On war
•	Diplomacy and war: the big difference is violence. Diplomacy has conflict and hate, but it is resolved through non-violent means. Cold and warm diplomacy, cold and hot war.
•	Diplomacy: warm peace: trade, cooperation, arms sales. Democracies engage in arms trades with each other. Can result in alliances. Cold peace: less trade, cooperation is interests-based and not ideological, less tourism and less cooperation.
•	War: hot war, typical war, most prevalent type in history. Three types: conventional, non-conventional (chemical, nuclear, biological), sub-conventional (guerilla, terror, asymmetric warfare). Cold war: no usage of weapons, proxy wars. Two main components: significant espionage, constant armament because of a fear of hot war.
•	War: the phenomenon that always is. Clausewitz definition. Usage of violence as a state act. To compel our opponents to fulfill our will. He based it on nation-states, but today it has evolved – from states to “actors”, “groups”, “alliances”, etc. Quincy Wright definition: a violent contact of distinct but similar entities, reciprocal violent action between sovereign powers for certain duration.
•	Main components: violent, between states/groups, the 1000 victims quantity (singer). Traditionally, a winner and a loser. However, it’s often a loss to both sides.
•	Causes for war: Hobsian (human nature), rousseau (state/society), marxist (war serves the rich to exploit the poor), most important: the anarchy of the international system
•	Rousseau: creation of property (agriculture) and therefore status, the state becomes a tool of the rich/powerful to enrich themselves and use the poor as cannon fodder.
•	Hobbes: state of nature, war predates the state. Dichotomy between in-state and between states (more security in-state, but no security between states). Hobbes is more accepted lately (paradox of contact).hunter-gatherer societies, Australia.
•	Reasons for war:  resources, security, social status, revenge, procreation options, security dilemma.
•	Results of arms race: running in place (no relative advantage gained), pre-emptive attacks
•	Domestic policy affects foreign policy (Kissinger). However, non-state wars can exist (piracy). Less relative death (%) in modern states because of their size and because of the distance from the front. Less people are conscripted.
•	War in the international system: war is the violent aspect of international relations. Fights over resources, reputation, power.
•	Theoretical schools: realism (power, technology, geopolitics). Classical realism (will to power), neo-realism (structural, but not human nature, rather the anarchy of the system and the security dilemma).
•	Purpose of power: offensive/defensive
•	Liberalism: classical (human nature is inherently peaceful), neo-realism (structure, international system: (reduce wars through cooperation, Kantian triangle [NGO, economic interdependence, democracy]). Adam smith invisible hand.
•	Collective security (league of nations). Failed: balance of powers, interests, different values/ideologies.
•	Constructivism: 70s and onwards. Amaterial. Focused on norms and cultures.
•	Clausewitz war: the people represents man (evil/violent), balanced by the government (rational) and the army (management of war). 20th century war:  extra element of technology (media) and economy. Can decide wars.
•	Levels of war: policy (determine objectives and assign means to achieve them), strategy (the art of dividing military means and employing them for the objectives of the policy, Liddell Hart), tactics (employing military means in practice)
•	Strategy vs tactics:  strategy defines goal, dialectics between the two (what’s possible?), ranks (strategy > tactics), importance/results/scale, different utilities
•	Lidelhart: Greater strategy (military, economic, diplomacy/policy), military strategy, operative level (between strategy and tactics, due to the increasing amount of battle fronts), tactics
On Strategy:
•	Offense (change the status quo) vs defense (maintain it). All actions are a result of this distinction.
•	War of attrition vs decisive victory. Attrition is usually a result of the weaker side being unable to seal the deal (notably: guerilla warfare). All-out war vs limited war.
•	Lawrence freedman: enforcement vs deterrence. Coercion is the use of power to force actor B to choose a strategy for A’s interest.
•	Deterrence: defensive strategy (maintains status-quo). Purpose: achieve objectives without employing violent means. Assumes rationality.
•	Components of deterrence: ability (must have the ability, must be known to the other side, must be proportional, trustworthiness/reputation (credibility of threat hinges on past instances of delivering), communication (must exist between the two to communicate the threat, verbal and visual).
