October 30 1968: Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell

A transcript supplement to the post "The Treason of Richard Nixon Part One" (http://italkyoubored.wordpress.com/2014/04/08/the-treason-of-richard-nixon-from-possibility-to-certainty/).

JOHNSON
Hello?

OPERATOR
Go ahead, please sir.

RUSSELL
Good morning, Mr. President.

JOHNSON
How are you, my friend?

RUSSELL
Good. I'm sorry about the phone being off the hook upstairs. Everybody's running around trying to fix it, and yesterday the phone was (inaudible) somebody's listening.

JOHNSON
Got some kids. I understand you got some children in the house.

RUSSELL
No no.

JOHNSON
Every phone's off the hook at my place when I got that sixteen month grandson. He's a mechanic. He works on it all the time.

RUSSELL
He's got an inquiring mind. Goes into things. See what it's about.

JOHNSON
Well, I've got one this morning that's pretty rough for you.

We have found that our friend, the Republican nominee-our California friend-has been playing on the outskirts with our enemies and our friends, both-our allies and the others. He's been doing it through rather subterranean sources here.

And he has been saying to the allies that "you're going to get sold out. Watch Yalta, and Potsdam, and two Berlins, and everything. And they're [the Johnson administration] going to recognize the NLF. I [Nixon] don't have to do that. You better not give away your liberty just a few hours before I can preserve it for you."

One or two of his business friends divulged it first a couple of days ago, about the time he [Nixon] made the statement that he had rumors that the staff was selling out, but he did not include me in it. You saw that, didn't you?

RUSSELL
Yeah. And he sorta retracted that didn't he?

JOHNSON
Well. No. Laird put that out. Travelling with him. They have three planes, and he's on a separate plane and he just, his job is to spread rumors and background the press. They all like him because he's strong for health and education and welfare. On that HEW Committee. And so, the press likes him, and he puts that out. Nixon comes along and says, "Now I have heard this but I do not believe it." In other words, I do not believe Laird. I believe the president is not crooked. They say he is, but I don't believe he is. He becomes a very strong defender of the president. The press resents it. They come back and say, "Well hell, why, if you don't believe it, why'd your man put it out?" The man who wrote the story is very reliable, Merryman Smith, he's covered the White House under four five presidents. And. But that is what happened.

The next thing that we got our teeth in was one of his associates-a fellow named [John] Mitchell, who is running his campaign, who's the real Sherman Adams [Eisenhower's chief of staff] of the operation, in effect said to a businessman that "we're going to handle this like we handled the Fortas matter, unquote.  We're going to frustrate the President by saying to the South Vietnamese, and the Koreans, and the Thailanders [sic], 'Beware of Johnson.'"

"At the same time, we're going to say to Hanoi, 'I [Nixon] can make a better deal than he [Johnson] has, because I'm fresh and new, and I don't have to demand as much as he does in the light of past positions."

Now, when we got that, pure by accident, as a result of some of our Wall Street connections, that caused me to look a little deeper.

RUSSELL
I guess so.

JOHNSON
And I have means of doing that, as you may well imagine.

RUSSELL
Yes.

JOHNSON
And...Mrs. [Anna] Chennault is contacting their [South Vietnamese] ambassador from time to time-seems to be kind of the go-between, the Chiang Kai-Shek deal. In addition, their ambassador is saying to 'em that "Johnson is desperate and is just moving heaven and earth to elect Humphrey, so don't you get sucked in on that." He is kind of these folks' agent here, this little South Vietnamese ambassador.

Now, this is not guesswork.

RUSSELL
I just . . . I didn't exactly understand how Taiwan got in it.

JOHNSON
Well, Mrs. Chennault, you know-

RUSSELL
I know that, but I didn't understand just what Chiang has to do with it-

JOHNSON
Well, I don't know that he has anything, except just generally that lobby. It may be [former Minnesota congressman] Walter Judd. I know it's her.

RUSSELL
Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

JOHNSON
Mrs. Chennault, you know, of the Flying Tigers.

RUSSELL
I know Mrs. Chennault.

JOHNSON
She's young and attractive. I mean, she's a pretty good-looking girl.

RUSSELL
She certainly is.

JOHNSON
And she's around town. And she is warning them to not get pulled in on this Johnson move.

