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#; Wordpress iMember360 Plugin 3.8.012 - 3.9.001 - Multiple

Apr 29th, 2014
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  1. Full title Wordpress iMember360 Plugin 3.8.012 - 3.9.001 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
  2. Date add 2014-04-29
  3. Category web applications
  4. Platform php
  5. Risk <font color="#FFBF00">Security Risk High</font>
  6.  
  7. =====================================================
  8.  
  9. ------------
  10. BACKGROUND
  11. ------------
  12. "iMember360is a WordPress plugin that will turn a normal WordPress site
  13. into a full featured membership site. It includes all the protection
  14. controls you can imagine, yet driven by Infusionsoft's second-to-none CRM
  15. and e-commerce engine."
  16. -- http://imember360.com/
  17.  
  18. This plugin is hailed by some as being one of the power tools of the "big
  19. boys" of internet marketing, and according to the author it is installed on
  20. some 5,000 sites worldwide.
  21.  
  22. Unfortunately, the author is openly hostile at the suggestion that there
  23. are problems with his code: attempts to alert him to the problems with the
  24. plugin resulted in a flurry of insults, accusations, and nasty-grams to me
  25. and others working on the project. He accused me of telling "blatant lies"
  26. and fabricating screenshots of the vulnerabilities (!!!). So here we are
  27. in the disclosure list. Developers would do well to error on the side of
  28. humility here and remember that the only acceptable response to a bug
  29. report you disagree with is "cannot reproduce," and it my sincere hope that
  30. the author gets therapy, a security audit, or both: his customers deserve
  31. more than the incompetence and aggression.
  32.  
  33. -------------------
  34. VULNERABILITIES
  35. -------------------
  36.  
  37. * Disclosure of database credentials
  38. * XSS Vulnerabilities
  39. * Arbitrary user deletion
  40. * Arbitrary code execution
  41.  
  42.  
  43. -----------------
  44. AFFECTED VERSIONS
  45. -----------------
  46. v3.8.012 thru v3.9.001
  47.  
  48. -----------------------
  49. PROOF OF CONCEPT
  50. -----------------------
  51.  
  52. Dictionary based URL scanning of a site where the plugin is installed
  53. revealed numerous $_GET parameters that triggered special functionality
  54. that rarely seemed properly checked for permissions. The specific
  55. vulnerabilities include:
  56.  
  57. DATABASE CREDENTIALS DISCLOSED
  58.  
  59. ?i4w_dbinfo=
  60.  
  61. Prior to version 3.9.001, setting this parameter on a site where the plugin
  62. is installed would trigger the full database credentials to be printed,
  63. including database name, user, password, and encoding.
  64.  
  65. After version 3.9.001, this exploit requires that the user request an admin
  66. URL (e.g. as a registered subscriber).
  67.  
  68. XSS VULNERABILITIES
  69.  
  70. ?decrypt=<any XSS code here>
  71. ?encrypt=<any XSS code here>
  72.  
  73. If set, both of these parameters will simply print what follows verbatim
  74. onto the page and exit: nothing else is printed. A phishing attack is
  75. quite simple here because the attackers do not have to camouflage anything:
  76. the remote Javascript file can simply generate the *entire* page. Just a
  77. reminder that some hosts filter the $_GET parameters (e.g. escaping quotes)
  78. and not all browsers interpret malformed tags correctly, but this these
  79. parameters are vulnerable to XSS attacks. On some setups with caching,
  80. this may result in a persistent XSS attack when subsequent page views serve
  81. up the compromised page.
  82.  
  83.  
  84. DELETE ARBITRARY USERS
  85.  
  86. ?i4w_clearuser=&Email=<user_login_name>
  87.  
  88. If these 2 parameters are defined, the named user will be *deleted* from
  89. the Wordpress database (with one catch). The i4w_clearuser parameter must
  90. match the API key used by the plugin, but if the plugin has not yet had the
  91. license activated, then the API key is null, so the attack succeeds.
  92. Wordpress login names are printed in comments or can be guessed (e.g. the
  93. ubiquitous "admin").
  94.  
  95.  
  96. ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION
  97.  
  98. ?i4w_trace=; <put any code here> #
  99.  
  100. The i4w_trace parameter passes unescaped values to the system shell when
  101. the page is being requested by an admin (the user must be authenticated as
  102. an administrator for this to work). Put any code you want in between the
  103. ";" and the "#". This makes for a dangerous phishing attack if you can
  104. convince an admin to click on a prepared link.
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