•	Three classifications: nuclear vs conventional, range (general, enlarged [C intervenes], specific), preventive vs punitive (iron dome vs sanctions)
•	Enforcement: after the failure of deterrence.  Posing an ultimatum post-action to turn back.
•	Thomas Schelling responds to Freedman: difference between deterrence and enforcement. Red line, time factor, relation to status quo, recognizing success.
•	Deterrence problems: delays and doesn’t solve problems, its very existence can lead to being attacked.
•	Why does deterrence fail? Failure of execution, communications failure, language failure. Pessimistic: it’s inherently flawed, rationality doesn’t apply.
•	Advantage of the crazed actor (chicken game).
•	Crisis: when deterrence fails. Resolved: Cuban missile. Got worse: WW1.
•	Strategic surprise, tactical surprise. Strategic surprise rarely existed in older times because of technological constraints.
•	Germany, 1st world war, utilizing the new mobility enabled by technology. They try to rapidly take France by surprise, but don’t have the technology for a decisive, quick victory. Changes in WW2. Surprise is easy, but capitalizing on it is not.
•	How to achieve strategic surprise: technology, secrecy, speed, deception (that I won’t attack, Germany vs Stalin, or the place where I will attack, Normandy vs Germany)
•	Surprised, why? Old doctrine: bad info. New doctrine: overinformation, cognitive dissonance/disbelief, ethnocentrism,
•	Fundamental surprise vs situational surprise (Zvi Lenir). The cheating woman.
•	Ephraim Kum: when, where, how, who. A strategic surprise answers positively to two of them, 4 = complete surprise.
•	Diplomatic surprise: (oslo accords).
On Strategy in the Nuclear Age and the Cold War
•	History: becomes prominent in the 60s. First development in 1945 (U.S.A). 1949 – USSR. 1952 U.K, 1960 France, 1964 China.
•	Makes deterrence a highly relevant topic again: M.A.D. Pure awareness of mutually assured destruction in war. Highly effective deterrent.
•	Properties: long-term damage, significant damage from a single attack, from quick wars to avoiding war.
•	Why did it not nuke the USSR? Limited arsenal, anti-war rhetoric, USSR could still cause significant conventional damage in Europe.
•	Massive retaliation: Eisenhower doctrine. Huge retaliation (deterrence) against Soviet expansionism.  Problems: not proportional, USSR has weapons in 49.
•	Replaced by flexible response: Kennedy doctrine. Tactical use (small scale) of nuclear weapons, or conventional means. Incremental, proportional. Problems: still nuclear weapons, enemy might retaliate with strategic nukes to tactical nukes.
•	Replaced by MAD: agreed upon in the détente. 1st hit (against weapons) 2nd hit (civilian targets).
•	ABMs – defensive weapon that enables offense. Chicken game.
•	Sputnik in 57 (threat that the Soviet Union is technologically progressing more than the USA), 60s development of the arrowhead technology, increased accuracy of missiles, evolution of anti-missile technology (Defensive offense).
•	Détente period: cooling down. Talks of limiting weapons. Salt treaty (freezing nuclear development). Salt 2 fails because of soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
•	80s – the Reagan alternative: can’t hold our cities hostage like that. Denuclearization. Until it’s possible, bolster defenses. Develop a defensive structure for the USA (star wars). Satellites that would shoot down soviet missiles. Result: pressure on USSR. They can’t compete, they are financially stagnating. They seek rapprochement, which eventually leads to their collapse.
•	Cold war: the big issue was to prevent soviet penetration into Western Europe. NATO (1948) (collective defense, through conventional means). Development of own nuclear arsenal.
•	Waltz: in favor of nukes for all. Evens out power levels, prevents war.
•	Sagan: bad. Might fall into the hands of irrational players. Will increase preventative wars (Israel vs Iraq). More bad usage and accidents.
•	NPT agreement in 1968 – no more nuclear shit. Didn’t sign: Israel, Pakistan, India, NK (left).
•	Why sign? Guarantee against being nuked/threatened, can use nuclear energy for other purposes. Since 1991: gradual reduction of nukes.

On Modernity:
•	Reduction of wars due to nukes.
•	However, there’s another thing: since 1815, periods of peace have grown larger and larger, while previously there was scarcely a period without war.
