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  1. Sources : Electronic and Cyber Warfare in Outer Space ...
  2. 1 For debates within India, for instance, see R.P.Rajagopalan, “India’s Changing Policy on Space Militarization: The
  3. Impact of China's ASAT Test”, India Review, vol. 10, no. 4, 2011, pp. 354–378.
  4. 2 R.P. Rajagopalan, “Having Tested its ASAT Capability, India Should Help Shape Global Space Norms ”, ORF
  5. Commentaries, 29 March 20
  6. 3 Foreword by Gen.J.P. Jumper, Chief of Staff, US Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, 2 August 2004.
  7. 4 J.B. Sheldon, “Threats to Security in Space from Counter-Space Technologies”,ASEAN Regional Space Security
  8. Workshop, Hoi An, Vietnam, 6–7 December 2012, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/20th/
  9. ARF%20Workshop%20on%20Space%20Security,%20Hoi%20An,%206-7December2012/Annex%205%20-
  10. %20Space%20Security.pdf.
  11. 5 Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, p. 47.
  12. 6 For a good account on the US and Soviet Cold War space competition, see T.Brown, “The American and Soviet Cold
  13. War Space Programs”, Comparative Strategy, vol. 30, no. 2, 2011, pp. 177–185.
  14. 7 B. Weeden and V. Samson (eds), Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment, Secure World
  15. Foundation, April 2018, https://swfound.org/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf.
  16. 8 It should be noted that India focuses more on its space race with China than China does,since China sees itself in
  17. competition with the United States. But there are elements of mutual competition such as undertaking Moon and
  18. Mars missions.
  19. 9 T. Harrison, K.Johnson and T.G.Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018, Center for International and Strategic
  20. Studies, April 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180823_Harrison_SpaceThreat
  21. Assessment_FULL_WEB.pdf.
  22. 10 B.S. Kuplic, “The Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race”,North Carolina Journal
  23. of International Law and Commercial Regulation, vol. 39, no. 4, 2014, https://scholarship.law.
  24. unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.in/&httpsredir=1&article=2011&context=ncilj.
  25. 11 It should be noted that a space system can come under attack in five different segments: launch, the control
  26. segment, the up-down link segment, the user segment and the space segment. John B. Sheldon, “Threats to Security
  27. in Space from Counter-Space Technologies,” ASEAN Regional Space Security Workshop, Hoi An, Vietnam, 6–7
  28. December 2012,
  29. http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/20th/ARF%20Workshop%20on%20Space%20Security,%20Hoi%20
  30. An,%206-7December2012/Annex%205%20-%20Space%20Security.pdf
  31. 12 J.B. Sheldon, “Threats to Security in Space from Counter-Space Technologies”,ASEAN Regional Space Security
  32. Workshop, Hoi An, Vietnam, 6–7 December 2012, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/20th/
  33. ARF%20Workshop%20on%20Space%20Security,%20Hoi%20An,%206-7December2012/Annex%205%20-
  34. %20Space%20Security.pdf
  35. 13 US Department of Defense, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”,Defense Technical Information
  36. Center, September 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-09-28-
  37. 100314-687.
  38. 14 B. Weeden: “Two points: 1) this is all about civil GPS signals (military signals are much more robust) 2) the DOD
  39. could have done more to prevent spoofing of civil GPS, but has not 3) Galileo, BeiDou & QZSS will all help, but not
  40. prevent it completely (see #2)”, 18 December 2018, https://twitter.com/brianweeden/status/1074787323357876229.
  41. 15 L. Bonner, “Defending Our Satellites: The Need for Electronic Warfare Education and Training”,Air & Space Power
  42. Journal, November–December 2015, https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29_Issue6/SEW-Bonner.pdf.
  43. 16 Ibid.; T.Harrison, K.Johnson and T.G.Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018, Center for International and Strategic
  44. Studies, April 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180823_Harrison_SpaceThreat
  45. Assessment_FULL_WEB.pdf.
  46. 17 Ibid.