Then he [the ambassador], in turn, is warning his government. Then we, in turn, know pretty well what he [Thieu] is saying out there. So he is saying that well, he's got to play it for time, and get it by the next few days. Now, the Soviets are climbing the wall, and Hanoi is, and of course our people in Paris are, because they have agreed that they will let the GVN come to the table. That has been the thing we have insisted on. They have met our demands. The Soviets have said that we understand that we're gonna resume if they violate the DMZ and we can see that immediately after we make the announcement whether they are or not. We have reserved the right for reconnaissance and we have made it clear it's an act of force, and not an act of war, in our announcement. And we got South Vietnam, and all the allies aboard on a one day. We announce it one day and we meet the next. But Hanoi wanted more time, so they demanded a couple of weeks, and then ten days, and then a week, and we wouldn't do it, because we thought that Saigon couldn't stand to wait that long between the time of the announcement and the time of the meeting. So we have insisted on one day because Hanoi had said productive discussions could begin the next day. So, we took them at their word. About that time, Humphrey made a fool speech in which he said that he would stop the bombing without a comma or a semicolon, he'd just make it period.

RUSSELL
Well, that'd kill the whole thing.

JOHNSON
Well, it did for ten days, and then Bundy made a fool speech. And they all of them had to dissect that and take it- (inaudible) Yes yes, the Adlai Stevenson group and they just get the tail of the dashboard right at the right time, they do the wrong thing, every time. But we wore that out, we got it back on the track. And in getting it back on the track, meantime, Nixon gets scared to death, so he gets into the thing. And it gets off the track at the other place. Now, everybody had approved the one day thing. Then they came along and approved the three day thing, and they actually got down to the wording of the announcement, a joint announcement to be made by the two of us. And it was all agreed upon, all satisfactory, and then Nixon gets on and says no use selling out now, just wait a few days. And you can't trust Johnson, may want to, really he's gonna pet the North Vietnamese, NLF, on the back, just like Roosevelt did to Russia. And that scares them. So then they come back,

RUSSELL
How'd he get that word to them?

JOHNSON
He gets it through their ambassador here. And they are really, they think, he's just been mad something's gonna happen this election. And he's just not erratic at all. Now I played no politics with them, and I'm not going to, I've given Humphrey more hell at their joint meetings than I have Nixon. Nixon's been pretty responsible. But I don't want pass up an opportunity to sit here on my fanny, till he comes in, let him just pick up like Eisenhower did the Korean thing, and say, well I did so-and-so. Same time, I don't want another day to go that I don't have to do when I get what I asked for. Now, the effect of the situation I'm in now is effectively letting Thieu say, well, we gotta have more time. First he says we haven't got enough time to get a delegation there. Second, this Ky gets in it, Ky says he thinks we're really winning militarily, just give a few more days, we'll have everything. And then Ky demands that rather than have a coup, he'd be the adviser in Paris. And we got all those things, now we have put off and put off and we are trying to bring them aboard. After we had them aboard, on both times.

RUSSELL
I thought they were pretty firm.

JOHNSON
They were. They were all firm. Now Abrams came in, before I finally make up my mind. And he spent several hours with me. Just he and I. And then he met with a group. But he, not only recommends, he urges me, to take this action with or without them. That we cannot do any good in the North for the next ninety days anyway. That we need this power in South Vietnam, and we need this power in Laos. And in any event, the guarantees that we get on the DMZ, if they carry them out alright, we're not bound. But what we would get at the DMZ which would be reflected two hours after we make the announcement, what we would get there, we'd get by immunity of the cities, permit him to go through the countryside, and with the psychological advantage of having these fools at the Paris meeting. Kinda wrap up the country. And he says, from a strictly military standpoint, that this military power is no good for ninety days on account of the weather. That it is needed, and will be used, you either get something for it or you don't. Because he's gonna use it anyway. Ninety percent of it in Laos and South Vietnam, even if it didn't finish ordering here. He would do it there. Because he says it's unlikely you'll get more than one or two days a month. That you can do anything.

RUSSELL
Well, they've been giving whole lot of reports I didn't understand, I hear they hit a truck and all that thing-

JOHNSON
Well, they've had ten days and we're coming to the last of that ten days.

RUSSELL
I see.

JOHNSON
And by the time we put the thing into the meeting, why, there won't be much chance. And, in any event, he says this thing has changed so radically since last August. That, not only do we no longer endanger our men, that this gives them much more protection than we'd have if we just followed the existing policy. Now I've heard all that, and I've seen all that in cables, but I just didn't take it, I made him come in. And he is much stronger than any of your joint chiefs. His general statement was very much along the lines, of McConnell's. If you remember it.

