Topic 1:

Readings:
Shafer-Landau, “Eleven Arguments Against Moral Objectivity”

In “Eleven Arguments Against Moral Objectivity,” Shafer-Landau considers 11 arguments against the idea that morality is objective.

Wishing to make room for the possibility that morality is objective, Shafer-Landau argues that each of these 11 arguments is unsound, either because it is invalid or because one or more of the premises is false. (These criticisms are not positive arguments for moral objectivity, but are critiques of arguments against moral objectivity.)

Does Shafer-Landau succeed in shifting the burden of proof to the side of the subjectivist?
If not, how do his criticisms fail to demonstrate the unsoundness of these arguments? But if so, how might you envision the subjectivist’s next argumentative move? E.g., is there a 12th argument, essentially distinct from the previous ones, that the subjectivist might offer in response? If so, can you put this argument in a deductively valid form, and do you think this new argument is sound? Why or why not?

Finally, consider how an objectivist who responds to “Argument 11” by rejecting Premise 1, might justify the rejection of this premise? What would a world be like in which science were not the measure of all things?

Topic 2:

Readings:
Plato, Euthyphro; Shafer-Landau, “Morality and Religion”, Chapter 5 of The Fundamentals of Ethics; Shafer-Landau, “Eleven Arguments Against Moral Objectivity”; Shafer-Landau, “Ethical Relativism”; Baggett, “The Euthyphro Dilemma,” in Bruce and Barone, ed. Just the Arguments

Consider the Euthyphro dilemma argument (a version of “constructive dilemma”). Do you think that this argument is sound? Using “disjunctive syllogism”, how might you resolve the dilemma? Would you resolve it towards the idea that (i) morality is arbitrary or towards the idea that (ii) morality is independent of the gods? How do you see the larger consequences of either of these resolutions? Finally, is the soundness of the argument altered if “the gods” are replaced by “God”, or if “the gods” are replaced by “human society”? Why or why not?

Topic 3:

Readings:
Plato, Euthyphro

Socrates: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this?
Euthyphro: We would certainly do so.
Socrates: Again, if we differed about the larger and the smaller, we would turn to measurement and soon cease to differ.
Euthyphro: That is so.
Socrates: And about the heavier and the lighter, we would resort to weighing and be reconciled.
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: What subject of difference would make us angry and hostile to each other if we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly,
the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other men become hostile to each other whenever we do? (Plato, Euthyphro, 7b-e)

Socrates tells us that the phenomena of ethics and esthetics (i.e., the subjects that deal with justice and with what is culturally valuable) are on the surface peculiar: on the one hand, we have no decision procedure for settling ethical disputes, and, on the other hand, we believe that our views on these subjects are of the highest importance: there is a tendency firmly to believe we are right, and others wrong.

Phenomenologically speaking, this makes ethics and esthetics different both from empirical science and from mere matters of taste. In questions of empirical science, getting our views right is of great importance, but we have a decision procedure for settling disputes and, because of this, find ourselves reconciled. When it comes to pure matters of taste, although we lack a decision procedure for settling the issue, the divergence of opinion is of no real importance, and, as nothing is at stake, we remain reconciled in our indifference. However, (in contrast to both empirical science and mere matters of taste) when it comes to the issues of ethics and esthetics, while there is no standardly recognized procedure for reconciling our disputes, these issues nonetheless persist in presenting themselves to us as being of overriding importance, such that we feel they must be settled one way or another, and (we hope) settled rightly, at that.

On the surface, this suggests that questions of ethics and esthetics simultaneously treat of an objective domain but one for which there is no decision procedure akin to those found in the sciences. This brings together two properties which we typically do not find unified and which seem difficult to assimilate: (i) objectivity, on the one hand, and (ii) resistance to any perspective-neutral method for decidability, on the other. How is this possible? Are appearances here deceptive or should we take them at face value? Most importantly, what do you think explains the fact that (what’s your theory about how) ethics and esthetics have (could have) both of these phenomenological qualities simultaneously?