7

The term 'axiom' has a precise meaning in philosophy, unlike in mathematics, where axioms are merely inter-consistent but arbitrarily chosen rules. Praxeological axioms are self-evident propositions. A proposition is self-evident if you must accept its validity in attempting to dispute its validity. We saw above how the law of non-contradiction is a self-evident proposition; in disputing anything at all, you first must accept that the law of non-contradiction holds.

Similarly, in disputing the NAP, you presuppose its truth as it is implied by the very nature of argumentation. First, recall that argumentation does not exist in a normative void; that is to say, certain norms are presupposed in the very act of arguing. Consider what it would mean for this not to be the case: if argumentation had no particular normative structure, it would lose any meaning-literally any action a man takes could be considered an argumentation, such as eating an apple, swinging from a tree, or shooting someone through the head. It is because certain norms define a dialectic as such that there is such a thing called argumentation in the first place.

Second, the validity of any truth claim must be raised and decided upon in the course of an argumentation, so the normative structure of argumentation, in particular, has the special status of being the practical pre-condition for ascertaining the truth or validity of any statement. This is known as the a priori of argumentation, which is another self-evident proposition-if you were to dispute it, you would first have to start arguing, thus presupposing its truth.

Third, to try and argumentatively dispute one of the norms of argumentation would be to contradict oneself; this is called a dialectic or performative contradiction. That is, it is a contradiction not between propositions but between a proposition and the very act of proposing it. For instance, if one were to argue that people ought never argue, they would first presuppose that they should be arguing, thus, they are in contradiction. Therefore, the negation of "people ought never argue," which is "people ought ever argue," or "people ought sometimes argue," must be correct. Of note is that under argumentation ethics, the "sometimes" is not an arbitrary "when I feel like it"; it's something more like "people should argue to resolve disputes" rather than "people should engage in conflict to resolve disputes."

This is because, fourth, argumentation is a conflict-free interaction; interlocutors have some dispute over the truth of the matter, and they are seeking to convince the other not through the force of violence (i.e., by aggressing against them), but rather through the force of their argument. Specifically, argumentation is a method of resolving disputes peacefully, not violently. Consider A and B have a dispute over who has the property right to a, A asserts that they are the owner, and vice versa. Arguing over this dispute would not involve the two parties violently attacking each other, it would involve the exchange of propositions with the intent of determining the truth of the matter. Simply warring over a word would not be truth-seeking; interpersonal warfare does not involve argumentative justification, and argumentative justification does not involve interpersonal warfare. This means that the normative structure of argumentation implies non-aggression, thus, the NAP is dialectically true.

Consider what it would mean to say that this is not the case, that violence is perfectly permissible in an argument. If Crusoe has a disagreement with Friday and Crusoe decides that he will beat Friday until an agreement is reached, is Crusoe really seeking the truth of the matter here? Clearly, he is not coercing others to not argue with you cannot tend to establish the truth-warfare of this sort is the enemy of reason. Insofar as a man is engaged in unreason, i.e., avoiding truth, he cannot coherently make any truth claim, thus, no negation of any proposition can arise from unreason-you have to accept reason to argue at all, and accepting reason means accepting the NAP. It certainly cannot be denied that the purpose of argumentation is to seek the truth of the matter, so such aggressive activities that do not tend to establish truth must be excluded from arguments. In short, argumentation is a rational activity, and aggression is the enemy of reason, thus, these sets of actions must be mutually exclusive. All true propositions are justifiable argumentatively. A true ethic is justifiable to an arguer. Justifiability is irrelevant in a conflict. A conflict cannot be justified to an arguer (if it could, there would be no conflict!). Hence, causing conflicts is against the ethics of argumentation.

Looked at from another angle, participants in argumentation indisputably need to use and control the scarce resources in the world to survive; otherwise, they would perish. But because their scarcity makes conflict over the uses of resources possible, only norms that determine the proper ownership can avoid conflict over these scarce goods. That such norms are valuable cannot be denied because anyone alive in the world and participating in the practical activity of argumentation cannot deny the value of being able to control scarce resources and the value of avoiding conflicts over such scarce resources.