  47. 18 K. Grover, A. Lim, and Q. Yang, “Jamming and Anti-Jamming Techniques in Wireless Networks: A Survey”,
  48. International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing, vol. 17, no. 4, http://www.cs.montana.edu/yang/
  49. paper/jamming.pdf
  50. 19 B. Sutherland, “Militarising Space”, in B. Sutherland (ed.), Modern Warfare, Intelligence and Deterrence: The
  51. Technologies That Are Transforming Them, 2014, pp. 142–143;P.C. Saunders and C.D. Lutes, “China’s ASAT Test
  52. Motivations and Implications”,National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC,
  53. 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a517485.pdf; P.C. Saunders, “China’s Future in Space: Implications for
  54. US Security”, Space.com, 24 May2005, http://www.space.com/1116-chinasfuture-space-implications-security.html.
  55. 20 See R.D. Fisher Jr., “China’s Progress with Directed Energy Weapons”,testimony before the US–China Economic and
  56. Security Review Commission, 23 February 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Combined.pdf.
  57. 21 See V. Muradian, “China Tried to Blind US Sats with Laser”,Defense News, 25 September 2006, https://www.ar15
  58. .com/forums/general/Chi-na_Tried_To_Blind_U_S__Sats_With_Laser/5-501978/.
  59. 22 See F. Harris, “Beijing Secretly Fires Lasers to Disable US Satellites”, The Telegraph, 26 September 2006,
  60. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1529864/Beijing-secretly-fires-lasers-to-disable-US-satellites.html
  61. 23 See “BBC Fears Iranian Cyber-Attack over Its Persian TV Service”, The Guardian, 14 March2012,
  62. http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/14/bbc-fears-iran-cyber-attack-persian; P.Horrocks, “Stop Blocking
  63. Now”, BBC News, 14 June2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/theeditors/ 2009/06/stop_the_blocking_now.html.
  64. 24 See S. Peterson and P. Faramarzi, “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US drone, Says Iranian Engineer”, The Christian Science
  65. Monitor, 15 December 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-USdrone-says-Iranian-engineer. In another specific incident reported by Christian Science Monitor in 2011, according to
  66. an unnamed European intelligence source, Iran had “managed to ‘blind’ a US satellite by ‘aiming a laser burst quite
  67. accurately’”; see T. Harrison, K. Johnson and T.G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018, Center for International and
  68. Strategic Studies, April 2018, p. 32, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/180823_Harrison_Space Threat Assessment_FULL_WEB.pdf.
  69. 25 “DPRK Jamming GPS Signals, says Seoul”,North Korea Tech, 3 May 2012, http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/05/
  70. 03/dprkjamming-gps-signals-says-seoul/; “‘North Korea Jamming’ Hits South Korea Flights”,BBC News, 2 May 2012,
  71. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17922021; S.Waterman, “North Korean Jamming of GPS Shows System’s
  72. Weakness”, The Washington Times, 23 August 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/23/
  73. northkorean-jamming-gps-shows-systems-weakness/?page=all.
  74. 26 See T. Harrison, K. Johnson and T.G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018, Center for International and Strategic
  75. Studies, April 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180823_Harrison_Space Threat
  76. Assessment_FULL_WEB.pdf; A.Mathew, “Russia Completes Development of Airborne Anti-satellite Laser Weapon”,
  77. DefPost, 26 February2018, https://defpost.com/russia-completes-development-airborne-anti-satellite-laserweapon/; D.Cenciotti, “Russia Has Completed Ground Tests of Its High-Energy Airborne Combat Laser System”, The
  78. Aviationist, 5 October 2016, https://theaviationist.com/2016/10/05/russia-has-completed-ground-tests-of-its-highenergy-airborne-combat-laser-system/; “The Russian Plane with Laser Weapons Successfully Passed the Ground
  79. Tests”, (Russian media), October 5, 2016 (only available in Russian),
  80. https://tvzvezda.ru/news/opk/content/201610051309-vplh.htm
  81. 27 See T. Harrison, K. Johnson and T.G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018, Center for International and Strategic
  82. Studies, April 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180823_Harrison_Space Threat
  83. Assessment_FULL_WEB.pdf
  84. 28 See “Source Reveals Tech Details of New Russian Anti-Satellite Warfare Plane”, Sputnik, 9 July 2018,
  85. https://sputniknews.com/military/201807091066176858-russia-electronic-warfare-plane-satellites/.
  86. 29 “Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities”, Council on Foreign Relations, 3 April 2018,
  87. https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities; G. Falco, “Job One for Space Force: Space
  88. Asset Cybersecurity”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2018, https://www.belfercenter.org
  89. /sites/default/files/files/publication/CSP%20Falco%20Space%20Asset%20-%20FINAL.pdf/.
  90. 30 K. Pollpeter, “Testimony Before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Hearing on China’s
  91. Advanced Weapons”, CNA, February 2017, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/CPP-2017-U-014906-Final.pdf;
  92. D. Coats, “Statement for the Record—Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”,Office of the
  93. Director of National Intelligence, 13 February2018, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies
  94. /2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.
  95. 31 J.R. Clapper, statement before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of
  96. the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, 9 February 2016, https://www.dni.gov
  97. /files/documents/SSCI_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR%20_FINAL.pdf.
  98. 32 T. Harrison, K. Johnson and T.G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018, Center for International and Strategic
  99. Studies, April 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180823_Harrison_Space Threat
  100. Assessment_FULL_WEB.pdf
  101. 33 A. Gini, “Cyber Crime from Cyber Space to Outer Space”, Space Safety Magazine, 14 February2014,
  102. http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/cyber-security/cyber-crime-cyber-space-outer-space/;
  103. T. Harrison, K. Johnson and T.G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018, Center for International and Strategic
  104. Studies, April 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180823_Harrison_Space Threat
  105. Assessment_FULL_WEB.pdf.
  106. 34 R. Santamarta, “A Wake-up Call for SATCOM Security”, Technical White Paper, IOActive, 2014,
  107. http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_SATCOM_Security_WhitePaper.pdf.
  108. 35 R. Pollock, “These Are The Hacker Groups Everyone Is Watching Right Now”, The Daily Caller, 9 July 2015,
  109. http://dailycaller.com/2015/07/09/these-are-the-hacker-groups-everyones-watching-right-now/.
  110. 36 B. Weeden and V. Samson (eds), Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment, Secure World
  111. Foundation, April 2018, https://swfound.org/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf.
  112. 37 A. Gini, “Cyber Crime from Cyber Space to Outer Space”, Space Safety Magazine, 14 February 2014,
  113. http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/cyber-security/cyber-crime-cyber-space-outer-space/;
  114. and B. Weeden and V. Samson (eds), Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment, Secure World
  115. Foundation, April 2018, https://swfound.org/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf
  116. 38 J. Wolf, “China Key Suspect in U.S. Satellite Hacks: Commission”, Reuters, 28 October 2011,
  117. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-satellite-idUSTRE79R4O320111028.
  118. 39 “Chinese Military Suspected in Hacker Attacks on US Satellites ”, Bloomberg, 27 October2011,
  119. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-27/chinese-military-suspected-in-hacker-attacks-on-u-ssatellites; “China Denies It Is Behind Hacking of US Satellites ”, Reuters, 31 October2011,
  120. http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2011/10/31/us-china-us-hacking-idUSTRE79U1YI20111031; L.Johnson, “Sky Alert:
  121. When Satellites Fail”, 2013, p. 37; M.P. Flaherty, J. Samenow, and L.Rein, “Chinese Hack US Weather Systems,
  122. Satellite Network”,Washington Post, 12 November 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/chinese-hack-usweather-systems-satellitenetwork/2014/11/12/bef1206a-68e9-11e4-b053-65cea7903f2e_story.html.
  123. 40 See “Turla: Spying Tool Targets Governments and Diplomats”, Symantec Security Response, 7 August 2014,
  124. https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/turla-spying-tool-targets-governments-and-diplomats.; S. Khandelwal,
  125. “Russian Hackers Hijack Satellite To Steal Data from Thousands of Hacked Computers”, The Hacker News,
  126. 10 September 2015, https://thehackernews.com/2015/09/hacking-satellite.html.
  127. 41 J. Bachman, “NASA Says Hackers Stole Employee Information”,Bloomberg News, 19 December 2018,
  128. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/nasa-says-hackers-stole-employee-information; M. Peterson,
  129. “China Charged with Hacking NASA, 45+ US Tech Firms and Govt. Agencies”, iDrop News, 21 December 2018,
  130. https://www.idropnews.com/news/fast-tech/china-charged-with-hacking-nasa-45-u-s-tech-firms-and-govtagencies/90222/.
  131. 42 B.S. Kuplic, “The Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race”,North Carolina Journal
  132. of International Law and Commercial Regulation, vol. 39, no. 4, 2014, https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/view
  133. content.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.in/&httpsredir=1&article=2011&context=ncilj.
  134. 43 C. Peoples (2008) “Assuming the Inevitable? Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space Weaponization and
  135. Conflict”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 29 no. 3, 2008.
  136. 44 Article 39 reads, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
  137. peace, or act of aggression”.
  138. 45 General Assembly, “Text of UN General Assembly Resolution 3314”, 14 December 1974, http://www.un.org/ga
  139. /search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3314(XXIX)&Lang=E
  140. 46 Y. Henri, “Long-Term Efficiency of the Space Regulatory Framework”, https://www.itu.int/net/ITUR/information/promotion/e-flash/2/article6.html.
  141. 47 For details, see International Telecommunication Union, “Radio Regulations”, http://life.itu.int/radioclub/rr/frr.htm.
  142. 48 S. Pinnagoda, “Harmful Interference and Infringements of the Radio Regulations”,Regional Radiocommunication
  143. Seminar for Asia–Pacific, The Philippines, 25–30 May 2015, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/terrestrial/workshops/RRS15-Asia/Documents/Harmful%20Interference.pdf.
  144. 49 N. Jasentuliyana, “Regulatory Functions of I.T.U. in the Field of Space Telecommunications”,Journal of Air Law and
  145. Commerce, vol. 34, no. 1, 1968, https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2576&context=jalc.
  146. 50 B. Ba, “Harmful Interference and Infringements of the Radio Regulations”, Regional Radiocommunication Seminar
  147. for Africa 2013, Cameroon, 16–20 September 2013, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/terrestrial/workshops/RRS-13-
  148. Africa/Documents/Harmful%20Interference.pdf.
  149. 51 “Harmful Interference to Space Services”, BR-SSD e-Learning Center, https://www.itu.int/en/ITUR/space/elearning/presentations/UIT_SSD_028.pdf.
  150. 52 N. Jasentuliyana, “Regulatory Functions of I.T.U. in the Field of Space Telecommunications”,Journal of Air Law and
  151. Commerce, vol. 34, no. 1, 1968, https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2576&context=jalc.
  152. 53 B. Weeden, “Electronic Warfare and Satellites: Challenges in Assuring Space Capabilities”, Electronic Warfare GCC,
  153. Abu Dhabi, 25–26 October 2016, https://swfound.org/media/205651/bw_ew_satellitesatellites-gcc_oct2016.pdf.
  154. 54 Even though the ITAR is a US domestic regulation, given the United States’ position both in diplomacy and in trade,
  155. ithas had a significant effect on high technology exchanges. For more details on the US domestic export control
  156. regulations including ITAR and EAR, see “The International Traffic in Arms Regulations”
  157. 55 General Assembly, Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities, UN document
  158. A/RES/65/68, 8 December2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/68
  159. 56 Security Council, UN document S/RES/1540, 28 April 2004, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
  160. S/RES/1540%20(2004)&Lang=E
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