Illinois Defamation

A cause of action for defamation will support a claim for punitive damages if it is alleged and proven either that the defendant acted with actual malice (Gibson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 292 Ill.App.3d 267, 685 N.E.2d 638, 226 Ill.Dec. 383 (5th Dist. 1997)), or that the defamation was per se, thus implying malice (Brown v. Farkas, 158 Ill.App.3d 772, 511 N.E.2d 1143, 110 Ill.Dec. 823 (1st Dist. 1986)). However, state defamation law is subject to the constraints of federal  constitutional law, which require the proof of actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth in cases involving matters of public concern. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 86 L.Ed.2d 593, 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985). Contrary to the general rules of recovering punitive damages, actions for defamation support a punitive award even though malice may be an essential element of proving the claim (Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 208 Ill.App.3d 771, 566 N.E.2d 998, 153 Ill.Dec. 148 (3d Dist. 1991)) or when there is no proof of actual damages because the plaintiff relies on the presumed damages in a per se action (Moore v. Streit, 181 Ill.App.3d 587, 537 N.E.2d 408, 130 Ill.Dec. 341 (2d Dist. 1989)).