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  1. GRN HQ SET SIR (FINAL)
  2. ERINYS IRAQ
  3. INCIDENT REPORT
  4.  
  5. OVERVIEW
  6.  
  7.  
  8. What
  9. CONVOY HIT BY SAF
  10.  
  11. Region
  12. MOSUL
  13.  
  14. Sector
  15.  
  16.  
  17. Site
  18.  
  19.  
  20. Where (Specific Location)
  21.  
  22. MSR TAMPA BETWEEN FREEDOM / MAF (GRID 38S LF322 267)
  23.  
  24.  
  25. When (DTG)
  26. 13 0606 OCT 04
  27.  
  28. CASUALTIES
  29. NONE
  30.  
  31. Reported by
  32. KEITH MESSINGER
  33.  
  34. Reporter’s Appointment
  35. GRN DISTRICT PROJECT LEADER
  36.  
  37.  
  38. FINAL REPORT
  39.  
  40. As at (DTG)
  41. 13 0606 OCT 04
  42. What happened? GRN HQ SET (Mosul) was enroute to Bayji. Passengers included Wendall Benner (Erinys); MAJ Paul Dansereau, GRN; SPC James Gieb, GRN
  43.  
  44. Convoy had just left Camp Freedom and was on MSR Tampa when it came under SAF. SAF flattened 1 tire (no run flats) on Vehicle 3 and disabled the engine. Vehicle 2 (VIP) took 5 hits. JB Baxter (SET) has small wound on hand - treatable locally.
  45.  
  46. Team deployed as per SOP, changed tire, attached tow strap and returned to Camp Freedom
  47.  
  48. What did we do about it? Keith Messinger immediately notified TFO and GRN personnel at approximately 0620.
  49.  
  50. Subsequent Follow-up
  51.  
  52. Current Situation Armored vehicle is no longer usable. Have secured a armoured vehicle on loan from Aegis. Gun Truck is operational. Gun Truck Codan is not working. SET is operational.
  53.  
  54.  
  55.  
  56. ADD UPDATES AS NECESSARY
  57. Statements by other shooters . . .
  58. Raymond Ernest Stone Born: 04 12 1960 at Liskeard, England Who states:
  59.  
  60. I am Raymond Ernest Stone, I am currently employed as a member of the Erinys PSD Team allocated to the HQ of USACE GRN. My status of employment is that of a DOD Contractor. I have been a member of this team since 9 Sept 2004.
  61.  
  62. On Wednesday 13 October 2004 I was a member of the team whose mission was to move members of an ATFP Unit from Camp Freedom in Mosul to the Power Station at Bayji.
  63. At 0545hrs, I with the rest of the team and members of the ATFP Unit attended the Team leader’s briefing ( Ken Rodger), once completed we departed at about 0600hrs.
  64.  
  65. We departed from FOB Freedom at about 0600hrs on route to Bayji, It had just become daylight and traffic was very light, as we approached an overpass, my attention was drawn by the lead vehicle commentator that a lone car was stationary on the overpass to my forward right about 150M from me, I noticed two pax outside the vehicle both armed with long barreled weapons, one pax brought his weapon to bear towards us, at that point Ken Rodger engaged him, gunfire was immediately returned from the gunmen at me and believing that my life was in danger I returned fire with my AK47 expending a mag of 30 rounds, (at this point in time I realized that we were the subject of an ambush), I then changed mags and switched fire to another two man position under the bridge as we drove through, these two gunmen were firing at my level again I returned another 30 rounds, at the same time I was aware that we were taking fire from the right hand side as we drove through out of the killing area.
  66.  
  67. Once clear of the ambush site we stopped as our vehicle had taken hits to a tyre and to the engine and was no longer mobile, we went into an all around defence whilst the tyre was changed and a toe rope was attached, once completed we then made our way back to FOB Freedom.
  68.  
  69.  
  70. Signed//Ray Stone
  71.  
  72.  
  73. Danny Young Born: 15 05 1974 at Bondi, Australia Who states:
  74.  
  75. I am Danny Young, I am currently employed as a member of the Erinys PSD Team allocated to the HQ of USACE GRN. My status of employment is that of a DOD Contractor. I have been a member of this team since Mid May 2004.
  76.  
  77. On Wednesday 13 October 2004 I was a member of the team whose mission was to move members of an ATFP Unit from Camp Freedom in Mosul to the Power Station at Bayji.
  78. At 0545hrs, I with the rest of the team and members of the ATFP Unit attended the Team leader’s briefing ( Ken Rodger), once completed we departed at about 0600hrs.
  79.  
