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[Russian Internet Censorship] Fed Up With Roskomnadzor, pt3

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  3.  
  4. # A Short Letter on Continuing Assault on Internet Freedom in Russia
  5.  
  6. _April 28, 2018_
  7. _Anonymous IT Guy <[email protected]>_
  8.  
  9. Remember that you can always use Google Translate to view links that are in
  10. Russian.
  11.  
  12. ## Previous posts:
  13.  
  14. * https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16937311 (the original Hacker News
  15. post).
  16. * https://pastebin.com/Etp2TNBi - part 1.
  17. * https://pastebin.com/3ZLZJMwd - part 2.
  18.  
  19. ## Links
  20. * http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_28399/ - First, a link to a
  21. copy of Russian Constitution, in case RKN's shills are too busy 'fighting'
  22. Telegram and forgot what this document means.
  23. * https://usher2.club/en - here you can monitor RKN's activity.
  24. * https://antizapret.info - A site with RKN's blocked address dumps, here
  25. you can see what's blocked right now.
  26. * https://roskomsvoboda.org - A Russian privacy activist group. I'm not
  27. (yet) affiliated with them, but they seem like they're fighting for the
  28. right cause.
  29. * https://github.com/zapret-info/z-i - a downloadable list of addresses
  30. blocked in the Russian Federation. Updated on a best effort basis but
  31. mostly current.
  32.  
  33. ## Glossary
  34. * [FSB](http://fsb.ru) - FSB, The Federal State Security Service of Russia.
  35. * [RKN](http://rkn.gov.ru) - Roskomnadzor, the state's regulatory agency for
  36. communications.
  37. * [FNS](http://nalog.ru) - Russian Tax Agency.
  38.  
  39. ## Preface
  40. First, an apology to you, dear netizens. I was tired, I haven't had a good
  41. night's sleep and my first two letters were panicked and full of knee-jerk
  42. comments.
  43.  
  44. Since then, I decided, I'll just try keeping you guys in the loop on local
  45. news. If anybody's interested, thanks for reding this. If you'll repost this,
  46. I (and many IT people and ordinary netizens in Russia) would be really
  47. grateful.
  48.  
  49. As always, you are free to repost this -- this is what information freedom is
  50. for, right?
  51.  
  52. ## Acknowledgements
  53. I would like to thank [EFF](https://eff.org) for its work in protecting the
  54. world's digital freedoms. Even if they're only mainly affecting the US,
  55. they're setting the mark of what should be possible. Thanks guys.
  56.  
  57. Also I would like to thank [Roskomsvoboda](https://roskomsvoboda.org) and the
  58. [Pirate party of Russia](https://pirate-party.ru/).
  59.  
  60. Kudos to the hard-working people of Agora(http://agora.legal), without you
  61. there wouldn't have been a torrent of legal action aimed at punishing RKN and
  62. the russian Government's illegal attempts to censor, block and disrupt the
  63. Internet, among other things. Seriously guys, you are awesome.
  64.  
  65. ## Background
  66. On April, 16, 2018, RKN has been blocking access to entire swaths of IP space
  67. in a series of (pretty vain) attempts to block the Telegram messenger. They
  68. blocked about 20 million IP addresses in a week's span.
  69.  
  70. It is estimated that profit loss from its direct actions had totaled $2
  71. billion. (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3614069).
  72.  
  73. Services such as Amazon, Google, PSN, Digital Ocean were affected. Sites
  74. couln't load fonts from fonts.google.com and some of Mastercard's processing
  75. was down. Google translate was down.
  76.  
  77. People started saying it's like hitting a city with a thermonuclear warhead
  78. because of a sole criminal they wanted to catch in that city.
  79.  
  80. RKN has opened a hot line where you can complain about a service not working:
  81.  
  82. ## Timeline of Events:
  83. Here is an (obviously incomplete) timeline of Russian government's efforts to
  84. censor the Internet and free speech in general. I will add relevant
  85. information to it in future posts.
  86.  
  87. * 2007: The [Federal List of Extermist
  88. materials](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_List_of_Extremist_Materials)
  89. was created.
  90. * 2012: A
  91. [law](https://giod.consultant.ru/documents/1621853?items=1&page=12) was
  92. passed, that mandated the creation of nationwide black list of sites.
  93. * 2016: The infamous [Yarovaya
  94. law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yarovaya_law) was passed, of course its
  95. stated purpose was to fight terrorism. The law mandated operators to STORE
  96. RECORDINGS OF THE CONTENT OF ALL PHONE CONVERSATIONS and ALL DATA TRAFFIC
  97. GOING THROUGH. To me, this is blatantly anti-constitutional.
  98. If you're at least moderately technically minded, you should know that a)
  99. it's a horrible blow to privacy, the human rights in general and b) it
  100. would require such enormous data storage capabilities that were not exitsent
  101. in any country in the world (maybe except the Utah's data center?!).
  102. * 2016-2017: In accordance to this law, RKN ordered Telegram to hand out the
  103. encryption keys to FSB. First, this isn't technically possible, and
  104. second, it's again against our 'beloved' constitution.
  105. * April 16, 2018. RKN begins blocking Telegram's addresses. Telegram evades.
  106. RKN begins blocking entire /15's of IPv4 address space. The largest prefix
  107. I've seen was /10 I think.
  108. Many services are thrown offline. Among the few are parts of EC2 (not
  109. surprising!), parts of Google, PSN, Digital Ocean. And much, much more.
  110. Sites couldn't load Google fonts, Google translate was down, and a lot of
  111. things was going haywire. I couldn't pay with my debit card because they
  112. blocked some of MasterCard's stuff.
  113. * April 16, 2018. RKN threatened that owners of Telegram SOCKS proxies would
  114. be [blocked]
  115. (https://mbk.news/news/proksi-serveri-blokirovka-za-ekstremizm/) as
  116. 'extermism propaganda'.
  117. Somewhere along this madness RKN opened a hotline for businesses affected
  118. with the mass blocks.
  119. * April 27, 2018 00:00: RKN accidentally blocked addresses of Yandex,
  120. Twitter, VK, Facebook, Odnoklassniki, a major time server located at
  121. Moscow's MSK-IX and a bunch of others.
  122. They were quick to unblock that and it's obvious this was a technical
  123. error on their part.
  124. * April 28, 2018: RKN promised not to block large prefixes anymore. They
  125. also unblocked about 3 million addresses of Amazon and some others. They
  126. continued to block /32s though.
  127. * April 28, 2018: [First lawsuit against
  128. RKN](https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/04/27/141306-protiv-roskomnadzora-podali-pervyy-isk-iz-za-blokirovki-telegram)
  129. by a commercial entity.
  130.  
  131. # Future efforts
  132. * On April 30th, 2018, there will be a protest organized by the Libertarian
  133. party of Russia (http://digitalresistance.moscow) against unlawful
  134. blocking of Telegram.
  135. As I see it, we can't turn the issue of Telegram into a political one, we
  136. should instead defend the freedom of speech and information as a whole,
  137. but these guys are still doing the good work.
  138. It's just if you plan to go to these protests, or monitor them, remember:
  139. it's not only for Telegram, it's for defending the right for the freedom
  140. of speech in Russia.
  141.  
  142. ## My thoughts on the so-called Yarovaya Law.
  143. IMHO, this law blatantly violates the Constitutions and is a huge threat
  144. not only to our citizens' data privacy, but to the integrity of the already
  145. failing Russian economy. Just think about huge resources that are needed for
  146. its execution.
  147.  
  148. The law also opens up enormous possibilities of misuse and is simply
  149. dangerous to Russian businesses and individuals, since anybody well bribed
  150. could listen in on not only our metadata (which I've witnessed numerous times
  151. in the past), but our data too.
  152.  
  153. Moreover, about 51% of today's IP traffic is already encrypted, making
  154. short-term storage of such traffic simply impractical.
  155.  
  156. IMO again, handing this data over into the hands of some corrupt officers is
  157. way more dangerous for Russia than all NSA efforts combined were for the US.
  158. There is already a monkey with a grenade situation going on with RKN, just
  159. imagine how much worse it'd be when YL goes into effect.
  160.  
  161. ## Some extra information
  162.  
  163. ### QR coded cash slips
  164.  
  165. To fight economical crime, the FNS mandated that ALL new cash registers are to
  166. be so called online cash registers. It means that as soon as a purchase is
  167. made, they upload information about it to the cloud, including:
  168.  
  169. * The contents of the purchase (if available)
  170. * The date and time of the purchase
  171. * The serial of the cash register
  172. * The taxpayer ID of the merchant.
  173.  
  174. An example of such a slip is here: https://imgur.com/a/iCzuiK7
  175.  
  176. Including in the internet shops - there are farms of these online registers
  177. churning out paper slips for e-purchases that are then distributed to the
  178. client.
  179.  
  180. The 'cloud' is operated by commercial entities, the so-called Fiscal
  181. Operators, who have almost uncontrolled potential for abusing this data and
  182. mining it. Today, with the advent of Big Data, having (even anonymized)
  183. purchase data for ALL OF THE COUNTRY effectively turns these commercial firms
  184. into the Big Brother. What could possibly go wrong, right?
  185.  
  186. The only upside of this horrible thing is that people can pull this data into
  187. their personal finance software, it seems.
  188.  
  189. ### Biometrics in Moscow Metro
  190.  
  191. Today, there was [news](https://sdelanounas.ru/blogs/106529/) that the first
  192. suspect was detained after a positive facial recognition by a camera in Moscow
  193. metro.
  194.  
  195. They started using some pretty hi-res AXIS stuff everywhere, as I see. Even
  196. inside the cars, which, by the way, have Wi-Fi.
  197.  
  198. ### Voice recognition data to be handed over to the authorities
  199.  
  200. (http://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=80347)[The order of access of FSB and
  201. MIA of Russia to citizen's voice recognition data is developed].
  202.  
  203. The bill is now at the phase of civil discussion, but I have no doubt that it
  204. will be passed soon.
  205.  
  206. Now I might add, voice recognition is almost bulletproof and the easiest to
  207. ues of all the mass ID methods because of so much readily available data on
  208. everybody.
  209.  
  210. This is certainly a threat to every Russian citizen because of, again,
  211. widespread possibilities of abuse of this act.
  212.  
  213. ## Russian Internet Blocking system: A Technical Review
  214.  
  215. ### Domain blocks resolved by ISPs threaten the integrity of Runet
  216.  
  217. Okay guys, somewhere later I'll post an in depth review of how the blocks
  218. work, but mostly for now they're simple address space blocks for carriers that
  219. don't have DPIs.
  220.  
  221. In the past it was possible to effectively block an ARBITRARY resource on the
  222. Internet simply by squatting an expired domain on the block list and slapping
  223. the victim's IP addresses as A records. ISP's filters would resolve it and the
  224. victim will get effectively blackholed in Russia. IDK if this works now, but I
  225. think some smaller providers might still use this tactic.
  226.  
  227. As of now there's a (semi-secret) whitelist containing addresses of critical
  228. infrastructure that should not be blocked. I don't know of its contents but I
  229. know they were mailing it to ISPs before Putin's hotline with Russian citizens
  230. in summer 2017.
  231.  
  232. Several incidents employing this method have already been reported.
  233.  
  234. ### Revisor ('Inspector') system: fines for ISPs for not blocking
  235.  
  236. RKN has implemented a simple Revisor system that consists of a modified
  237. TP-Link MR-3020 router that plugs into an ISP's network edge and continuously
  238. monitors resources from the blocking list. If an ISP fails to block something,
  239. they are subjected to a fine and (IIRC) their license might get cancelled for
  240. repeated violations.
  241.  
  242. ## My own thoughts on the blocking system
  243. As a libertarian, I deeply disapprove of any form of violation of human
  244. rights. Right here we do have a blatant violation of Constitution article 23,
  245. which states:
  246.  
  247. > 'Everyone has the right to privacy of correspondence, telephone
  248. > conversations, postal, telegraphic and other communications.
  249. > Restriction of this right is allowed only on the basis of a court
  250. > decision.'
  251.  
  252. and Constitution article 24, which states:
  253.  
  254. > The collection, storage, use and dissemination of information about a
  255. > person's private life without his consent is not allowed.
  256.  
  257. > Bodies of state power and bodies of local self-government, their officials
  258. > are obliged to provide everyone with an opportunity to get acquainted with
  259. > documents and materials directly affecting his rights and freedoms, unless
  260. > otherwise provided by law.
  261.  
  262. As such, this and other 'advancements' in censorship in Russia are blatant
  263. violations of human rights, aimed at keeping the status quo of corrupt
  264. officials and companies.
  265.  
  266. I can't say if they are anti-constitutional as I'm no legal expert, but to me
  267. it seems like they surely are.
  268.  
  269. Sincerely Yours,
  270. The Anonymous (and pretty sleepless these days) IT Guy.
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