INTERNATIONALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
In our time, internationalism is not something to be insisted upon or necessarily even discussed, it is thought of as an inherent facet of our modern world. Stipulations are discussed, tariffs here and non-intervention there, but by and large, international trade, organization, and action are accepted as natural. This need not be the case, nor should it be.

One of the points frequently levied against the former president Donald Trump is that he made us look bad in the eyes of the “international community” and our “allies”. The fact that this claim is levied so often evidences just how deep internationalist notions have seeped into our collective notions. It’s rarely explained why we should give a damn what the “international community” thinks, after all the president is an American office, it’s his job to do right by Americans, and not by the vague and elusive “international community”. How concerned are the French with the Americans? How about the Nigerians? They care about our nation as far as it can help or hinder theirs.

Outside of a passing personal interest, the inhabitants of the rest of the world do not give one good goddamn if America burns to the ground, unless it causes damage to their nation. What I wish to express is that internationalism is often a one-sided deal, and that each case of international activity ought to be thought about long and hard before we dedicate ourselves to working with other nations.

WHAT INTERNATIONALISM COSTS US

At the center of international relations are resources of varying composition. A resource can be material, such as iron or rubber. A resource could also mean diplomatic leverage, military goods or action, money, or even labor needed for construction. The root of international relations is, and always has always been, getting what your nation requires but does not have itself.

There are three primary methods through which a nation can acquire resources; it can produce them itself, fight another nation for the resources, or trade for them. In that very order exists their desirability. To produce the resources yourself means perpetual self-sufficiency, only in the case of issues regarding extraction and supply-lines will a resource fail to be produced by its nation. Should a nation not have a necessary resource, its next option is war. A war can mean permanent ownership of the relevant resource, if successful it will effectively revert to the first option, production of the necessary resource in perpetuity. Last is trade. When a war appears to be too onerous to fight, or too expensive relative to the acquired resource, a nation may trade to obtain it. Though this sounds far more favorable than a war, given that no blood need be shed, the issue lies in sustainability.

When a nation trades with another for a necessary resource, the nation without the resource becomes effectively bound to the nation with the resource. Should nation A, the one without the resource, take action to better its nation, to the detriment of nation B, nation B will have an avenue through which to exploit nation A and to prevent action which would disadvantage it. In the case of a serious difference in desired policy, it could mean war, in which nation A, who has built large amounts of infrastructure around the traded resource, will now have a rug ripped out from beneath their feet. Even a war is unnecessary for such a thing to happen, all that needs to occur is a change in the policy of nation B, and nation A is left scrambling and desperate, with nation B no worse for the wear, outside of having a few dollars less.

Before the Japanese conquered large swaths of territory, which included much of the world’s rubber production, synthetic rubber had never been necessary. Were synthetic rubber not possible to produce, the allied nations would have had a serious issue on their hands. They, like the Germans, would have been forced into a situation where it was impossible to produce tires and tank treads in necessary quantities, significantly lowering their potential effectiveness in combat. From this it is clear that a nation which can produce its own resources, be they mineral or manufactured, ought to.

If importation is leaving yourself beholden, then what is exporting? Though exportation may appear to be desirable, it does come with often unconsidered consequences. Exportation means structuring your economy not around the needs of your people, but around the needs of other nations. The result is yet again, becoming beholden to other nations. The exporter becomes beholden to their partners, whom they sell to, and to their partners whom they import from, for an economy structured around profitable exportation will use its manpower primarily for the creation of exported goods, and not for their own needs, thus leaving them reliant on using their profits to procure the goods and resources they themselves neglect to produce, though it is often within their power.

 For example, the southern states famously built their economy around the exportation of cotton. This was a fabulously profitable institution, but once at war with the Union, their manufactures produced insufficient amounts of food, arms, and everything but cotton. With their ports blockaded, their cotton meant little other than an excess of material for uniforms. Another example is the city-states of North Italy. With their hinterlands too small for self-sufficiency in food production, they turned to the merchants. In time, the city-states’ labor resources were largely dedicated to manufacturing goods, which were then sold to the merchants, the profits from the goods were used to purchase grain, and the rest went into the coffers of the leadership. The merchants of course profited from selling the grain, and from reselling the manufactured goods. This reliance on imported grain is also why Italy was particularly devastated by the Black Death, while Poland, self-sufficient in grain production, was largely safe from the plague.

Much of the wealth gained by the leadership of the city-states went directly into the pockets of mercenaries to fight wars with other city-states. The mercenaries changed sides frequently, this lack of a proper army meant the gains were often fleeting, making the wars political in nature, “who’s in charge of this city, and who’s in charge of that city”, as opposed to a war for permanent gain of resources.