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The constitution in cyberspace.

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  8.  
  9. Laurence H. Tribe, "The Constitution in Cyberspace"
  10. PREPARED REMARKS
  11.  
  12. KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE
  13. FIRST CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY
  14.  
  15. Copyright, 1991, Jim Warren & Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
  16. All rights to copy the materials contained herein are reserved, except as
  17. hereafter explicitly licensed and permitted for anyone:
  18. Anyone may receive, store and distribute copies of this ASCII-format
  19. computer textfile in purely magnetic or electronic form, including on
  20. computer networks, computer bulletin board systems, computer conferencing
  21. systems, free computer diskettes, and host and personal computers, provided
  22. and only provided that:
  23. (1) this file, including this notice, is not altered in any manner, and
  24. (2) no profit or payment of any kind is charged for its distribution, other
  25. than normal online connect-time fees or the cost of the magnetic media, and
  26. (3) it is not reproduced nor distributed in printed or paper form, nor on
  27. CD ROM, nor in any form other than the electronic forms described above
  28. without prior written permission from the copyright holder.
  29. Arrangements to publish printed Proceedings of the First Conference on
  30. Computers, Freedom & Privacy are near completion. Audiotape and videotape
  31. versions are also being arranged.
  32. A later version of this file on the WELL (Sausalito, California) will
  33. include ordering details. Or, for details, or to propose other distribution
  34. alternatives, contact Jim Warren, CFP Chair,345 Swett Rd., Woodside CA 94062;
  35. voice:(415)851-7075; fax:(415)851-2814; e-mail:jwarren@well.sf.ca.us.[4/19/91]
  36.  
  37. [ These were the author's *prepared* remarks.
  38. A transcript of Professor Tribe's March 26th comments at the Conference
  39. (which expanded slightly on several points herein) will be uploaded onto the
  40. WELL as soon as it is transcribed from the audio tapes and proofed against
  41. the audio and/or videotapes.]
  42.  
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  44.  
  45. "The Constitution in Cyberspace:
  46. Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier"
  47.  
  48. by Laurence H. Tribe
  49.  
  50. Copyright 1991 Laurence H. Tribe,
  51. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law,
  52. Harvard Law School.
  53.  
  54. Professor Tribe is the author, most recently, of
  55. "On Reading the Constitution" (Harvard University Press,
  56. Cambridge, MA, 1991).
  57.  
  58.  
  59. Introduction
  60.  
  61. My topic is how to "map" the text and structure of our
  62. Constitution onto the texture and topology of "cyberspace". That's
  63. the term coined by cyberpunk novelist William Gibson, which many
  64. now use to describe the "place" -- a place without physical walls
  65. or even physical dimensions -- where ordinary telephone
  66. conversations "happen," where voice-mail and e-mail messages are
  67. stored and sent back and forth, and where computer-generated
  68. graphics are transmitted and transformed, all in the form of
  69. interactions, some real-time and some delayed, among countless
  70. users, and between users and the computer itself
  71.  
  72. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  73. Some use the "cyberspace" concept to designate fantasy worlds
  74. or "virtual realities" of the sort Gibson described in his novel
  75. *Neuromancer*, in which people can essentially turn their minds into
  76. computer peripherals capable of perceiving and exploring the data
  77. matrix. The whole idea of "virtual reality," of course, strikes a
  78. slightly odd note. As one of Lily Tomlin's most memorable
  79. characters once asked, "What's reality, anyway, but a collective
  80. hunch?" Work in this field tends to be done largely by people who
  81. share the famous observation that reality is overrated!
  82.  
  83. However that may be, "cyberspace" connotes to some users the
  84. sorts of technologies that people in Silicon Valley (like Jaron
  85. Lanier at VPL Research, for instance) work on when they try to
  86. develop "virtual racquetball" for the disabled, computer-aided
  87. design systems that allow architects to walk through "virtual
  88. buildings" and remodel them *before* they are built, "virtual
  89. conferencing" for business meetings, or maybe someday even "virtual
  90. day care centers" for latchkey children. The user snaps on a pair
  91. of goggles hooked up to a high-powered computer terminal, puts on
  92. a special set of gloves (and perhaps other gear) wired into the
  93. same computer system, and, looking a little bit like Darth Vader,
  94. pretty much steps into a computer-driven, drug-free, 3-dimensional,
  95. interactive, infinitely expandable hallucination complete with
  96. sight, sound and touch -- allowing the user literally to move
  97. through, and experience, information.
  98.  
  99. I'm using the term "cyberspace" much more broadly, as many
  100. have lately. I'm using it to encompass the full array of
  101. computer-mediated audio and/or video interactions that are already
  102. widely dispersed in modern societies -- from things as ubiquitous
  103. as the ordinary telephone, to things that are still coming on-line
  104. like computer bulletin boards and networks like Prodigy, or like
  105. the WELL ("Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link"), based here in San
  106. Francisco. My topic, broadly put, is the implications of that
  107. rapidly expanding array for our constitutional order. It is a
  108. cyberspace, either get bent out of shape or fade out altogether.
  109. The question, then, becomes: when the lines along which our
  110. Constitution is drawn warp or vanish, what happens to the
  111. Constitution itself?
  112.  
  113. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  114. Setting the Stage
  115.  
