2004 GROUND OP ON GAZA EVALUATION


1. (S) SUMMARY: We assess that the threshold for IDF conventional ground force action in Gaza following a complete Israeli withdrawal, including from the Philadelphia Strip, would be substantially elevated. The loss of IDF-secured roads, fortified bases and settlements, and diminished IDF tactical intelligence capabilities would create real obstacles that ground force commanders would be hesitant to confront. Moreover, the IDF would have to count on facing better-armed Palestinians than at present. In response to threats or provocations from Gaza, the IDF would almost certainly rely for as long as possible on standoff action, especially airstrikes. Special forces operations would be an intermediate step between standoff and ground force actions, but they would be hindered by many of the same obstacles as a ground invasion. (This judgment does not necessarily apply to Shin Bet operations, which would continue.) Events that would almost certainly trigger some form of IDF strike on Gaza include mega-terror attacks by Gaza-based Hamas or PIJ, or with some other clear connection to Gaza; the deployment from Gaza of standoff weapons with professional characteristics (e.g., Katyushas, SAMs, military-quality mortars) against targets in Israel; and, the revelation of a Karine-A-like smuggling operation.