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Chester Nimitz (Military History)

Apr 29th, 2017
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  1. Introduction
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  3. Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, US Navy, is arguably the most important American naval officer of the 20th century. His leadership, acumen as a strategist, sense of the intricacies and requirements of logistics, organizational skill, military requirement foresight, ability to accept and act on ambiguous intelligence, and profound faculty for evaluating his subordinates with the willingness to make changes in his command structure where warranted combined to establish Nimitz as the prototype of a World War II military leader and effective wartime decision maker. Fleet Admiral Nimitz developed his expertise in each of these areas by setting and maintaining an extremely rigorous study regimen, interacting intellectually with his fellow naval cadets and midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy and later, as a commander, with the future leaders of the US Navy, by consciously striving to understand and emulate the characteristics and decision-making capabilities of successful more senior officers—and most importantly, developing their skills in dealing with people—that he identified while passing through the ranks of the Navy. Ultimately, Fleet Admiral Nimitz rose to become commander-in-chief, Pacific, during World War II. As such, he commanded the largest ocean area and most ships of any single commander in the history of the world. He served as the strategic commander for the entire Pacific Ocean Area for almost the entire war, and was the strategic decision maker for the important carrier actions including the battles of the Coral Sea, the battle of Midway, the battle of the Eastern Solomons, the battle of Santa Cruz, and the battle of the Philippine Sea. Near the end of the war, Nimitz transferred his command post from Pearl Harbor to Guam to be nearer to the action. While constantly able to issue commands from his land-based command post, as opposed to his counterpart Japanese strategic decision makers, who were invariably embarked at sea, Nimitz’s leadership in the war was characterized by his refraining from interfering with the strategic and operational direction of his embarked commanders during battle, who had a better operational perspective on the action in which they were engaged.
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  5. General Overviews
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  7. In his younger years, Chester Nimitz was characterized by his purposefulness and dedication to intense study. In his Navy career prior to World War II, he was known for his innovation, organizational prowess, and faculty for relating well to the people around him. As commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, he was most respected for his leadership and decision-making ability. The most useful biographies of Nimitz stress these factors that shaped his career in the Navy. Elmer B. “Ned” Potter gives an excellent perspective of the entire career of Fleet Admiral (FADM) Nimitz, including important insights on his leadership during key battles, in Nimitz (Potter 1976). Nimitz is a complete and well-researched book that includes many insights on such things as intelligence and its relationship to strategy and operational details that do not exist in other secondary sources. Morison 1947–1962 provides excellent context for the battles of the Pacific war that help to explain Admiral Nimitz’s strategic analysis and decisions as the war progressed. Reynolds 1978 gives a concise and focused overview of the life and career of Nimitz. Pfannes and Salamone 1983 provides brief but useful biographical information on the life and career of FADM Nimitz. Hoyt 1970 places Nimitz within the context of the great naval leaders of World War II in the Pacific. Potter and Nimitz 1981 provides a complete survey of the important naval battles of history from the earliest battles recorded through the original 1960 publication date. Baer 1994 provides an overview of the political and strategic situation leading up to and during World War II that had to be considered in Nimitz’s decision processes in addition to a strictly military focus. Smith 2006 evaluates the key decisions made by Admiral Nimitz in fighting the Pacific war, rating his performance as a strategic and operational thinker in that war. Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s diary for World War II in the Pacific—his Gray Book—is available online as an authenticated chronicle of the war and his correspondence with and direction of senior subordinates.
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  9. Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
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  11. Provides an excellent overview of the political and strategic situation faced by Admiral Nimitz on assuming his position as commander in chief, Pacific.
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  13. Hoyt, Edwin P. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. New York: Weybright & Talley, 1970.
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  15. Provides useful chronological overview of the Pacific War and how FADM Nimitz interacted with his principal commanders in conducting it.
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  17. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. 15 vols. Boston: Little Brown, 1947–1962.
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  19. Volumes 3–9 and 12–14 apply to the Pacific War. Considered by many the definitive source on Navy activities in World War II. This source was written close to the end of World War II, and while it is replete with excellent source material, errors do exist in it, since it is based on incomplete documentation. It remains a valuable resource, however, and it includes many considerations of the war not offered elsewhere. Reprinted in 2001 by Castle Books, Edison, NJ.
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  21. Nimitz, Chester W., Fleet Admiral. Gray Book. American Naval Records Society.
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  23. The so-called Gray Book (because of the color of its cover) represents FADM Nimitz’s diary for the Pacific Command from 7 December 7 1941, until two days before the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay (31 August 1945). This compilation of Nimitz correspondence with major commanders is called “Admiral Nimitz command summary, running estimate and summary, 1941- 1945.” It is the most authoritative source on the Pacific war available anywhere.
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  25. Pfannes, Charles E., and Victor A. Salamone. The Great Admirals of World War II. Vol. 1, The Americans. New York: Kensington, 1983.
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  27. Provides good and highly focused, but limited, information on Nimitz and his conduct during the Pacific War.
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  29. Potter, Elmer B. Nimitz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
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  31. Well-researched and complete documentation of the life and Navy career of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz including personal anecdotes, detailed presentation of wartime decision process, and interaction with major commanders during key battles.
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  33. Potter, E. B., and Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral. Sea Power: A Naval History. 2d ed. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1981.
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  35. A classic and well-researched treatment of naval and maritime warfare throughout history. Sections on World War II in the Pacific are excellent and concise. This is a standard text for courses in maritime history. It also gives insights into the depth of historical knowledge on war at sea that Admiral Nimitz brought to his position as commander in chief, Pacific. Originally published in 1960.
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  37. Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978.
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  39. Written by an expert on World War II in the Pacific Theater. Provides good and highly focused, but limited, information on Nimitz and his conduct of the Pacific War.
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  41. Smith, Douglas V. Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm’s Way. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
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  43. Considers Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s leadership and decision making in key World War II battles.
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  45. Background, Education, and Early Career
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  47. Son of a German immigrant to northwestern Texas, Nimitz was imbued with a military ethos and wanted to obtain a congressional appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point. When none was available, he accepted the alternative of an appointment to the United States Naval Academy. His father having passed during his youth, his grandfather devised a study regimen that prepared Chester well for the rigors of the Naval Academy regimen. Arising at 5:00 am each morning, Nimitz earned top grades and respect among his teachers, military faculty members, and his fellow midshipmen. As he progressed through the ranks, Fleet Admiral Nimitz was known first and foremost as an innovator. He is known best for becoming the Navy’s leading expert on diesel engines; setting up the submarine base at Pearl Harbor; being officer in charge of one of the first six Naval Reserve programs at the University of California at Berkley; and introducing the circular tactics so critical to protection of the few strategic assets—carriers—that the Navy had to fight the Pacific war after the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. These are but a few examples of the ingenuity and resourcefulness displayed by Admiral Nimitz in his early career. After the war, Nimitz collaborated with a Naval Academy professor, E. B. “Ned” Potter, on several books. The men formed a close friendship, and Nimitz shared some of his most close-held personal background and insights with Potter. Potter 1976 reflects an understanding of Nimitz’s rationale for key decisions and details of his personal life not available in any other source, and particularly on his time as a Naval Academy midshipman. Potter also covers Nimitz’s early career in rich and useful detail. Garraty and Carnes 1999 provides a short biographical sketch of Fleet Admiral Nimitz and captures his early years well.
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  49. Garraty, John A., and Mark C. Carnes. “Chester Nimitz.” In American National Biography. Vol. 16. Edited by John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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  51. Concise background and career of Fleet Admiral Nimitz.
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  53. Potter, Elmer B. Nimitz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
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  55. Key information on Nimitz’s family background, approach to education, subjects he excelled in, and midshipmen with whom he interacted and formed friendships that framed his later career and expectations of subordinates in World War II.
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  57. US Naval War College
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  59. Admiral Nimitz considered his time at the Naval War College as a commander the most intellectually and professionally formative time of his entire career. He made good use of the opportunity to interact with fellow officers who were the elite operational specialists and tacticians in the US Navy. He used the time wisely to think through naval problems that he anticipated would be key to the success of the American Navy if war should come, as expected, with Japan. He developed a feeling of how he could expect the most senior officers in the Navy to react under battle conditions, and even adopted and implemented in the fleet the circular tactics devised by his classmate, Captain Roscoe C. MacFall, that replaced the rectangular tactics that were limiting and ill-suited to the carrier tactics that would dominate World War II in the Pacific. Sound Military Decision was the most important of three procedural guideline booklets that in combination framed the command and decision process employed by virtually all the major naval commanders of the Second World War. It contained a somewhat rote, but effective, sequence of procedures for a combatant commander to evaluate the situation in which the fighting would take place, consider the various courses of action open to him and his adversary, weigh the costs and risks involved in these courses of action, and quickly arrive at an optimized operational or strategic course of action. Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus’s article in the Naval War College Review (Kalbfus 1942) explains the criticality of Sound Military Decision to success in war at sea. Thomas B. Buell’s articles (Buell 1973a, Buell 1973b) place further emphasis on the importance of Sound Military Decision in preparing the US Navy and its senior leaders for fighting World War II in the Pacific Theater. Battle of Sable Island Manuscript represents the major war game in which Fleet Admiral (FADM) Nimitz took part. While attending the Naval War College in 1923 as a commander, Nimitz was required to write two theses—a thesis on policy (Nimitz 1922), which dealt with a possible impending war with Japan, and a thesis on tactics (Nimitz 1923), in which he considered the future implications of the battle of Jutland. Charles M. Cooke Jr.’s 1934 thesis, “The Relationship in War of Naval Strategy, Tactics, and Command with Special Reference to Aircraft and Submarines” (Cooke 1934), represents the insights he brought to his later position as FADM Nimitz’s principal wartime planner for the Pacific war.
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  61. “Battle of Sable Island Manuscript.” Serial No. 71, RG 14/15. US Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI, October–November 1923.
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  63. Complete reconstruction and diagrams of the major war game that Admiral Nimitz participated in while a student at the Naval War College, and that was central to the thesis on tactics he wrote there.
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  65. Buell, Thomas B., Commander, US Navy. “Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and the Navy Planner’s ‘Holy Scripture’: Sound Military Decision.” Naval War College Review 25 (May–June 1973a): 31–40.
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  67. A history of the decision-making procedural guide used in the Naval War College curriculum in the interwar period that was critical to FADM Nimitz’s and many other senior Navy officers’ decision-making processes during the Pacific War.
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  69. Buell, Thomas B., Commander, US Navy. “Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus and the Naval Planner’s ‘Holy Scripture,’ Sound Military Decision.” US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 7 March 1973b.
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  71. History of and insights on the wartime decision-making procedural guide that formed Admiral Nimitz’s approach to formulating strategic and operational decisions in World War II.
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  73. Cooke, Charles M., Jr., Commander, US Navy. “The Relationship in War of Naval Strategy, Tactics, and Command with Special Reference to Aircraft and Submarines.” MA thesis, Charles M. Cooke Collection, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 7 May 1934.
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  75. Naval War College thesis of Admiral Nimitz’s key planner for the Pacific War relating their shared views on key aspects of strategy for the impending Pacific War. “Savvy Cooke” was Admiral Nimitz’s primary planner through most of the war, and his planning was critical in some of the most important battles, such as Midway. This thesis demonstrates how Cook viewed the battle situation, which was the basis for his planning in World War II.
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  77. Kalbfus, E. C., Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). Sound Military Decision. ALNAV 59–53, RG 15. Newport, RI: US Naval War College Archives, 21 September 1942.
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  79. The president of the Naval War College describes the importance of Sound Military Decision in the War College curriculum and in naval battles its students might subsequently fight. Declassified on 15 December 1953.
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  81. Nimitz, Chester W., Commander, US Navy. “Policy.” MA thesis, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1 September 1922.
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  83. During his year as a student at the Naval War College, Admiral Nimitz was required, as all students there were, to write two theses—one on policy and one on fleet tactics (Nimitz 1923). This thesis represents his views on American policy vis-à-vis Japan in a period of increasing tensions leading up to World War II.
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  85. Nimitz, Chester W., Commander, US Navy. “Tactics.” MA thesis, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 28 April 1923.
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  87. This thesis—a critical analysis of the battle of Jutland—is the second thesis written by Admiral Nimitz as a student at the Naval War College (see also Nimitz 1922) and represents his views on fleet tactics in 1923.
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  89. Sound Military Decision. ALNAV 59–53. Newport, RI: US Naval War College Archives, 1942.
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  91. Classic text for all officers at the Naval War College during the interwar period. An earlier version used while FADM Nimitz was a student there in 1923 formed the basis for his decision process in the Pacific and for his wartime diary, which he titled as “The Running Estimate of the Situation for the Pacific War,” but which is commonly referred to as the Gray Book (cited under General Overviews) because of the color of its cover. Declassified on 15 December 1953.
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  93. Road to World War II
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  95. As only a lieutenant commander, Chester Nimitz was assigned to construct the submarine basing at the new Pearl Harbor Naval Station that was critical later to the submarine onslaught against Japanese surface shipping throughout World War II. His accomplishment is documented in E. B. Potter’s Nimitz (Potter 1976, cited under General Overviews). Nimitz’s views on the importance of Navy professional education as preparation for war are detailed in his address to the Naval War College graduating class of 2 December 1941 (Nimitz 1941). His participation in several of the twenty-one naval exercises known as fleet problems (Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923–1941; Fleet Problem XXII was cancelled due to the breakout of war in Europe) in the early 1920s as assistant chief of staff and tactics officer for commander in chief, Battle Fleet, allowed him to implement the circular (vice rectangular) battle formations envisioned by his classmate in the 1923 Naval War College class, Commander Roscoe C. MacFall, that were hugely instrumental in successful battle maneuvering in World War II. The reconstruction and evaluation of these fleet problems, which set the learning curve and naval doctrine for all Navy officers in World War II, can be found through James Rhoads’s Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923–1941a. A detailed set of post-exercise analyses may be found under Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923–1941b. Admiral Husband Kimmel’s papers providing a defense for his actions leading to and during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Statement before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack) fully document the strategic situation and state of the fleet inherited by Admiral Nimitz in December 1941. Together, these documents provide insights on Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s role in preparing for the war, the intellectual exercises instrumental in framing his strategic and operational mindset for it, and the Navy he inherited to fight the Pacific War at its outset.
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  97. Kimmel, Husband E., Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). “Statement before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Senate Congressional Resolution 27.” File group 76, box 2. American Heritage Foundation Archives, Laramie, WY.
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  99. Complete description of the events leading up to, and the situation following, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which Admiral Nimitz inherited on taking command as commander in chief, Pacific. This analysis of why Pearl Harbor happened and the state of ships and shore facilities, and the extent to which the Pacific Fleet was reduced by the attack gives important insights into the limitations on strategic options faced by Nimitz during the most critical stages of the Pacific War.
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  101. Nimitz, C. W., Fleet Admiral, US Navy. “Address of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to the Graduating Class.” RG 16. US Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI, 2 December 1941.
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  103. Provides Admiral Nimitz’s views on the importance of professional education in preparing for war.
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  105. “Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923–1941b.” National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, 1975.
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  107. Detailed post-exercise analyses of the twenty-one fleet problems (Fleet Problem XXII was cancelled due to the outbreak of World War II in Europe).
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  109. Rhoads, James B. “Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923–1941a.” RG 38, no. 1. National Archives, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC.
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  111. Also found under General Records of the Department of the Navy, RG 80, and Records of Naval Operating Forces, RG 313. Admiral Nimitz gained insights on the wartime doctrine and operations, carrier aviation, and implemented circular screening tactics during fleet problems and Joint Army-Navy Problem No. 2 as assistant chief of staff and tactics officer for Admiral Samuel S. Robison, commander in chief, Battle Fleet, from June 1923 through October 1924. Rhoads provides detailed information on the fleet problems in which Admiral Nimitz participated.
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  113. Selection for Admiral and Commander-In-Chief
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  115. Having gained favor with such influential people as Admiral Samuel S. Robison, commander in chief, Battle Fleet, and even President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Nimitz was propelled quickly through the ranks to admiral. In fact, he was offered the position of commander in chief, Pacific, in early 1941, but declined as he felt he would be ineffective with lack of support of the large number of admirals he would have passed over to take the job. Compelled to put aside his reservations when Pearl Harbor was attacked, Nimitz accepted President Roosevelt’s mandate and replaced his good friend, Admiral Husband Kimmel, as commander in chief of the Pacific on 25 December 1941. Potter 1976 chronicles the points in Nimitz’s career and circumstances under which he was promoted to each successive rank, with greater detail once Nimitz obtained flag rank. Transcript of Naval Service lists every promotion Nimitz received from commissioning as an ensign on 31 January 1907, through promotion to fleet admiral on 13 May 1946, retroactively effective as of 19 December 1944, as well as the ships and stations that Nimitz was assigned to throughout his career and the twenty-seven military medals and awards he received for his service. Agawa 1979 gives insights into the career and strategic outlook of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Admiral Nimitz’s Japanese strategic opposite during much of the war. Admiral Nimitz’s wartime diary, the Gray Book, gives a complete chronicle of Nimitz’s correspondence with his major wartime commanders and serves as a critical source for his and their decisions and the rationale for them during the entire war. This source (twenty-eight bankers’ boxes of original source material) is most voluminous and complete for 1942, arguably the critical year of the Pacific War.
  116.  
  117. Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. Translated by John Bester. New York: Kodansha International, 1979.
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  119. Insights on Admiral Nimitz’s strategic counterpart for the Imperial Japanese Navy.
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  121. Nimitz, Chester W. Gray Book.
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  123. From 7 December 1941, the date of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, to 31 August 1945, two days before the Japanese surrender at Tokyo Bay, Pacific Fleet staff at Pearl Harbor maintained a running estimate and summary of communications and other records in a “gray book,” filed at the Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC.
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  125. “Personnel File of Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, US Navy, 5502—Transcript of Naval Service.” RG 13. US Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI.
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  127. Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s personnel file listing dates of promotions, periods of assignment to ships and stations, and receipt of medals and awards.
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  129. Potter, Elmer B. Nimitz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
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  131. Well-researched and complete documentation of the Navy career of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, including documentation of and insights on his promotions to successive ranks.
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  133. 1942 (The Critical Year)
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  135. After Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz’s strategic options were limited. The Japanese had ten aircraft carriers on which to structure their strategic options, and the Americans had only three: the Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise (the Yorktown was on temporary duty in the Atlantic when the war broke out and was ordered to return to the Pacific immediately after Pearl Harbor). Willmott 1982 presents in detail the situation faced by Admiral Nimitz in the first four months of the Pacific War. Nimitz’s Letter of Instruction (28 May 1942) represents his famous directive on acceptance of “calculated risk” in engaging with enemy forces that subsequently became part of every operation order for the Pacific war. Many scholars of World War II naval operations have speculated on the origin of this direction on “calculated risk,” but this document ties it directly to Fleet Admiral (FADM) Nimitz. Hone 2003 evaluates the evolution and advancements in tactical doctrine in the interwar period that were so crucial in the early months of the Pacific War, when Japan’s naval force structure was greatly superior to that of the United States. Edwards 1943 considers the raids on Japanese-held islands and how they contributed to the learning curve on how to conduct successfully offensive tactics against the Japanese.
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  137. Edwards, R. S., Chief of Staff. Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway, December 1941 to June 1942, Including Makin Island Raid 17–18 August. Declassified DOD Dir. 5200.9. Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Navy Department, 15 February 1943.
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  139. Battle experiences of FADM Chester Nimitz and those who worked for him.
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  141. Hone, Trent. “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the US Navy, 1922–1941.” Journal of Military History 67.4 (October 2003): 1107–1148.
  142. DOI: 10.1353/jmh.2003.0300Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  143. History of the development of US Fleet tactical doctrine, including the introduction of the circular formation intended to protect high-value units (i.e., battleships or aircraft carriers) in hostile waters by Admiral Nimitz. The circular formation, devised by his classmate at the Naval Academy and Naval War College, Captain Roscoe C. MacFall, and introduced in the fleet by Admiral Nimitz, was one of the most important new doctrinal innovations of World War II.
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  145. Nimitz, C. W., Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. “Letter of Instruction.” Commander Striking Forces (Operation Plan 29–42, Serial 0115W), RG 15. US Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI, 28 May 1942.
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  147. Famous directive from Admiral Nimitz instructing his striking force commanders to be governed by “the principle of calculated risk” in which he defines that term and which appeared in all Pacific Fleet Operation Plans from that point in the war forward. Downgraded from secret to unclassified on 25 August 1982.
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  149. Willmott, H. P. Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Naval Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.
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  151. Excellent analysis of the strategies of the belligerents in the Pacific Theater during the critical early stages of World War II.
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  153. Battle of the Coral Sea
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  155. The battle of the Coral Sea—the first naval battle in history where ships of both sides engaged without ever being in sight of their enemy—was critical to the outcome of World War II in the Pacific. Had the Japanese canceled their plan to invade Port Moresby on New Guinea’s southern coast and not lost the use of its two newest carriers and half their 144 aircraft in this battle for several months, the Imperial Japanese Navy Shokaku and Zuikaku would arguably have made the difference in rendering the Japanese victorious in the battle of Midway, which ensued less than a month later. Bates 1947 completely analyzes the battle of the Coral Sea, including all major operational decisions taken during it. Prados 1995 chronicles the importance of decryption of the Japanese JN-25 naval code in giving the US Navy strategic advantage in preparation for this battle and the insight of Admiral Nimitz in believing the limited intelligence available to him in risking half of his strategic assets in the first carrier battle of World War II. Morison 2001, Volume 4 of the author’s fifteen-volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, covers the battle of the Coral Sea in rich detail based on the most complete set of original source documents available at such an early stage after the war.
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  157. Bates, Richard W., Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). “The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1 to May 11 Inclusive, 1942, Strategical and Tactical Analysis.” Unpublished manuscript. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC, 1947.
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  159. Detailed critical analysis of the battle of the Coral Sea, including Admiral Nimitz’s decisions during the battle, commissioned by Admiral Raymond Spruance while he was president of the Naval War College in the period just after the end of World War II. Manuscript now held by the Defense Documentation Center, Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA, and at other authorized military installations.
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  161. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of Unites States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions May 1942–August 1942. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001.
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  163. Excellent consideration of the battle of the Coral Sea based on original-source records, documents, and interviews. Originally published in 1949.
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  165. Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random House, 1995.
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  167. Describes the importance of intelligence gained from breaking the Japanese JN-25 naval code as it relates to the battle of the Coral Sea and succeeding battles.
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  169. Documents
  170.  
  171. The documents in this section relate to Admiral Nimitz’s decision process in this battle and those that followed during the Pacific War. Please note that these microfilm documents can also be found at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA 1) and at the Naval History and Heritage Command, both in Washington, DC, and in other naval archives as well. Buckmaster 1942a (11 May 1942) outlines attacks conducted by the commander of the Coral Sea operation at the commencement of hostilities with the Japanese in a letter to Admiral Nimitz. Buckmaster 1942b (16 May 1942) provides details to Admiral Nimitz of the American air attacks against Japanese warships in the battle of the Coral Sea. Buckmaster 1942c (25 May 1942) provides greater details of the carrier Yorktown and her air wing’s action against Japanese warships at Coral Sea. Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch (25 May 1942), embarked aboard the USS Lexington as commander, Task Force Eleven, and subordinate to Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher during the battle of the Coral Sea, provides an after-action letter to Fletcher, commander of Task Force Seventeen, chronicling the action of the Lexington and her air wing, and the loss of the Lexington during the battle (see Fitch 1942a). On 31 May 1942, Fitch forwards his war diary (the Lexington’s ship log) to Fletcher for review (Fitch 1942b). The same date, Fitch sends a letter of promulgation with his war diary (Fitch 1942c). Fletcher 1942a (1 May 1942) is an overall commander promulgation of operation order for the battle of the Coral Sea. Captain Frederick C. Sherman’s (31 May 1942) after-action report as captain of the carrier Lexington to Admiral Nimitz can be found in Sherman 1942a. In Sherman 1942b, Sherman explains to Admiral Nimitz why the sinking of the USS Lexington happened and how it could have been prevented. Fletcher 1942b is his after-action report to Admiral Nimitz for the battle of the Coral Sea and includes recommendations to improve carrier survivability under attack and to combat efficiency.
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  173. Buckmaster, E., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated May 11, 1942, Subj: Attack made by Yorktown Air Group on Enemy Forces in TULAGI and GAVUTU HARBORS.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942a.
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  175. The commanding officer of the carrier Yorktown, flagship of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who commanded US forces at the battle of the Coral Sea, chronicles the air attacks on Tulagi Island and Gavutu Harbor to prevent their use as staging bases for Japanese long-range reconnaissance aircraft at the start of the battle for Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  177. Buckmaster, E., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated May 16, 1942, Subj: Air Operations of YORKTOWN Air Group against Japanese Forces in the vicinity of the LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO on May 7, 1942.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942b.
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  179. Commander of the carrier USS Yorktown at the battle of the Coral Sea details the air operations of the Yorktown in that battle for Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  181. Buckmaster, E., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated May 25, 1942, Subj: Report of action of YORKTOWN and YORKTOWN Air Group on May 8, 1942.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942c.
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  183. The commanding officer of the carrier Yorktown further chronicles air attacks on the Japanese during the battle. Previously classified document.
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  185. Fitch, Aubrey W., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Group 17.5 (Commander Carrier Division One), letter to Commander Task Force Seventeen, dated May 18, 1942: Action Report—Coral Sea—May 7–8, 1942.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942a.
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  187. Battle after-action report with recommended changes in procedures by the commander of Carrier Division One (Task Force 11/Task Group 17.5), vice “captain” of the sunk carrier Lexington, Rear Admiral Fitch, commander of all air assets in the battle of the Coral Sea, to Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
  188. Find this resource:
  189. Fitch, Aubrey W., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “War Diary, Commander Task Force Eleven (Commander Carrier Division One), dated 31 May 1942. Commander Task Group 17.5 Action Report, letter to Commander Task Force Seventeen, dated 18 May 1942.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942b.
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  191. Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch, the commander of Carrier Division One (Task Force 11/Task Group 17.5), forwards his war diary for the battle of the Coral Sea to Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, the overall operational commander for that battle. His flagship, the carrier USS Lexington, was sunk at the battle of the Coral Sea and he communicates the details to Rear Admiral Fletcher. Previously classified document.
  192. Find this resource:
  193. Fitch, Aubrey W., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “War Diary, Commander Task Force Eleven (Commander Carrier Division One), dated 31 May 1942. Commanding Officer, USS Lexington, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated May 25, 1942.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942c.
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  195. Letter accompanying the Lexington war diary by Rear Admiral Fitch, to Admiral Nimitz, with details of the sinking of the carrier Lexington. Previously classified document.
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  197. Fletcher, Frank Jack, Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force Seventeen, Operation Order No. 2–42, dated 1 May 1942.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942a.
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  199. Admiral Fletcher’s operation order for the battle of the Coral Sea. Previously classified document.
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  201. Fletcher, Frank Jack, Rear Admiral. “Commander Task Force Seventeen, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, dated 27 May 1942, Subj: The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 4–8, 1942.” Reel A39, starting frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942b.
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  203. Letter of Rear Admiral F. J. Fletcher, the commander of all US Naval Forces at the battle of the Coral Sea, to Admiral Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific, following the battle, containing extremely useful recommendations—including increasing the fighter aircraft on American carriers from thirteen (Yorktown) and eighteen (Lexington) to twenty-seven on all carriers. Previously classified document.
  204. Find this resource:
  205. Sherman, Frederick C. “War Diary, Commander Task Force Eleven (Commander Carrier Division One), dated 31 May 1942. Commander Officer, USS Lexington Report of Action, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated 15 May 1942.” Reel A39, first frame 41078. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942a.
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  207. Letter of Captain Frederick C. Sherman, command officer, USS Lexington, to Admiral Nimitz, detailing the loss of the ship. Previously classified document.
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  209. Sherman, Frederick C. “Commanding Officer, USS Lexington, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated 15 May 1942.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942b.
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  211. Sherman, commanding officer of the USS Lexington, which was sunk at the battle of the Coral Sea, provides the details of her sinking to Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  213. Battle of Midway
  214.  
  215. The battle of Midway is arguably the pivotal battle of the Pacific war. Admiral Nimitz’s willingness to believe in his incomplete intelligence and to risk all three of his available carriers on it reveals his confidence in his analysis and judgment, the strength of his character in facing ambiguous decision situations head-on, and his leadership by the confidence he displayed toward his trusted subordinates. Rear Admiral H. E. Yarnell’s report for Grand Joint Exercise Number Four (Yarnell 1932) recounts actions of a two-carrier task force that successfully conducted a simulated attack on Pearl Harbor almost exactly as the Japanese did on 7 December 1942, but from the northeast rather than the northwest. Umpires discounted this attack against Yarnell’s protests, and this has been interpreted by historians as a conscious Navy attempt to cover up the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor later exploited by the Japanese. Bates 1947 reconstructs and critiques the decisions made during this pivotal battle in a study commissioned by Admiral Raymond Spruance just after World War II while the author was president of the Naval War College. Prados 1995 documents the cryptology effort conducted at Station Hypo in Hawaii that was absolutely critical to American victory in the battle. Prange, et al. 1982 provides a widely regarded history of the battle of Midway. Fuchida and Okumiya 1955 provides a critique of the mistakes, strategic and operational, made by Japan, as well as decisions made by Nimitz from the perspective of a high-level participant in the battle (Fuchida). Lundstrom 1984, by a leading scholar and authority on US Navy World War II operations in the Pacific, expertly chronicles the events leading up to and including the battle of Midway. Ugaki 1991, by the chief of staff for Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet, provides an excellent overview on the battle of Midway from the perspective of the officer charged with immediately critiquing the battle in all its respects.
  216.  
  217. Bates, Richard W., Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). The Battle of Midway Including the Aleutian Phase, June 3 to June 14, 1942. Alexandria, VA: Defense Documentation Center, Defense Logistics Agency, 1947.
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  219. Detailed critical analysis of the battle of Midway, including Admiral Nimitz’s decisions during the battle, commissioned by Admiral Raymond Spruance while he was president of the Naval War College in the period just after the end of World War II.
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  221. Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake Okumiya. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan; The Japanese Navy’s Story. Edited by Clarke H. Kawakami and Roger Pineau. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955.
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  223. An excellent analysis of the Japanese decision making and operational execution leading up to and during the battle of Midway. Some consider this source flawed by self-serving manipulation of the facts.
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  225. Lundstrom, John B. The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984.
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  227. Excellent consideration of Naval Air warfare in the early stages of World War II, but limited treatment of Nimitz.
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  229. Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random House, 1995.
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  231. Important and comprehensive consideration of the code-breaking efforts in the Navy during the Pacific War. American success in the war in the Pacific during World War II has been credited by many to code-breaking efforts and the inclination of Admiral Nimitz to believe in the intelligence provided in the products decoded and act on it strategically and operationally.
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  233. Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. Miracle at Midway. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982.
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  235. Considered by many the best single-volume source on the battle of Midway that includes Admiral Nimitz’s critical role in the battle.
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  237. Ugaki, Matome, Admiral, Imperial Japanese Navy. Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–1945. Translated by Masataka Chihaya. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.
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  239. Diary of the chief of staff for Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s counterpart at the strategic level, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Vice Admiral Ugaki’s diary serves as a counterbalance to Admiral Nimitz’s decision process during the war.
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  241. Yarnell, H. E., Rear Admiral, US Navy, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. “Operations of the Blue Air Force in Grand Joint Exercise No. 4, 1–12 February 1932, from Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, dated 27 February 1932.” RG 8, box 61, folder 3. US Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI, 1932.
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  243. This major 1932 exercise, where Rear Admiral Yarnell’s force simulated an attack on the Hawaiian Islands from two actual carriers positioned to the northeast of the islands, presaged the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Its successful results, though constructive, resounded throughout the American Navy, including with Admiral Nimitz.
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  245. After-Action Battle Reports
  246.  
  247. The documents in this section relate to Admiral Nimitz’s and his principal subordinates’ decision processes in this battle and the consequences they had on his decisions that followed during the Pacific War. Midway represents a major turning point in the war, where the major offensive ships available were approximately equal for both major belligerents. In attacking a significantly numerically superior Japanese force, Admiral Nimitz’s placement of his three available American carriers, battle instructions to his commanders, and unique propensity for believing in the intelligence he was provided on the intent and movement of the Japanese naval forces and on what was happening during the battle were essential elements for the great American naval victory at Midway. Captain E. Buckmaster’s report of action (Buckmaster 1942) recounts for Admiral Nimitz the events of the clash with the Japanese at Midway, including the sinking of the ship he commanded, the USS Yorktown. In Dubose 1942, Captain L. T. Dubose recounts for Nimitz the action of the cruiser division, including his flagship, the USS Portland, during the battle of Midway. Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher (11 June 1942), overall commander of all US warships during the battle of Midway and commander of all cruisers in the Pacific Fleet, reports to Nimitz on the action of American cruisers involved in the Midway engagement to Admiral Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific, in Fletcher’s secondary command position as commander, cruisers, Pacific (see Fletcher 1942). Admiral Nimitz (28 June 1942) reports to his senior in Washington, Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief, on the action and outcome of the battle of Midway (see Nimitz 1942). Sauer 1942 reports on the attack of Japanese torpedo planes on the USS Yorktown, which contributed to her being sunk later in the action by Japanese submarine torpedoes. Simard 1942, by the commander of the Naval Station at Midway, provides Admiral Nimitz with the details of the two Japanese carrier air strikes at Midway on 4 June 1942. Spruance 1942, by the commander of Task Force Sixteen under Admiral Fletcher, who took operational command of the overall American Strike Force when the USS Yorktown was abandoned while sinking, forwards the battle reports of his subordinate commanders to Admiral Nimitz giving the details of the battle of Midway from the perspective of all types of ships and aircraft squadrons that took part in the battle. Wildenberg 2005 considers the impact of technological advances, several of which, such as circular formations, were introduced in the fleet by Admiral Nimitz, in the outcome of the battle of Midway.
  248.  
  249. Buckmaster, E., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Subj: Report of Action for June 4, 1942, and June 6, 1942, dated 18 June 1942.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  251. Battle after-action report on the battle of Midway from the commanding officer of the carrier USS Yorktown to Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  253. Dubose, L. T., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Portland, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Subj: Action Report, dated June 11, 1942.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  255. Commander, cruiser division, after-action report for Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  257. Fletcher, Frank Jack, Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander, Cruisers, Pacific Fleet, letter to Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, Subj: Report of Action, June 4, 1942, dated 11 June 1942.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  259. Commander of all Pacific cruisers’ after-action report to Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  261. Nimitz, Chester W., Admiral, US Navy. “Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, letter to Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet [Admiral King], Subj: Battle of Midway, dated June 28, 1942.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  263. Admiral Nimitz reports the details of the action that took place at Midway to his superior in Washington, Admiral King. Previously classified document.
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  265. Sauer, E. P., Commander, US Navy. “Commander Task Group 17.4 (Commander Destroyer Squadron SIX), letter to Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN, Subj: Japanese Torpedo Plane Attack on USS Yorktown During Battle of Midway, June 4, 1942—Report of June 12, 1942.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  267. Commander Sauer provides insights from the perspective of the destroyers screening the American carriers at Midway on the nature and effectiveness of the Japanese torpedo plane attacks on the USS Yorktown for Rear Admiral (RADM) Fletcher, commander of the overall US force opposing the Japanese at Midway. Previously classified document.
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  269. Simard, Cyril T., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Midway Island, letter to Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, Report of Engagement with the Enemy, Battle of Midway, 30 May to 7 June 1942, dated 18 June 1942, Diary.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  271. Details of the engagement with two Japanese air strikes and the action before, during, and after those attacks, as related by the commanding officer at Midway. Previously classified document.
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  273. Spruance, Raymond A. “Commander Task Force Sixteen, 16 June 1942 letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Subj: Battle of Midway; forwarding of reports.” Reel A55, first frame 41571. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  275. RADM Spruance forwards the reports of his subordinate type commanders from the battle of Midway to Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  277. Wildenberg, Thomas. “Midway: Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?” Naval War College Review 58.1 (Winter 2005): 121–135.
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  279. Discussion of US Navy doctrine—some of which was devised or enacted by Admiral Nimitz—and its effect on the outcome of the battle of Midway, which enabled the Navy to go on the offensive for the first time in the Pacific war.
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  281. The Fight for Guadalcanal
  282.  
  283. While many consider the battle of Midway one of the most “decisive” naval battles in history, a strong argument can be made that the series of battles resulting in ultimate US dominance of Guadalcanal and the Lower Solomon Islands was more important in deciding the outcome of the war in the Pacific. Immediately prior to the battle of Santa Cruz, Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley gave indications that he had developed a defeatist attitude, forcing Admiral Nimitz to replace him with Vice Admiral William F. Halsey as commander of the South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC). This was one of the best and most critical decisions made by Nimitz during the entire war. Frank 1990 provides an outstanding and comprehensive history of the fighting that resulted in the United States taking control of Guadalcanal and the surrounding islands, which had been under Japanese control. Morison 2001 provides an excellent and comprehensive depiction of the land and sea battles that in combination resulted in the American capture of Guadalcanal and the surrounding Lower Solomon Islands from the Japanese. Smith 2006 concisely sets the stage for the Guadalcanal campaign. Bates 1950a was commissioned by Admiral Raymond Spruance (then president of the Naval War College) after World War II as an analysis of this battle and a study on it. It makes use of formerly classified and unclassified sources from both the United States and Japan, as well as interviews with the participants wherever possible, and is the most definitive and exhaustive study on the battle of Savo Island available. It is drawn on substantially as an original source document by such eminent and seminal works as the fifteen-volume set entitled History of United States Naval Operations in World War II by the noted historian Samuel Eliot Morison (see Morison 2001, as well as Morison 1947–1962, in General Overviews). Bates 1950b provides a set of charts and maps that offer excellent spatial orientation for the action that took place during the battle. Dyer 1972 is perhaps the best treatment of US amphibious operations during the entire war, but he provides an essential understanding of the amphibious operations that the First Marine Division conducted in taking the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the early stages of the Guadalcanal campaign.
  284.  
  285. Bates, Richard W., Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). “The Battle of Savo Island, August 9th, 1942: Strategical and Tactical Analysis.” Unpublished manuscript. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC, 1950a.
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  287. This study, commissioned by Admiral Raymond Spruance after World War II, provides a comprehensive analysis of the most disastrous battle in the history of the US Navy, which took place under the command of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz during the later stages of the Marines’ landing on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Manuscript now held by the Defense Documentation Center, Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA, and at other military installations. Previously classified document.
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  289. Bates, Richard W., Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). “Diagrams for the Battle of Savo Island, August 9, 1942: Strategical and Tactical Analysis.” Unpublished manuscript. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC, 1950b.
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  291. Excellent spatial orientation for Bates 1950a. Manuscript now held by the Defense Documentation Center, Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA, and at other military installations. Previously classified document.
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  293. Dyer, George Carroll, Vice Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972.
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  295. Excellent and complete consideration of a major part of World War II in the Pacific—amphibious warfare—that was central to Field Admiral Nimitz’s conduct of the war, but that is not often considered by many scholars and other observers of the war.
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  297. Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990.
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  299. Comprehensive consideration of the US Marine and Army campaign to wrest the island of Guadalcanal and surrounding islands in the Southern Solomon Islands from the Japanese.
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  301. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal and the Marianas, August 1942–February 1943. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001.
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  303. Excellent consideration of the land and sea action that took place in late 1942 in the Guadalcanal campaign. Originally published in 1949.
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  305. Smith, Douglas V. Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm’s Way. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
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  307. Chronicles events preceding the Guadalcanal campaign and the major naval battles associated with it.
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  309. Battle of the Eastern Solomons
  310.  
  311. The documents in this section relate to Admiral Nimitz’s decision process in this battle and those that followed during the Pacific War. They also chronicle the action that took place in the battle of the Eastern Solomons and provide the after-action analysis that Nimitz’s major commanders provided to him relating to their decisions and actions, as well as those of their Japanese counterparts. In Davis 1942a, A. C. Davis (5 September 1942) describes to Admiral Nimitz the battle action of the carrier USS Enterprise, of which he was commanding officer, including air attacks on her during the battle of the Eastern Solomons—the third of the five carrier battles of the Pacific war. Davis’s second letter of the same date (Davis 1942b) provides more detailed information, including detailed drawings charting the Japanese air attacks on his ship. In Fletcher 1942, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher (26 September 1942) recounts for Admiral Nimitz the details of the battle of the Eastern Solomons. In Leslie 1942, Max Leslie (2 September 1942), commander of the Enterprise air group, reports the air action during that battle engaged in by that carrier’s aircraft. Nimitz 1942 (27 September 1942) is Nimitz’s letter reporting the action in the Eastern Solomons to his boss in Washington, DC, Admiral Ernest J. King.
  312.  
  313. Davis, A. C. “Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, letter to Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet of September 5, 1942, Subj: Action of August 24, 1942, Including Air Attack on USS Enterprise; Report of.” Reel A99, first frame 42790. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942a.
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  315. Documents action of the carrier USS Enterprise including Japanese air attacks on the ship, during the battle of the Eastern Solomons. Previously classified document.
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  317. Davis, A. C. “Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, letter to Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific fleet, dated September 5, 1942, Subj: Action of August 24, 1942, Including Air Attack on USS Enterprise, Report of, Enclosure ‘A’ to Enterprise, Serial 008, USS Enterprise Track Chart with contact and Attack Sequence off Solomon Islands August 23–25, 1942 (only page of enclosure).” Reel A99, first frame 42790. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942b.
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  319. Provides additional detail, including drawings and charted movements, of the USS Enterprise during the battle. Previously classified document.
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  321. Fletcher, Frank Jack, Vice Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force Sixty-one, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated September 26, 1942, Subj: Report of Action on August 24, 1942.” Reel A99, first frame 42790. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  323. Fletcher, recently promoted to vice admiral to be the senior officer present and command this important operation, provides detailed information on and critique of the battle of the Eastern Solomons to the man responsible for his promotion, Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
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  325. Leslie, M. F. “Commander, Enterprise Air Group, letter of September 2, 1942 to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Subj: Report of Action in the Solomon Islands Area, August 22–25, 1942.” Reel A99, first frame 42790. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  327. Famed pilot Max Leslie, commander of the Enterprise Air Group, provides Admiral Nimitz with a detailed recounting of the air action in the battle of the Eastern Solomons. Previously classified document.
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  329. Nimitz, C. W., Admiral, US Navy. “Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, letter to Commander in Chief, US Fleet, dated September 27, 1942, Subj: Solomon Islands Campaign—Action of 23–25 August, p. 6.” Reel A99, first frame 42790. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  331. Admiral Nimitz, as commander in chief of the US Pacific Fleet, summarizes the action and decisions taken by his commanders, sailors, and Marines in the battle of the Eastern Solomons for Admiral King, commander in chief of the US Fleet, in Washington, DC.
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  333. Battle of Santa Cruz
  334.  
  335. The documents in this section relate to Admiral Nimitz’s decision process in this battle and those that followed during the Pacific War. The battle of Santa Cruz resulted in the loss of more Japanese aircraft and pilots than the battle of Midway and must therefore be considered a critical battle in the defeat of the Japanese Navy in World War II. The battle also resulted in the sinking of the US carrier Hornet, leaving the United States with only one operational carrier available in the Pacific until the return to action of the USS Saratoga, which received major torpedo damage when hit by a Japanese submarine-launched torpedo in late September 1942. The Japanese are estimated to have lost as many as 161 aircraft in the battle, a crippling outcome, as the inability to train and replace pilots quickly rendered the Imperial Japanese Navy increasingly unable to defend against the American onslaught as new-construction carriers arrived in the Pacific starting in the late summer of 1943. In Halsey 1942, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey (20 November 1942) reports the action of one of the most critical naval battles of the Pacific war. In this battle, the Japanese sank the carrier Hornet, leaving the recently repaired Enterprise as the only operational carrier in the US inventory in the Pacific. Captain O. B. Hardison (10 November 1942) provides details of the battle of Santa Cruz to Admiral Nimitz as commanding officer of the USS Enterprise in Hardison 1942. In Kinkaid 1942a, Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid (3 November 1942) provides a preliminary evaluation of the results of the battle to Admiral Nimitz as the overall commander of US warships engaged in the Santa Cruz action. The next two documents by Kinkaid (Kinkaid 1942b, Kinkaid 1942c), dated 6 November 1942 and 30 October 1942, represent a report on the sinking of the USS Hornet and the second endorsement with comments on CTF-17’s (Rear Admiral G. D. Murray’s) after-action summary report for the battle of Santa Cruz. Kinkaid’s final document (no exact date given) is Admiral Kinkaid’s final overall summary of the carrier action that took place north of Santa Cruz Island on 26 October 1942, and its impact on the fighting capacity of his remaining ships in the Pacific against the Japanese (Kinkaid 1942d). Nimitz 1943 represents Nimitz’s final report on the battle of Santa Cruz to Admiral Ernest King, commander in chief of the US Fleet, his superior in Washington, DC.
  336.  
  337. Halsey, William F., Vice Admiral, US Navy. “Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated November 20, 1942, Subj: Report of Action, October 26, 1942, and subsequent loss of USS Hornet.” Reel A193, starting frame 45530. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  339. Admiral Nimitz’s principal subordinate in the South Pacific Area, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, reports the action of US and Japanese forces in the battle of Santa Cruz, in which the carrier USS Hornet was sunk, leaving the United States with only a single carrier operational in the entire Pacific. Previously classified document.
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  341. Hardison, O. B., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, letter to Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, dated November 10, 1942, Subj: The Battle of Santa Cruz, October 26, 1942, Report of.” Reel A193, starting frame 44181. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  343. Battle report of Captain O. B. Hardison, commanding officer of the USS Enterprise, on the battle of Santa Cruz. Previously classified document.
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  345. Kinkaid, Thomas C., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force Sixty-One, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated 3 November 1942, Subj: Preliminary Report of Action, October 26, 1942 (1st Endorsement on CTF-17, Secret letter A16-3 (11t), Serial 0050, dated October 30, 1942).” Reel A193, starting frame 44181. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942a.
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  347. Preliminary report of the overall commander of US warships in the battle of Santa Cruz, Thomas C. Kinkaid, for Admiral Nimitz. Previously classified document.
  348. Find this resource:
  349. Kinkaid, Thomas C., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force SIXTY-ONE letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Subj: USS Hornet Report of Action, October 26, 1942—Comments on, dated 6 November 1942.” Reel A193, starting frame 43846. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942b.
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  351. Comments elucidating questions raised by Nimitz in his preliminary report on the battle of Santa Cruz (see Kinkaid 1942a). Previously classified document.
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  353. Kinkaid, Thomas C., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force Sixty-One, letter to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated 8 November 1942, Subj: Preliminary Report of Action, October 26, 1942 (2nd Endorsement on CTF-17, Secret letter A16-3 (11t), Serial 0050, dated October 30, 1942).” Reel A193, starting frame 44181. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942c.
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  355. Second endorsement on the comments and recommendations made by his principal subordinate commander, Rear Admiral G. D. Murray, Commander Task Force Seventeen, by Rear Admiral Kinkaid, Commander Task Force Sixty-One, the overall commander in the battle of Santa Cruz. Previously classified document.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. Kinkaid, Thomas C., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force Sixty-One, letter to Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet Serial 0077 (no date given), Subj: Report of Carrier Action North of the Santa Cruz Islands, 26 October 1942.” Reel A193, starting frame 44248. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942d.
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  359. Rear Admiral Kinkaid reports to Admiral Nimitz on the loss of the USS Hornet in this action, as well as on the huge number of Japanese aircraft and pilots shot down during the battle. Previously classified document.
  360. Find this resource:
  361. Nimitz, Chester W., Admiral, US Navy. “Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, letter to Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet [Admiral King], Subj: Solomon Islands Campaign, Battle of Santa Cruz—26 October 1941, dated January 6, 1943.” Reel A193, starting frame 45530. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1943.
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  363. Admiral Nimitz’s summary report to Admiral King on the battle of Santa Cruz and its effect on obtainment of the overall objectives of the Solomon Islands campaign. Previously classified document.
  364. Find this resource:
  365. Records Relating to Loss of USS Hornet
  366.  
  367. Records relating to the loss of the carrier Hornet during the battle of Santa Cruz are provided in this section. Captain C. P. Mason (30 October 1942), commanding officer of the carrier Hornet, which was sunk during the battle, reports to Nimitz on the action of the battle of Santa Cruz, including the circumstances of the loss of the carrier USS Hornet, in Mason 1942. In Murray 1942a, Rear Admiral G. D. Murray (30 October 1942), commander of Task Force Seventeen, provides a preliminary report of the Santa Cruz action for Admiral Nimitz. In Murray 1942b, Murray (12 November 1942) provides his final report on the battle of Santa Cruz to Admiral Nimitz. CTF 17 1942 is the document that provides the directive, issued by Rear Admiral Murray during the battle, that the USS Hornet will be torpedoed and sunk by a US warship as soon as all survivors of the Japanese attack have been removed from the ship. In Sanchez 1942, Lieutenant H. G. Sanchez (26 October 1942), commanding officer of Fighting Squadron Seventy-Two, provides a description of that squadron’s efforts to engage the Japanese attack planes and save the Hornet during the battle. Captain A. Souchek, commanding officer of the USS Hornet during the battle of Santa Cruz, explains the details of her sinking by the Japanese in Souchek 1942. Captain Mahlon S. Tisdale, the overall cruiser commander in the battle, describes the details of the battle to Admiral Nimitz in his after-action report of 29 October 1942 (see Tisdale 1942). In Widhelm and Vose 1942, Lieutenant (junior grade) W. J. Widhelm and Lieutenant J. E. Vose, commanding officers of the Scouting and Bombing squadrons aboard the USS Hornet, describe the action of their squadrons, including disposition of the aircraft unable to land on the USS Hornet after she was sunk, to her commanding officer after the battle.
  368.  
  369. CTF 17. “Message of 260507Z42 to CTG 17.4 directing ‘As soon as all personnel are picked up torpedo Hornet,’ with CTG 17.4’s response to CTF 16 and CTF 17 reporting on completion of tasking.” Reel A193, starting frame 43846. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  371. Message from RADM Murray directing that the carrier USS Hornet be torpedoed and sunk as soon as all of her personnel abandoned ship. Previously classified document.
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  373. Mason, C. P., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Hornet, letter to the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated October 30, 1942, Subj: Report of Action, October 26, 1942, and subsequent loss of USS Hornet.” Reel A193, starting frame 43846. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  375. Letter from Captain C. P. Mason to the secretary of the Navy explaining the loss of his ship, the USS Hornet, in the battle of Santa Cruz. Previously classified document.
  376. Find this resource:
  377. Murray, G. D., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force Seventeen, letter to Commander–in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated October 30, 1942, Subj: Preliminary Report of Action, October 26, 1942.” Reel A193, starting frame 43846. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942a.
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  379. Letter from Rear Admiral G. D. Murray, commander Task Force Seventeen, to Admiral Nimitz giving a preliminary assessment of the outcome of the battle of Santa Cruz. Previously classified document.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Murray, G. D., Rear Admiral, US Navy. “Commander Task Force Seventeen, letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 November 1942, Subj: Final Report of Action Santa Cruz Islands, October 26, 1942.” Reel A9, starting frame 79537. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942b.
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  383. Letter from Rear Admiral Murray to the secretary of the Navy providing his final assessment of the action north of the Santa Cruz Islands. Previously classified document.
  384. Find this resource:
  385. Sanchez, H. G., Lieutenant Commander, US Navy. “Commander, Fighting Squadron Seventy-two to Commander, Task Force Seventeen, dated November 2, 1942, Subj: Action Report of October 26, 1942.” Reel A193, starting frame 44181. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  387. Commander of fighter aircraft in the battle of Santa Cruz reports on fighter action during the battle. Previously classified document.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Souchek, A., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Hornet, letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated October 30, 1942, Subj: Report of Action, dated October 26, 1942, and subsequent loss of USS Hornet.” Reel A193, starting frame 44692. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  391. Letter from the captain of the USS Hornet to the secretary of the Navy recounting the action resulting in her loss. Previously classified document.
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  393. Tisdale, Mahlon S., Captain, US Navy. “Commander Cruisers, Task Force Sixteen, letter to Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated October 29, 1942, Subj: Report of Action—October 26, 1942.” Reel A193, starting frame 44692. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  395. Letter from the commander of cruisers in the Santa Cruz action to Admiral Nimitz detailing their role in that battle. Previously classified document.
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  397. Widhelm, W. J., Lieutenant Commander, US Navy, and J. E. Vose, Lieutenant, US Navy. “Commander Scouting Squadron EIGHT and Bombing Squadron EIGHT, letter to Commanding Officer, USS Hornet, Subj: Action on 26 October 1942, dated 29 October 1942.” Reel A193, starting frame 45530. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1942.
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  399. Letters from the commanding officers of the scouting and bombing squadrons aboard the USS Hornet detailing their squadrons’ action in the battle of Santa Cruz and the disposition of those squadrons once their carrier was lost in the battle. Previously classified document.
  400. Find this resource:
  401. The Upper Solomons Campaign
  402.  
  403. In the Upper Solomons campaign, General Douglas MacArthur and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey conducted campaigns that were intended at the outset to converge ultimately at the Japanese forward naval base of Rabaul. General MacArthur’s prong of the offensive employed the combined forces of the United States and Australia to move up the coast of New Guinea, while Vice Admiral Halsey’s amphibious campaign was conducted up the Solomon Islands chain to the east. Cooperation was immediate and complete between these two commanders, making the Upper Solomons campaign an example of perhaps the most effective joint campaign of the Pacific war. Karig and Purdon 1947 provides an insightful and comprehensive history of the Upper Solomons campaign and the battles that followed as the United States and her allies moved steadily up the central Pacific, ultimately toward the Japanese home islands. Morison 2001 provides an excellent, scholarly analysis of the two-pronged-strategy phase of the war as the United States and her Pacific allies moved toward the Japanese home islands along two parallel axes starting in the lower Solomon Islands.
  404.  
  405. Karig, Walter, Captain, United States Navy Reserve, and Commander Eric Purdon, United States Navy Reserve. Battle Report: Pacific War; Middle Phase. New York: Rinehart, 1947.
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  407. Excellent description of the Upper Solomons campaign and the battles that followed in the central Pacific.
  408. Find this resource:
  409. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of Unites States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier: 22 July 1942–1 May 1944. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001.
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  411. Excellent original source consideration of the Upper Solomons campaign executed in large part by forces commanded by Admiral Nimitz. Originally published in 1950.
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  413. Two-Pronged Strategy
  414.  
  415. Admiral Nimitz, as commander in chief, Pacific, and Admiral King in Washington favored an advance through the Pacific starting with the Gilbert Islands and proceeding through the Gilberts, the Marshalls, Marianas, and Volcano Islands toward Japan proper. General MacArthur, on the other hand, advocated an advance along the north coast of New Guinea, through the Philippines and ultimately either Formosa or the coast of China toward Japan. In the late summer of 1943, a compromise was reached by the Joint Chiefs, whereby both prongs of what came to be known as the two-pronged strategy would be conducted, as it was determined that there were enough LSTs available to do so. In reality, the two-pronged strategy had already started in late 1942 with the Upper Solomons campaign, but the concept was formalized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when serious consideration of the trade-offs in Nimitz’s and MacArthur’s competing strategic concepts had of necessity to be reconciled. Poor, et al. 1994 provides a useful chronology of the events and sequencing of the two-pronged strategy. Morison 2001a and Morison 2001b offer an excellent scholarly and well-researched original-source account of the progression of the two-pronged strategy. In Litch 1944, Captain E. W. Litch (30 June 1944) provides an excellent firsthand account of the attack on the Marianas Islands as commanding officer of the USS Lexington (Lexington II) to Admiral King in Washington.
  416.  
  417. Litch, E. W., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Lexington, letter to Commander in Chief, US Fleet, dated 30 June 1944, Subj: Attack on the Marianas Islands from June 11 through June 19, 1944 (East Longitude dates) in support of the occupation of Saipan and the engagement of the Japanese Fleet on 19 and 20 June, 1944 (East Longitude dates)—Action report of.” Reel A9, starting frame 79537. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1944.
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  419. The captain of the new carrier USS Lexington, named after her predecessor sunk at the battle of the Coral Sea, informs Admiral Nimitz in depth of the strikes on the Marianas islands Saipan and Tinian, and in support of the Marine landings on Saipan. Previously classified document.
  420. Find this resource:
  421. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of Unites States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier: 22 July 1942–1 May 1944. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001a.
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  423. As an on-scene observer embarked afloat, Morison gives insights into the campaigns against the Japanese in New Guinea, the Central Solomons, and the Upper Solomons including Bougainville and finally Rabaul. Originally published in 1950.
  424. Find this resource:
  425. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of Unites States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas March 1944–August 1944. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001b.
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  427. In this volume, Morison covers the extremely effective US submarine offensive against Japanese shipping, General MacArthur’s final offensive to take the rest of New Guinea, and the Nimitz prong of the American two-pronged offensive in the Pacific, including the battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas Turkey Shoot and the taking of Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas and subsequently Guam. Originally published in 1953.
  428. Find this resource:
  429. Poor, Henry V., Henry A. Mustin, and Colin G. Jameson. Battle of Cape Esperance, 11 October 1942; Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, 26 October 1942. Combat Narratives: Solomon Islands Campaign 4–5. Declassified DOD Dir. 5200.9. Washington, DC: Publications Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, 1994.
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  431. Useful and detailed chronology of the major battles at the outset of the two-pronged strategy. Originally published in 1943.
  432. Find this resource:
  433. Battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas Turkey Shoot
  434.  
  435. The documents in this section relate to Admiral Nimitz’s decision process in this battle and those that followed during the Pacific War. The Japanese are estimated to have lost over four hundred aircraft and had three aircraft carriers sunk, and only two of the nine carriers they engaged in the battle of the Philippine Sea remained seaworthy. While the Imperial Japanese Army’s Ichi-Go offensive was going extremely well in China and Southeast Asia, for the first time the top Japanese leadership realized that the back door had been kicked into the east when Saipan fell. Thus, Admiral Nimitz’s role in orchestrating the last carrier battle of the war became a critical step in the ultimate defeat of Japan. Tillman 2005 provides an excellent account of the battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas Turkey Shoot that is complete and scholarly in content. Captain M. B. Gardner’s letter (9 July 1944) to Admiral King provides the war diary portions for the battle from the perspective of the commanding officer of the USS Enterprise (Gardner 1944).
  436.  
  437. Gardner, M. B., Captain, US Navy. “Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, letter to Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, dated 9 July 1944, Subj: USS Enterprise War Diary for June 1944—Forwarding of.” Reel A9, starting frame 79537. US Naval War College Microfilm Collection, Newport, RI, 1944.
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  439. Commanding officer of the USS Enterprise provides Admiral King that ship’s war diary for the period including the battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas Turkey Shoot. Previously classified document.
  440. Find this resource:
  441. Tillman, Barrett. Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II. New York: New American Library, 2005.
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  443. Excellent scholarly account of the battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas Turkey Shoot.
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  445. Leyte Gulf and the Road to the Japanese Home Islands
  446.  
  447. The battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval battle in history, with over 1,200 ships involved on both sides. This battle marked the first step in a quickening pace of advance to the Japanese home islands. It also marked a battle where Admiral Nimitz’s and General MacArthur’s areas of responsibility converged, creating a seam that could be exploited by the Japanese if not carefully attended to in the strategic and operational concepts of both commanders. Once a stronghold was established at Leyte and General MacArthur was able to move north and take a firmer hold of the Philippine Islands, the more aggressive part of Admiral Nimitz’s naval strategy aimed squarely at Japan was pursued with determination. Cutler 1994 provides a scholarly, concise, and focused account of the battle of Leyte Gulf. Vego 2006 provides a comprehensive assessment of the battle of Leyte Gulf. Frank 1999 offers an exceptional account of the demise of the Japanese Empire, analyzing the collapse from both a land and naval perspective.
  448.  
  449. Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf 23–26 October 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994.
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  451. Excellent, scholarly account of the battle of Leyte Gulf.
  452. Find this resource:
  453. Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Random House, 1999.
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  455. Exceptional, scholarly, and concise analysis of all aspects of the demise of the Imperial Japanese Empire.
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Vego, Milan. The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
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  459. Comprehensive and meticulously researched presentation of all aspects of the battle of Leyte Gulf.
  460. Find this resource:
  461. Full to Fleet Admiral
  462.  
  463. At the time of World War II, the rank of admiral was the highest that could be achieved in the US Navy. Admiral Nimitz was, however, promoted to fleet admiral (FADM) as soon as congressional legislation authorized that rank, on 13 May 1946, with a date of rank retroactive to 19 December 1944. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, in King 1946, offers a truly insightful view of World War II from the position of the top Navy leader for the war, including his evaluations of the performance and leadership of his top commanders, such as Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, whom he recommended for the rank of fleet admiral. Office of the Secretary of Defense Weapons Systems Evaluation Group 1951 offers a critique of the fast carriers’ part in the Pacific War, which constituted the centerpiece of the strategies FADM Nimitz was able to enact, propelling him to that rank. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1955 describes the events of the war that led to Fleet Admiral Nimitz receiving recognition by promotion to the very top rank in the Navy.
  464.  
  465. King, Ernest J., Fleet Admiral, US Navy. US Navy at War, 1941–1945. Washington, DC: United States Navy Department, 1946.
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  467. Fleet Admiral King provides insights on World War II, including evaluations of his top Navy leaders.
  468. Find this resource:
  469. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Naval Chronology, World War II. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955.
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  471. Prepared in the Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. Naval Chronology offers insights into the war, including FADM Nimitz’s part in it.
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  473. Office of the Secretary of Defense Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. Operational Experience of Fast Carrier Task Forces in World War II. WSEG Staff Study 4. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1951.
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  475. The Office of the Secretary of Defense considers the fast carriers that entered wartime service starting in the late summer of 1943, which enabled the aggressive strategies enacted by Fleet Admiral Nimitz from that point in the war. Declassified on 17 May 1979.
  476. Find this resource:
  477. Chief of Naval Operations
  478.  
  479. After his wartime service, Fleet Admiral Nimitz became chief of Naval Operations. In this capacity, he initiated changes in the Navy emanating from his vast prewar and wartime experiences that enhanced operations and operational efficiency for generations. His legacy, however, was already established as a consummate wartime leader, innovator, organizer, and motivator of men. Nimitz’s 1946 annual report represents his analysis of the accomplishments of and state of the Navy for fiscal year 1946 (Navy Department 1947).
  480.  
  481. Navy Department. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1946. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.
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  483. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz’s annual report to Congress as chief of Naval Operations.
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  485. Retirement
  486.  
  487. Nimitz 1960 and Nimitz 1961, two addresses to the students and faculty of the Naval War College, reveal what Fleet Admiral Nimitz considered some of the biggest challenges in preparing for World War II and how his education at the War College helped prepare him to deal with them. Nimitz’s letter to the president of the Naval War College (Nimitz 1965) evaluates the quality of the education Nimitz received there and its centrality to the strategic and operational conduct of the Pacific War by him and other senior Navy leaders who were alumni of that same institution. Potter and Nimitz 1981 represents a comprehensive and concise history of maritime history from its earliest period to the present. It demonstrates clearly Fleet Admiral (FADM) Nimitz’s interest in and grasp of maritime history, and was used for years as the main text for maritime history classes offered at the United States Naval Academy. Maser 1979 recounts the trial of German Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz at Nuremberg, at which Admiral Nimitz provided a sworn affidavit, for which he was subsequently widely criticized, that resulted in Dönitz escaping a death sentence.
  488.  
  489. Maser, Werner. Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial. Translated by Richard Barry. New York: Scribner, 1979.
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  491. This volume examines the Nuremberg Trial, with a lengthy account of Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz’s defense. There were three charges against him: (1) conspiring to wage aggressive war; (2) waging aggressive war; and (3) violation of the laws of war at sea. Dönitz was convicted of the last two. FADM Nimitz was roundly criticized for providing an affidavit saving Dönitz from a death sentence.
  492. Find this resource:
  493. Nimitz, Chester W., Fleet Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). “Address Delivered to the Naval War College, 10 October 1960.” US Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI, 1960.
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  495. Recollections of Nimitz’s career that relate to preparations for World War II, starting the Naval Reserve unit at the University of California at Berkley, and how he approached severe manpower shortages as new construction ships authorized by the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 would soon have to be manned.
  496. Find this resource:
  497. Nimitz, Chester W., Fleet Admiral, US Navy (Ret.). “Address Delivered to the Naval War College, 12 October 1961.” US Naval War College Archives, Newport, RI, 1961.
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  499. Recollections of FADM Nimitz’s career that relate to preparations for World War II.
  500. Find this resource:
  501. Nimitz, Chester W., Fleet Admiral, US Navy. “Letter to Vice Admiral Charles Melson, President of the United States Naval War College, dated 19 September 1965.” US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1965.
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  503. In 1965, after the war, Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote a letter explaining that his preparation for World War II at the Naval War College was so complete (and he delineated specifics of that educational experience) that nothing in the war, save the kamikaze attacks, was not considered and covered in it prior to the war. Letter on display in McCarty-Little Hall at the College.
  504. Find this resource:
  505. Potter, E. B., and Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral. Sea Power: A Naval History. 2d ed. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1981.
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  507. Collaborative work by Fleet Admiral Nimitz and a distinguished naval historian from the Naval Academy, completed after Admiral Nimitz’s retirement. This work demonstrates Admiral Nimitz’s lifelong interest in history and frequent reading of naval history as a means of enhancing his own abilities as a commander of men and ships. Originally published in 1960.
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