Criminal complaint against Fed bomb plot suspect

DMB:JPL:RMT
F.#2012R01575
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA C O M P L A I N T
- against – (T. 18, U.S.C., §§
2332a(a)(2)(D) and
QUAZI MOHAMMAD REZWANUL AHSAN NAFIS, 2339B(a)(1))
Defendant.
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, SS:
JOHN NEAS, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is
a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, duly
appointed according to law and acting as such.
Upon information and belief, on or about October 17, 2012,
within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant
QUAZI MOHAMMAD REZWANUL AHSAN NAFIS did knowingly, intentionally and
without lawful authority attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction,
to wit: an explosive bomb, against persons and property within the
United States, and the offense and the results of the offense would
have affected interstate and foreign commerce.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(a)(2)(D))
Upon information and belief, on or about and between July
15, 2012 and October 17, 2012, both dates being approximate and
inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere,
2
the defendant QUAZI MOHAMMAD REZWANUL AHSAN NAFIS did knowingly and
intentionally attempt to provide material support and resources, as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b), including communications equipment,
explosives and personnel, including himself, to a foreign terrorist
organization, to wit: al-Qaeda.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B(a)(1))
The source of your deponent’s information and the grounds
for his belief are as follows:1
1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”). I have been employed by the FBI for
approximately two years. I am currently assigned to the New York
Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”), which is dedicated to
1 Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited
purpose of establishing probable cause to arrest, I have not set forth
every fact learned during the course of this investigation. At
various points in this affidavit, I will offer my interpretations
of certain communications in brackets and otherwise. My
interpretations are based on my knowledge of the investigation to
date and review of prior communications, the contents and context
of the communications, prior and subsequent communications,
conversations with other officers, and my experience and familiarity
with terrorist organizations generally. Summaries of
communications do not include references to all the topics covered
during the course of the communications. In addition, the summaries
do not necessarily include references to all statements made by the
speakers on the topics that are mentioned. Finally, quotations from
written communications are as they appear in their original form,
including any grammatical or spelling errors. While transcribers
have attempted to transcribe conversations accurately, to the extent
that quotations from these communications are included, these are
preliminary, not final, transcriptions.
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investigating counterterrorism-related matters. As a result of my
training and experience, I am familiar with the tactics, methods and
techniques of terrorist networks and their members.
BACKGROUND
I. The Defendant
2. According to records from federal immigration
authorities, the defendant QUAZI MOHAMMAD REZWANUL AHSAN NAFIS
(hereinafter “NAFIS”) is a 21-year-old Bangladeshi citizen who
entered the United States on a student visa in or about January 2012.
NAFIS lives in Queens, New York.
II. Al-Qaeda
3. Al-Qaeda has been designated by the Secretary of
State as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On February 23, 1998,
al-Qaeda issued the following directive:
[I]n compliance with God’s order, we issue the
following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to
kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians
and military -- is an individual duty for every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it
is possible to do it[.]
Al-Qaeda has committed and attempted to commit numerous large-scale
terrorist attacks against the United States and American citizens,
including, among others, the August 7, 1998 bombings of United States
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which
4
caused hundreds of deaths, and the September 11, 2001 airplane
hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, which
caused the deaths of thousands of Americans. More recently, in 2009,
three al-Qaeda operatives plotted to conduct a suicide bombing attack
against the New York City subway system, but the plot was disrupted
by law enforcement.
SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
I. NAFIS Contacts A Confidential Source And Expresses
A Desire To Wage Violent Jihad Against The United States
4. In or about early July 2012, NAFIS first contacted
an FBI confidential human source (the “CHS”) and subsequently
attempted to recruit the CHS into a jihadist cell to carry out a terror
attack on U.S. soil. On or about July 5, 2012, the CHS received a
call from NAFIS wherein NAFIS advised, in sum and substance, that
NAFIS is from Bangladesh but came to the United States to wage
“jihad.”2 NAFIS told the CHS that all Muslims and Muslim sheikhs in
the United States are “Talafi,” meaning not true Muslims. NAFIS also
told the CHS that NAFIS admired Sheikh “O,” whom the CHS understood
to be Osama bin Laden. In addition, NAFIS told the CHS that he
2 “Jihad” is an Arabic term meaning “struggle,” referring
to one’s struggle on behalf of Islam. In the context of the
communications set forth herein, and based on later communications,
I understand NAFIS to be referring to a violent form of jihad, or
holy war.
5
admired the magazine starting with “I,” which the CHS understood to
be the al-Qaeda-affiliate-sponsored publication “Inspire.”3
5. During that same July 5, 2012 call with the CHS, NAFIS
described the United States as “dar al-harb,” which means “land of
war” in Arabic. NAFIS further told the CHS that NAFIS believes it
is permissible to travel to the United States for only two reasons:
for “dawaa,” which means “preaching,” or for “J,” which the CHS
understood to mean “jihad.” During this call, NAFIS told the CHS
that he was in communication with both an individual in the United
States (the “CO-CONSPIRATOR”)4 and another “brother” in Bangladesh.
NAFIS told the CHS that this group, including the CHS, should remain
in close contact.
6. On or about July 6, 2012, the CHS engaged in a
consensually recorded telephone conversation with NAFIS. During
that conversation, NAFIS stated that he was in New York City. NAFIS
3 Based on my training and experience, I know that Inspire
is an English-language online magazine reported to be published by
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”). Among other things, the
magazine includes recruiting material for AQAP and provides
information about how to carry out particular types of terrorist
attacks. For example, one article titled “How to Make a Bomb in the
Kitchen of Your Mom” describes how to construct a bomb using items
found in a typical kitchen. As of the date of this affidavit, there
have been nine issues of the magazine.
4 The CO-CONSPIRATOR is not a government agent and has
subsequently been arrested by federal authorities for
non-terrorism-related felony offenses.
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also stated that he wanted to recruit others to join the group. NAFIS
discussed the possibility of “martyrdom” during this conversation.
7. During the period between July 6, 2012 and July 8,
2012, NAFIS, the CO-CONSPIRATOR and the CHS began to communicate via
Facebook, an internet social-media website. During these
communications, which were consensually recorded by the CHS, the
three discussed certain Islamic legal rulings that advise that it
is unlawful for a person who enters a country with a visa to wage
jihad there. NAFIS stated that he had conferred with another
individual in Bangladesh and was advised that he was not bound by
such rulings. Accordingly, NAFIS indicated that he believed that
he was free to continue with his plan to conduct a terrorist attack
on U.S. soil.
8. On or about July 11, 2012, the CO-CONSPIRATOR told
the CHS, in sum and substance, that NAFIS had previously told the
CO-CONSPIRATOR that NAFIS wanted to attack and kill a high-ranking
government official (the “high-ranking official”). This
communication was consensually recorded.
9. A few hours later, on or about July 12, 2012 in the
early morning, NAFIS told the CO-CONSPIRATOR and the CHS, in sum and
substance, that NAFIS had contacts with al-Qaeda members overseas
who could assist the group in planning and executing an attack on
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the high-ranking official. This communication was consensually
recorded.
10. On or about July 14, 2012, NAFIS told the CHS, in sum
and substance, that NAFIS intended to return to Bangladesh, likely
in December 2012, to obtain training from al-Qaeda. This
communication was also consensually recorded.
II. NAFIS Meets With The UC And Describes His Plan For
A Terrorist Attack In The United States
11. The CHS had previously told NAFIS during a
consensually recorded communication that the CHS knew an individual
who was a member of al-Qaeda, and NAFIS indicated that he wanted to
speak to that individual. During a subsequent consensually recorded
conversation on or about July 15, 2012 between NAFIS and an undercover
law enforcement officer purporting to be the CHS’s al-Qaeda contact,
NAFIS stated, in sum and substance, that he wanted assistance from
al-Qaeda in launching a terrorist attack in the United States. In
a subsequent consensually recorded communication, the undercover
officer told NAFIS, in sum and substance, that he would have another
al-Qaeda member contact NAFIS to assist with an attack.