RUSSELL
Yes, I do quite well.

JOHNSON
So, we thought it was all gone, already, then at noon yesterday, Thieu comes in and says, no, and now the question is, do you leave him, and Korea and Thailand, they'll all hang together, they're scared to get peace there, so forth. So, we've tried to get them back on board. We don't think they're gonna come in the light of the Nixon thing.

RUSSELL
-Nixon, I never had much in common with him, but damn, if I thought he'd stoop to anything like that.

JOHNSON
It may be his agents. All we know is, I saw him on television this morning, in Syracuse last night. And he says that this conference must be broadened to include the Soviets. Well, we're talking to them every day, two three times a day,

RUSSELL
I doubt they really want to see anything.

JOHNSON
They wouldn't be in it. They wouldn't come to it, and he just makes an ass of himself, they are scared to death, the Chinese, everything they do is subterranean. But there's no question they're in it, I met them Sunday night, go back to Kosygin [Alexei Kosygin] and say that he understood that I was doing this with his full knowledge, and the problem I would have on DMZ and the cities, and understand that, and not charge me with deceit. Because they didn't abide by it, I was gonna hit them. And he came back, said my doubts about their biding by it were not justified. So, he is in it. But Nixon says, "The Soviets oughta be brought in <i>and</i> he says other asian countries must come to the conference." Well, a few hours later, this is last night, this morning at nine o'clock, we get a wire from Korea, saying they oughta be in the conference. So, he's kinda playing with the Asians, see, to divide us, and they're trying to do what the Hanoi's been unable to do for five years. Divide me from Korea, and Thailand. And so forth. And that's this damn election, for what I think, seriously, what I'll do is this. The South Vietnamese have no good reason for not coming. They say they need more time. So, I think instead of saying that-

RUSSELL
-two three months, I don't get-

JOHNSON
Well, they said they got to get a delegation, and all that. I think I'll say to them, well I'll give you the next meeting we have now, normally comes up Wednesday. We had one today. That gives you a full week. Now they said three four days ago, they'd need a week or ten days. We'll give you a full week. Now, we're gonna stop. In the next few hours. And we're gonna make an announcement of that. Now, we're gonna say we have understood that you could be president at this meeting a week from now. And we hope you're there. But in any event, we're not going to force us to keep on bombing when we don't want to. And when we got a chance to get them to lay off the DMZ and when we got a chance to get them to lay off the cities and when we got a guarantee you attend the meeting. Now, we just got to be that blunt. If they come on board, all and well good, if not, we're just in shambles, I guess, but I don't think I could defend the people of this country that I had everything I asked for and then this sonofabitch vetoed it.

RUSSELL
No, I don't see how he can refuse to come aboard.

JOHNSON
Well, he does though.

RUSSELL
-damn well better play than that, leave him over there, let him settle it- (near inaudible line)

JOHNSON
Well, I've carried on five years pretty big failure happened.

RUSSELL
Well, I don't think that. I think it's been accepted everywhere the reason we're in there is because they wanted us. They don't want us, well by god, a man is not that bad, (inaudible), he said, get out now, wish you were up in the air, I thought, of course not, I'll leave.

JOHNSON
Well, what I'm thinking, seriously of doing, I'm not talking to any of the other legislators, or anybody outside my little group. And he weren't in it, and I thought you could get an independent evaluation of how screwey it sounded to you. What I thought of doing would be to say to them this morning, both in Paris and in Saigon, that I'm gonna say tonight or tomorrow morning, that I am stopping this action. That I have agreed with the other side to meet in Paris. On the sixth. That's the day after the election, our next regular meeting. Next Wednesday. That day we agreed the GVN can be there. That's what I've insisted on for years. And I notified them of this effect. Now, I will background, I can't say publicly, but I'll tell two three reporters confidentially, kind of let them leak it out, that they ought to wipe the DMZ the next few days. And I would think twenty four hours they'll be writing stories that obviously Johnson got to them. Peace on the DMZ. And to watch the cities. Now, if I get peace there, than alright, but if I don't, I can still bomb. In any event, I will have stopped it, and we'll announce we'll have this meeting. And then if they come aboard, alright, and if they don't, well I just-

RUSSELL
I don't see how they can afford not to.

JOHNSON
Well. Well, suppose they don't. Where am I? If they don't come aboard, if Korea doesn't come aboard, I think they'd just be so afraid about having Uncle Sam out there, that they just couldn't do it. They might think they'd have Nixon. (inaudible) Well, they don't understand their constitutional system. They may think they got Nixon. You know, in their country, when something changes, the whole outfit changes. They don't realize they'll have you, and Fulbright, and the whole Congress that I've had. And they think that they get Nixon, they get all of Nixon's casinos. Now, they're not gonna- Nixon's not gonna be able to be much harder than I've been.

RUSSELL
Well.

JOHNSON
And I don't believe that publicly Nixon can take us on anyway. He may have a little-

RUSSELL
His published statements haven't been too bad.

JOHNSON
No, no, that's right.

RUSSELL
The leak I heard, in one speech, where he supported you much better than Humphrey was.

JOHNSON
Oh yeah, he says that, but then he says, everybody-

RUSSELL
I understand, it's in the interest of. I see that.

JOHNSON
It's just like my getting upset, I know Dick Russell, they say Dick Russell is so-and-so-and-so-and-so, but I really don't believe that.

RUSSELL
Yeah.

JOHNSON
If you didn't believe-

RUSSELL
Exact statement he made tonight.

JOHNSON
That's right.

RUSSELL
Well. That's a (inaudible) for sure. I just don't see how that- that Vietnamese government though can stay out of it.

JOHNSON
Well, don't you see this-

RUSSELL
They've been admitted to the table.

JOHNSON
How can I carry on a bombing, when everyone of my joint chiefs, including Abrams, say, from a military standpoint, it's even better that I go the other route at this time? And the only thing they want assurance of is that I would resume it, if I didn't get these actions that we expect to follow, the DMZ, the cities.

RUSSELL
Well. It'd be very difficult. It'd be very different. What is your old man out there-

JOHNSON
Bunker.

RUSSELL
Yeah. What does he think of it?

JOHNSON
He wants to give them this week. That I'm giving them. He says this morning to give them a week, and I'll call their bluff. That gives them plenty of time, it's not important when they show up at this meeting. If we give them a week. We were gonna have the meeting November the 2nd. He says move it back to the sixth, the seventh. And he and Abrams both have been hardly for this, had them aboard, but this other thing came into it.

RUSSELL
Does Bunker know what decision.

JOHNSON
No, I don't think so. I don't think we've got him all the intercepts and things. We have, though, Thieu's talks to his people, and so forth, and he knows that, he knows part of it. But I've ordered them all sent out to them this morning. But you see it's only natural, you look at it from Thieu's standpoint.

RUSSELL
He's getting something for nothing.

JOHNSON
He was staying with me, and he was supporting me, and he was going along with it. Then this guy comes in, and says, now let me show you here. Humphrey says, he's gonna stop it period, without any comma or semicolon. Now, I'm not gonna do that. Humphrey says that he's not gonna let you veto anything he does. Well, I'm gonna work with you. So, there's that man looking at two horses, a bay and a black, and there's no question that Nixon's statements are better for him than the other, so he thinks all he's gotta do is hold out two or three days and he's in clover.

RUSSELL
But he hasn't got anything to lose, because he's been busting Humphrey with the election. And Nixon loses. Well, he hasn't lost anything. He just took a gamble.

JOHNSON
That's right. I think I'm gonna move ahead unless you see some reason I shouldn't.

RUSSELL
Well, I don't see any, but it's yours if you think-

JOHNSON
It is. It is, but we can't-

RUSSELL
-it's most confused-

JOHNSON
It's gonna be more confused when the Koreans and the Thais and all your allies say you did it just for election purposes. But the one thing, the meeting doesn't take place until after the election.

RUSSELL
Yeah, that's right.

JOHNSON
And I think that helps a little.

RUSSELL
I think that does. That takes some of the curse off.

JOHNSON
But the announcement comes beforehand, and they say why didn't you do it before, and I'm gonna say because it's Sunday night, that I got the assurances that I wanted. And I had them confirmed by Abrams yesterday. If they wanna come with me, alright, if they don't, don't. Okay, I just want your feel of it.

RUSSELL
Well, I'm prepared to get it, but little more, I just don't see how they can stay out. I just don't see how they can afford to stay out. You're gonna be the president till January 20th anyhow.

JOHNSON
You wouldn't let him veto you if you were me, would you?

RUSSELL
No sir, I wouldn't.

JOHNSON
Thank you, goodbye.

RUSSELL
I would've been hard as hell on this matter-

JOHNSON
I have. Thank you.