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- "56619","3/15/2006 13:18","06MADRID644","Embassy Madrid","UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY","","VZCZCXRO9454
- PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ
- DE RUEHMD #0644 0741318
- ZNR UUUUU ZZH
- P 151318Z MAR 06
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9150
- INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 1802","UNCLAS MADRID 000644
- SIPDIS
- SIPDIS
- SENSITIVE
- E.O. 12958: N/A
- TAGS: PTER, PGOV, SP
- SUBJECT: BASQUE JOURNALIST DOUBTS ETA READY FOR PEACE DEAL
- 1. (SBU) Oscar Beltran, a journalist for the Basque Region
- daily \"El Correo\" and a former International Visitor grantee,
- recently shared his observations regarding rumors of an
- upcoming truce declaration by ETA. He has covered ETA for
- several years and reports extensively on the group. Beltran
- expects ETA to announce a truce soon, most likely on Good
- Friday in an effort to draw parallels between the Northern
- Ireland peace process and the situation in the Basque Region,
- part of ETA\'s \"long-held dream of internationalizing the
- conflict.\" He said the rumors of a possible truce obscured
- increasing tensions in the region, which he ascribed to a
- sense among ETA members that they have recovered from Spanish
- and French police actions in 2004 and 2005 that decimated
- their leadership and can therefore resume the political and
- military offensive.
- 2. (SBU) Beltran expressed concern that well-intentioned
- Spanish government officials may believe that they are making
- progress with ETA as a result of negotiations with the
- organization\'s political wing, while in reality the ETA
- military wing remained fully in control. \"The ETA military
- leadership doesn\'t care about Arnaldo Otegi (leader of ETA
- political front group \"Batasuna\"), they operate according to
- their own logic and make the decisions without consulting the
- political leadership.\" In his view, ETA\'s military wing did
- not have a realistic appreciation of what was achievable and
- believed it was operating from a relatively strong position,
- an attitude that was not conducive to good faith negotiations.
- 3. (SBU) Beltran noted with concern that ETA carried out bomb
- attacks to mark the March 9 general strike called by Batasuna
- to protest the deaths in prison of two ETA members (one by
- suicide, the other from natural causes). He said that
- although the strike was a total failure, the bombings were
- worrisome since ETA had not previously joined in direct
- support of political actions, such as the strike. (NOTE:
- Spanish officials were set to charge Otegi and other Batasuna
- leaders with inciting the March 9 violence, but the examining
- judge delayed a March 13 hearing due to Otegi\'s poor health.
- END NOTE).
- 4. (SBU) According to Beltran, ETA has significantly ramped
- up the extortion of Basque businesses to collect
- \"revolutionary taxes.\" He attributed this to both an
- increased need on the part of the organization and to the
- recovery of ETA\'s \"extortion wing\" from the 2004 arrest of
- Maria Soledad Iparragirre, who was in charge of collecting
- these funds. Beltran said ETA was making up for lost time
- and had probably run out of \"legitimate\" funds diverted from
- public coffers when Batasuna was a legal political entity,
- necessitating a crash program to generate funds for ETA and
- Batasuna activities. He was struck by the fact that ETA was
- using strong-arm tactics against even businesses known to be
- sympathetic to radical nationalists, sending company owners
- pictures of their children as a clear threat of violence.
- 5. (SBU) Beltran said the Basque Socialist Party felt
- tremendously confident that it could displace the Basque
- moderate PNV as the largest party in the region. He
- described the PNV as riven by ideological and personal
- struggles and clearly losing ground to the Socialists on one
- side and to the radical nationalists on the other. As for
- the Popular Party, once the second power in the Basque
- Region, Beltran said the party was in disarray and still
- reeling from its fall to third place in the Basque Parliament
- in the March 2005 elections, behind the PNV and the
- Socialists. He said, however, that observers of the Basque
- political scene were more focused on the 2007 municipal
- elections than on regional-level politics, since Batasuna
- stands to make significant gains at the local level if an ETA
- truce leads to the legalization of the group by the Zapatero
- government. Almost certainly, the PP would wage a pitched
- political campaign to keep Batasuna out of the political
- process, setting the stage for a major legal and legislative
- battle at the national level.
- AGUIRRE
- "
- "
- "79833","9/27/2006 10:18","06MADRID2435","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","06MADRID1709|06MADRID2073","VZCZCXRO1661
- PP RUEHAG
- DE RUEHMD #2435/01 2701018
- ZNY CCCCC ZZH
- P 271018Z SEP 06
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0871
- INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2109","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002435
- SIPDIS
- SIPDIS
- E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
- TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SP
- SUBJECT: SPAIN: SIX MONTHS ON, ETA\'S \"PERMANENT CEASEFIRE\"
- ON SHAKY GROUND
- REF: A. MADRID 1709
- B. MADRID 2073
- MADRID 00002435 001.2 OF 002
- Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
- 1. (C) Summary: Six months after the Basque separatist
- group ETA announced a permanent ceasefire, many inside Spain
- are now doubting its permanence. Street violence and
- vandalism continue in the Basque region and alleged ETA
- supporters released a statement over the weekend claiming
- that the group would refuse to disarm until the region gains
- its independence. Spanish newspapers have reported in recent
- days that ETA might reconsider its ceasefire agreement if the
- government fails to make significant progress toward the
- legalization of its outlawed political wing, and Interior
- Minister Rubalcaba announced earlier this week that talks
- between the government and ETA had been postponed
- indefinitely. Post sees the potential for a hiatus, if not a
- complete breakdown, in the GOS peace process with ETA as each
- side remains intransigent, and forging some type of middle
- ground does not at the moment appear possible. End Summary.
- 2. (U) The Basque region was hit with its fourth straight
- weekend of \"kale borroka,\" or street violence perpetrated by
- young ETA supporters, and recent acts of vandalism have
- included attacks on a radio station in Pamplona and a nearby
- headquarters of the Basque Socialist Party. Adding to the
- tension, on September 23 three masked figures claiming to
- represent ETA read a statement saying that ETA\'s fight was,
- \"not past, but rather present and future.\" If genuine, the
- message would be the most threatening released by ETA since
- their announcement of a permanent ceasefire in March.
- President Zapatero responded a day after the statement\'s
- release that his government would hold firm in the management
- of the peace process, but Interior Minister Rubalcaba
- informed parliament on September 26 that a meeting with ETA
- planned for this month would be postponed indefinitely.
- Spanish newspapers have recently reported that ETA might
- reconsider its ceasefire agreement if the government fails to
- make significant advances toward the legalization of its
- outlawed political wing Batasuna, and rumors are circulating
- that ETA may take some sort of action, be it an ultimatum or
- an outright return to violence intended to force the
- government\'s hand, around the middle of October.
- 3. (C) Post sees the potential over the coming weeks for a
- hiatus, if not a complete breakdown, in the GOS peace process
- with ETA. As reported in REFTEL A, President Zapatero
- announced in late June that he would launch direct
- negotiations with ETA--as the group had in his opinion
- followed through with its declaration of a permanent cease
- fire--and that Minister Rubalcaba would brief political
- leaders in September regarding the progress of the
- negotiations. Talks have not materialized, primarily because
- the two sides have yet to find common ground on the \"Law of
- Political Parties\" that was enacted in 2002 by the two main
- Spanish political parties to ban ETA front group Batasuna
- from the political process for its refusal to renounce
- terrorism. Zapatero insisted that Batasuna change its name
- and party statutes in order to meet legal requirements, steps
- that Batasuna continues to reject. ETA radicals and Batasuna
- political operatives have expressed frustration lately with
- the lack of progress they believe the government has made in
- addressing their concerns and charge that the government is
- trying to indefinitely delay political negotiations involving
- the legal status of Batasuna. Batasuna insists that it has
- kept its side of the bargain by respecting the ceasefire, and
- criticizes the government for continuing to arrest and try
- suspected ETA members while not lifting the ban on political
- participation by Batasuna.
- 4. (U) The government for its part is holding firm to what
- it believes was agreed upon previously, namely that only a
- Batasuna that respected democratic procedures would be
- allowed to participate in the peace process, and that ETA
- would limit itself in negotiations to its disarmament and
- dissolution. Zapatero insists that the government does not
- intend to modify its firm stance on ending ETA violence, and
- that the rules of the game are clear. GOS officials remain
- publicly optimistic that there is room for agreement and have
- urged Spaniards to be patient as the process moves along and
- not focus too heavily on the continuing street violence. Our
- contacts indicate that privately, however, officials in
- Zapatero\'s government no longer believe that these messages
- are meant for internal ETA consumption and are wondering
- whether ETA hard-liners have won the day.
- 5. (C) Poloff spoke with Basque journalist Oscar Beltran,
- who covers ETA terrorism for the leading regional daily \"El
- Correo,\" to request his assessment of recent tensions in the
- MADRID 00002435 002.2 OF 002
- peace process. Beltran opined that legalization of Batasuna
- under another name was no longer sufficient for radical
- Basque nationalists, as their objective is now the complete
- revocation of the \"Law of Political Parties.\" Beltran said
- that the Zapatero government had the votes to overturn the
- law, but that the political price of doing so would be
- extremely high. Zapatero\'s options were therefore limited to
- either an all-out conflict with ETA, or the ceding to key ETA
- demands on political recognition and territorial ambitions.
- Beltran described rumors currently circulating in the Basque
- region that ETA would take \"important measures\" during
- October that would leave clear whether or not the group
- intended to hold to the ceasefire and peace process. He said
- ETA was not fully in control of its base, and gave as an
- example the inability of the leadership to halt a hunger
- strike by imprisoned ETA terrorist Juan de Chaos that could
- inflame die-hard ETA fighters and undermine the group\'s
- willingness to negotiate.
