Gulfstream III N303GA (March 29, 2001)

Date: March 29, 2001
Passengers: 15
Crew: 3
Fatalities: 18
Cause: "The flight crew made numerous procedural errors and deviations during the final approach segment of the VOR/DME approach to Aspen (ASE). The crew demonstrated poor crew coordination during the accident flight. The flight crew was under pressure to land at ASE. Darkness, reduced visibility, and light snow showers near the airport at the time of the accident significantly degraded the flight crew's ability to see and safely avoid terrain. The March 27, 2001, Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) regarding the nighttime restriction on the VOR/DME-C approach was vaguely worded and ineffectively distributed."


Legend:
CAM     Cockpit area microphone or sound source
HOT		Hot microphone voice or sound source
RDO     Radio transmission from accident aircraft
GPWS    Ground Proximity Warning System
FPA		Flight Profile Advisory unit
ATIS	Automatic Terminal Information Service
APP		Aspen Approach
TWR		Aspen Local Control/Tower
N527JA	Canadair Challenger 600, N527JA
N898R	Canadair Challenger 600, N898R
-1      Voice identified as captain
-2      Voice identified as first officer
-3		Voice identified as flight attendant
-4		Voice identified as male passenger in cockpit jumpseat
*       Unintelligible word
@       Non-pertinent word
&       Third-party personal name
#       Expletive
[ ]     Translated from German
( )     Questionable insertion
(( ))   Editorial insertion
...     Pause
Times are expressed in MST. This is a partial transcript as a full transcript is unavailable. This is pieced together from key events and the final report.


---


1831:06		HOT-1	Well, there's the edge of night right here.

1831:24		HOT-2	((asks for the time of official sunset at Aspen))

1831:28		HOT-1	Six twenty-eight...so we get thirty minutes after sunset. So six fifty-eight...about...seven o'clock.

1837:04		HOT-2	((calls for approach briefing))
			HOT-1	We're...probably gonna make it a visual...if we don't get the airport over here we'll go ahead and shoot that approach. We're not going to have a bunch of extra gas so we only get to shoot it once and then we're going to Rifle.
			HOT-2	((acknowledges information))

1839:56		ATIS	((sends information Hotel))
			HOT-2	((reads back wind, visibility, sky condition and temperature))
			HOT-1	((acknowledges))

1844:22		RDO-2	((makes contact with Aspen Approach))

1844:43		N527JA	((requests another approach to Aspen))
			APP		((clears N527JA for the published missed approach procedure))

1845:00		HOT-2	I hope he's doing practice approaches.

1845:03		RDO-1	((asks Aspen Approach if N527JA's pilot is doing practice or missed the approach))
			APP		((answers that it is a missed approach, informs captain that two other planes are on approach to Aspen))

1845:32		APP		((instructs flight to turn to 360 for vectors for approach sequence))

1845:45		HOT-1	Where's that...highway? Can we get down in there?

1845:56		HOT-1	Can you see?
			HOT-2	I'm looking, I'm looking...no.

1846:26		HOT-1	I got it.

1846:28		HOT-1	Can't really see up there, can ya?
			HOT-2	Nope, not really. I see a river but I don't see nothing else.

1847:19		HOT-2	I see...some towns over here and the highway's leading that way but I'm not sure.

1847:30		APP		((blanket broadcast that the pilot of N900MF saw the airport at 10400ft and was making a straight-in approach))
			HOT-2	Ah, that's good.

1847:41		RDO-1	I can almost see up the canyon from here but I don't know the terrain well enough or I'd take the visual.

1847:51		HOT-2	Could do a contact but...I don't know. Probably we could not...

1848:04		HOT-2	Remember that crazy guy in this Lear when we were...on the ground in Aspen last time and he (stated that he could) see the airport but he couldn't see it?

1848:51		HOT-1	There's the highway right there.
			HOT-2	((asks captain if we wanted to be set up on that approach))
			HOT-1	((indicates he is ready))

1849:28		HOT-1	((asks whether the first officer could see the highway))
			HOT-2	No, it's clouds over here on this area I don't see it.

1850:42		HOT-1	But it's right there.

1850:48		HOT-1	Oh I mean we'll shoot it from here I mean we're here but we only get to do it once.

1850:54		HOT-1	((tells flight attendant that if the approach was unsuccessful, they would have to go to rifle))...it's too late in the evening then to come around.

1851:54		APP		((instructs crew to turn to 050))

1853:09		APP		((instructs crew to turn to 140 to intercept the final approach course, and maintain 16000ft, then makes blanket broadcast that N898R had missed the approach))
			HOT-2	That's...not...good.

1853:57		HOT-3	((asks crew if a male passenger could sit in the jumpseat in the cockpit))

1854:08		HOT-3	((instructs passenger to make sure his seatbelt was on))
			CAM		((sound of seatbelt buckle))

1855:05		N898R	((intention to execute a missed approach))
			HOT-1	The weather's gone down, they're not making it in.
			HOT-4	Oh, really?
			APP		((clears N898R to continue missed approach procedure))

1856:06		APP		((clears flight for VOR/DME-C approach, advises that the flight is 5 miles from Red Table VOR, instructs crew to cross VOR at 14000ft))
			RDO-2	((acknowledges))

1856:23		HOT-2	After VOR you are cleared to twelve thousand seven hundred

1856:42		APP		((announces that ATIS information India is current and visibility north of Aspen Airport is two miles, then instructs flight to contact Aspen local control))

1857:28		RDO		((crew establishes contact with Aspen local control))
			TWR		((informs crew that they are following Challenger airplane N527JA that was two miles from runway, wind 240 at 5, cleared to land runway 15))

1857:55		RDO-2	One five cleared to land three golf alpha
			HOT-1	((asks first officer for DME at the 12700ft step-down fix))
			HOT-2	3 DME ((south of the Red Table VOR))

1858:00		TWR		((asks N527JA if they have the airport in sight))
			N527JA	Negative, going around.

1858:13		HOT-4	Are we clear?
			HOT-1	Not yet. The guy in front of us didn't make it either.

1858:27		HOT-1	((asks first officer for next step-down altitude))
			HOT-2	((answers 12200ft, and that next step-down fix was at 6 DME south of Red Table VOR))

1859:11		HOT-1	((asks first officer for next step-down altitude))
			HOT-2	((answers 10400ft))

1859:30		HOT-1	((calls for landing gear))
			CAM		((sound of two clunks, increase in background noise))

1859:34		HOT-1	Flaps

1859:36		CAM		((sound of click, then clunk))

1859:39		HOT-2	((indicates that the step-down fix at 10400ft was 9.5DME south of Red Table VOR))

1859:46		HOT-2	Three greens.

1900:04		HOT-2	((indicates that missed approach point was 11DME south of Red Table VOR))

1900:08		HOT-4	Snow.

1900:22		HOT-1	Okay...I'm breaking out.

1900:27		RDO-1	((asks controller if runway lights were all the way up))
			TWR		Affirmative, they are high.

1900:30		HOT-2	Okay you can go...ten thousand two hundred.

1900:43		HOT-1	((asks first officer if he can see the runway))

1900:45		HOT-2	*

1900:46		HOT-1	((asks first officer if he can see the highway))

1900:47		HOT-2	See highway.

1900:49		TWR		You have the runway in sight?

1900:51		HOT-2	Affirmative.
			HOT-1	Yes, now, yeah we do.

1900:52		RDO-2	Runway in sight three golf alpha.

1900:54		TWR		Gulfstream three golf alpha cleared visu roger.

1901:13		HOT-2	To the right is good.

1901:21		CAM		((sound of configuration alarm for 9s))

1901:28		FPA		One thousand.
			HOT-2	One thousand to go.

1901:31		FPA		Nine hundred.

1901:34		FPA		Eight hundred.

1901:36		HOT-1	Where's it at?

1901:38		FPA		Seven hundred.

1901:42		FPA		Six hundred.
			HOT-2	To the right.

1901:43		HOT-1	To the right.

1901:45		FPA		Five hundred.
			GPWS	Five hundred.

1901:49		GPWS	Sink rate.
			FPA		Four hundred.

1901:52		GPWS	Sink rate.
			FPA		Four hundred.
			CAM		((sound of rumbling noise until end of recording))

1901:53		CAM		((sound of engines increasing to max power))

1901:54		FPA		Three hun-

1901:55		GPWS	Two hundred.

1901:56		FPA		Two hundred.

1901:57		GPWS	Bank angle.

1901:58				((end of recording))