A few thoughts on event security

A few thoughts on event security...

I don't have a lot of experience as an anon but I do have quite a bit of experience as an activist. With my former organization my specialty was event security. I'm going to try to put down a few thoughts as to how, and why, this might be applied to anonymous events. I'll be using Occupy Steubenville as an example.

At the present time there is no security in place. While it's certainly not likely, it's not out of the question that things could go sideways and we'd have no organized plan to deal with it. First we'll go over a basic security setup, then we'll mock up a couple scenarios and discuss how they might be dealt with.

No persons should read anything into this that isn't stated. Anonymous events are extremely safe compared to other protest events. These are just ideas drawn from my experience based on what I've seen. Security will be esentially invisible unless needed.

Securing the Steubenville site, to a reasonable degree, assuming numbers on our side of approximately 500, would require a 10 person security team. We'll lay them out like this:

Each end of the protest area gets 2 security guys. 2 at the end where the Sheriff usually is and 2 at the opposite end of the Courthouse grounds. Along Market St. we'll place 4, in teams of 2, evenly spaced for good coverage and fast response. The other 2 will be near the speaker area, one will shadow the event spokesperson, the other will shadow the current speaker. In the event of nobody speaking, that guard will become a rover in the vicinity of the front steps. The security team leader will be generally assigned as the guard for our spokesperson for several reasons.

First, he or she will, preferably, have some experience at this and will be more apt to recognize threats early. Second, the top of the steps provides the best vantage point over the whole area. Finally, there will communications equipment there if a message needs to be passed either to other team members or to the crowd in general.

In the event that this individual needs to leave the area for any reason, the rover will assume the position. Should there be a speaker, the spokesperson will be asked to remain very close to the speaker area so both can be covered by the one person.

Some of you are asking why we need this. Well, with a bit of luck, we don't. A few scenarios are possible though. Keep in mind that there are "Kobayashi Maru" scenarios which are basically unfixable. We won't discuss those here. We'll discuss a few more likely events which I have personally seen play out at other organization's events.

We'll also keep in mind the Anonymous philosophy of non-violence. All security responses will be verbal confrontation and physical blocking unless forced beyond that. Weapons will not be authorized.

* Scenario 1- Lone nut. This is the most likely scenario, yet also the easiest to deal with assuming the attacker is unarmed.

In this scenario a lone individual approaches the protest area with violence in mind. The most likely target will be our spokesperson.

The tell-tales will be a single person rapidly approaching the speaker area. He (almost certainly) will be moving at a fast walk and probably pushing people out of his way. He may or may not be vocal as he approaches.

The response, immediately initiated, will be for all security personnel to converge on the speaker area at a run. The 2 personnel already on the steps will move to intercept the attacker as our spokesperson moves as far from the issue as is possible. Initial security response will be open palms held out in front of body, loud voices telling the individual to stop. If he refuses to stop and makes physical contact with security personnel, he will simply be grabbed, taken to the ground, and secured with as little damage as possible. The police should be there by this time but we must be prepared for a deliberately slow law enforcement response.

* Scenario 2- Multiple nuts. This scenario is much rarer but can occur in a situation where alcohol is being consumed. Largest likely group is 4 attackers.

The response plays out exactly as the lone nut scenario, tell-tales are the same too, its just more difficult to deal with. Security teams members would need, and surely can expect, assistance from the friendly crowd. Everything else is the same. The critical moment is if multiple attackers reach the speaker area prior to crowd response. In this case the 2 security persons on the steps must simply try to delay as best as possible.

* Scenario 3- LEO movement into crowd. This is most likely in the event that we have a well-known, possibly 'sought after' individual addressing the hive.

The response in this case is a blocking response. Security personnel would place themselves in front of the infiltrators, attempting to gain as much time as possible for the target to remove from the area. Complete hands-off response is vital to avoid arrest. Questions and bodies in front of the movement will provide some delay.

A common issue that security might need to deal with would be 'out of control, ranting speakers'. Turn the PA off, gently try to calm.

In all cases security focus will be on safety of anonymous members and supporters. Team members need no special qualifications, briefings will be provided by team leader at each event.  Large, imposing males have some advantage but this is not mandatory. Some method of identifying security personnel will be devised, likely armbands.

Security alerts and other messages are always related from the view of the speaker. In other words, if the person at the podium were to say "alert left" if would mean to his/her left. Compass directions can be confusing in strange places.

Thanks for taking the time to read this. Please address questions or concerns to @anon_wv on twitter.