•	Primary assumption: wars have become too costly and devastating. But it is wrong! Relative losses have not increased (%), technology enables more devastation but also more protection.
•	Utilitarian theory: industrial revolution made peace more profitable. Higher production capabilities (which war freezes), more inter-economic dependence on trade and state-level specialization.
•	Inter-economic dependence: German economy in ww1, German/Japanese economy in ww2.
•	Why do wars still occur? Modern nationalism, economic protectionism, imperialism (informal).

On democracy:
•	Do democracies wage less war? No. But, against each other – they dramatically wage almost never a war.
•	Why? Normative and ideological.
•	Problem 1: hard to analyze older democracies (poor records). Problem 2: Peloponnesian war. Answer: ancient democracies are too different from modern ones. Problem 3: semi-democracies (german empire). Problem 4: almost-incidents (uk us, france uk).
•	Proponents: more democracy/liberalism, more peace.
•	Why increased? Modernization. Urbanization, political participation, wealth, awareness,
•	Why does democratization fail? Bad “modern” infrastructure. Way more complex than that (comparative politics).
On Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerilla):
•	Definition: unequal military power
•	Principle: drag a stronger opponent into a territory where he lacks advantages/experience to curb his superior might. Usually pertains to superior technology.
•	Guerilla warfare fights sporadically and primitively to cancel out the modern advantages.
•	Guerilla definition: deliberate use of violence against military targets for political goals.
•	Irregular warfare. Use of ambushes, hit and run, mobility, exhausting the opponent, etc. Not decisive!
•	Attrition (moral exhaustion, public opinion, media). Use of civilians: supplies food, hiding, recruits and fights, needs civilian support (as civilians pay the price), high determination (close-interest vs far off interest).
•	Clauswitz’s innovation: after observing guerilla warfare he changes his definitions of war. Not about defeating 20% of armed forces, need to defeat the civilian support and fighting spirit. Powerful tool – introduces chaos to an ordered military system. A natural part of a people’s defense of their homeland. Guerilla alongside classic warfare: partisans (red army). Spain: after a conventional loss, the advantage being that they come refreshed vs the exhausted army.
•	Guerilla is prominent from the 20th century onwards. Gil Marom: the stoppage of old methods of punishing civilians is the result (liberal democracies).
•	Soviet union vs Afghanistan. Peaceful protest (Gandhi).
•	Liberal democracies: example of the Russians vs Syrian rebels. Blending among civilians – good or bad?
•	One way: very rare, but to attempt to win over the population. Second way: use precise weaponery.
•	Prevent mobilization of big forces on the grounds. Seek local allies.
•	Israel and intifadas: liberal democratic. 1st intifada – Oslo accords. Second intifada – Gaza returned. Guerilla fighting corners Israel to make concessions.

On Terrorism:
•	Affliction of fear on civilians. French revolution roots.
•	Definition: employment of violent means at civilian targets for political purposes.
•	MUST HAVE A POLITICAL PURPOSE or else it’s just crime
•	States or non-state actors. Characterized by a psychological component – fear.
•	Two primary types: anarchistic (in-states) and nationalistic
•	Reliance on media (Munich Massacre, 1972)
•	Mostly late 19th century, relies on technology
•	New explosive materials (TNT). Automatic weapons in 20th century. A single man now has significant power. Higher mobility. Information revolution.
•	Further accelerated in the 60s due to planes and TV
•	Most efficient against democracies – needs free flow of information and freedom to operate
•	Works well for nationalistic purposes, fails for domestic shit
•	Why is it more prominent lately? 1) lack of real conflict 2) more effective media 3) larger scale possibilities, more gadgets and shit 4) globalization. Suicide bombers. Potential use of non-conventional means. 9/11.
•	Laqueur: unconventional terror. Problems: hard to use. Chemical weapons: easy to access, hard to use effectively. Biological weapons: not yet there. Nuclear: best, but impossible to acquire. Huge threat: terrorists are not rational, deterrence doesn’t work on them.
•	Big risk with nukes after USSR collapse: America wins over scientists and makes sure the nukes are in Russia’s hand.
•	Fighting in asymmetric conditions: targeting resources, organizations, divide and conquer (population from group), attacking civilians (totalitarianism), media cooperation.
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On the World Order:
•	21st century, victory of democracy.
•	90s-2000 : optimism, democracy wave. End of Marxism and fascism (Fukuyama).
•	2000s: problems. 9/11, wars, economic crash, state of China and Russia – all cast doubt.
•	Why did democracy win in the 20th century? Can it be expected to survive the 21st?
•	Democratic win over communism economically. Democratic vs totalitarian capitalist states – win because the U.S.A wins baby.
•	The china problem: capitalistic economy, but not a political democracy. Opposite of expectations. The Russia problem: moving further away from democracy under Putin.
•	The proportional industrial strength of the USA is reduced as other actors rise up. However, U.S.A is still incredibly productive and has a demographic-geographic advantage; a lot of room to grow.
•	Fareed Zakaria: future of U.S.A empire in the 21st century? American hegemony is challenged. Analysis historical comparatives. British Empire 100 years ago. Both were massively spread out. Military presence: met by tough guerilla forces (Boer war and Iraq/Afghanistan). Loss of reputation over these wars. Economic factors (production of steel). Direct comparison: militarily, U.K was unexceptional while U.S is unmatched. Economically: U.K failed economically while the U.S is robust and self-dependent. Extra: America’s research power (brain drain).
•	Threats to the U.S.A: Europe (aged population, no military, disorganized), Asia (China is focused on geographic proximity and does not have the power to challenge the U.S.A, India is irrelevantly self-centered) Russia (highest motivation but shithole tbh, not supported by other states, poor quality of life). Conclusion: American influence is still strong. Being challenged, but not through anti-american sentiment rather post-american.

On Israeli Security Policy:
•	At constant threat of elimination, surrounded by enemies
•	Security Doctrine of Israel: asymmetry between Israel and Arab Nations (demographic, geographic, resources, geo-strategies).
•	Politically shunned, economically boycotted, not supported by anyone. Relies on power.
•	First 40 years: resounding success militarily. Why do the Arabs not fight properly? Arab alliances against it fail for inner-conflictual reasons, Arab preoccupation with remnants of colonial occupations, pragmatic governments (unlike the population).
•	On the surface economic relations are skewed against Israel, but its successful modernization made it a powerhouse vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. Ridiculous defense budget expenditures (defense doctrine: one loss is GG).
•	Sinai war (56): conclusion that Israel cannot change the territorial status-quo through war, and that Israel should not seek war because it cannot force peace. Keep a strong reserve and fight defensively.
•	Doctrine, extended: rapid victories, move the fight to enemy territory.
•	Deterrence policy: deny success, punish. Need to be aware to prepare reserve forces. Decisive early victory if it comes to war.
•	B.G encourages Aliyah, fertility, reserve duty, quality of military, seek ally
•	Triggers for Israeli aggression: damage to Jordanian waters, blocking the tiran straits towards Eilat, mobilization of military force in the Sinai or Jordan
•	Principle of isolating enemies on their territories, principle of the first hit, Egypt first then Jordan.
•	Case of the Fedayeen
•	Peace will only come when Arabs realize the futility of the war against Israel. Practical, not friendly peace accord.
•	Israeli extremism doctrine of the 50s-60s. Decisive 67 victory assumed to be the ultimate deterrent. However!
•	Egypt: damaged honor, lost territory, seeks to restore 67 losses. Egypt funds through USSR a military boost, Israel increases expenditures by 4-6%
•	73: Israel doesn’t strike first, Egyptians walk into Sinai free.
•	U.S interference under Kissinger. Sinai back to Egypt but Egypt changes alliance. Peace accord in 1979.
•	Pull out of Arab states from the conflict: Egypt leaves, Iraq leaves, USSR collapses, Arab spring.
•	Change in the 80s to guerilla, terror, rockets, missiles.  Evolution of defense doctrine: passive and active.
•	Against: it’s weakness, need to eliminate the threat, not wait for it to come to us. In favor: must have defense to support offense.
•	Israel nuclear:  always the intention. 52 research begins. 55, small reactor from Eisenhower (nuclear peace agreement).  Israeli/French/U.K alliance in the Suez crisis, Israel secures a reactor from France. Work at Dimona starts in 59, progresses through the 60s. Israel tricks U.S., U.S sells conventional weapons.
•	For (Peres, Dayan): Israel cannot win long term, needs it as deterrence. Against: IDF is getting stronger, not weaker, takes from conventional budget, might incur a nuclear race, not an all-out solution, Israel is especially vulnerable to other nukes.
•	Secrecy doctrine: Israel will not detonate and not declare. Begin doctrine: prevent Arab nations from acquiring it at all costs.
•	Impact on the conflict: 1st school – significant. Pressured the Arabs into 67, prevented the Syrians and Egyptians from crossing in 73, resulted in Egyptian peace accord. 2nd school – not so important. Israel’s conventional power is enough.
•






Kenneth Waltz (defensive realism, neo-realism [structural], proliferation of nuclear weapons):
•	Root of evil is man, cause of our misfortunes and wars. Man makes state or state makes man? State makes war?
•	Prescription types: based on faulty analysis (doesn’t yield the desired results), not logically related to its analysis (must understand relations to other causes to understand the consequences that are likely for another cause)
•	“Bad states produce wars, good states produce peace” – we must ask, can the proposition be implemented/how? Is there a logical relation between prescription and image? Is the image adequate? How will filling the prescription affect other goals?
•	Three images of analysis: three causes of war.  1st: Human nature/individuals (Napoleon/Hussein), classical realism. 2nd: States (domestic makeup of states), like non-democracies, or Lenin theory on capitalism. 3rd: international system. The most influential: the anarchic structure of the international system is the root cause of war. No sovereign body to govern the interactions between autonomous nation-states.  No 911, no court for state wars. You can only rely on power, and that knowledge dictates state relations.
Mearsheimer (history of realism, offensive realism):
•	Realism. Pessimistic, power-relations oriented. States are principal actors; behavior is influenced by external environment (and not internal characteristics). No good or bad, only POWAH. Calculations about power dominate the thinking, the competition is between states, about power, it’s zero-sum – rare cooperation but inherently conflict driven.
•	Clausewitz: war is a continuation of politics by other means.
•	Dominant schools of realism: Morgenthau (human nature realism) and Waltz (defensive realism). They answer the two principal questions: why power, and how much power.
•	Human nature realism: (classical realism): dominated from 1940 to 1970. States are lead by human beings with a will to power. The international anarchy/security dilemma is only secondary to it. The fight for supremacy.
•	Defensive realism: late 1970s. Contests will to power: states just want to survive. The anarchy of the system means there is a threat of security, and states must pay attention to the balance of power. Power is the best means of survival. However, it is DEFENSIVE. They seek to not upset the balance of power. Excessive pursuits of strength are likely to cause other states to band together against them. Natural advantage of defense over offense.
•	Mearsheimer: offensive realism. Another structural theory of international politics. Same as defensive regarding anarchy, but different regarding the second question: how much power? -  the international system creates powerful incentives for states to seek opportunities for power at the expense of rivals, and take them when the benefits outweigh the costs. Ultimate goal of the state: to become a hegemon. Difference from human nature realists: the drive for power is not inherent and desirable, it’s a force situation for security reasons.





Jervis (Security dilemma, offense or defense, identifying them, four worlds)
•	Cooperation under the Security Dilemma
•	Security dilemma: increasing one’s security decreases others (state level)
•	Offense vs Defense dilemma
•	Technology and geography: the main factors that determine which one has the advantage
•	Geography buzzwords: terrain, buffer zones, natural borders/barriers, mountains/sea/islands
•	Technology buzzwords: vulnerable vs invulnerable weapons (missiles vs naval forces)¸ fluctuation dependent on time (some technological times favor offense, others defense),
•	Benefits of differentiating between offense and defense: 1) status-quo powers can identify each other, laying down the foundation for cooperation 2) advance warnings against planned aggressions 3) potential arms agreement against offensive weapons
•	Even when identification is possible (which it isn’t always), three problems: 1) if offense>defense, protection will be too expensive 2) states may need offensive weapons to reclaim territory 3) states might need offense if a state perceives that the other one will only make peace under threat/loss of territory, or 3rd party pacts.
•	Purely defensive: immobile systems. Ambiguous: limited mobility, because they can cover an offense (i.e anti-aircraft weapons)
•	Four worlds: offense/defense advantage + differentiated offense and defense or not
•	Double offensive is most dangerous, double defense most stable. Unclear + defense = security dilemma, but requirements may be compatible. Clear + offense = no security dilemma, but aggression possible.
Lawrence Freedman (Coercion):
•	Strategic coercion: use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices. Coercive vs deterrence. Coercion: the target is never denied choice but must weigh the costs of compliance vs non-compliance, has an opportunity for counter-threats (bargaining). However, it’s not just about the design of efficient threats – the way actors construct reality and their grasp of their opponent’s construct matters a lot.
Lebow (On deterrence and its flaws):
•	Deterrence is not satisfactory to explain international relations. Fails at predicting shit.
•	Deterrence map: no trespassing, watchtowers. Concerns: safeguarding their credibility, discovering vulnerabilities in their adversary.
•	Challengers focus on their own needs and don’t seriously consider/distort the needs, interests, and capabilities of their adversaries. Defenders, meanwhile, interpret the intentions in a way that’s consistent with their expectations. Both sides may prove insensitive to each other’s signals for political, cultural, or other reasons. Repeat interactions don’t really help in these cases: in fact it can do the opposite (confirmation bias).
•	Deterrence can bring about the very war it seeks to prevent. It’s self-defeating: it can cause the security dilemma by itself (Securing deterrence comes at the expense of the other’s security), and it can be perceived as aggression in itself.
•	Too abstract, needs to be more empirical.


Walt (Alliances, balance of threat theory) :

•	Alliance formations/balance of power – why? Developed balance of threat theory from Waltz’ balance of powers.
•	1: balance against or bandwagon strong states 2: ideology/culture 3: military/economic aid, propaganda, political penetration. Together: to explain the current structure of world power.
•	Balancing: join the weaker side. Why? Don’t be at the mercy of a tyrant.  Increase influence as opposed to reduce influence. Bandwagoning: joining the stronger side. Why? Natural drift towards the strong, avoid attack on oneself, share spoils of victory
•	However, it’s not always a matter of strength. It’s a matter of threat. Causes for threat: aggregate power, proximate power, offensive power, offensive intentions(provoke balance against them).
•	World where balancing is more common: credibility is less important, self-interests, aggression is discouraged, restraint and benevolent policies.
•	World where bandwagoning is more common: competitive, aggressive. Credibility reigns. More defections.
•	Understanding which world you live in is crucial: false perception backfires completely since the two are opposed.
•	Balancing is more common. Weak states more likely to bandwagon because of proximity, no availability of allies
•	Ideology: birds of a feather flock together. Why? Defending another similar political system is the same as defending yours. Less fear of being attacked by a “good” state. Enhanced legitimacy by being a part of a larger group. Or, the ideology itself might dictate alignment (Marxism).
•	Problems: when an ideology has hierarchy in it (calls for a single leader).  Works well in democracy/monarchy because their authority remains within the state.
•	Pragmatic interests/security interests come before ideological ones. USSR vs West. Ideologies can be manipulated (exaggerated/downplayed).
•	Bribery: securing an alliance through economic aid. Evoking gratitude or creation a reliance. However, it’s usually a result of an alliance and not a cause. Gives power to the recipient, however - Rabin and Kissinger example.
•	Penetration: covert or indirect manipulation of another state’s political system. Public officials with divided loyalties, lobbying, foreign propaganda.
•	Limited, however: more prone to work in open societies, can be counter-productive if detected. This implies it’s most likely to work when there’s already incentive for alignment. Preserves alignments but rarely creates them.
•	Soviet Union is politically isolated because of geographic proximity; U.S is politically popular and geographically isolated. Soviet is perceived as aggressive. Soviet has an authoritarian, divisive ideology.


Lawrence Freedman (nukes, massive retaliation, flexible retaliation):
•	Researches the evolution of nuclear weapons from 45. Soviet development in 49 leads the USA to be in a conflicted situation. Focus on weapons that can destroy enemy arsenals and hit all possible land targets. Development of hydrogen bombs. As much as 1000 times as devastating. War can lead to human extinction.
•	Massive retaliation, flexible retaliation.
•	On limited wars: must avoid total wars. Must limit wars. Because nukes.

Richard Rosecrance (Rise of the trading state):
•	Choice between trade and military. Wars have become more costly. Wars are uncertain. If the prospect of an easy win then states will be inclined to opt for it. Further, some considerations can trump utilitarian ones: ideology (nationalism/doctrines). Nations improve their position through these two means: however while growth in an open economy is not a zero-sum game, taking over territories is. Social learning (what actions to take as a state? Based on previous experience mostly).
•	Territorial states were not decisively the victors in the 15th century against local influences/universalists. End of 16th century: religious struggles lead to king and territorial state to be victorious. Domestic centralization > anarchy in the international system is established. A contest between states for power and glory. Domestic state was reformed yet again after the Napoleonic wars.
Joshua Goldstein (Wars in each period):
•	Comparison of wars in different periods.
•	21st century has less wars than the 90s, less annual deaths, less fronts.
•	Cold war vs post-cold war. Less psychological threat, less deaths, denuclearization, less military expenditure (except for USA LOL).
•	Cold war vs WW2. Definitely way less violent, come on.
•	Was the 20th century the most violent one? Hard to say: Eurocentric view, bad historical records, % vs sheer quantity, etc.

Kaysen (Wars for profit):
•	Comments on Mueller’s argument that war has become less frequent because of socio-cultural elements which make them “unthinkable”. Kaysen – they are “unthinkable” because they became economically and politically unprofitable.
•	Mueller fails to address realism/neo-realism, the dominant school of thought
•	Historically: wars were over land. Pure profit for winner. Romanticization of warriors, direct winnings: power holders were warriors themselves (9th-15th century). Later societies: war still profitable to the elite.
•	The great change: 19th century. Industrialization. Land becomes less important: capital and skill are what counts. Human lives are simply way more important. The calculations change.
•	Does war still pay? Political costs.
•	Nuclear war matters. It has changed the perception of war: nobody can believe that starting  a nuclear war is for survival. Tremendous political cost.
•	Wars can still occur. They are less likely and less profitable, but ideology in particular encourages them.

Doyle (On Kantian liberalism):
•	Kant as the essence of liberalism.
•	Positive freedom, negative freedom, democracy. How to balance the three? Conservative vs liberal liberalism. Lack of interference vs welfare policies.
•	Foreign relations: democratic peace. Respect of other the liberty of states.
•	Kantian reasoning: those who wage the war bear the results (citizens), war is irrational (profits-wise)
•	Triangle: republican constitutions (representative democracy), pacific union (international law/organization), cosmopolitan law (commerce and free trade).
Russet and Oneal (Virtuous and Vicious circles):
•	Triangulating peace.
•	Vicious circles in anarchy (arms race). Virtuous circles. Europe post-ww2.
•	How to establish a virtuous circle: the problem identified with WW2 was the destructive ambitions/negligence of authoritarian rulers. Therefore democratization is the first step. National economies (democracy hinges on economy) next. Economic interdependence. Then, international institutions (starting with OECD): organizations to promote and protect cooperation.
•	Still fragile: one collapse can drag others (economic crisis). External factors.
Gil Merom (Guerilla):
•	How do democracies lose small wars?
•	Military inferior protagonists can win – realism paradox! Gilpin: empire decay. Maoz: aggressiveness provokes 3rd parties.
•	Historically, losses to smaller forces can be attributed to overextensions and distribution of power.
•	Motivational explanations. Critique by Merom: in the past people had more to lose. They should have had higher motivation therefore higher success rates for insurgencies. However, historical records show it was worse.
•	Why do democracies fail? Because they can’t escalate the brutality to the level required for a decisive victory. Failure at the systematic level, the domestic structure. The influence of the people, particularly academics, influences foreign policy. Clash of domestic and foreign policy.
•	Guerilla warfare relies on the characteristic of the oppressor at the end of the day.