12. On or about July 19, 2012, another undercover law
enforcement officer posing as an al-Qaeda member and facilitator (the
“UC”), spoke with NAFIS on the telephone and arranged a meeting in
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Central Park in Manhattan, New York to occur on or about July 24,
2012. The call was consensually recorded.
13. On or about July 24, 2012, NAFIS met the UC in Central
Park. During that meeting, which was consensually recorded, NAFIS
told the UC, in sum and substance, that he wished to launch a terrorist
attack against the United States. NAFIS further told the UC, in sum
and substance, that he was collaborating with two other individuals
-- “Yaqueen” (the CO-CONSPIRATOR) and the CHS -- and that those
individuals also wanted to participate in the attack. NAFIS stated,
“We are ready for action.” NAFIS then said, in sum and substance,
that he, “Yaqueen” and the CHS “don’t care anything about our work.
We just want to meet our lord as soon as we can.” NAFIS continued:
What I really mean, is that I don’t want
something that’s like, small. I just want
something big. Something very big. Very very
very very big, that will shake the whole
country, that will make America, not one step
ahead, change of policy, and make one step
ahead, for the Muslims . . . that will make us
one step closer to run the whole
world . . . .
14. NAFIS further told the UC during the July 24, 2012
meeting, in sum and substance, that “Yaqueen” had told him about a
military base in Baltimore with one guard standing outside whom they
could attack. NAFIS then stated, in sum and substance, that he
proposed to attack more than a single individual. NAFIS explained,
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“I want to do something that brothers coming after us can be inspired
by us.
III. NAFIS Selects Manhattan’s Financial District As The
Target For His Attack
15. During a consensually recorded telephone
communication between NAFIS and the UC on or about August 5, 2012,
NAFIS told the UC, in sum and substance, that NAFIS was considering
the New York Stock Exchange as a possible target. On or about August
9, 2012, FBI agents conducting surveillance on NAFIS observed him
in the area of the Stock Exchange, apparently as part of NAFIS’s
efforts to assess its suitability as a target. Surveillance agents
also observed NAFIS appearing to take notes while he was in the area
of the Stock Exchange.
16. On or about August 11, 2012, NAFIS met with the UC
in a hotel room in Queens, New York. During that meeting, which was
consensually recorded, NAFIS confirmed that he wanted to target the
financial district of Manhattan -- specifically, the New York Stock
Exchange. NAFIS told the UC, in sum and substance, that he wanted
to use explosives as part of a suicide attack, either contained in
one or more cars, or strapped to his person. NAFIS explained, “We
are going to need a lot of TNT or dynamite.” NAFIS also provided
the UC with a handwritten map of the area that NAFIS had apparently
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prepared while scouting the area around the Stock Exchange on or about
August 9, 2012.
17. During that same meeting, NAFIS asked the UC whether
approval for NAFIS’s proposed attack would come from the “top” of
the al-Qaeda leadership. The UC responded, in sum and substance,
that he was going to meet with al-Qaeda leadership and advise them
about NAFIS’s plan.
18. NAFIS and the UC then traveled to the financial
district in Manhattan, and NAFIS took several photographs of
prospective targets in that area.
IV. NAFIS Describes His Proposed Attack And Confirms
That It Will Be On Behalf Of Al-Qaeda
19. On or about August 23, 2012, NAFIS again met with the
UC in a hotel room in Queens, New York. Just a few minutes after
arriving at that meeting, which was consensually recorded, NAFIS
asked, “The thing that I want to ask you about is that, the thing
that I’m doing, is it under al-Qaeda?” The UC responded in the
affirmative.