- 6. (C) Comment: As the ceasefire negotiations enter their
- seventh month, misperceptions, diverging tactics, ambiguities
- and distortions threaten to unravel the fledgling process.
- Each side has been boxed into a corner by its own actions
- and/or pressure from opposing forces, and the middle ground
- does not at the moment appear sustainable. Batasuna leaders
- sold the peace process to its more radical supporters as the
- only viable entry ramp into political negotiations, but as
- the government stalls on the question of legalization, these
- supporters are becoming increasingly disenchanted and
- agitated and are hinting at reconsidering a return to
- violence. The Zapatero government\'s maneuvering room has
- been limited by constant attacks and criticism from ETA
- victims organizations and the opposition Popular Party (which
- has been vehemently opposed to Zapatero\'s ETA peace
- initiative at a time when ETA was practically eliminated by
- cooperation between Spanish and French police forces). It is
- important to note that ETA supporters have been saying for
- over a month that the ceasefire declaration has been in
- crisis (as reported in REFTEL B), and they have threatened to
- respond in the past. What is unclear, however, is just if
- and when ETA\'s patience with the peace process will
- eventually run out.
- ********************************************* ****************
- CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN THE ETA PEACE PROCESS (2006)
- March 22 - ETA declares \"Permanent Ceasefire\"
- March 23 - Ceasefire takes effect
- May 21 - Zapatero says he will announce in June the start of
- direct talks with ETA
- June 26 - Zapatero announces that he will begin \"long and
- difficult\" peace talks with ETA
- August 18 - ETA claims peace process \"immersed in an obvious
- state of crisis\"
- September 23 - Alleged ETA gunmen announce refusal to disarm
- until the region gains its independence
- ********************************************* *****************
- AGUIRRE
- "
- "91533","1/4/2007 16:37","07MADRID17","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","06MADRID3111|07MADRID1|07MADRID6","VZCZCXRO9083
- PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
- DE RUEHMD #0017/01 0041637
- ZNY CCCCC ZZH
- P 041637Z JAN 07
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1548
- INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
- RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0289
- RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 0988
- RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1272
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2330
- RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
- RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
- RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
- RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
- RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
- RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
- RHEFHTA/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000017
- SIPDIS
- SIPDIS
- E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017
- TAGS: PTER, PGOV, SP
- SUBJECT: ETA ATTACK: FIRST DEATH CONFIRMED, ZAPATERO FACING
- POLITICAL FALLOUT
- REF: A. MADRID 6
- B. MADRID 1
- C. 2006 MADRID 3111
- MADRID 00000017 001.2 OF 003
- Classified By: Charge d\'Affaires Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (D)
- 1. (C) Summary. Authorities confirmed late on January 3 that
- they had located the body of Ecuadoran immigrant Carlos
- Alonso Palate in the wreckage of the airport parking garage
- bombed by ETA on December 30. Alonso Palate becomes the
- 818th victim of ETA terrorism and the first ETA victim since
- May 2003. Sources close to President Zapatero said that he
- would appear before Parliament to discuss his \"new
- anti-terrorism strategy,\" as Popular Party (PP) leader
- Mariano Rajoy continued his criticism of Zapatero\'s handling
- of the attack and other PP figures speculated that Zapatero
- wants to maintain a dialogue with ETA. An ETA expert told us
- that ETA may have forshadowed the attack to Socialist Party
- (PSOE) negotiators in a secret meeting in Ankara, but the
- PSOE representatives may have misinterpreted the warning.
- ETA\'s normally disciplined political front group Batasuna
- appeared to be in disarray, with one of its leaders saying
- only ETA could explain the rationale behind the attack, while
- another insisted that there was no proof that ETA had
- undertaken the bombing and that the Basque peace process
- remained viable. A Batasuna leader said the attack had been
- \"completely unexpected,\" but failed to condemn the bombing.
- End Summary.
- //AUTHORITIES LOCATE BODY//
- 2. (U) Police located the body of Carlos Alonso Palate in his
- vehicle, which had been on the lowest level of the five-floor
- garage destroyed by an ETA bomb on December 30. Crews
- continue to search for the body of Diego Armando Estacio, a
- second Ecuadoran immigrant who was in a separate section of
- the garage. There are now reports of a possible third
- victim, an Uruguayan traveler whose family has reported
- missing. Alonso Palate is the 818th victim of ETA violence
- and the first since May 2003, when ETA killed two police
- officers in Navarra. President Zapatero met with the
- families of both victims, following criticism by one of the
- families that he had not contacted them for days following
- the attacks. Zapatero also faced criticism for not having
- visited the site of the bombing, which is expected to cost
- over $40 million to rebuild, making it the most costly ETA
- attack ever in economic terms.
- 3. (U) The Government took several steps to tighten security
- in anticipation of possible additional attacks. The Ministry
- of Defense ordered increased security for all of its units
- and the Basque Regional Government and the national
- Government increased personal protection for politicians
- considered to be under threat by ETA. According to one press
- report, there is concern that ETA has shifted its technology,
- making current countermeasures against explosive devices less
- effective.
- //ZAPATERO TO SPEAK BEFORE PARLIAMENT//
- 4. (U) PP leader Mariano Rajoy harshly criticized the
- Zapatero Government\'s response to the ETA attack, saying
- Spain was \"like a boat without a helmsman.\" Rajoy, who had
- joined Madrid PP leaders in making an early visit to the site
- of the bombing, called upon Zapatero to address Parliament to
- explain his counter-terrorism policies. Socialist (PSOE)
- leaders countered that the PP should demonstrate unity with
- the Government rather than criticizing Zapatero, pointing out
- that former President Aznar had not appeared before
- Parliament when ETA broke its truce with his Government in
- 1999, nor had the PSOE asked him to. Nevertheless, just
- hours later, sources close to the Zapatero Government told
- Spanish media that he would appear in Parliament \"once all of
- the facts were available\" to discuss his strategy. Socialist
- politicians discussed the possibility of establishing a new
- counter-terrorism pact to broaden its current pact with the
- PP. Rajoy argued that the PSOE had broken the PP-PSOE pact
- by engaging in talks with ETA and called on the PSOE to
- re-implement the existing pact rather than open it to
- renegotiation simply to include other political parties.
- MADRID 00000017 002.2 OF 003
- Some PP leaders expressed concern that Zapatero intends to
- maintain contacts with ETA in spite of the bombing.
- Meanwhile, the moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)
- reconfirmed its support for the Government\'s decision to
- suspend negotiations with ETA.
- //ETA MAY HAVE WARNED PSOE//
- 5. (C) Oscar Beltran (strictly protect), a journalist in the
- Basque Region who has covered ETA for over 20 years, told
- Poloff that ETA negotiator Josu Ternera may have warned PSOE
- negotiators in mid-December that ETA would carry out
- \"actions,\" but that these actions were not intended to
- disrupt the peace process. News reports indicate that
- Ternera, accompanied by his son and by ETA member Ainhoa
- Ozaeta, held a secret meeting in Ankara on December 15 with
- Basque PSOE leader Jesus Eguiguren and two unnamed PSOE
- figures, during which the participants made no progress, but
- also did not break off negotiations. Beltran speculated that
- the PSOE negotiators in this meeting may have misinterpreted
- Ternera\'s warning to mean that ETA would escalate vandalism
- and street violence, as it had done in October and November.
- Beltran said that police sources in Paris indicated that the
- French authorities had expected an ETA attack before the end
- of the year, fears that evidently were not shared by the
- Spanish leadership.
- //ETA SUPPORTERS AT A LOSS//
- 6. (U) Batasuna leaders emphasized their position that the
- Basque peace process was \"more important than ever\" and
- continued to accuse the Government of failing to move forward
- on the negotiations and even insisted that there was no proof
- that ETA had carried out the bombing. But there were also
- signs that internal Batasuna discipline was fraying. Asked
- to characterize the airport bombing, Batasuna spokesman
- Pernando Barrena said that it was \"up to ETA to interpret
- (the attack).... we have no doubt that what ETA has to say
- to the Basque people about this incident will be very
- important.\" Another Batasuna leader, Joseba Alvarez,
- acknowledged that the bombing had created serious problems
- and said that \"nobody had expected\" the bombing. There were
- numerous reports that Batasuna leader Arnaldo Otegi had
- wanted to be more critical of the attack in his December 30
- press conference, but had been overruled by more hard line
- members of the organization.
- 7. (C) Beltran, the Basque journalist, said that there was
- tremendous confusion within ETA\'s support groups because ETA
- had yet to issue an official declaration regarding the
- bombing. He said that ETA had been expected to issue a
- declaration on January 2, but since that failed to take place
- Batasuna and other ETA supporters were simply falling back on
- standard extremist rhetoric. Beltran said that the December
- 30 bombing had severely demoralized Basque society and
- politicians across the political spectrum, who are bracing
- for further ETA violence.
- 8. (U) In a signal that Spanish judicial authorities intend
- to ramp up pressure on ETA\'s political front groups,
- prosecutors denied a request by Otegi to attend a conference
- in Germany and asked police to prepare a report on the
- actions of Batasuna leaders on the day of the bombing. Otegi
- is free on bond, but faces large fines and 15 months in
- prison for slandering King Juan Carlos and for leading a 2003
- ceremony to honor dead ETA fighter Manuel Benaran Ordenana.
- In addition to Batasuna, six other ETA front groups face
- judicial action on terrorism-related charges.
