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theunpromisedone3

Trapwire Stratfor Email 2

Aug 9th, 2012
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  1. Re: [CT] Discussion- Al-Mabhouh blowback
  2. Date 2010-02-17 23:06:54
  3. Others InReplyTo: [email protected]
  4. Text
  5. Any ideas how they got to the shopping center? Maybe a cab driver
  6. talked? Only need to connect one person to make the dots come together.
  7.  
  8. On 2/17/2010 5:06 PM, Ben West wrote:
  9.  
  10. right, but there was no inherent connection between the hotel and the
  11. shopping center that I could see. In order to run TrapWire, you first
  12. have to have the images to analyze - I'm curious as to who decided to
  13. look at the shopping center tapes and how they determined that it needed
  14. to be looked at.
  15. In general, this just seems too good to be true. Either Dubai police
  16. department are a bunch of bad-asses or someone got help.
  17.  
  18. Fred Burton wrote:
  19.  
  20. Forensically, you start on the hotel tapes from the floor of the murder
  21. and walk the cat back, using TrapWire like software.
  22.  
  23. Ben West wrote:
  24.  
  25.  
  26. One thing I was talking to Bayless about just now: I realize that there
  27. is now face recognition technology out there that would allow the
  28. Emirates to track these people, but in order to use that, you have to
  29. have the right set of images to work from in the first place.
  30. Running analysis at the airport makes sense because the team would have
  31. scanned their passports there and so had to have gone through the
  32. airport. Same for the hotels, authorities would have been able to place
  33. the team members at each hotel based on their passports, which would
  34. help specify which video to analyze.
  35. However, I don't understand how they got video of the team going into
  36. the shopping center. Out of all the random places that the team
  37. could've met, what prompted the police to check that shopping center?
  38. Either they ran checks on hundreds of other CCTV tapes or they somehow
  39. had a tip that the team was meeting at the mall.
  40.  
  41. Fred Burton wrote:
  42.  
  43.  
  44. Yes, I think as you break down the tape, the teams had specific roles.
  45. If host country intelligence and/or another service picked up on them,
  46. they had enough players in the mix to send any surveillance team down a
  47. rat hole. I think we are missing something on the dead guy.
  48.  
  49. George Friedman wrote:
  50.  
  51.  
  52.  
  53. 17 people for a hit leaves so many opportunities for failure that its
  54. breathtaking. Maybe it is the Israelis, but that is way out of the
  55. box. Like I said, I wonder how many were camo. I bet you some of those
  56. who resolved back to the Israeli passport holders weren't even aware
  57. there was a hit on. That much razzle dazzle might mean a small team
  58. hidden in a big box.
  59.  
  60. Fred Burton wrote:
  61.  
  62.  
  63.  
  64. Wow
  65.  
  66. His links to Iran must have been very important.
  67.  
  68. Sean Noonan wrote:
  69.  
  70.  
  71.  
  72.  
  73. Just to clarify--NYT, sourced from Dubai police, says 17 people now.
  74. The 11 they identified, with pictures/passport info, and then 6 others.
  75. Fred Burton wrote:
  76.  
  77.  
  78.  
  79.  
  80. When you break down the video tape, efforts were made by the hit team to
  81. conceal their identities from the video.
  82.  
  83. The operation was worked around the video tape I think.
  84.  
  85. Between 13-15 men were in play; multiple surveillance teams; hand offs,
  86. clothing changes; wigs, toupees, cover for action.
  87.  
  88. Mossad has made several tactical errors in the past, to include the loss
  89. of two Palestinian double agents in Europe.
  90.  
  91. They had the same passport foul up on the attempt to poison Mishaal in
  92. Amman, which led to them being caught.
  93.  
  94. Frankly, Mossad has a history of bungled operations, but quite a few
  95. good ones, like Ali Hassan Salameh.
  96.  
  97. This was Mossad.
  98.  
  99. George Friedman wrote:
  100.  
  101.  
  102.  
  103.  
  104.  
  105. A Mossad team would be extremely aware of placement of security
  106. cameras. They would not be doing what this woman did. She is to a
  107. great extent blown now. Major intelligence agencies would be able to do
  108. biometrics on her pretty effectively. An agent competent enough to
  109. participate in an assassination of a HVT in an Arab country would be
  110. highly trained and prized. So from this we can assume that she is
  111. either a throwaway in the team or that this isn't a major league
  112. hit--and it was. The Israelis did not need to make this appear to be an
  113. Israeli hit because everyone would assume that it was Israeli anyway. No
  114. need for confirmation. For a hit like this the passports used would
  115. have been much harder to trace, certainly not to living people in
  116. Israel. The Israelis, like all intelligence organizations, maintain
  117. libraries of properly aged identities that don't resolve to living
  118. people.
  119.  
  120. Either this was not an Israeli hit or the Israelis sent a second tier
  121. team. The women looks like she could be Jewish, but she could also be
  122. middle eastern or American.
  123. This hit, like some other allegedly Israeli hits in recent years, does
  124. not follow high professional standards. Trust me on this--the hotel in
  125. which this woman stayed was mapped out months ago, probably from blue
  126. prints but certainly remapped for security devices and cameras. She was
  127. briefed (pounded into her head) where the cameras were and to turn her
  128. head as she walked by, preferably wearing a dress that hid her figure--a
  129. blob on the video camera. Instead, she is hamming it up. Looking at
  130. her, she wasn't the honey trap, so what the hell is going on?
  131.  
  132. Sean Noonan wrote:
  133.  
  134.  
  135.  
  136.  
  137.  
  138. As Posey works on the piece from the tactical angle, I wanted to bring
  139. up the political angle. Now that all kinds of information has come
  140. out on the assassination of Hamas operative Al-Mabhouh in Dubai on
  141. Jan. 19, European governments are starting to question the fraudulent
  142. use of their passports. 6 British, 3 Irish, 1 German and 1 French
  143. passports were all faked/stolen/borrowed and then used by the
  144. assassination team. NYT/Dubai says there were another 6 involved, who
  145. they probably didn't get on camera.
  146. Israel has in the past borrowed/acquired passports from immigrated or
  147. dual-citizens of other countries (like Canada for failed Meshaal
  148. assassination). They also can fake them or steal them. It's becoming
  149. clear that this was a Mossad op, so if we make that assumption, what's
  150. the blowback on Israel?
  151.  
  152. UK is asking questions:
  153. http://www.english.rfi.fr/europe/20100217-uk-presses-answers-hamas-killing
  154.  
  155. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5heI4dq286UxVDMXoueq-dwR8tbJw
  156.  
  157. http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=37297
  158.  
  159. Ireland from a week or so ago:
  160. http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/israeli-hit-squad-that-killed-hamas-commander-had-irish-passports-14670094.html
  161.  
  162.  
  163. Six of the passport _names_ had dual citizenship with israel:
  164. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/16/world/la-fg-dubai-slaying17-2010feb17
  165.  
  166.  
  167. I haven't seen stuff from other countries yet. When this happened to
  168. the Canadians with Meshaal, they couldn't/didn't do much. Will the
  169. Brits or anyone else do anything? Obviously Israel doesn't really
  170. give a shit, but I feel like this is something we should watch.
  171.  
  172. --
  173. Sean Noonan
  174. ADP- Tactical Intelligence
  175. Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
  176. Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
  177. www.stratfor.com
  178.  
  179.  
  180.  
  181.  
  182.  
  183.  
  184. --
  185.  
  186. George Friedman
  187.  
  188. Founder and CEO
  189.  
  190. Stratfor
  191.  
  192. 700 Lavaca Street
  193.  
  194. Suite 900
  195.  
  196. Austin, Texas 78701
  197.  
  198.  
  199. Phone 512-744-4319
  200.  
  201. Fax 512-744-4334
  202.  
  203.  
  204.  
  205.  
  206.  
  207.  
  208.  
  209.  
  210.  
  211.  
  212. --
  213.  
  214. George Friedman
  215.  
  216. Founder and CEO
  217.  
  218. Stratfor
  219.  
  220. 700 Lavaca Street
  221.  
  222. Suite 900
  223.  
  224. Austin, Texas 78701
  225.  
  226.  
  227. Phone 512-744-4319
  228.  
  229. Fax 512-744-4334
  230.  
  231.  
  232.  
  233.  
  234. --
  235. Ben West
  236. Terrorism and Security Analyst
  237. STRATFOR
  238. Austin,TX
  239. Cell: 512-750-9890
  240.  
  241.  
  242.  
  243. --
  244. Ben West
  245. Terrorism and Security Analyst
  246. STRATFOR
  247. Austin,TX
  248. Cell: 512-750-9890
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