or. 538, 543, 52 P. 694, 696 (Or., 1898).
DUTIES OF THE COURT
	Illinois law provides that courts have an independent duty to vacate void orders and may sua sponte declare an order void. Delgado v. Board of Election Com'rs of City of Chicago, 224 Ill.2d 481, 486, 865 N.E.2d 183, 187 (Ill., 2007) citing, See People v. Thompson, 209 Ill.2d 19, 27, 805 N.E.2d 1200, 1205 (Ill., 2004); People v. O'Malley, 356 Ill.App.3d 1038, 1048, 828 N.E.2d 376, 385 (2 Dist., 2005); In re Adoption of A.W., 343 Ill.App.3d 396, 400, 796 N.E.2d 729, 732 (2 Dist., 2003), quoting, Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill.2d 160, 166, 775 N.E.2d 936, 940 (Ill., 2002).
	All judges, have sworn upon oath to uphold the Constitution, and therefore, with knowledge of Robert J. Mangans’ abuse of power by rendering and entering his own court orders into the Court Record, the Court has an affirmative duty to vacate and expunge those void acts, and must act to prevent future occurrences of acts in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States within its own Court.
	By effect of Illinois law, this Court is mandated by the Illinois Rules of Evidence Rule 201(d) to take judicial notice of Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan’s acts appearing in its own Court Record. The law imposes a legal duty on the judges of the Appellate Court with actual knowledge of Mangan’s bad acts. With knowledge, the judges of the Appellate Court have a duty to expunge all of Robert J. Mangan’s void acts from the Court Record to prevent the Court from being a willful accomplice in the transgression of the Constitution and Laws of the United States. With knowledge, allowing orders rendered by a clerk to remain in the Appellate Court Record makes the judges of the Appellate Court accomplices by furthering the effect of those illegal orders and criminal acts.
	“Public policy favors the exposure of crime, and the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge thereof is essential to effective implementation of that policy.” Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. 85 Ill.2d 124, 133-134, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ill., 1981) quoting, Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 82 Ill.2d 40, 44, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Ill., 1980).
	Illinois Constitution of 1970, Article VI, The Judiciary, § 18 (a) states: “The Supreme Court and the Appellate Court Judges of each Judicial District, respectively, shall appoint a clerk and other non-judicial officers for their Court or District.” Therefore, the Appellate Court Clerk is appointed by and may be removed by the Appellate Court Judges of the same Judicial District.
	In the absence of a fixed term of office created by the constitution or by statute, the public employee holds his position at the pleasure of the appointing power and he may be removed at any time. Levin v. Civil Service Commission of Cook County, 52 Ill.2d 516, 521, 288 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ill., 1972) citing, Quernheim v. Asselmeier, 296 Ill. 494, 498, 129 N.E. 828, 829-830 (Ill., 1921), Morgan v. County of Du Page, 371 Ill. 53, 56, 20 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ill., 1939). Anderson v. City of Jacksonville, 380 Ill. 44, 45, 41 N.E.2d 956, 957 (Ill., 1942); People ex rel. Ruesch v. Hire, 406 Ill. 341, 345, 94 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ill., 1950).
	Illinois is an employment-at-will state. Cress v. Recreation Services, Inc., 341 Ill.App.3d 149, 171, 795 N.E.2d 817, 839 (2 Dist., 2003) citing, Harris v. Eckersall, 331 Ill.App.3d 930, 934 771 N.E.2d 1072, 1074 (1 Dist., 2002).
	It remains the law in Illinois that an at-will employee may be discharged for any reason or no reason. Interstate Scaffolding, Inc. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Com' , 236 Ill.2d 132, 149, 923 N.E.2d 266, 276 (Ill., 2010) citing, Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill.2d 142, 159, 601 N.E.2d 720, 728 (Ill., 1992).
	It is the unlawful act itself, the actus reus, of rendering judicial orders, factually evidenced in the 2-12-0688 Court Record and by Exhibits 1 and 2, that the unlawful acts of Robert J. Mangan disqualify him from holding employment as clerk.
	The bad acts by Robert J. Mangan, at a minimum, violate his Oath of Office both as clerk and attorney, constitute the felonies of Tampering With Public Records, Obstruction Of Justice, and criminal violations of Illinois’ Court Clerk Regulation Act.
	The law is presumed to furnish a remedy for the redress of every wrong. Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614, 622, 126 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Ill., 1955); Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 103, 197 N.E. 578, 582 (Ill., 1935); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 163, 1803 WL 893, 17, 2 L.Ed. 60 (U.S., 1803).
	This court has a duty to protect the public from an attorney's improper practices. In re Fisher , 15 Ill.2d 139, 154, 153 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ill., 1958) (This duty has repeatedly been declared by this court.). In re Estate of Burgeson, 125 Ill.2d 477, 488, 532 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ill., 1988).
	The factual evidence in the Court Record leaves no doubt as to the occurrence of the acts charged. After knowledge, the Court in allowing Clerk/Attorney Robert J. Mangan to continue to render orders, a legal nullity, would show intent to conspire with and further Mangan’s unlawful purpose and criminal acts.
     Under our Constitution no court, state or federal, may serve as an accomplice in the willful transgression of ‘the Laws of the United States,’ laws by which ‘the Judges in every State (are) bound . . .. “”’”' U.S. v. Peltier 422 U.S. 531, 537, 95 SCt 2313, 2317 (1975) quoting, Lee v. State of Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86, 888 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1968) (footnotes omitted); Art. VI, cl. 2, U.S.Const.

     Our constitution requires judges to be attorneys. City of Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill.2d 334, 339, 253 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ill., 1969).

     Article VIII. Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010, Rule 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct, states in pertinent part: “(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of Rule 8.4(b) or Rule 8.4(c) shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”

      If attorney's conduct violates rule requiring attorney to report attorney misconduct, imposition of discipline for such breach of duty is mandated. See, In re Himmel, 125 Ill.2d 531, 541, 533 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ill., 1988); ILCS S Ct Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 8.3.

	As stated in In re Himmel, 125 Ill.2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill., 1988) the duty to report misconduct is absolute. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill.2d 214, 226, 730 N.E.2d 4, 13 (Ill., 2000) citing, See also Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 185 Ill.2d 372, 377, 706 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ill., 1998).
	Further, the duty, and the certain discipline that flows from a breach of that duty, is animated by a desire to: maintain the integrity of the legal profession, further the ends of justice, and protect the public from unscrupulous attorneys. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill.2d 214, 226, 730 N.E.2d 4, 13 (Ill., 2000) citing, In re Himmel, 125 Ill.2d 531, 544,  533 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill., 1988); In re Demuth, 126 Ill.2d 1,13, 533 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ill., 1988); In re Imming, 131 Ill.2d 239, 260, 545 N.E.2d 715, 724 (Ill., 1989).
	Failing in that obligation, an attorney is himself subject to punishment. See, Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill.2d 214, 226, 730 N.E.2d 4, 13 (Ill., 2000) citing, In re Himmel, 125 Ill.2d 531, 541, 533 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ill., 1998).
	Actions of Defendant informing Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission or Judicial Inquiry Board of misconduct will not relieve attorney of his own duty to report another attorney's misconduct. Attorney himself violates Disciplinary Rules by failing to disclose information regarding the other attorney's misconduct. See, In re Himmel, 125 Ill.2d 531, 538, 533 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ill., 1988); S.Ct. Rule 63 (3)(a);  S.Ct. Rules, Article VIII. Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.3.
	There can be no question of the power of Supreme Court to deal with attorneys whose activities would impede proper administration of justice. This inherent power extends to attorneys who occupy the bench as well as those who are engaged solely in the practice of law. See, Bassi v. Langloss, 22 Ill.2d 190, 194, 174 N.E.2d 682, 684 (Ill., 1961).
RELIEF REQUESTED
	An order void upon its face and requiring only an inspection of the record to demonstrate its invalidity is a mere nullity, in legal effect no order at all, conferring no right and affording no justification. See, Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241, 51 N.E.2d 277, 280 (Ill., 1943) citing, Voorhees v. Jackson ex dem. Bank of United States, 10 Pet. 449, 475, 35 U.S. 449, 477, 1836 WL 3750, 22, 9 L.Ed. 490, 501 (U.S., 1836).
	First, the Court has a duty to announce the fact that any judicial order not rendered by judge is void and vacate from the Court Record all fourteen (14) orders to date in case 2-12-0688 as void.
	[v]oid orders “are a complete nullity from their inception and have no legal effect”; such orders “may not change the status of a case” In re Marriage of Breslow, 306 Ill.App.3d 41, 56-57, 713 N.E.2d 642, 653 (1 Dist., 1999) quoting, National Bank v. Multi National Industries, Inc., 286 Ill.App.3d 638, 640, 678 N.E.2d 7, 9 (3 Dist., 1997); Wilder v. Finnegan, 267 Ill.App.3d 422, 425, 642 N.E.2d 496, 499 (5 Dist., 1994) (“a void order can be attacked at any time and is from its inception a complete nullity and without legal effect”); Application of Cook County Collector, 228 Ill.App.3d 719, 731, 593 N.E.2d 538, 547 (1 Dist., 1991) (void orders are “a complete nullity and without legal effect”); Schak v. Blom, 334 Ill.App.3d 129, 134, 777 N.E.2d 635, 640 (1 Dist., 2002) (A void order is a complete nullity from its inception and has no legal effect.) Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 214 Ill.2d 371, 379-380, 827 N.E.2d 422, 427-428 (Ill., 2005) (A void judgment is from its inception a complete nullity and without legal effect.)
	If what purports to be a record has been so made up by the clerk or other official as to not speak the real facts, it must be amended so as to conform to them. Devine v. People, 100 Ill. 290, 1881 WL 10618, 3 (Ill., 1881).
	Whether it is a misprision of the clerk or a malfeasance, the court has power at all times, upon notice given, to reform its records, so as to make them speak the truth. People ex rel. Wonogas v. Holmes, 312 Ill. 284, 286, 143 N.E. 835, 835 (Ill., 1924).
	The motion was not to amend or change a record made by the court, but to expunge a false and fraudulent interpolation from the record which had neither been made or authorized by the court. That the court had power to protect its records from such acts we think can not be doubted. Blakemore v. Wilson, 61 Ill.App. 454, 457, 1895 WL 2655, 2 (2 Dist., 1895).
	Second, a court record must always be a record of the truth of what the judicial action really was, at the time. A court cannot lawfully fabricate events which did not occur or otherwise make a false entry appear in the record without, at a bare legal minimum, Tampering with Public Records and an act of fraud.
	The control of the court over its records is limited to the power of making the records show what the judicial action really was. A court cannot, under the guise of amending its record, correct judicial error or remedy the effect of judicial non action. Encyclopedia of Pleadings & Practice, Vol. 17, 912 Woolf v. Deahl, 152 Ill.App. 357, 359, 1910 WL 1630, 2 (1 Dist., 1910); Gardner v. People, 100 Ill.App. 254, 258, 1902 WL 1757, 3 (1 Dist., 1902) in turn citing, Forquer v. Forquer, 19 Ill. 68, 1857 WL 5653, 3 (Ill., 1857).
	Third, immediately take affirmative action to prevent any person from further tampering with the public records of the Appellate Court 2nd District, including but not limited to, terminating employment of criminals.
	It is not the conviction of a crime which justifies discipline, but the commission of the act. In re Rolley, 121 Ill.2d 222, 233, 520 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill., 1988).
	Fourth, knowledge gained in the future of attorney misconduct triggers the ongoing duty of each judge of the Appellate Court 2nd District to disclose to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, or if appropriate, the Judicial Inquiry Board information regarding any attorney misconduct in the Appellate Court, in any manner, in any court case, at any time.
	Fifth, this Court mandatorily must take judicial notice of the fact that the Court Record in 2-12-0688 shows no judicial acts to this date.
	Sixth, the first judicial act, required by the Court, is to judicially hear Appellant’s motions of constitutional substance filed December 12, 2013 and December 26, 2013 and the Appellee’s Response to same as evidenced in the Appellate Court Record and by attached Exhibit 2.
	Seventh, Appellant proffers the Court take its second judicial act, after hearing Appellant’s motions, in the form of setting an initial briefing schedule with notice to the parties.
	 ‘ I think it appropriate here to recall the closing words of Mr. Justice Brandeis' great dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (U.S., 1928): Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. “In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.” ’ Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387, 409, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1244-45, (U.S., 1977) (Mr. Justice Marshall, concurring); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1631 (U.S., 1966).
	The learned guidance of our founding fathers, the words of the Constitution and Supreme Court in Olmstead, Brewer, and Miranda must never be forgotten and always be accomplished, for wherever law ends, tyranny begins.