- //COMMENT//
- 9. (C) If it were confirmed that ETA negotiator Josu Ternera
- had issued any kind of warning to Socialist negotiators prior
- to the attack, it could prove a political bombshell for
- Zapatero. The PP would be able to point to this incident as
- proof that the Zapatero Government was either incompetent in
- handling the negotiations with ETA or weak in not immediately
- pushing back on the ETA threat. Even if this particular
- incident does not gain traction in the media, Zapatero\'s
- uncertain handling of the aftermath of the explosion has
- MADRID 00000017 003.2 OF 003
- already damaged his standing. The PSOE is now focused on
- organizing a response that both demonstrates toughness and
- neutralizes PP criticism. The need for Zapatero to make a
- strong and credible presentation before Parliament appears to
- be increasingly necessary if the PSOE is to stem the
- bleeding. A possible approach may be for the PSOE to seek to
- create a new \"anti-terrorism pact\" that includes smaller
- leftist and nationalist parties, particularly if the PP opts
- out of a pact for reasons that appear petty or partisan. The
- PP feels vindicated in its frequent warnings to Zapatero not
- to engage ETA and is in no hurry help Zapatero achieve a
- graceful solution to his political predicament.
- LLORENS
- "
- "179861","11/24/2008 17:34","08MADRID1231","Embassy Madrid","SECRET","06MADRID3111|06MADRID766|07MADRID1078","VZCZCXRO8366
- RR RUEHLA
- DE RUEHMD #1231/01 3291734
- ZNY SSSSS ZZH
- R 241734Z NOV 08
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5618
- INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1514
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3675
- RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
- RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
- RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
- RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001231
- SIPDIS
- PASS TO EUR/WE\'S ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI, S/CT\'S
- MARC NORMAN, NSC\'S ELIZABETH FARR, AND NCTC\'S PAUL SAUPE
- E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2033
- TAGS: PINR, PINS, PREL, PTER, SP, FR
- SUBJECT: SPAIN: ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT ETA
- ARRESTS IN FRANCE
- REF: A. 2007 MADRID 1078
- B. 2006 MADRID 3111
- C. 2006 MADRID 766
- Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)
- 1. (C) SUMMARY: French police and Spanish Guardia Civil
- (GC) paramilitary forces conducted a joint raid in Cauterets,
- France early on the morning of November 17 in which they
- arrested ETA members Mikel Garikoitz Aspiazu Rubina (aka
- \"Txeroki\" in Basque or \"Cherokee\" in English) and Leire Lopez
- Zurutuza. ETA,s military chief since 2003, Txeroki
- represents the new generation of radical young hardliners who
- in recent years have supplanted the old guard and taken
- control over ETA. Roughly 48 hours after Txeroki\'s capture,
- Spanish Interior Minister Alfredo PerezRubalcaba publicly
- assessed that not only was Txeroki the military chief, but he
- had also assumed some political responsibilities following
- the May 2008 detention of Francisco Javier Lopez Pena, aka
- Thierry, which gave Txeroki control of overall strategy, thus
- making him the number one man in ETA. This cable provides an
- assessment of the arrests, identifies the roles of the
- detained, examines the capabilities of what\'s left of ETA,
- and discusses the political reaction in Spain. END SUMMARY.
- 2. (SBU) Media coverage most often describes Txeroki, age 35,
- as the one who reportedly gave the order to bomb the parking
- garage at Madrid\'s Barajas airport (See Reftel A) in December
- 2006 that effectively ended the \"permanent unilateral
- ceasefire\" that ETA had declared nine months earlier (See
- Reftel C). According to recently arrested ETA members\'
- comments in the media, Txeroki claimed to have been the
- trigger-man in the shooting deaths of two GC officials in
- Capbreton, France in December 2007. The Spanish media
- describe the arrests as a severe blow to ETA and note that,
- since ETA officially declared an end to its ceasefire in June
- 2007 (See Reftel B), Spanish and French security forces have
- detained the group\'s military, political, and logistical
- senior leadership.
- 3. (S) Embassy Madrid POLOFF and Information Officer
- discussed the arrests on November 21 with longtime ETA
- watcher Jesus Maria Zuloaga (Please Protect), the Deputy
- Director of conservative-leaning, Madrid-based La Razon
- newspaper. A native of the Basque Country, Zuloaga is a
- well-connected source on ETA with contacts at the highest
- levels of the GC and Spanish National Police. He also says
- he considers Interior Minister Rubalcaba a personal friend.
- He is the author of a book on ETA and countless articles on
- the group over 22 years in journalism. He has been an ETA
- target for years, including the intended victim of a letter
- bomb in 2000. In self-imposed exile from the Basque Country,
- he lives in hiding and says he undergoes extensive security
- precautions in his day-to-day life, including changing
- residences every two years, not owning a car, and never
- allowing his picture to be published. POLOFF also discussed
- the fallout of the arrests on November 24 with Oscar Beltran
- Otalora (Please Protect), political editor of the
- Bilbao-based newspaper, El Correo, and likewise an expert on
- ETA issues.
- //The Arrests//
- 4. (S) Press reports note that French police and the GC found
- two handguns, two laptops, several memory sticks, maps and
- just 3,000 euros in cash, which media reports attribute to
- ETA,s recent difficulties in fund-raising. Zuloaga says
- that the information in the memory sticks will be where
- Spanish security services will find the most valuable
- information, because ETA has instituted a policy of keeping
- PCs \"clean.\" He added that ETA policy is to protect its pen
- drives with Pretty Good Privacy (\"PGP\") encryption software,
- Virus Script and Ultra Wipe, all of which are available for
- free. As of November 22, Spanish media reported that French
- security forces had not yet broken the \"almost impenetrable\"
- encryption and noted that in some cases in the past, ETA\'s
- encrypted communications have never been broken.
- //Txeroki\'s Role Within ETA//
- 5. (S) When the arrests were announced on November 17, media
- outlets described Txeroki as the leader of ETA\'s military
- wing. He had held that role since 2003 and was a known
- MADRID 00001231 002 OF 003
- quantity to Spanish security forces. Beltran told POLOFF
- that Txeroki had acquired a myth-like status within ETA,
- which made his detention a tough symbolic blow to the group.
- Rubalcaba publicly called him \"probably the most wanted
- objective\" of the Spanish security forces. However, by
- November 19, the Minister had re-evaluated his assessment of
- Txeroki\'s role and told state-owned radio network Cadena SER
- that Txeroki was in fact in charge of policy and strategy as
- well. Txeroki had assumed some political responsibilities
- falling the May 2008 detention of his rival, Francisco Javier
- Lopez Pena, aka Thierry, who had been ETA\'s political leader
- and the chief negotiator with the Zapatero government during
- peace talks in 2006, which Txeroki reportedly bitterly
- opposed. After Thierry\'s arrest, Txeroki reportedly
- suspended the power of ETA\'s Executive Committee, the group\'s
- highest authority, and assumed some of Thierry\'s duties,
- which effectively gave him control of overall strategy and
- made him the number one man in ETA. In Rubalcaba\'s words,
- Txeroki was \"in charge of everything, the political apparatus
- and the so-called military apparatus. The one who ordered
- the killings was Txeroki.\"
- //Txeroki\'s Successor As Military Chief//
- 6. (S) Even with Rubalcaba\'s re-evaluation of Txeroki\'s role,
- Zuloaga cautioned Embassy officials not to magnify the
- importance of his detention. Spanish press reports suggest
- that ETA\'s new military chief is Aitzol Iriondo Yarza,
- Txeroki\'s 31-year-old deputy who is an information technology
- expert with extensive experience in explosives and internal
- security. Zuloaga opined that Iriondo -- whose primary nom
- de guerre is \"Gurbitz\" but who is also known as \"Gurbita,\"
- \"Asier\" and \"Barbas\" -- is more dangerous, radical, and
- methodical than Txeroki and will probably do a better job as
- military chief than Txeroki did. Zuloaga noted that, under
- Txeroki\'s leadership of the military wing, ETA claimed \"only\"
- seven lives in five years, which is lower than most previous
- five-year periods.
- //Lopez Zurutuza\'s Role Within ETA//
- 7. (S) Most Spanish media reports have depicted Lopez
- Zurutuza as Txeroki\'s girlfriend. However, Zuloaga says this
- is incorrect and tells Embassy officials his sources inform
- him that she is in fact the commander of ETA\'s \"legal cells,\"
- i.e., those ETA members who have 9-5 jobs on weekdays but who
- are then operational -- including in carrying out attacks --
- on weekends.
- //Txeroki\'s Alleged Plans//
- 8. (S) The Spanish media report that Txeroki had planned to
- purge ETA\'s ranks of Thierry loyalists, whom he considered
- dissidents and not trustworthy. The media also report that
- Txeroki\'s appointment planner has a series of meetings
- scheduled until January 2009 in which he intended to create a
- cell composed of French Basques, who would be able to transit
- the border more easily and stay in hotels in Spain without
- arousing suspicion. Zuloaga assesses that Txeroki and Lopez
- Zurutuza were meeting for the purpose of implementing attacks
- in furtherance of ETA\'s November 5, 2008 communique, which
- Zuloaga described as conveying the most violent threats he
- had ever seen in his 22 years of monitoring ETA\'s activities.
- That communique and others have threatened to carry out
- deadly attacks to force the GOS back to the negotiating
- table.
- //ETA\'s Status and Reprisals//
- 9. (S) Some Spanish media suggest that some 40 members of ETA
- may be identified by authorities and compromised following
- the arrest of Txeroki, while others suggest that ETA\'s
- dedicated, core group numbers just 100 members (a number
- which Beltran suggests is accurate). Post-arrest Spanish
- media reports suggest that ETA has only three operational
- cells left, although Zuloaga suggests there are \"at least
- four or five.\" Meanwhile, Rubalcaba asserted on November 18
- that among both ETA prisoners in Spanish jails and the
- radical Basque nationalists who support violence there is
- increasingly \"a sense of growing weakness\" and an almost
- unstoppable process of deterioration in their support and
- abilities, which he predicted will cause hardline leaders to
- attempt a reprisal as a show of strength and to bolster
- MADRID 00001231 003 OF 003
- morale.
- 10. (S) Rubalcaba has announced that Spanish security forces
- are on maximum alert for prospective reprisals from ETA,
- which already has detonated a bomb in suburban Bilbao on the
- night of November 20, which did not kill anyone but caused
- extensive damage to a TV relay tower that is used by police
- and security forces for radio signals. Beltran remarked that
- the ETA attack was a very disproportionate and weak response
- in comparison to the blow that they had received.
- Nevertheless, he suggested that ETA could execute a stronger
- attack at any moment. Zuloaga concurred, opining that if ETA
- can carry out reprisals, they will. However, he noted that
- the border between Spain and France is \"practically closed\"
- and that at the moment it would be difficult to carry out
- ETA\'s usual modus operandi of bringing a stolen car from
- France into Spain to carry out a car-bomb attack. He
- assessed that ETA members are \"fanatics, but not foolish,\"
- suggesting that the group will instead wait one or two months
- to regroup and then seek to carry out a more substantive
- attack.
- //The Political Reaction//
- 11. (C) President Zapatero on November 17 publicly declared
- the arrest a \"serious\" and \"decisive\" blow to ETA,s
- organization and capacity and a \"huge advance\" in the fight
- against ETA. He phoned French President Sarkozy to thank him
- for French counter-terrorism (CT) efforts and the two leaders
- agreed to convene in Madrid an extraordinary summit on CT
- measures in the coming weeks. The French Ambassador to Spain
- has publicly suggested the first quarter of 2009 is a likely
- timeframe. Spanish media reports also suggest that National
- Court Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza will travel to France
- in early December to secure a temporary extradition of
- Txeroki to Spain, where he faces 22 charges for a range of
- illegal activities. Meanwhile, Rubalcaba has publicly
- discarded any possibility that the GOS would renew
- negotiations with ETA. However, Beltran suggests that if
- things keep going the way they are for ETA, the terrorist
- group may in the long term be forced to ask for negotiations
- from a position of weakness.
- 12. (C) COMMENT: As Zapatero and Rubalcaba have indicated,
- the arrest of Txeroki is a landmark event in the GOS\'s more
- than 40-year battle against ETA. He is now in jail in Paris,
- where authorities have been unable to match the ballistics of
- the guns found in his possession with those used in the
- Capbreton murders. French officials have nevertheless
- charged him with leading a group with the objective of
- preparing a terrorist attack (ie., the Capbreton murders).
- The arrest also marks an important political victory for the
- Zapatero administration, especially when viewed of the
- context of other senior level ETA arrests since the end of
- ETA\'s ceasefire - three in 18 months and two in the last six
- months. The GOS post-Barajas crackdown on ETA is putting the
- squeeze on the group, whose internal divisions over the past
- several years are now being portrayed as a true split between
- the Txeroki and Thierry factions.
- 13. (S) COMMENT (CONTINUED): Zuloaga is right to caution
- against over-emphasizing the importance of Txeroki\'s arrest
- and Rubalcaba prudently states that the end of ETA is not at
- hand, but the arrests are indeed significant and will cause
- further damage to the dramatically weakened terrorist group,
- which appears to reeling from a series of problems which
- include an internal schism on the direction the group should
- take, declining social support in the Basque Country which
- has led to decreased fundraising from their extortion
- activity, low morale and paranoia ht the group has been
- infiltrated by the security services, frequent arrests that
- have created a larger (and politically divided) prison
- population than ever before, and an increasingly younger,
- more inexperienced leadership at the helm of the group. In
- the long term, Beltran suggests that the disenchanted ETA
- prison population -- which includes numerous former leaders
- of the group, whose views apparently carry weight -- is \"one
- of the keys\" to an eventual resolution of the conflict. He
- says the GOS has been engaging them to secure their support
- for an end to the violence. END COMMENT.
- AGUIRRE
- "
- "196986","3/16/2009 8:23","09MADRID272","Embassy Madrid","SECRET","08MADRID1055|08MADRID1231|08MADRID1306|09MADRID139","VZCZCXRO0202
- RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
- DE RUEHMD #0272/01 0750823
- ZNY SSSSS ZZH
- R 160823Z MAR 09
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0377
- INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
- RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1525
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3899
- RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
- RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
- RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
- RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
- RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000272
- SIPDIS
- PASS TO EUR/WE\'S ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI,
- S/CT\'S MARC NORMAN AND JASON BLAZAKIS,
- NSC\'S ELIZABETH FARR,
- NCTC\'S PAUL SAUPE
- E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2024
- TAGS: PINR, PINS, PREL, PTER, SP, FR
- SUBJECT: SPAIN: EXPERTS SEE WEAKENING OF BASQUE TERRORIST
- GROUP ETA
- REF: A. MADRID 139
- B. 08 MADRID 1231
- C. 08 MADRID 1055
- D. 08 MADRID 1306
- MADRID 00000272 001.2 OF 003
- Classified By: ADCM William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
- 1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Embassy Madrid recently pulsed
- the opinions on Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) watchers
- for their thoughts on the relative strength or weakness of
- the group. The consensus is that ETA is dramatically
- weakened but retains the ability to kill and do significant
- damage. One Embassy contact provided to POLOFF and the
- Embassy\'s Information Officer an alleged ETA internal
- strategy document, which apparently came into his posession
- from his contacts in the Spanish security services. Post
- cannot independently verify the authenticity of the file,
- which our contact described as the ETA equivalent of the
- documents retrieved from senior FARC official Raul Reyes\' PC
- in 2008. The document, which appears to have been finalized
- in December 2008, is highly critical of the group\'s actions
- in recent years and maps out a strategy for the way forward,
- in which it makes clear that the group intends to fight to
- the end and is not seeking \"an honorable exit.\" Post will
- pouch a copy of the document to interested parties. END
- SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
- //The Judicial Perspective//
- 2. (C) On February 24, POLOFF and LEGAT spoke at length with
- Magistrate Javier Gomez Bermudez, the President of the
- National Court\'s Criminal Chamber, who has overseen several
- high-profile ETA trials, including those for the 1995
- assassination of the center-right Popular Party\'s regional
- leader in the Basque Country, Gregorio Ordonez, and for the
- 1997 assassination of kidnapped Basque town councilman Miguel
- Angel Blanco. POLOFF and LEGAT asked for the magistrate\'s
- thoughts on the relative strength or weakness of ETA and how
- he envisioned ETA\'s armed conflict with the GOS would end.
- He replied that, for all intents and purposes, ETA already is
- over. He couched his comments by adding that there will
- always be some thug who will be willing to commit violence
- and invoke some vaguely political rationale, but by and large
- ETA has been defeated. He further remarked that the number
- of deaths ETA causes on an annual basis is nowhere near the
- early 1980s, when the rate was one every three days. He
- agreed with the notion that ETA receives a disproportionate
- amount of press and political discussion compared to its
- current threat capability. The amount of violence that
- exists today - three or four deaths per year - will never go
- away, he claimed.
- //ETA\'s Capabilities, Weaknesses Discussed//
- 3. (C) The Ministry of Interior, however, treats the threat
- posted by ETA as very real. In a January 15 meeting with an
- adviser to the Deputy Minister, POLOFF offered the Embassy\'s
- congratulations for the Ministry\'s back-to-back arrests of
- two of the terrorist groups\' military leaders in late 2008
- (See REFTEL A). The adviser described the arrests as
- important, but added, \"we\'re not done yet,\" meaning ETA is
- still active. This senior Guardia Civil officer indicated
- that he talks with his French counter-terrorism counterparts
- about ETA \"every day.\" He also remarked the latest
- generation of ETA leaders has less political acumen, a notion
- with which Oscar Beltran Otalora, political editor of the
- Bilbao-based newspaper, El Correo, and an expert on ETA,
- agrees. Most of the ETA operatives today are very violent
- and radicalized, but inexperienced and without any education,
- Beltran claimed. In a February 6 phone call with POLOFF,
- Beltran likened ETA\'s current weakness to the last days of
- World War II, when Hitler\'s army comprised \"child soldiers
- and old men.\" An entire generation of Etarras is in Spanish
- and French jails, he noted. COMMENT: As reported in REFTEL
- A, there were a record number of ETA members in jail as of
- the end of 2008. END COMMENT.
- 4. (C) Jesus Maria Zuloaga, the Deputy Director of
- conservative-leaning, La Razon newspaper whose bio and
- MADRID 00000272 002.2 OF 003
- credentials are provided in REFTEL B, discussed ETA\'s status
- with POLOFF and Embassy Madrid\'s Information Officer on March
- 2. Zuloaga said he still considers ETA to be \"very
- dangerous.\" Following the February 9 car bomb attack in
- Madrid (See REFTEL A) and keeping in mind the
- still-unexplained case of a Madrid gardener who was briefly
- kidnapped in September 2008 in an apparent case of mistaken
- identity (See REFTEL C), Zuloaga was adamant that ETA has
- reconstituted a cell of some kind in the Spanish capital. He
- acknowledged that the official GOS stance is that this is not
- the case, but Zuloaga claims this is a \"politically
- convenient\" position, because if the Ministry of Interior did
- publicly state that there was probably an ETA cell in Madrid,
- then there would be immense pressure on the Ministry to
- neutralize it. Zuloaga said he has spoken with security
- services personnel who interviewed the gardener, whose
- reputation is that of a stable person who does not abuse
- drugs or alcohol, but who now refuses to have his picture
- taken by the press and has had to quit his job because he is
- terrified and traumatized. Zuloaga suggested that ETA may
- have been attempting something similar to its kidnapping of
- Miguel Angel Blanco, who was executed after ETA\'s demands for
- a ransom were not met.