20. The UC subsequently asked NAFIS what NAFIS needed to
carry out his proposed attack, and NAFIS explained that he needed
a “big car with lots of fruits and vegetables in there which can blow
up the whole New York Stock Exchange building.” NAFIS added that
he needed “to make sure that this building is gone.”
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21. NAFIS subsequently told the UC, in sum and substance,
that he understood and was committed to al-Qaeda’s ideology. NAFIS
also asked the UC why the UC did not join him in carrying out the
attack. NAFIS asked, “Can I ask you something? Why aren’t you
(inaudible) to drive the car yourself? Why don’t you want to be
shahid?”5 The UC responded, in sum and substance, that it was his
role to facilitate NAFIS’s attack.
22. At the conclusion of that August 23, 2012 meeting,
the UC advised NAFIS that the UC was going to travel overseas to meet
with al-Qaeda leadership to discuss NAFIS’s proposed attack. The
UC further told NAFIS that the UC would contact NAFIS again when the
UC returned.
23. On or about August 26, 2012, FBI agents performing
surveillance again observed NAFIS in the area of the financial
district, apparently again for the purpose of scouting the location
for his proposed attack. The next day, on or about August 27, 2012,
NAFIS described NAFIS’s recent meeting with the UC to the CHS and
told the CHS, in sum and substance, that NAFIS believed he was now
a member of al-Qaeda. NAFIS told the CHS that “K”6 had traveled
5 Based on my training and experience, and the context of
this discussion, I know that dying “shahid” refers to martyring
oneself.
6 The UC told NAFIS that the UC’s name is “Kareem.”
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“overseas . . . for final confirmation,” apparently referring to
NAFIS’s belief that the UC was obtaining approval from al-Qaeda
leadership for NAFIS’s upcoming attack. This communication was
consensually recorded.
24. Later during the same discussion, NAFIS told the CHS,
in sum and substance, that his upcoming attack was going to be a “one
man job,” indicating that NAFIS did not want the CHS or the
CO-CONSPIRATOR to be directly involved in NAFIS’s attack on the
financial district. NAFIS and the CHS then discussed how the CHS
and the CO-CONSPIRATOR might launch their own attacks after NAFIS’s
attack was complete.
V. NAFIS Tells The UC That He Wants To Remotely Detonate
The Explosive Device
25. On or about September 15, 2012, NAFIS again met with
the UC in a hotel room in Queens, New York. During that meeting,
which was consensually recorded, NAFIS told the UC, in sum and
substance, that he wanted to launch an attack on the financial
district involving explosive devices in multiple cars with other
individuals participating in the attack. NAFIS also confirmed that
he was ready to kill himself during the course of the attack, but
Accordingly, based on my training, experience and knowledge of this
investigation, I believe NAFIS was referring to the UC when he
mentioned “K.”
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indicated that he wanted to return to Bangladesh to see his family
one last time to set his affairs in order. In addition, during this
meeting, NAFIS and the UC discussed how they needed to locate a
storage space in which to assemble the components for the explosive
device NAFIS would use in the attack. NAFIS agreed to look for a
storage space.
26. On or about September 20, 2012, NAFIS again met with
the UC for the purpose of identifying storage spaces where NAFIS could
conceal the components for an explosive device. Prior to that
meeting, which was consensually recorded, NAFIS had identified
several possible storage space locations to which NAFIS directed the
UC so they could examine them. In addition, NAFIS told the UC that,
for operational reasons, he was considering attacking the Federal
Reserve Bank instead of, or in addition to, the New York Stock
Exchange. NAFIS also told the UC, in sum and substance, that he
understood that the attack he was planning would result in a large
number of civilian casualties, including of women and children, but
still wanted to proceed with the attack.
27. Also during the course of that September 20, 2012
meeting, NAFIS once again told the UC that he wanted to return to
Bangladesh prior to launching his suicide attack in the United
States. The UC responded, in sum and substance, that if NAFIS
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returned home, he risked having his attack plan detected by U.S. law
enforcement officials. As such, the UC told NAFIS that while NAFIS
was free to return home at any time, NAFIS could not travel
internationally if NAFIS truly intended to carry out his attack with
al-Qaeda’s assistance. The UC then told NAFIS that he would pass
along NAFIS’s request to al-Qaeda leadership.
28. During a subsequent consensually recorded telephone
call with the UC on or about September 23, 2012, NAFIS urged the UC,
in sum and substance, to remind the al-Qaeda leadership both that
NAFIS had come up with the attack plan himself, and that he had come
to the United States for the purpose of conducting just such an
attack.
29. On or about September 27, 2012, NAFIS again met with
the UC. At the beginning of that meeting, which was consensually
recorded, the UC explained to NAFIS, in sum and substance, that the
al-Qaeda leaders with whom the UC had purportedly consulted at
NAFIS’s request would not wait for NAFIS to return from Bangladesh
before carrying out the attack. However, they had authorized NAFIS
to use a remote-controlled explosive device, rather than launching
a suicide attack. The UC explained that as a result, NAFIS could
participate in the attack and later return to Bangladesh. The UC
then asked NAFIS whether NAFIS wanted to continue to move forward
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with the plot, and NAFIS repeatedly confirmed that he was committed
to carrying out an attack on the financial district. Indeed, NAFIS
was excited by the new plan to detonate the explosive device remotely
because, he indicated, it would allow him to conduct additional
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.
30. During that same September 27, 2012 meeting, NAFIS
told the UC, in sum and substance, that he hoped that his attack would
disrupt the upcoming presidential elections. NAFIS said, “You know
what, this election might even stop.”
VI. NAFIS Prepares The Explosive Device
31. On or about October 4, 2012, NAFIS and the UC met and
traveled to a warehouse in the Eastern District of New York (the
“Warehouse”) that NAFIS stated he believed was suitable for storing
the explosives for the attack. Prior to that meeting, which was
consensually recorded, NAFIS had obtained numerous items for use in
the explosive device, including batteries and other electrical
components. During the meeting, NAFIS and the UC purchased
additional components to construct the explosive device, including
large garbage bins to contain the purported explosive material.
NAFIS told the UC, in sum and substance, that they should return to
the financial district during their next meeting to finalize exactly
how they would carry out the attack and escape. NAFIS told the UC:
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“We need to make a very concrete plan.” In addition, when the UC
asked whether NAFIS was ready to proceed with the attack, NAFIS
responded: “There is nothing stopping me.”
32. On or about October 12, 2012, NAFIS and the UC met
and transported what NAFIS believed to be explosive material to the
Warehouse.7 This meeting was consensually recorded. Upon arriving
at the Warehouse, NAFIS and the UC offloaded approximately twenty
fifty-pound bags of this purported explosive material into a trailer.
NAFIS also gave the UC a tarp that he had previously purchased with
his own money to cover the purported explosive device when it was
placed in the van. NAFIS also provided the UC with a thumb drive
containing an article NAFIS had written about his motivations for
his attack. NAFIS believed that this article would be published by
Inspire magazine. In that article, NAFIS included quotations from
“[o]ur beloved Sheikh Osama bin Laden” to justify the fact that his
plot likely involved the killing of women and children. NAFIS also
stated the following:
all I had in my mind are how to destroy America
. . . I came up to this conclusion that targeting
America’s economy is most efficient way to draw
the path of obliteration of America as well as
the path of establishment of Khilapha.
7 The material that purported to be the explosive material
was actually inert and posed no threat to the safety of the public.
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I decided to attack the Federal Reserve bank of
New York which is by far the largest (by assets),
most active (by volume) and most influential of
the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks. New
York Federal Reserve Bank implements monetary
policy, supervises and regulates financial
institutions and helps maintain the nation’s
payment systems.
33. Shortly after this October 12, 2012 meeting, NAFIS
called the UC and informed the UC that he had purchased a second mobile
telephone that NAFIS would use to place the cellular telephone call
to trigger the detonator for the bomb. This call was consensually
recorded.
34. On or about October 13, 2012, as previously suggested
by NAFIS, NAFIS and the UC returned to the financial district so NAFIS
could scout the site for his upcoming attack. During the drive to
the financial district, NAFIS plugged the thumb drive into his
computer and read aloud his article that he intended to be published
in Inspire. This meeting was consensually recorded. NAFIS
ultimately left the thumb drive with the UC, and it remains in FBI
custody.
VII. NAFIS Attempts To Detonate The Explosive Device
In The Financial District Of Manhattan
35. On or about October 15, 2012, the UC called NAFIS and
advised that they would be ready to proceed with the attack on October
17, 2012. NAFIS agreed and indicated, in sum and substance, that
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he was eager to proceed with the attack on that day. This call was
consensually recorded.
36. In the evening on or about October 16, 2012, NAFIS
called the UC and stated, in sum and substance, that he wanted to
“add something” to the planned attack, and that he wanted the attack
“to happen, no matter what.” That call was consensually recorded.
37. In the early morning on or about October 17, 2012,
NAFIS and the UC met and drove to the Warehouse in a van (the
“Vehicle”). This meeting was consensually recorded. During this
drive to the Warehouse, NAFIS told the UC, in sum and substance, that
he had a “Plan B,” which involved changing the attack into a suicide
bombing operation in the event that NAFIS believed the attack was
about to be thwarted by police.
38. After arriving at the Warehouse, NAFIS assembled the
purported one thousand-pound explosive device, pouring the bags
containing the inert explosive material into the trash bins and
placing them inside the Vehicle. He also installed components for
the purported detonator. As NAFIS and the UC prepared to leave the
Warehouse, NAFIS collected the empty bags that had contained the
inert explosive material and placed them in the van. NAFIS then told
the UC, in sum and substance, that he was collecting the extra bags
because he believed that there might be residual explosive materials
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in the bags that would contribute to the strength of the anticipated
detonation and kill more people.
39. NAFIS and the UC then drove in the Vehicle from the
Warehouse to the New York Federal Reserve Bank. During this drive,
Nafis explained that his jihadist views were shaped, in part, by
videotaped sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki. In addition, NAFIS told the
UC that he wanted to record a video statement prior to detonating
the device.
40. Before entering Manhattan, NAFIS armed the purported
explosive device for detonation by turning on the cellular phone to
be used in the detonator, installing the battery in the detonator
and connecting the wires linking the detonator to the purported
explosive materials.
41. Upon arriving at the New York Federal Reserve Bank,
NAFIS and the UC parked the Vehicle, exited, and walked to a nearby
hotel. Once inside a room at the hotel, NAFIS told the UC to film
a video statement Nafis wanted to make concerning the attack. During
a video-recorded statement to the American public, NAFIS stated: “We
will not stop until we attain victory or martyrdom.” While making
his video statement, NAFIS covered his face, wore sunglasses, and
disguised his voice.
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42. After completing the video, NAFIS repeatedly
attempted to detonate the purported bomb by placing multiple
telephone calls to the cellular telephone which he had installed as
the initiating device for the detonator. By placing these calls,
NAFIS was attempting to detonate the purported bomb inside the
Vehicle which was parked next to the New York Federal Reserve Bank.
These calls by NAFIS were observed by the UC and captured via
court-authorized pen register/trap and trace devices on both the
phone NAFIS used to make the calls, and the phone connected to the
purported explosive device. Agents entered the Vehicle and visually
confirmed that the detonator had been activated. Agents
subsequently placed NAFIS under arrest.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, your deponent respectfully requests that the
defendant REZWANUL NAFIS be dealt with according to law.
_______________________________
JOHN NEAS
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Sworn to before me this
___ day of October, 2012
______________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK