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  1. volkskrant.nl
  2. Huawei was able to eavesdrop on all calls from mobile KPN customers, including those of the prime minister
  3. Huib Modderkolk17 April 2021, 5:00
  4. 23-31 minutes
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  6. Huawei had free access to KPN's mobile network. This is evident from a secret report from Capgemini from 2010 that the Volkskrant has in its hands. Among other things, the Chinese company was able to listen in with members of the cabinet and in a database of tapped lines.
  7. The main findings from this article
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  9. The Chinese technology company Huawei had unauthorized access from China to the core of KPN's mobile network, could listen in on unlimited telephone conversations and had access to tapping information in violation of the law. Huawei thereby violated agreements with KPN. This is evident from a secret internal report from KPN from 2010, which is in the hands of de Volkskrant.
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  11. Huawei was able to "wiretap unauthorized, uncontrolled and unlimited KPN mobile numbers" both within KPN and from China, including those of ministers, then Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Chinese dissidents. Huawei also had insight into the database with tapped telephone numbers. This is contrary to the Telecommunications Act.
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  13. The findings of the internal report were so explosive that it was feared for the fate of KPN Mobile if it were to be leaked. From the report: "The survival of KPN Mobile is in serious danger because permits may be revoked or the government and the business community may give up their confidence in KPN if it becomes known that the Chinese government can eavesdrop on KPN mobile numbers and shut down the network."
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  15. Before Guusje ter Horst takes a plane to Beijing for a five-day working visit in the autumn of 2009, the Minister of the Interior receives security training from the AIVD. At the ministry in the Wijnhavenkwartier, two AIVDs talk about the risks of the visit to China. Ter Horst's travel company is also present at the training: her employee Jean Fransman, a policy officer and top civil servant Dick Schoof, who later became head of the AIVD.
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  17. It is not so much the nature of the working visit - the foursome travels to sign a bilateral agreement on police cooperation between the Netherlands and China - as the behavior of China that the company should pay attention to, say the AIVD'ers. Jean Fransman: "We were briefed extensively. They told us what to do with confidential documents and with our telephones. "At the end of each day, the official documents are taken with an embassy employee to a safe in the Dutch embassy.
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  19. Phones are a separate risk. Frenchman: "We were warned not to make phone calls." The officials are given a new SIM card, which is destroyed afterwards. Minister Ter Horst receives a prepaid telephone from the AIVD, which she must hand in to the service after the trip. She is also advised not to share confidential information over the phone.
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  21. It is not surprising that the AIVD is concerned about China. In 2008, the intelligence service saw an increase in the number of digital attacks on the Dutch government and business from China. Ministries and high-tech companies are a favorite target. China is mentioned by name in the annual report that year. Responsible minister Ter Horst said about this later in the House of Representatives: "There may sometimes be reason to explicitly mention some countries in the annual report. This happens when the scale is such that the AIVD is of the opinion that it should be widely shared. "
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  23. Concerns about China are also growing in Germany in 2009. That country is under constant attack from Chinese state hackers, says Walter Opfermann, a counterintelligence expert for the state of Baden-Württemberg quoted in The Guardian. He estimates that the espionage activities cost the German economy tens of billions a year. China is in so many systems that it is capable of sabotaging entire parts of the German infrastructure.
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  25. Despite this presence, Chinese espionage appears to be difficult to discuss in Germany, says Opfermann. "Companies don't want to admit that they are vulnerable and lose customers as a result. In addition, they do not want to waste business opportunities in China. Therefore, we only see the tip of the iceberg. "
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  27. This attitude is no different in the Netherlands. Because while the AIVD is concerned about Chinese espionage, Dutch telecom parties are investing heavily in equipment from the Chinese technology company Huawei. The reason: the Chinese company is much cheaper than competitors Nokia and Ericsson.
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  29. Only a few, especially in the security departments of the telecom companies, are concerned about data leakage to China.
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  31. If the customer and billing system is replaced at Telfort and different providers send a quotation, the Huawei offer turns out to be so much cheaper that employees
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