							Respectfully submitted,
							_________________________
							Christopher A. Briggs
							809 N. County Street
							Waukegan, Illinois 60085
							[email protected]
February 6, 2014					847-687-5590

MOTION DISTRIBUTION LIST

Justices of the Illinois Supreme Court
Supreme Court Building
200 E. Capitol
Springfield, IL 62701
    Rita B. Garman, Chief Justice
    Charles E. Freeman
    Robert R. Thomas
    Thomas L. Kilbride
    Lloyd A. Karmeier
    Anne M. Burke
    Mary Jane Theis
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Lisa Madigan - Illinois Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, IL 60601
=====
Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism
Two Prudential Plaza, Suite 1950
180 N. Stetson
Chicago, IL 60601
=====
Hon. Barbara Kerr Howe - Chair, American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Coordinating Council
American Bar Association
321 North Clark Street
Chicago, IL 60654-7598
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Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission
One Prudential Plaza
130 East Randolph Drive
Suite 1500
Chicago, IL 60601-6219
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Every registered Illinois Attorney of Boone, Carroll, DeKalb, DuPage, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kendall, Lake, Lee, McHenry, Ogle, Stephenson, and Winnebago Counties
=====
John G. Locallo – President, Illinois State Bar Association
Amari & Locallo
734 North Wells St.
Chicago, Illinois 60654
=====
Matt L. Walberg - Criminal Courts Reporter/Writer
Chicago Tribune
Tribune Tower
435 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611
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Pam Zekman, investigative reporter CBS 2 Chicago
CBS 2 Broadcast Center
22 West Washington St.
Chicago, IL 60602
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Judges of the Illinois Appellate Court, 2nd District
Appellate Court Building
55 Symphony Way
Elgin, IL 60120
  Joseph E. Birkett
  Michael J. Burke
  Donald C. Hudson
  Susan F. Hutchinson
  Ann B. Jorgensen
  Robert D. McLaren
  Mary Seminara-Schostok
  Robert B. Spence
  Kathryn E. Zenoff
======
Carol Marin - Political Columnist
Chicago Sun-Times
350 N. Orleans St., 10th Floor
Chicago, IL 60654
312-321-3000
======
Daily Herald News
Court Watch Department
155 E Algonquin Rd Arlington Heights, IL 60005