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Jun 26th, 2017
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  1. Revision Problem 8
  2. - Question of whether it is within power doesn’t arise as it is state legislation ( states have plenary power)
  3. - But s 31 A may potentially breach implied freedom of political freedom
  4. ○ As it does effect considerations relating to communicating matters in the public interest (less safe to say things). Does this by making unavailable the defence simply because of the irrelevant issue of national origin is also mentioned in the communication so that s31A may constitute a discouragement of the publication of important information in certain cases
  5. ○ This may breach implicit …. Established in ACTV and settled in Lange, Coleman and McLoy
  6. ○ The implied freedom is that it is derived from the precise form of rep government provided for in the Constitution - it applies to political communication. This is given a very liberal interpretation, extends to any matter that may be relevant to a persons decision at election time. Thus can probably say it is political communication on the facts. Also note that there is not temporal limitation
  7. ○ Communication that is protected is not limited to federal concern it extends to state, local and international matters - anything that is politically relevant --> no impediment to application to current facts
  8. ○ The implied freedom is relevant to 31A because the implied freedom applies as a constitutional limitation on laws (Lange) it is not a immunity from laws
  9. ○ How does this work in the context of defamation laws (recall Lange)
  10. ○ In Lange:
  11. § Whilst defamation laws are permissible, nevertheless, they must be consistent with the implied freedom
  12. § More precisely, it must not provide too onerous a burden on speech relating to political matters so that it will allow for some defence when it comes to making such remarks
  13. ○ Is burdening by s31A too onerous?
  14. § The test to determine this question is established in Lange modified in Coleman and then interpreted in its application in McLoy.
  15. § State the steps (but address/apply test to the facts in each step):
  16. 1. Does the law effectively burden political communication in its terms, operation or effect?
  17. a) Based on above discussion, it probably does
  18. b) It does add a burden to people speaking their minds
  19. 2. Is the purpose of the law and the means adopted to achieve that purpose legitimate in the sense that they are compatible with the maintenance of the prescribed system of representative government?
  20. a) If the purpose is punish people for stereotyping - then probably compatible.
  21. b) Its not incompatible to prevent people from saying these things
  22. c) Means adopted may not be compatible with representative government
  23. i) Why is this being achieved through defamation laws
  24. ii) Arguably the means adopted could be incompatible (but could go either way)
  25. 3. If concluded that incompatiblein 2, but nevertheless if it wasn’t incompatible we turn to step 3. Is the law reasonably adapted to advance the relevant object? (proportionality testing) - Determining this question is based on the answer to the following questions:
  26. a) Is the law suitable? In the sense of having a rational connection to its purpose
  27. i) On one hand political communication is being hampered by something unrelated to it
  28. ii) On other hand could argue that it isn't irrational
  29. b) Is the law necessary?
  30. i) No obvious and compelling alternative, reasonably practicable means of achieving the same purpose with has a less restrictive effect on the freedom?
  31. One. There probably is - i.e. a law that punishes the conduct
  32. Two. Maybe adding an exception that doesn’t apply when people are making political statements etc
  33. c) Is it adequate in its balance (proportionality testing)
  34. i) Requires a value judgment balancing the importance of the purpose and the extent of the restriction on freedom
  35. ii) Reasonable minds could differ on this point
  36. Points A and C could go either way here - B would probably fall short - probably in breach of the implied freedom -->
  37. - therefore having established this, can s31A be read down/severed?
  38. □ Probably cant sever or read down
  39. □ Given that it stands as one coherent statement of the law - would have to be struck out in its entirety
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