•	Examples of “old world” fates of guerilla: Jewish bar-kokhba, Irish against England
•	National Annihilation, Social Targeting (Isolating populations from insurgents), Military/Political targeting
•	Brutality: effective and cost-efficient (African colonization examples)
•	TL;DR: Guerillas happen frequently in asymmetrical war. Gives the underdog a chance to compete despite inferiority, by relying on the support of the indigenous population. If the oppressor refuses to comply with political demands, they can fight in a number of ways: annihilate the popular base, isolate the population from the insurgents, or selectively eradicate the insurgents and their leaders. Violence against civilian targets occurs in all of these cases. Cost effective. Brutality pays.
•	19th century Europe gave rise to a new middle class though their political power was weak. However, through the “the free marketplace of ideas” the educated could influence politics when other avenues were closed off to them.
•	2nd key development: military might became a less important factor as cultural and political changes created a normative different between the state and the educated segments of society. This latter group raised moral and utilitarian questions which affected foreign policy. Suddenly, domestic issues affected foreign policy – military calculations also had to consider the opinions “at home”.
Laqueur (terrorism):
•	Postmodern terrorism.
•	Terrorism is growing stronger (see above). Rarely politically effective.
•	Terrorists would use non-conventional if they could get their hands on them.
•	Why wouldn’t they use?  Fear of repercussion (losing funds), fear of damaging their own, bad imagery
•	Apocalyptic/religious/extremist groups
•	More expected ideologies, more radicalism, smaller groups. Growing state-sponsored terrorism to bypass international laws.
•	Cyberterrorism
•	Terrorism is weak right now. Attempts to have specific demands met or to weaken groups, but not submission. Access to mass destruction is limited. Cyberterrorism is the future.
Fareed Zacharia (America vs U.K. Post-America world):
•	See above
•	America needs to learn from others. Others are playing at its game, and offering competition. What it needs to do: be the source of ideas and energy.
•	Historical threats: 50s, Soviets and sputnik. 70s, Saudi and Western Europe (oil), 80s, Japan technology.
•	Critique of the American political system as weak to problem solve
•	Big historical shifts: western dominance (1500-1800), American rise (19th century), other parties (current times)
•	Moving to the post-American world, defined and directed by many places. America is losing influence in all sectors except military. Future vision: The U.S.A might take less space, but its ideals are dominant.

Huntington:
•	The conflicts post-cold war will be between civilizations, not ideological or economical.
•	Civilizations: collection of people with shared principles (language, history, culture, customs). Multiple types – state based, hemisphere based, smaller scale and larger scale. Can morph.
•	8 major civilizations. Most potent: China, which will become a hegemon and have others bandwagon, and Islam, because of Christianity – the two are missionary, universal all or nothing religions, and teleological.
•	Why clash? Cultural clashes over their differences. Basic differences like language and culture which are not flexible. More interaction between civilizations. Social/economic changes to identity. Economic identities based on regions. Dual role of the west: a peak power west creates an opposite, counter-culture reaction.
•	Breaking points: religion, Islamic-western relation, immigration, islam vs Africa, islam vs orthodox, islam vs hindu, Japan?
•	Civilization coalitions (west vs Islam in the gulf wars)
•	Western civ. Vs others: universal civ is a western concept. Democracy is usually a result of colonialization and such. Expected result: isolation, competition, or joining.
•	Inner-conflicts in states with multiple civilizations.
•	Chinese-Arab “alliance”
•	No future civilization, but multiple civilizations. Must adapt: must learn to tolerate them, must compete with them.
Avner Yaniv:
•	Arab resistance is logical, conflict might be unsolvable.
•	Israel is the weaker side that cannot enforce peace (Sharon disputes)
•	The lack of ability of Arabs to unite properly is their undoing. By 82 it was clear they wouldn’t even budge for Lebanon. By the 90s they were in-fighting (Iraq>Kuwait).
•	Security is the chief aim. Always a discussion in terms of total war.
•	Focus on maintain status quo and not on expansionism
•	Arab in-fighting
•	Need for ally
•	Focus on power
•	Israeli deterrence difference from the west: not a singular test but a long-term political-strategical process with relative successes and failures, and it’s a grand strategy

Yair Avron:
•	Nuclear Israel
•	Yadin deterrence policy of the 50s: don’t start a war, contain the enemy, move it to enemy territory, utilize the inner territory, short war.
•	60s: