theunpromisedone3

Trapwire Stratfor Email 2

Aug 9th, 2012
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  1. Re: [CT] Discussion- Al-Mabhouh blowback
  2. Date 2010-02-17 23:06:54
  3. From Anya.Alfano@stratfor.com
  4. To ct@stratfor.com
  5. ben.west@stratfor.com
  6. Others InReplyTo: 4B7C684B.4070805@stratfor.com
  7. Text
  8. Any ideas how they got to the shopping center? Maybe a cab driver
  9. talked? Only need to connect one person to make the dots come together.
  10.  
  11. On 2/17/2010 5:06 PM, Ben West wrote:
  12.  
  13. right, but there was no inherent connection between the hotel and the
  14. shopping center that I could see. In order to run TrapWire, you first
  15. have to have the images to analyze - I'm curious as to who decided to
  16. look at the shopping center tapes and how they determined that it needed
  17. to be looked at.
  18. In general, this just seems too good to be true. Either Dubai police
  19. department are a bunch of bad-asses or someone got help.
  20.  
  21. Fred Burton wrote:
  22.  
  23. Forensically, you start on the hotel tapes from the floor of the murder
  24. and walk the cat back, using TrapWire like software.
  25.  
  26. Ben West wrote:
  27.  
  28.  
  29. One thing I was talking to Bayless about just now: I realize that there
  30. is now face recognition technology out there that would allow the
  31. Emirates to track these people, but in order to use that, you have to
  32. have the right set of images to work from in the first place.
  33. Running analysis at the airport makes sense because the team would have
  34. scanned their passports there and so had to have gone through the
  35. airport. Same for the hotels, authorities would have been able to place
  36. the team members at each hotel based on their passports, which would
  37. help specify which video to analyze.
  38. However, I don't understand how they got video of the team going into
  39. the shopping center. Out of all the random places that the team
  40. could've met, what prompted the police to check that shopping center?
  41. Either they ran checks on hundreds of other CCTV tapes or they somehow
  42. had a tip that the team was meeting at the mall.
  43.  
  44. Fred Burton wrote:
  45.  
  46.  
  47. Yes, I think as you break down the tape, the teams had specific roles.
  48. If host country intelligence and/or another service picked up on them,
  49. they had enough players in the mix to send any surveillance team down a
  50. rat hole. I think we are missing something on the dead guy.
  51.  
  52. George Friedman wrote:
  53.  
  54.  
  55.  
  56. 17 people for a hit leaves so many opportunities for failure that its
  57. breathtaking. Maybe it is the Israelis, but that is way out of the
  58. box. Like I said, I wonder how many were camo. I bet you some of those
  59. who resolved back to the Israeli passport holders weren't even aware
  60. there was a hit on. That much razzle dazzle might mean a small team
  61. hidden in a big box.
  62.  
  63. Fred Burton wrote:
  64.  
  65.  
  66.  
  67. Wow
  68.  
  69. His links to Iran must have been very important.
  70.  
  71. Sean Noonan wrote:
  72.  
  73.  
  74.  
  75.  
  76. Just to clarify--NYT, sourced from Dubai police, says 17 people now.
  77. The 11 they identified, with pictures/passport info, and then 6 others.
  78. Fred Burton wrote:
  79.  
  80.  
  81.  
  82.  
  83. When you break down the video tape, efforts were made by the hit team to
  84. conceal their identities from the video.
  85.  
  86. The operation was worked around the video tape I think.
  87.  
  88. Between 13-15 men were in play; multiple surveillance teams; hand offs,
  89. clothing changes; wigs, toupees, cover for action.
  90.  
  91. Mossad has made several tactical errors in the past, to include the loss
  92. of two Palestinian double agents in Europe.
  93.  
  94. They had the same passport foul up on the attempt to poison Mishaal in
  95. Amman, which led to them being caught.
  96.  
  97. Frankly, Mossad has a history of bungled operations, but quite a few
  98. good ones, like Ali Hassan Salameh.
  99.  
  100. This was Mossad.
  101.  
  102. George Friedman wrote:
  103.  
  104.  
  105.  
  106.  
  107.  
  108. A Mossad team would be extremely aware of placement of security
  109. cameras. They would not be doing what this woman did. She is to a
  110. great extent blown now. Major intelligence agencies would be able to do
  111. biometrics on her pretty effectively. An agent competent enough to
  112. participate in an assassination of a HVT in an Arab country would be
  113. highly trained and prized. So from this we can assume that she is
  114. either a throwaway in the team or that this isn't a major league
  115. hit--and it was. The Israelis did not need to make this appear to be an
  116. Israeli hit because everyone would assume that it was Israeli anyway. No
  117. need for confirmation. For a hit like this the passports used would
  118. have been much harder to trace, certainly not to living people in
  119. Israel. The Israelis, like all intelligence organizations, maintain
  120. libraries of properly aged identities that don't resolve to living
  121. people.
  122.  
  123. Either this was not an Israeli hit or the Israelis sent a second tier
  124. team. The women looks like she could be Jewish, but she could also be
  125. middle eastern or American.
  126. This hit, like some other allegedly Israeli hits in recent years, does
  127. not follow high professional standards. Trust me on this--the hotel in
  128. which this woman stayed was mapped out months ago, probably from blue
  129. prints but certainly remapped for security devices and cameras. She was
  130. briefed (pounded into her head) where the cameras were and to turn her
  131. head as she walked by, preferably wearing a dress that hid her figure--a
  132. blob on the video camera. Instead, she is hamming it up. Looking at
  133. her, she wasn't the honey trap, so what the hell is going on?
  134.  
  135. Sean Noonan wrote:
  136.  
  137.  
  138.  
  139.  
  140.  
  141. As Posey works on the piece from the tactical angle, I wanted to bring
  142. up the political angle. Now that all kinds of information has come
  143. out on the assassination of Hamas operative Al-Mabhouh in Dubai on
  144. Jan. 19, European governments are starting to question the fraudulent
  145. use of their passports. 6 British, 3 Irish, 1 German and 1 French
  146. passports were all faked/stolen/borrowed and then used by the
  147. assassination team. NYT/Dubai says there were another 6 involved, who
  148. they probably didn't get on camera.
  149. Israel has in the past borrowed/acquired passports from immigrated or
  150. dual-citizens of other countries (like Canada for failed Meshaal
  151. assassination). They also can fake them or steal them. It's becoming
  152. clear that this was a Mossad op, so if we make that assumption, what's
  153. the blowback on Israel?
  154.  
  155. UK is asking questions:
  156. http://www.english.rfi.fr/europe/20100217-uk-presses-answers-hamas-killing
  157.  
  158. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5heI4dq286UxVDMXoueq-dwR8tbJw
  159.  
  160. http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=37297
  161.  
  162. Ireland from a week or so ago:
  163. http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/israeli-hit-squad-that-killed-hamas-commander-had-irish-passports-14670094.html
  164.  
  165.  
  166. Six of the passport _names_ had dual citizenship with israel:
  167. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/16/world/la-fg-dubai-slaying17-2010feb17
  168.  
  169.  
  170. I haven't seen stuff from other countries yet. When this happened to
  171. the Canadians with Meshaal, they couldn't/didn't do much. Will the
  172. Brits or anyone else do anything? Obviously Israel doesn't really
  173. give a shit, but I feel like this is something we should watch.
  174.  
  175. --
  176. Sean Noonan
  177. ADP- Tactical Intelligence
  178. Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
  179. Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
  180. www.stratfor.com
  181.  
  182.  
  183.  
  184.  
  185.  
  186.  
  187. --
  188.  
  189. George Friedman
  190.  
  191. Founder and CEO
  192.  
  193. Stratfor
  194.  
  195. 700 Lavaca Street
  196.  
  197. Suite 900
  198.  
  199. Austin, Texas 78701
  200.  
  201.  
  202. Phone 512-744-4319
  203.  
  204. Fax 512-744-4334
  205.  
  206.  
  207.  
  208.  
  209.  
  210.  
  211.  
  212.  
  213.  
  214.  
  215. --
  216.  
  217. George Friedman
  218.  
  219. Founder and CEO
  220.  
  221. Stratfor
  222.  
  223. 700 Lavaca Street
  224.  
  225. Suite 900
  226.  
  227. Austin, Texas 78701
  228.  
  229.  
  230. Phone 512-744-4319
  231.  
  232. Fax 512-744-4334
  233.  
  234.  
  235.  
  236.  
  237. --
  238. Ben West
  239. Terrorism and Security Analyst
  240. STRATFOR
  241. Austin,TX
  242. Cell: 512-750-9890
  243.  
  244.  
  245.  
  246. --
  247. Ben West
  248. Terrorism and Security Analyst
  249. STRATFOR
  250. Austin,TX
  251. Cell: 512-750-9890
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