wikileaks 09PARIS848 uncensored

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RHMFIUU/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000848

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, KDEM, PINR, MA, FR
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR:  FRENCH SUPPORT POLITICAL CONSENSUS
LEADING TO ELECTIONS

REF: A. EMBASSY ANTANANARIVO-KANEDA E-MAIL (JUNE 23)
     B. PARIS 815

Classified By: Acting Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Andrew Y
oung, 1.4 (b/d).

1.  (C/NF)  SUMMARY:  France continues to favor a political
consensus among contending parties that would lead to
credible elections, Presidential AF-advisor Remi Marechaux
said on June 23.  However, neither Rajoelina, Ravalomanana
(who is recruiting mercenaries in France), nor Ratsiraka are
making any conciliatory gestures.  The international
community needs to continue pressuring them.  SADC\'s recent
policy shift is helpful, as is its naming of Joaquim Chissano
as SADC mediator for Madagascar; the next International
Contact Meeting should take place in Antananarivo.  Marechaux
denied rumors indicating that France was providing a military
plane to the HAT; he said that bilateral relations were in a
\"gray zone,\" with the new French Ambassador not yet having
presented his credentials.  Marechaux said that France was
abiding by the EU\'s strictures against \"no new
non-humanitarian assistance,\" which the EU was enforcing
strictly.  The GOF is trying its best not to embroil itself
in the dispute over control over Madagascar\'s embassy in
Paris.  Marechaux labeled French businessman and
behind-the-scenes fixer Robert Bourgi as an opportunist with
little experience in Madagascar, who was asked to involve
himself by Franco-Malgache insider Patrick Lelu (phonetic).
END SUMMARY.

CONSENSUS LEADING TO ELECTIONS IS NECESSARY

2.  (C)  Remi Marechaux, AF-advisor at the French presidency,
discussed Madagascar on June 23, noting up front that \"our
policy is similar to yours and the international community\'s
-- there must be a political consensus among the contending
parties that will allow for credible elections.\"  Marechaux
said that SADC\'s recent shift in policy -- its renunciation
of reinstalling Ravalomanana by military means, its general
re-alignment with the rest of the international community,
and its naming of Joaquim Chissano as SADC mediator for
Madagascar -- was most helpful.  Marechaux remarked that the
next meeting of the International Contact Group should be in
Antananarivo, which he said would demonstrate support for the
new SADC mediator.

RAJOELINA

3.  (C)  That said, Marechaux said that outside pressure was
necessary to prod the three main parties -- Rajoelina,
Ravalomanana, and Ratsiraka -- into forming a consensus,  In
Marechaux\'s view, each of them was responsible for the lack
of progress.  Rajoelina was surrounded by HAT hard-liners who
would oppose an agreement and subsequent elections because
this would ultimately lead to their losing power.  Some of
these hard-liners wanted to go it alone and form, in their
view, a permanent government, regardless of internal and
international opinion.  Marechaux said that France had been
advising the HAT camp not to pursue the hard-liners\' approach.

4.  (C)  Marechaux said that Rajoelina himself was not
helping matters by remaining somewhat coy about his own
intentions to run.  Marechaux said that despite declarations
that Rajoelina would not run and his promises not to amend
the constitution to eliminate the age issue, it was not clear
what Rajoelina\'s intentions were.  All of this was
complicated by the \"totally untransparent\" prosecution and
conviction of Ravalomanana and the prohibition against his
running for office, which the HAT had handled in a completely
clumsy manner.  Marechaux thought that even if Rajoelina ran,
it was not clear that he would win, given the concentration
of his support in the capital and lack of it elsewhere.

RAVALOMANANA

5.  (C/NF)  As for Ravalomanana, Marechaux said that he
remained obsessed with making a come-back and being
reinstalled in power, despite the \"fantasy nature\" of such an
ambition.  Marechaux confided that Ravalomanana was
continuing to try to recruit mercenaries, including within
France.  Marechaux said that some of those in France whom
Ravalomanana had attempted to recruit had contacted the GOF,
in part because Ravalomanana, in making his sales pitch, had
claimed that \"the Elysee (i.e., French Presidency) is
supporting me.\"  Marechaux said that the Presidency denied
these claims and then referred Ravalomanana\'s case to other
branches of the GOF responsible for monitoring this kind of
activity.  Marechaux said the Presidency was not pleased that

PARIS 00000848  002 OF 003


Ravalomanana was recruiting mercenaries in France or claiming
that the French supported this activity.

6.  (C)  Marechaux said that assumptions that France was
\"anti-Ravalomanana\" were much exaggerated.  Ravalomanana
might not like France much (although not enough, apparently,
to refrain from claiming France supported him) but France had
developed a modus operandi in dealing with him.  He was
helpful on Mayotte, which the French valued.  Marechaux said
that Rajoelina feared Ravalomanana\'s return because
Ravalomanana had sufficient personal wealth and resources to
carry out a comprehensive campaign that Rajoelina would find
difficult to counter, much less overcome.  Marechaux
commented that one of the HAT\'s bad decisions was to shut
down Ravalomanana\'s extensive business empire, which resulted
in sudden unemployment for many and thus a ready-made host of
Ravalomanana supporters.

RATSIRAKA

7.  (C)  Marechaux remarked that Ratsiraka had also injected
himself into the turmoil by proposing that he, as
Madagascar\'s senior military man, be considered to run any
military-based transitional body.  Marechaux said that
Ratsiraka, while ambitious, probably could be placated into
dropping out if either side promised to give him a house and
other emoluments in recognition of his past accomplishments.
Marechaux confided that France had promised that it would
medevac Ratsiraka if the need arose.  Marechaux said that
Ratsiraka, in essence, needed to have his ego stroked and
then would likely exit center stage.

DIPLOMATIC \"GRAY ZONE\" AND EU AID STRICTURES

8.  (C)  Marechaux said that French relations with Madagascar
had entered into a bit of a gray zone, with the new French
Ambassador not having presented his credentials, so as not to
legitimize the HAT.  France was adhering to the EU\'s
restrictions on not providing new non-humanitarian assistance
to Madagascar.  Marechaux indicated that the EU was
interpreting this ban quite narrowly.  He said that France
had wanted to provide 1.5 million euros (about 2.1 million
USD) for a small project to clean up waste and pollutants at
a certain site in Antananarivo.  The EU blocked this as
\"development assistance\" despite the obvious public health
aspect to the project.

NO FRENCH PLANE FOR MADAGASCAR

9.  (C)  Responding to issues raised in ref A e-mail,
Marechaux said he was not aware of France\'s providing
Madagascar with a military plane, and he doubted that any
such project was in train.  However, he said he would
investigate and contact us if necessary.  He noted that there
had been an earlier program to provide Madagascar with small
surveillance planes that were used to spot cattle rustling,
which he said was an endemic problem.  He speculated that any
such plane to be delivered might be in connection with that
(non-military) program.  But he repeated that he had no
knowledge of any such transfer of a plane either now or in
the recent past.

MADAGASCAR\'S EMBASSY IN PARIS

10.  (C)  Marechaux said that the GOF was trying not to
become involved in the dispute at Madagascar\'s Embassy in
Paris where factions within the Embassy were fighting for
control over the Embassy and its buildings.  The police have
been told to provide protection and maintain law and order
outside the grounds of the Embassy but not to enter the
facility, except in exigent circumstances such as a fire or
gunshots and the like.  Marechaux said that fights among
Embassy staff had broken out over whether Ravalomanana\'s or
Rajoelina\'s portrait adorned the walls, with supporters of
both factions changing locks and trying to assert control.
Marechaux said that one of the Embassy counselors has been
designated by Antananarivo as charge d\'affaires, a.i., but
that a woman with no diplomatic credentials who had recently
shown up had been sending diplomatic notes and otherwise
acting as if in charge.  (NOTE:  We believe this woman to be
Rakotomanga Hajanirina, according to what Malgache Ambassador
Narisoa told us on June 16.  END NOTE.)  Marechaux regretted
this situation but said that the Embassy, even before
Ravalomanana\'s ouster, was largely out of the loop concerning
bilateral relations, with most issues managed by the French
Embassy in Antananarivo working with the central government.

(C/NF)  ROBERT BOURGI

PARIS 00000848  003 OF 003



11.  (C/NF)  As had his colleague Romain Serman (ref B, paras
7-11), Marechaux expressed discomfort with private
businessman and behind-the-scenes fixer Robert Bourgi\'s
apparent involvement in Madagascar.  He said that Bourgi had
no prior experience with Madagascar but had been asked to get
involved by Patrick Lelu (phonetic), a Franco-Malgache
businessman and advisor to several leading Malgache figures.
Marechaux said that Bourgi, looking for new business after
the death of Gabon\'s President Bongo, was eager to seek new
opportunities in Madagascar.  Marechaux repeated that Bourgi
was not in any way associated with the GOF and was interested
only in exploiting his own opportunities.




BERRY