- 5. (C) Zuloaga also opined on the recent turnover in ETA\'s
- leadership. He commented that he doubts that Jurdan
- Martitegi is actually the new military chief, as the press
- has reported (See REFTEL A), and suggests that Martitegi is
- probably just one of the most high-profile militants still at
- large whose name the GOS security forces know. Zuloaga also
- speculated on the December 9 arrest of Aitzol Iriondo, the
- short-lived successor to ETA\'s long-time military chief,
- Txeroki. Zuloaga said that the Spanish security forces only
- had a very small handful of officers monitoring the location
- where Iriondo was arrested. They could not believe that he
- arrived at a location whose security had been compromised
- following Txeroki\'s November 17 arrest, which Zuloaga cites
- as evidence that Iriondol was either really dumb, was
- sacrificed by rivals within ETA who set him up, or that there
- is a mole in ETA who tipped off the security services about
- his attendance at the meeting.
- //Alleged ETA File Conducts \"Ferocious\" Self Criticim, Offers
- Strategy For Future//
- 6. (S) Zuloaga (Please Protect) also provided Embassy
- officials a 69-page document which he claimed was an internal
- strategy document recently prepared by ETA, although Post
- cannot independently verify its authenticity. Zuloaga
- described the file as the ETA equivalent of the documents
- retrieved from senior FARC official Raul Reyes\' PC in 2008.
- The document - which is written in Castilian Spanish rather
- than Basque/Euskera - is part critical reflection on recent
- ETA missteps, part rant against capitalism, globalization and
- perceived oppression by the Spanish and French states, and
- part political platform for the way forward in building the
- type of society ETA would like to see in Euskal Herria, which
- would be comprised of the Basque and Navarra regions in Spain
- and the three historic Basque provinces in France: Lapurdi,
- Naforroa Beheree, and Zuberoa. Zuloaga claims the file
- likely was drafted over the course of the 18-month period
- from the end of ETA\'s \"permanent unilateral ceasefire\" in
- June 2007 until December 2008. Zuloaga suggested the
- document was the result of a \"virtual meeting\" of ETA\'s
- Executive Committee, its highest ruling body, conducted by
- passing the file to one another via thumb drives. He
- described its anonymous primary author as an intellectual who
- is very experienced within ETA, a mature individual perhaps
- in his 40s or 50s, and someone who thinks he knows fairly
- well the policies of Spain\'s Socialist President Jose Luis
- Rodriguez Zapatero and the Socialist party\'s Basque wing.
- 7. (S) For longtime ETA watcher Zuloaga, the document is
- notable for conveying a much more pragmatic rather than
- fanatical tone, while at the same time leaving no doubt that
- the group intends to fight to the end and is not seeking \"an
- honorable exit.\" In Zuloaga\'s words, the document undertakes
- a \"ferocious\" self-criticism of ETA\'s recent past and in
- particular calls for a \"profound reflection\" on the
- MADRID 00000272 003.2 OF 003
- limitations of the group\'s recent military operations. In
- particular, the author adamantly asserts that ETA should have
- undertaken a greater number of attacks in the run-up to its
- March 2006 declaration of a \"permanent unilateral ceasefire,\"
- which the author claims would have then enabled the group to
- negotiate with the GOS from a position of strength. The
- document also condemns the group for its lack of preparation
- to develop a clear negotiating position during the ceasefire
- and for not doing more to build public support for its stance
- before, during, and after ceasefire.
- 8. (S) The document acknowledges that ETA currently is
- weakened by Spanish and French security services, which are
- putting considerable pressure on the group and limiting
- recruiting efforts. The author therefore suggests changing
- the group\'s modus operandi to make itself less predictable.
- The document suggests the group ought to conduct attacks
- where and when security services least expect them and also
- urges the group to constantly change its security measures,
- in an effort to better protect its leadership. (COMMENT:
- Zuloaga pointed to the document as the explanation as to why
- ETA did not conduct more high-profile or more destructive
- attacks in the run-up to the March 1 election in the Basque
- Region: it was too predictable. END COMMENT.) The author
- of the document recommends that the group at present
- concentrate on raising money, while conducting \"selective,
- discriminating, and prudent\" attacks in which it seeks to
- cause \"the greatest possible damage to the enemy\'s interests\"
- while making every effort to avoid collateral victims, in an
- effort not to lose whatever public support the group has.
- The document - which identifies 12 different categories of
- approved targets - urges that the group lay low and bide its
- time until a more politically convenient time to step up its
- attacks. The document states, \"It is an accepted reality
- that the keys to the resolution of the conflict will be
- political and will be done through a negotiation process.\"
- However, it concludes by stating that \"ceasefires and truces
- - whether partial or general - will only be established,
- managed and maintained with the objective of reaching
- inflection points and political jumping-off points within the
- process of liberation.\"
- //Comment//
- 9.(C) Anything is possible, but we think a return to the
- negotiating table by Zapatero is unlikely, at least for the
- foreseeable future. The lure of negotiating with ETA for a
- Spanish President is to be the one who delivers a definitive
- end to a 40-year old problem that has baffled all previous
- governments. The risk, as Zapatero found to his cost, is
- that ETA is brutal, untrustworthy, and has an unrealistic
- agenda. Many Spaniards say it has become little more than an
- extortion racket. Zapatero was much-criticized by his
- political opponents during the 2008 general election for his
- policy of negotiating with ETA, particularly when he was
- forced to admit negotiations had continued after the 2006
- Barajas bombing and after he had told the public that
- negotiations had ceased. He would be unwise to risk further
- political damage, particularly as he carries the weight of
- the financial crisis on his shoulders and faces a number of
- regional elections between now and the next general election
- in 2012.
- CHACON
- "
- "208580","5/26/2009 8:58","09MADRID499","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","09MADRID139","VZCZCXRO2494
- RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
- DE RUEHMD #0499/01 1460858
- ZNY CCCCC ZZH
- R 260858Z MAY 09
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0670
- INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3995
- RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
- RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000499
- SIPDIS
- EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI
- E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
- TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SP, PINS
- SUBJECT: SPAIN: HISTORIC TRANSFER OF POWER IN BASQUE REGION
- REF: A. MADRID 139
- B. OSC EUP20090429950021
- MADRID 00000499 001.2 OF 003
- Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission William H. Duncan for rea
- sons 1.4 (b) and (d)
- 1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. On May 5 Socialist Patxi Lopez
- was sworn in as the first-ever, lehendakari, or regional
- governor of the Basque Region, who is not a Basque
- nationalist, an historic milestone for the troubled region.
- His inauguration followed the March 1 regional election (See
- REF A), in which the Socialists won enough votes in the
- Basque Country to form a minority government supported by the
- conservative Partido Popular. Outgoing lehendakari
- (1999-2009) Juan Jose Ibarretxe, whose Basque Nationalist
- Party (PNV) had ruled the region for the past 29 years and
- has struggled to accept being ousted from power, bitterly
- announced his retirement from politics on the day of Lopez\'s
- inauguration. Lopez\'s inauguration - which the Basque
- terrorist group ETA had plotted to attack shortly before its
- latest military chief was arrested - presents a poisoned
- chalice to Spanish President Zapatero in national politics.
- The PNV has withdrawn its support in the Spanish Parliament,
- where it had been a frequent ally to Zapatero\'s minority
- government, which is viewed as increasingly weak and lacking
- in parliamentary allies just as the global economic crisis is
- reaching new depths and unemployment in Spain has topped 17
- percent. The next electoral test for the Zapatero government
- will be the June 7 elections for the European Parliament,
- which several polls suggest will be marked by low turnout in
- Spain and declining enthusiasm for the Socialists. END
- SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
- 2. (U) In regional elections held March 1, the incumbent PNV
- won the most seats and the most votes but failed to secure
- the backing of one or more parties to give it a working
- majority. The vote represented the first serious challenge
- to the Basque nationalists\' hold on power since the first
- post-Franco regional elections were held in 1980. The PNV
- also had held the lehendakari post since it was created in
- 1936, although the lehendakaris spent roughly 40 years in
- exile during the Franco regime. Ibarretxe and the PNV had
- until now relied on the support of radical separatist parties
- to form a parliamentary majority. In this year\'s election,
- however, the radical parties banned by the Spanish Supreme
- Court for their ties to the Basque terrorist group ETA were
- barred from running. An estimated 9.2% of votes cast were
- blank ballots in protest. The Basque Socialists (PSE) won
- enough seats to form a working majority with the conservative
- Partido Popular (PP).
- 3. (SBU) Basque final election results confirmed
- non-nationalist voters (50.45%) outnumbered nationalist
- voters (48.29%) for the first time, meaning a majority in the
- regional parliament will have the votes to counteract any
- nationalist or separatist measures. The conservative PP,
- though it lost two seats, did better than had been predicted.
- Lower voter participation relative to 2005, combined with
- the banning of any ETA-linked parties, hurt the PNV.
- 4. (U) 2009 Basque Election Results, 65.88% Participation,
- 75 Seats Total
- PNV 38.56 percent 30 seats
- PSE 30.71 25 seats
- PP 14.09 13 seats
- Aralar 6.05 4 seats
- EA 3.68 1 seat
- EB-IU 3.51 1 seat
- UPyD 2.14 1 seat
- 5. (SBU) On March 5, the PSE rejected the PNV\'s proposal of
- a \"stability agreement\" offering either a coalition
- government or a legislative agreement that would have allowed
- Ibarretxe to remain his office. After more than three weeks
- of intense negotiations, the PSE and PP established a formal
- compromise to elect Lopez as lehendakari. The PP has
- promised not to censure Lopez as long as the PSE follows
- their negotiated agreement, entitled \"Basis for Democratic
- Change in Service of Basque Society.\" The primary points
- include: the fight against ETA; measures to revive the
- economy, including new job creation; stabilizing the system
- of Basque self-governance; bilingual rights and continued
- implementation of the two official languages (Euskera and
- Castilian); and the prohibition of terrorist propaganda on
- the public radio-television network. Side agreements with
- other parties are not discarded as long as they do not alter
- the PSE-PP accord.
- MADRID 00000499 002.2 OF 003
- 6. (C) There is an atmosphere of optimism and goodwill within
- Spain and the Basque Region that change is imminent that will
- help make the Basque Region \"normal.\" El Pais, Spain\'s
- left-of-center flagship daily, on May 19 published an
- editorial suggesting that the new lehendakari\'s challenge is
- to implement the reforms he campaigned on, while not
- antagonizing the moderate Basque nationalists within the PNV
- and elsewhere, and maintaining the support of the PP.
- However, Prof. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, an ETA and electoral
- politics expert at the Juan March Institute, privately told
- POLOFF on May 20 this task is nearly \"impossible,\" and he
- opted not to speculate how long the PSE government would
- last. He highlights that the PSE\'s minority government holds
- fewer seats than the primary opposition party, the PNV, and
- also suggested that if the PSE\'s accord with the PP falls
- apart, the PSE\'s next likely ally would be with the moderates
- among the PNV, so the PP has an interest in not pushing the
- PSE too hard. Meanwhile, Basque journalist and long-time ETA
- observer Oscar Beltran predicted to POLOFF the PSE minority
- government would last at least two years.
- //Key Players in Basque Politics Following the March 1
- Election//
- 7. (C) Francisco \"Patxi\" Javier Lopez Alvarez was born in
- 1959 in the Basque town of Portugalete. In 1975 he joined
- the Young Basque Socialists movement (serving as its
- Secretary General during 1985-88) and joined the PSE in 1977.
- He was a member of the national parliament during 1987-89
- and has been a member of the regional parliament since 1991.
- He has been Secretary General of the PSE since 2002 and led
- the PSE in the 2005 election, in which he helped the PSE earn
- the most votes while Ibarretxe and the PNV secured the most
- seats. Lopez is married without children. Beltran on May 19
- told POLOFF that he believes Lopez will be very pragmatic and
- will not attempt any \"acts of vengenace\" for the past.
- 8. (C) Rodolfo Ares, the Secretary of the PSE for
- Organization and the right-hand man of Lopez, has assumed the
- key post of regional Minister of Interior, which is charged
- with defeating ETA. Born in 1954, he has spent his career in
- Basque politics. Ares, together with Lopez and Ibarretxe, in
- early 2009 was a defendant in a short-lived trial for holding
- talks with the outlawed political wing of ETA during the
- terrorist group\'s 2006 ceasefire. The case was shelved. (See
- REF A). Beltran has suggested to POLOFF that Aras is the
- behind-the-scenes brains who provides the strategic vision to
- Lopez and the rest of the PSE.
- 9. (SBU) The Basque PP\'s ability to reach an accord with the
- PSE despite several key differences in their policy platforms
- has strengthened the leadership of 39-year-old Antonio
- Basagoiti, leader of the PP\'s Basque wing since mid-2008.
- The PP\'s national leader, Mariano Rajoy, had supported
- Basagoiti\'s promotion. A longtime veteran of Bilbao city
- hall, Basagoiti holds a law degree.
- 10. (SBU) As part of its price for supporting the PSE, the PP
- negotiated that one of its members would preside over the
- Basque Parliament, the second most powerful position in
- Basque politics. On April 3, 35-year-old Arantza Quiroga,
- the number-three official in the Basque wing of the PP,
- became the first woman to hold the post. It is the most
- senior post that a PP official has ever held in the Basque
- regional government. Quiroga publicly self-identifies with
- the conservative wing of the PP. Regional PP officials
- publicly tout Quiroga, who holds a law degree, as a rising
- star.
- 11. (C) In the short term, Ibarretxe\'s retirement leaves the
- PNV under the guidance of Inigo Urkullu, who has been party
- leader since December 2007. Urkullu is known to be more of a
- moderate Basque nationalist, far less strident than
- Ibarretxe, who polarized Basque society with his unyielding
- quest for Basque \"free association\" with Spain. However, the
- PNV remains divided and it remains to be seen whether the
- moderates or the radicals achieve the upper hand.
- Sanchez-Cuenca told POLOFF that Urkullu\'s primary rival for
- control of the PNV will be Josepa Igiber, the ideologue of
- the party\'s radical wing.
- //Weakened and Divided, ETA Lingers as Threat, Despite Even
- More Key Arrests//
- 12. (C) Meanwhile, ETA has announced that it will not
- recognize the authority of the new PSE-led government and on
- April 12 publicly identified incoming senior officials of the
- government as priority targets. ETA publicly declared that
- MADRID 00000499 003.2 OF 003
- Lopez would be the \"primary objective\" of their upcoming
- activities as they \"continued striking out against enemies of
- the Basque Country and its interests.\" These plans were
- derailed on April 18 when the terrorist group, already
- dramatically weakened, suffered yet another blow by Spanish
- and French security services, who arrested ETA\'s latest top
- military leader, Jurdan Martitegi, amidst a plot to explode a
- van-bomb at Lopez\'s investiture ceremony. Martitegi, who
- held the top military post since December 2008, was the third
- consecutive military leader detained in six months while a
- separate joint Spanish-French operation also nabbed Ekaitz
- Sirvent Auzmendi, allegedly ETA\'s top forger, in Paris on
- April 10. Rogelio Alonso, a professor at the King Juan
- Carlos University in Madrid who also works at the Real
- Instituto Elcano\'s Global Terrorist Program, cautioned to
- POLOFF on May 19 not to make too much of this, however,
- noting that ETA has an impressive \"ability to regenerate.\"
- Spanish press reports (See REF B) already identify Iurgi
- Mendinueta, age 27, as ETA\'s most likely new military chief.
- Two women -- Izaskun Lesaka, 32, and Iratxe Sorzabal, 37 --
- allegedly form part of his inner circle. All three
- reportedly are known to Spanish and French security services.
- Sanchez-Cuenca told POLOFF that there is increasing media
- interest in Josu Ternera, a veteran ETA member in the
- political wing, who is likely \"the real power\" in ETA -
- which remains divided. Sanchez-Cuenca suggested that
- Ternera, who favors ETA\'s disarmament and negotiations with
- the GOS, is more important than the last few military leaders
- have been.
- 13. (C) Sanchez-Cuenca also shared with POLOFF an advance
- copy of his lengthy, soon-to-published analysis of the March
- 1 Basque election and its significance. In it, he describes
- ETA as \"an extremely resilient group... with tentacles in
- civil society - unions, student associations,
- environmentalist groups, mass media, culture, etc. - and a
- broad political organization that provides legitimacy and
- public support for violence.\" His article concludes with the
- assessment that \"the political movement around ETA is far
- from disappearing.\"
- //Impact of Change in Basque Government on National Politics//
- 14. (C) For the Socialists, the ability to govern the Basque
- Country is a poisoned chalice. By supporting Lopez\'s efforts
- to become lehendekari, Zapatero helped bring historic change,
- but at the expense of PNV support in the national parliament
- -- just as there are increasing calls on the GOS to fix the
- worsening economic crisis. Seven seats shy of a working
- majority, Zapatero\'s PSOE has just lost the support of the
- PNV\'s six seats, making the Socialists increasingly isolated
- in Parliament. Although there is a precedent in Spanish
- regional politics for the party that wins the plurality of
- seats and votes not to be part of the resulting government,
- the PNV feels burned by the PSE and is in no mood to support
- at the national level the Socialists that just unseated it at
- the regional level. PNV officials frequently have described
- the PSE-PP alliance to POLOFF as \"unnatural\" and \"illogical.\"
- The PNV has already shown its displeasure by voting against
- Zapatero and siding with the PP on congressional votes
- regarding judicial review and infrastructure issues.
- 15. (C) Josu Erkoreka, the PNV\'s parliamentary caucus leader,
- revoked the party\'s support for the PSOE and on March 11
- accused the PSOE and the Spanish judicial system of being in
- cahoots to manipulate the outcome of the March 1 elections in
- Basque Country, to the PNV\'s detriment. On March 11,
- Erkoreka privately told Embassy officials that he sees the
- PSOE in a quickening tailspin in which it will be unable to
- pass any legislation at the national level and professed not
- to understand why Zapatero was sacrificing the Socialists\'
- prospects at the national level for power at the regional
- level in the Basque Country.
- 16. (SBU) Meanwhile, the moderate Catalan nationals,
- Convergence and Union (CiU, which has 10 seats in the
- national parliament) also lost power at the regional level to
- the Socialists in the 2003 and 2006 elections, despite having
- won more seats. The CiU publicly has stated that the PSOE
- cannot automatically count on its support. Among other
- parties in the national parliament, the Republican Left of
- Catalonia has three seats while a handful of other parties
- hold one or two seats.
- DUNCAN
- "
- "230431","10/20/2009 13:38","09MADRID1026","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","09MADRID139|09MADRID499|09MADRID707","VZCZCXRO4671
- RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
- DE RUEHMD #1026/01 2931338
- ZNY CCCCC ZZH
- R 201338Z OCT 09
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1355
- INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4161
- RUEHMD/USDAO MADRID SP
- RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
- RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001026
- SIPDIS
- EUR/WE FOR ALEX MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI
- E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2019
- TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SP, PINS
- SUBJECT: SPAIN: BASQUE REGION REFLECTS ON POLITICAL CHANGE
- IN 2009
- REF: A. MADRID 499
- B. MADRID 139
- C. MADRID 707
- MADRID 00001026 001.2 OF 002
- Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission William H. Duncan for rea
- sons 1.4 (b) and (d)
- 1. (C) SUMMARY: A broad range of Basque politicians and
- civic leaders privately reflected privately on political
- changes in the Basque Region in 2009 and assessed the first
- four months of the Socialist (PSE) government led by
- Lehendakari - regional premier or U.S Governor equivalent -
- Patxi Lopez (See Refs A and B) in separate mid-September
- meetings with POLOFF. While nearly all of those consulted
- agreed that there has been significant change in the region,
- there were mixed reviews on how successful the PSE government
- has been in its initial months in office. For its part, the
- PSE drove home the message that it is trying to make the
- Basque Region \"normal\" and \"boring\" to counter its long-held
- reputation for violence and conflict. Both the PSE and its
- de facto junior partner, the conservative Popular Party (PP),
- suggested their alliance was likely to last for the duration
- of the four-year legislature. END SUMMARY.
- //PSE: Important Changes Will Take Time to Consolidate//
- 3. (C) Andoni Unzalu, Secretary General for Communications
- and a key Lopez political adviser, Guillermo Echenique,
- Secretary General for Foreign Relations, and Irune
- Aguirrezabal, Director of Foreign Relations, on September 9
- told POLOFF that they were \"satisfied\" with the PSE\'s
- progress to date and suggested that little by little, the PSE
- was implementing important changes, but these symbolic
- efforts were not necessarily quantifiable. These officials
- from the Office of the Lehendakari asserted that they are
- \"winning the first steps of this battle\" and that the public
- knows that Lopez will defend the interests of all Basques.
- They further claimed that the Basque public is \"learning to
- live in more than a monocolor world\" after 70 years of
- \"totalitarian rule,\" first by General Franco and later by the
- PNV. Unzalu stated that he did not have the least doubt that
- the PSE can count on the support of the PP throughout Lopez\'s
- full four-year term, arguing that it would be political
- \"suicide\" to break their accord (Ref A). Separately, Idoia
- Mendia, spokesperson for the Office of the Lehendakari, told
- POLOFF \"it\'s true\" that the PP and PSE have \"nothing in
- common\" in terms of their social and economic policies, but
- their pact serves the Basque Region and is open for other
- parties to join. She said the most important thing that has
- happened so far under PSE rule is that the public has seen
- that the region did not \"implode\" under non-nationalist rule.
- She asserted that the PSE is trying to emphasize dialogue in
- its interaction with other parties and the public.
- //PP Sees \"New Era\" in Basque Region//
- 4. (C) Anton Damborenea, President of the PP in the Basque
- province of Vizcaya, and Leopoldo Barreda, spokesperson for
- the PP caucus in the regional parliament, were positively
- giddy in reflecting on the \"night and day difference\" in the
- political fortunes of the PP Basque wing over the past year.
- They assessed that the March elections and the subsequent
- PSE-PP pact to form a government have created the \"end of an
- era\" in Basque politics and that the region has entered
- \"uncharted territory\" in which \"everything is unwritten.\"
- They said that although some leading conservative opinion
- leaders grumbled about PP regional leader Antonio Basagoiti\'s
- pact with the PSE, the PP national party headquarters itself
- never objected to the deal. The two PP officials suggested
- that the PSE-PP accord would likely hold for the full
- legislature but will become strained as the next scheduled
- regional election draws closer. The duo also delighted in
- saying that the Basque public is \"learning that the PNV is
- just another party.\"
- //PNV Still Adjusting to Life as An Opposition Party//
- 5. (C) Offering a different perspective, Inaki Goikeotxeta,
- the senior official on foreign policy issues within the
- Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) admitted that 2009 has been \"a
- pretty tough year\" and suggested that what has occurred in
- the Basque Region has not been an era of change but a change
- of era. However, he was adamant that the PNV did not \"lose\"
- the March 2009 election, as is sometimes reported in the
- media. He pointed out that - despite being dislodged from
- office for the first time since 1980 - the PNV won the most
- MADRID 00001026 002.2 OF 002
- seats in the regional parliament and the largest percent of
- the popular vote (Ref A). Goikeotxeta said it was \"amazing\"
- that the PSE and PP aligned in a \"marriage of convenience\"
- and asserted that the only thing they accomplished was to
- remove the PNV from power. He pointed to a July 2009 poll by
- Euskobarometro - the region\'s most respected polling firm -
- that found that 65 percent of respondents had little or no
- faith in the Lopez government. He further alleged that the
- PSE and PP do not have any policy initiatives beyond the
- accord they signed. Goikeotxeta criticized the PSE\'s efforts
- to take down public posters and photos that glorify ETA
- members (Ref C), calling this move too provocative for ETA
- and some Basque nationalists. He suggested that the PSE\'s
- \"cure was worse than the illness\" and said that the situation
- needs a \"prudent, proportional response.\" He concluded his
- evaluation by describing the PSE government as \"weak\" and
- \"looking for our (the PNV\'s) help.\"
- //Thoughts from Observers of Basque Politics//
- 6. (C) Eduardo Uriarte, Manager of Foundation for Liberty,
- says there has been \"enormous change\" in the Basque Region in
- the past year, although it has not happened as the Socialists
- envisioned, since it has involved a PSE-PP partnership. He
- assessed that \"bit by bit\" there are \"appreciable changes\" in
- the Basque Region under the Lopez Administration and judged
- that the PSE has done well in defending civil rights, in
- counter-terrorism initiatives and in supporting victims of
- terrorism. Uriarte added that he notes a certain relaxation
- in the political atmosphere in the Basque Region these days
- and - echoing Mendia - suggested that the public is realizing
- that life under PSE rule is not as bad as the Basque
- nationalist doomsayers said it would be. He said that for
- the first time people are beginning to mix socially with
- other people who do not hold the same political views.
- Uriarte is a former ETA member who was sentenced to death at
- the famous Burgos trial of 1970, received amnesty during
- Spain\'s transition to democracy and later was active in
- Basque municipal politics as a Socialist. His NGO lobbies
- for peace in the Basque Region, as well as an end to ETA.
- 7. (C) According to Maite Pagazaurtundua, President of the
- Association for Victims of Terrorism, under PSE rule, there
- has been a \"qualitative jump\" in support for victims of
- terrorism. She said that under former PNV Lehendakari
- (1999-2009) Juan Jose Ibbaretxe, the regional government
- provided a bare minimum of support to terrorism victims \"to
- cover appearances,\" but was never truly committed to victims\'
- rights as a political priority. In contrast, Pagazaurtundua
- deemed important the Lopez Administration\'s political will to
- make real changes in this area. She also applauded the Lopez
- Administration\'s initial steps to end a sympathetic editorial
- slant to ETA in programming on the Basque public television
- and radio network.
- 8. (C) Oscar Beltran, editor of Bilbao-based El Correo
- newspaper, offered a \"wait and see\" approach to the PSE\'s
- initiatives, suggesting that the Lopez Administration was
- still in the formative stages and had not accomplished too
- much just yet. He pointed out that - broadly speaking -
- officials holding the two most senior levels of power have
- never been in government before and that officials in the
- third and fourth tiers were either appointed by the PNV
- during 1980-2009 or have always fulfilled their duties in an
- PNV-led environment. Beltran suggested that the PSE fears
- their initiatives may be sabotaged from the inside.
- 9. (C) From his vantage point in Madrid, Ignacio
- Sanchez-Cuenca, an ETA and electoral politics expert at the
- Juan March Institute, agreed with the notion that most of the
- PSE government\'s accomplishments to date have been symbolic.
- He also assessed that - because of weak public support - both
- the PSE and PP were under pressure to hide any partisan
- differences and make their pact work. Sanchez-Cuenca
- acknowledged the PSE\'s efforts to remove public murals,
- slogans and posters glorifying ETA, but noted that the
- implementation of that initiative will fall to city halls
- throughout the region, where the political will to do so -
- especially in rural areas - is not very strong. He also
- praised the ascendant career of Basagoiti, whom he said has
- accomplished quite a bit in a little more than a year as
- President of the PP\'s Basque wing.
- CHACON
- "
- "232594","11/2/2009 17:29","09MADRID1072","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","07MADRID1078|08MADRID1055|08MADRID1231|09MADRID139|09MADRID272|09MADRID499|09MADRID707|09MADRID775","VZCZCXRO6485
- RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
- DE RUEHMD #1072/01 3061729
- ZNY CCCCC ZZH
- R 021729Z NOV 09
- FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
- TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1407
- INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
- RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4185
- RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
- RUEHMD/USDAO MADRID SP
- RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001072
- SIPDIS
- DEPT. FOR EUR/WE ALEX MCKNIGHT
- DEPT. FOR EUR/WE STACIE ZERDECKI
- E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019
- TAGS: PINR, PINS, PREL, PTER, SP
- SUBJECT: SPAIN: ETA LOSES MORE KEY LEADERS, EXTENSIVE
- SUPPLIES
- REF: A. MADRID 775
- B. MADRID 707
- C. MADRID 499
- D. MADRID 272
- E. MADRID 139
- F. 08 MADRID 1231
- G. 08 MADRID 1055
- H. 07 MADRID 1078
- MADRID 00001072 001.2 OF 003
- Classified By: ADCM William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
- 1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Spanish and French security
- forces have re-doubled their efforts against the Basque
- Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist group, following the
- high-profile, deadly and destructive attacks that ETA
- executed during July 29-30 to mark its 50th anniversary (Ref
- A). Joint operations since then have notched a string of
- notable successes, including the arrests of ETA\'s political
- leader (who doubled as the group\'s propaganda spokesperson),
- number-two military commander, logistics chief, and liaison
- with ETA members abroad as well as 10 Basque nationalist
- political figures aligned with ETA. Security forces also
- seized more explosives and other supply material in one week
- in August than at any other point in the past five years.
- This cable discusses recent key events in reverse
- chronological order. When viewed in the context of ongoing
- pressure against ETA (Refs B-H) since the formal end of its
- most recent ceasefire (2006-07), ETA faces a tremendous
- shortfall of experienced leaders and increasingly scant
- supplies. Post will provide Septel analysis on who\'s who
- among ETA\'s remaining leadership.
- 2. (C) The domino effect of arrests is likely to continue as
- the most recent detentions - and a trove of documents seized
- as evidence - may lead to the identification and detention of
- still others. Meanwhile, in continuing its longstanding
- tit-for-tat relationship with the security services, look for
- ETA to respond to the recent arrests and seizures by
- conducting attacks where and when it can to buck up sagging
- morale and show the public it remains a force to be reckoned
- with. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
- //Detention of Alleged Liaison with ETA Members Abroad//
- 3. (SBU) French authorities, supported by Spain\'s Civil Guard
- (GC), on October 27 arrested Joseba Agudo, a longtime lawyer
- for arrested ETA members, in Hendaya, France. He is accused
- of being the chief of ETA\'s \"Refugee Committee\" and of
- passing along direct orders from ETA during his visits to
- numerous Spanish prisons and various travels to South America
- and Europe. Agudo - whose role was brought to light through
- documents seized during the 2008 arrest of longtime political
- leader (2004-08) \"Thierry\" - reportedly encouraged ETA
- members who had fled abroad to return to fight for the cause.
- //ETA\'s Alleged Political Leader/Chief Spokesperson Arrested//
- 4. (SBU) A combined unit of French police and Spanish GC on
- October 19 arrested ETA\'s alleged political leader, Aitor
- Elizaran, in Carnac, Brittany. Although the Spanish press
- initially provided conflicting reporting on Elizaran\'s exact
- role, Rubalcaba in a press conference that same day
- identified him as the highest-ranking official in ETA\'s
- political apparatus and a member of the group\'s Executive
- Committee. Longtime ETA military chief (2004-08) \"Txeroki\"
- reportedly was influential in appointing Elizaran as
- political chief shortly after May 2008, when Thierry was
- detained. Elizaran, age 30, reportedly is the one who gave
- political orders to ETA and to the \"izquierda abertzale\" (or
- Basque patriotic left). Oihana San Vicente, a key deputy of
- Elizaran\'s, also was arrested. Both were armed and carrying
- false identification and computers. Rubalcaba publicly has
- described the information gathered from the duo\'s arrest as
- \"very valuable.\"
- 5. (SBU) French and Spanish security forces reportedly
- believe that Elizaran was dual-hatted as ETA\'s primary
- spokesperson and served as one of the masked figures who
- regularly appear in video communiques released by the
- terrorist group. The vast array of items recovered from the
- stolen car in which Elizaran was traveling led the Spanish
- press to describe the vehicle as a kind of \"mobile propaganda
- unit.\" Among the items discovered were three sets of black
- berets, white masks, and jackets embroidered with the ETA
- MADRID 00001072 002.2 OF 003
- seal similar to those used in ETA\'s video messages. In the
- house in Carnac where Elizaran was staying, police also found
- a video library, ETA flags, and other assorted symbolic
- emblems used during videotaped messages.
- //Arrest of \"Board of Directors\" for Nascent, ETA-Aligned
- Political Party//
- 6. (SBU) The detention of Elizaran and San Vicente occurred
- six days after the detention of Arnaldo Otegi and nine other
- leaders of the izquierda abertzale for trying to establish
- \"Bateragune\" (whose name translates to \"All Together\") as a
- replacement political party for Batasuna, which was outlawed
- in 2003 for its ties to ETA. The suspects could face 15
- years in jail for belonging to a terrorist group and for
- obeying orders from ETA. It is believed that Elizaran was
- delivering directives to the 10 suspects in this case,
- although initial press reports have acknowledged that proof
- of this may not (yet) be available. On October 16
- Investigating Judge Baltasar Garzon of Spain\'s National Court
- ordered Otegi, the former spokesman of Batasuna and the
- public face of radical Basque nationalists, to be kept in
- preventative detention. Otegi - whom Spanish security
- services believe goes by the name of \"Ronaldinho\" in internal
- ETA correspondence - also was reportedly was seen in France
- with ETA members prior to the late July attacks that marked
- ETA\'s 50th anniversary.
- //ETA\'s Reported Number-Two Military Official Arrested//
- 7. (SBU) On October 11, alleged ETA members Iurgi Mendinueta
- Mintego and Joanes Larretxea Mendiola were arrested in France
- as part of a joint Spanish GC-French Police operation.
- Mendinueta, who also reportedly was close to Txeroki,
- reportedly was the number-two official in ETA\'s military wing
- and had been on the lam since 2002. Some press reports
- earlier this year had identified him as one of three likely
- candidates to take over the military wing after Txeroki\'s
- successor was arrested. Meanwhile, Larretxea\'s mug shot had
- been included in a \"Most Wanted\" poster disseminated by the
- Spanish Ministry of Interior after the late July 2009 ETA
- attacks in Burgos and Mallorca, the latter of which claimed
- two GC victims. Both men are believed to be part of ETA\'s
- military arm, and they were arrested in possession of
- weapons, detonators, detonator cords, fake documentation, and
- various pen drives. At the suspected terrorist hide-out,
- police discovered fake license plates and the machinery to
- make them. Those operations were unrelated to the arrest of
- another ETA member, Ibai Seuskun, in France on October 10.
- Seuskun, on the run from Navarra police for over a year,
- sought help for a gunshot wound in his hand, and the owners
- of the farm were he sought aid turned him in to police after
- he identified himself as an ETA member.
- //Arrest of Trio, including Alleged Logistics Chief and
- Senior Military Wing Official, ...//
- 8. (SBU) French security forces, aided by the Spanish
- National Police, arrested three alleged members of ETA\'s
- military logistics wing on the morning of August 19 in Le
- Corbier, in the French Alps. Aitzol Etxaburu, Alberto
- Machain Beraza, Andoni Sarasola - all reportedly armed and
- carrying false identity papers - were allegedly in charge of
- providing weapons and explosives to cells for terrorist
- attacks in Spain. Extaburu, also known for his close ties to
- Txeroki, had been on the run since his alleged involvement in
- a 2005 car bomb attack in the Basque Region. He reportedly
- became ETA\'s short-lived logistics chief following the July
- 2009 arrest of Itziar Plaza (see Ref B). Like Larretxea,
- Machain rose to public prominence weeks earlier after his
- picture appeared as one of the six ETA suspects wanted in
- connection with the late July 2009 ETA attacks. Sarasola, a
- one-time candidate for the radical left in local politics,
- was profiled in the Spanish media earlier this year as one of
- the three top leaders - along with Mendinueta - of ETA\'s
- military wing following the back-to-back arrests of Txeroki
- and his successor in late 2008. Sarasola\'s brother, Martin,
- was one of the those responsible for the deadly December 2006
- bombing of the T4 parking garage at the Madrid airport that
- brought a de facto end to ETA\'s \"permanent unilateral
- ceasefire.\"
- //... Leads to Largest Arms Cache Seizures Since 2004//
- 9. (C) In the week following the August 19 arrests, French
- MADRID 00001072 003.2 OF 003
- and Spanish authorities located 14 \"zulos\" or hidden arms
- caches in France. These raids resulted in the capture of
- nearly a ton of explosives, more than 200 kilos of ammonium
- nitrate, dozens of weapons, 7,000 rounds of ammunition, 150
- license plates, roughly 250 detonators, a slew of documents,
- forged ID cards, radios, mobile phone cards, tools for
- stealing cars, etc. Two ETA caches discovered on August 20
- alone exceeded the total amount of explosive material seized
- from ETA in all of 2008 and together was sufficient to have
- made 100 limpet bombs or to have carried out at least 50
- attacks, according to the media. In a rare public statement,
- Parisian prosecutor Jean-Claude Marin told reporters on
- August 25 that the week-long crackdown was \"a major blow to
- ETA\'s supply network. There hasn\'t been a find on this scale
- since 2004.\" Oscar Beltran, editor of Bilbao-based El Correo
- newspaper, was more skeptical, however, noting ETA
- traditionally safeguards its operations by compartmentalizing
- its members\' knowledge and duplicating its efforts. On
- September 9 he told POLOFF that while the arrest of these
- three individuals led to the seizure of 14 zulos, it is very
- likely another three individuals know of another 14 zulos.
- CHACON
- "
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