  80. We departed from FOB Freedom at about 0600hrs on route to Bayji, It had just become daylight and traffic was very light, as we approached an overpass ,tracer firing started coming from the left and right side of my position. I turned my attention to the left hand side gunmen firing position, I started firing 10 to12 round burst with the SAW. As we traveled down the road at a high speed my attention was then drawn to the second position on the right .I switched firing position and in engaged with 10 to 12 round bursts. I then switched fire again and again until we were clear of the killing zone.
  81.  
  82.  
  83. Once clear of the ambush site we stopped as our vehicle had taken hits to a tyre and to the engine and was no longer mobile, we went into an all around defence whilst the tyre was changed and a toe rope was attached, once completed we then made our way back to FOB Freedom.
  84.  
  85.  
  86. Signed//Danny Young
  87.  
  88.  
  89. 13/10/2004
  90. 0600
  91.  
  92.  
  93. At time and date stated ,I Jon McMahon an employee of Erinys International Ltd and a DoD contractor was part of a PSD team on a mission to Bayji power plant .we had just left Camp Freedom in a three vehicle convoy and were travelling south on route Tampa when we came under contact from several fire positions, I was seated in the rear left of the gun truck when we came under fire from the left hand side by two persons one armed with a PKM and the other with a AK47 , fearing that my life and the lives of my team members was in danger I engaged the gunmen in my arc of fire and I saw the the pax armed with the AK47 go down, I fired 3x magazine of 7.62 before we broke contact, all the while I was aware that the other operators ( Ken Rodgers, Ray Stone and Danny Young ) were engaging targets in their arc's of fire, it was at this time I became aware through the driver of the gun truck (John Baxter) that we had a flat tyre as a result of the contact, we moved to an area south of the kill zone, and went in to all round defence while the tyre was changed, we then realised the gun truck had sustained more damaged than first thought and had to be towed back to camp Freedom .
  94.  
  95.  
  96. Signed//Jon McMahon
  97.  
  98.  
  99. INCIDENT END
  100.  
  101.  
  102.  
  103.  
  104.  
  105.  
  106.  
  107. GRN SIR (Serious Incident Report):
  108. (See Attached CCIR for what is considered a Serious Incident)
  109. Form last revised 17 Sep 04
  110.  
  111. 1. Collect as much of the information as outlined below, but do not delay in sending “FIRST REPORT”.
  112.  
  113. 2. Email to GRN and GRD Operations via email. If the information included in report is classified the SIR must be sent via SIPR.
  114. GRN
  115. NIPR (UNCLASS Email) SIPR (Classified Email)
  116. Kurt.ubbelohde@tac01.usace.army.mil kurt.ubbelohde@tfo.c1.army.smil.mil
  117.  
  118. Phillip.Kaufmann@tac01.usace.army.mil
  119. Phillip.kaufmann@tfo.c1.army.smil.mil
  120. Paul.dansereau@tac01.usace.army.mil paul.dansereau@tfo.c1.army.smil.mil
  121.  
  122. Michael.Cirian@tac01.usace.army.mil
  123.  
  124. Brian.Harper@tac01.usace.army.mil
  125.  
  126.  
  127.  
  128. GRD
  129. NIPR (UNCLASS Email) SIPR (Classified Email)
  130. Daniel.Russell@tac01.usace.army.mil
  131. michael.donovan@tac01.usace.army.mil Michael.Donovan@iraq.centcom.smil.mil
  132. Vance.Purvis@tac01.usace.army.mil Vance.Purvis@iraq.centcom.smil.mil
  133.  
  134. William.foos@tac01.usace.army .mil
  135. William.Foos@iraq.centcom.smil.mil
  136. Frank.myers@tac01.usace.army.mil Frank.Myers@iraq.contcom.smil.mil
  137. gregory,baisch@tac01.usace.mil baischgl@iraq.centcom.smil.mil
  138. Rene.lopez@tac01.usace.army.mil lopezR@iraq.centcom.smil.mil
  139.  
  140. david.breitbach@tac01.usace.army.mil david.breitbach@iraq.centcom.smil.mil
  141.  
  142.  
  143. 3. Phone GRN Operations VOIP – 540-527-1487/1489/1474, DNVT – 527-1198, DSN: 302 527-1198; GRD Operations (914) 360 – 5085; DSN: 318 836-1053 and inform operations of the SIR and how the report was sent.
  144.  
  145. 4. Send follow up reports on serious incident until the information is complete and accurate.
  146.  
  147. CIRCLE appropriate one: FIRST - INTERIM - FINAL report
  148.  
  149. Updated information is listed in Blue Font.
  150.  
  151. Who: (List by NAME and who each person works for)
  152. GRN HQ SET-Erinys Team Leader, Ken Roger. SET members, Drew Wilson, Sean Nolte, John Hollis, Cassie Schoeman, Danny Young, JB Baxter, Jon McMahon.
  153.  
  154. What/Where: (Explain in as much detail as possible what is involved and where it happened)
  155.  
  156. Three vehicle convoy. GRN HQ SET (Mosul) was enroute to Bayji. Passengers included Wendall Benner (Erinys); MAJ Paul Dansereau, GRN; SPC James Gieb, GRN
  157.  
  158. Convoy had just left Camp Freedom and was on MSR Tampa when it came under SAF. SAF flattened 1 tire (no run flats) on Vehicle 3 and disabled the engine. Vehicle 2 (VIP) took 5 hits.
  159.  
  160. Team deployed as per SOP, changed tire, attached tow strap and returned to Camp Freedom
  161.  
  162. John Baxter received one slight cut on right hand. He is RTD.
  163.  
  164. Vehicle 3, add-on armor gun truck, was disabled by 1 round to the Transmission cooler which caused the loss of transmission fluid. Vehicle 3 was towed to prevent further damage to the vehicle.
  165.  
  166. Suspected total of 8 AIF personnel with 2 PKM machine guns. See attached powerpoint slides for diagram of the incident site.
  167.  
  168. Erinys HQ Team Leader Incident Report Follows:
  169.  
  170. On Wednesday 13 October 2004, I was in charge of a Mission to move members of an ATFP Unit from Camp Freedom in Mosul to the Thermal Power Plant at Bayji, some 200kms south of the City. I had carried out a map recon of the route, obtained up to date intelligence information, including the fact that an IED sweep was scheduled to take place on MSR Tampa between the hours of 0600 and 0800 that day, meaning that the recommended timings for road moves along that route were between 0600 and 1000hrs.I carried out a Team Briefing at 0545hrs, with departure scheduled for 0600hrs. My choice of Routes for the Mission were MSR Tampa, RTE Lexus, Toyota, Saab and rejoin MSR Tampa at Camp Marez for the journey South.
  171.  
  172. The convoy I was in charge of comprised of 3 vehicles, the lead vehicle was a black Ford Excursion HAV (Heavily Armoured Vehicle), vehicle number 2 was a vehicle exactly the same and number3 was a ‘kit’ armoured Ford Expedition. The vehicles were crewed as follows: Vehicle 1, Driver Sean Nolte, Commander/Observer, Drew Wilson, also on board in the rear was Specialist Geib of the US Army Military Police. Vehicle 2 was driven by Casper Schoen, the team 2ic Observer John Hollis, the rear seat passengers were Major Paul Dansereau, Operations Officer USACE GRN and Benner Wendell, Trinty/ATFP. Vehicle 3 was driven by John Baxter, I was in the front passenger seat, the rear seat shooters were Ray Stone and John McMahon and the tail gunner was Danny Young, all members of the PSD Team were Erinys Employees. All members of the crew were armed, the crew of the gun truck were wearing body armour, kevelar helmets and eye protection, all other PSD Team members were wearing body armour and eye protection. The PSD Team had been fully briefed on the actions on contact and the rules of engagement. Rehearsals of anti ambush and contact drills are carried out on a regular basis, the most recent being Tuesday 12 October 2004. A live firing practice was also carried out at Marez Range on Friday 09 October 2004. I have had some 30 years of experience operating in hostile environments and have been involved in a number of shooting incidents, including 5 since I arrived in Iraq.
  173.  
  174. We departed from FOB Freedom at about 0600hrs and traveled south along MSR Tampa, the traffic was very light and it had just become daylight. As we approached an overpass, where MSR Tampa joins RTE Lexus at Grid 38S LF 322 267, I saw a vehicle, a silver/light coloured saloon car parked on the over pass above me to my right, about 150 meters from me, I saw 2 men outside of the vehicle, one of whom was armed with a PKM Machine gun and the other with an AK47 assault rifle. The man with the PKM was trying to bring it to bear in my direction. I honestly believed he was going to open fire on my convoy, so I engaged him with my AK47, which was fitted with a 75 round drum magazine. I fired a long burst at him and saw him fall against the protective barrier, which ran alongside the road, I then switched fire to the other man and fired the remaining rounds in my magazine at him. I know about that point Ray Stone also opened fire. I also became aware of a very heavy volume of fire in our direction from at least 2 points. One on the opposite, the left side of the road and as we passed under the bridge, from my right, at the same level as us. I changed magazines on my weapon and returned fire in the direction of another firing point, to my rear right, on the low ground underneath the overpass. I could see tracer rounds incoming onto the road to our front, left and right sides. John Baxter my driver called that our vehicle had been hit and had a flat tyre. I also am aware that both John McMahon and Danny Young also returned fire at the attackers.
  175.  
  176. We were driven clear of the ambush site, to a location approximately 1km south at Grid 38S LF 33832 24226, where we stopped, secured an area around our vehicles, checked the status of the team, apart from a slight graze to one of John Baxter’s hands, there were no injuries. The flat tyre was changed, however, it became apparent that our vehicle sustained damage and could not be driven. A tow strap was hooked from vehicle 1 to recover us. At this time situation reports were passed back to the Erinys Operations Room and they were made aware that we were going to self recover to FOB Freedom. I made this decision based on historical information and the methods of operation of the AIF, who carry out hit and run attacks and our relatively close proximity to our home base.
  177.  
  178. I personally expended 115 rounds of 7.62 ammunition during the contact and my team fired a total of 465 rounds, in my opinion, it was the high volume of accurate fire we were able to put down on the AIF positions which contributed to the breaking of contact and lack of casualties on the team. The weapons used by the team were 3 x AK 47’s, me, Ray Stone and John McMahon and the SAW by Danny Young, it was clear to me that the single shot M4 would not have been able to put sufficient rates of fire to counter this well prepared ambush. Again the team was let down and could possibly have sustained serious casualties due to the fact that run flat tyres are not fitted as standard to all vehicles. As in previous incidents, the frequent team training paid off, in that, reactions were instinctive and every one knew what was required of them.
  179.  
  180.  
  181. When: (When did the incident happen, when was leadership notified)
  182.  
  183. Approx. 0610hr on 13OCT04.
  184.  
  185. Time of incident 0606 hours.
  186.  
  187. Time consolidation point 0608 to 0620 hours
  188.  
  189. Time returned to FOB Freedom 0631hours
  190.  
  191. What is Impact on GRD/GRN Operations: (What is the So What?)
  192.  
  193. ATFP survey at Bayji will have to be rescheduled.
  194.  
  195.  Expedition returned to service
  196.  
  197.  
  198. Other: (List any other information that might be relevant to incident)
  199.  
  200.  No IEDs were involved in this ambush
  201.  Global Security Convoy (six NTVs) with multiple M2 HB MG, SAWs, and approximately 20 personnel passed through same kill zone at approximately 0600 hours travelling North to South. They did not observe AIF.
  202.  Ambush location is a typical IPS checkpoint, however no IPS have manned this checkpoint position for the past week.
  203.  AIF forces were spotted prior to all three vehicles being in the kill zone South of the overpass. Erinys gun truck vehicle was able to initiate fire on personnel located on the overpass.
  204.  Majority of AIF fire was focused on the Vehicle 2 of the convoy (total of 6 hits) to the driver side front and driver rear. Based upon AAR and impact locations the enemy engaged the vehicle from both the front and rear in three distinct bursts of SAF, one burst being machine gun fire from the 7 o’clock position with 12 o’clock being due south. Also 4 impacts suggest the AIF were aiming for the vehicle driver.
  205.  AIF were unable to concentrate fire from all three positions simultaneously due to volume suppressive fire from Erinys Vehicle number 3 Gun Truck. Recommend additional 75 round drum magazines for AK-47 rifles or exchange Erinys Team’s current semi-automatic only capable M-4 carbines to M-4 carbines with three round burst capability.
  206.  Armor Add-on Kit gun truck and one HAV are not equipped with run flat tires. Add-on Armor gun truck driver side rear tire was flat due to gunfire.
  207.  Floor Jacks and Tow Straps received from GRD last week enabled the quick change of the flat tire as well as the ability to tow the disabled Vehicle 3 back to FOB Freedom. These are essential items to all GRN convoys. Recommend two each D shackles are provided for each vehicle to assist recovery operations.
  208.  Based upon Mission AAR believe three probable enemy WIA as displayed on the attached diagrams.
  209.  GRN synchronizes Convoy movements with MNB-NW military IED sweep times through Mosul and MSR Tampa. This information is a key component of mission planning. Additional factors considered are volume of traffic in and around Mosul is significantly during morning hours and is a factor considered to mitigate risks.
  210.  Codan not working on Gun Truck. Issue to be resolved.
  211.  
  212. Actions Required: (List any actions that are required and who should take the action.)
  213.  
  214.  Follow-up mission debrief with MNB-NW C2
  215.  GRN HQ continue to assess vehicle operational capability.
  216.  
  217. Name and Contact Information of Person Taking Report:
  218.  
  219. MAJ Paul T. Dansereau, GRN Operations Officer, DNVT 527-1198
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