  116. To set the stage with a perhaps unfamiliar example, consider
  117. a decision handed down nine months ago, *Maryland v. Craig*, where
  118. the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the power of a state to put an
  119. alleged child abuser on trial with the defendant's accuser
  120. testifying not in the defendant's presence but by one-way,
  121. closed-circuit television. The Sixth Amendment, which of course
  122. antedated television by a century and a half, says: "In all
  123. criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
  124. be confronted with the witnesses against him." Justice O'Connor
  125. wrote for a bare majority of five Justices that the state's
  126. procedures nonetheless struck a fair balance between costs to the
  127. accused and benefits to the victim and to society as a whole.
  128. Justice Scalia, joined by the three "liberals" then on the Court
  129. (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens), dissented from that
  130. cost-benefit approach to interpreting the Sixth Amendment. He
  131. wrote:
  132.  
  133. The Court has convincingly proved that the Maryland
  134. procedure serves a valid interest, and gives the
  135. defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause
  136. guarantees (everything, that is, except confrontation).
  137. I am persuaded, therefore, that the Maryland procedure is
  138. virtually constitutional. Since it is not, however,
  139. actually constitutional I [dissent].
  140.  
  141. Could it be that the high-tech, closed-circuit TV context,
  142. almost as familiar to the Court's youngest Justice as to his even
  143. younger law clerks, might've had some bearing on Justice Scalia's
  144. sly invocation of "virtual" constitutional reality? Even if
  145. Justice Scalia wasn't making a pun on "virtual reality," and I
  146. suspect he wasn't, his dissenting opinion about the Confrontation
  147. Clause requires *us* to "confront" the recurring puzzle of how
  148. constitutional provisions written two centuries ago should be
  149. construed and applied in ever-changing circumstances.
  150.  
  151. Should contemporary society's technology-driven cost-benefit
  152. fixation be allowed to water down the old-fashioned value of direct
  153. confrontation that the Constitution seemingly enshrined as basic?
  154. I would hope not. In that respect, I find myself in complete
  155. agreement with Justice Scalia.
  156. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  157. But new technological possibilities for seeing your accuser
  158. clearly without having your accuser see you at all -- possibilities
  159. for sparing the accuser any discomfort in ways that the accuser
  160. couldn't be spared before one-way mirrors or closed-circuit TVs
  161. were developed -- *should* lead us at least to ask ourselves whether
  162. *two*-way confrontation, in which your accuser is supposed to be made
  163. uncomfortable, and thus less likely to lie, really *is* the core
  164. value of the Confrontation Clause. If so, "virtual" confrontation
  165. should be held constitutionally insufficient. If not -- if the
  166. core value served by the Confrontation Clause is just the ability
  167. to *watch* your accuser say that you did it -- then "virtual"
  168. confrontation should suffice. New technologies should lead us to
  169. look more closely at just *what values* the Constitution seeks to
  170. preserve. New technologies should *not* lead us to react reflexively
  171. *either way* -- either by assuming that technologies the Framers
  172. didn't know about make their concerns and values obsolete, or by
  173. assuming that those new technologies couldn't possibly provide new
  174. ways out of old dilemmas and therefore should be ignored
  175. altogether.
  176.  
  177. The one-way mirror yields a fitting metaphor for the task we
  178. confront. As the Supreme Court said in a different context several
  179. years ago, "The mirror image presented [here] requires us to step
  180. through an analytical looking glass to resolve it." (*NCAA v.
  181. Tarkanian*, 109 S. Ct. at 462.) The world in which the Sixth
  182. Amendment's Confrontation Clause was written and ratified was a
  183. world in which "being confronted with" your accuser *necessarily*
  184. meant a simultaneous physical confrontation so that your accuser
  185. had to *perceive* you being accused by him. Closed-circuit
  186. television and one-way mirrors changed all that by *decoupling* those
  187. two dimensions of confrontation, marking a shift in the conditions of
  188. information-transfer that is in many ways typical of cyberspace.
  189. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  190. What does that sort of shift mean for constitutional analysis?
  191. A common way to react is to treat the pattern as it existed *prior*
  192. to the new technology (the pattern in which doing "A" necessarily
  193. *included* doing "B") as essentially arbitrary or accidental. Taking
  194. this approach, once the technological change makes it possible to
  195. do "A" *without* "B" -- to see your accuser without having him or her
  196. see you, or to read someone's mail without her knowing it, to
  197. switch examples -- one concludes that the "old" Constitution's
  198. inclusion of "B" is irrelevant; one concludes that it is enough for
  199. the government to guarantee "A" alone. Sometimes that will be the
  200. case; but it's vital to understand that, sometimes, it won't be.
  201.  
  202. A characteristic feature of modernity is the subordination of
  203. purpose to accident -- an acute appreciation of just how contingent
  204. and coincidental the connections we are taught to make often are.
  205. We understand, as moderns, that many of the ways we carve up and
  206. organize the world reflect what our social history and cultural
  207. heritage, and perhaps our neurological wiring, bring to the world,
  208. and not some irreducible "way things are." A wonderful example
  209. comes from a 1966 essay by Jorge Louis Borges, "Other
  210. Inquisitions." There, the essayist describes the following
  211. taxonomy of the animal kingdom, which he purports to trace to an
  212. ancient Chinese encyclopedia entitled *The Celestial Emporium of
  213. Benevolent Knowledge*:
  214. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  215. On those remote pages it is written that animals are
  216. divided into:
  217.  
  218. (a) those belonging to the Emperor
  219. (b) those that are embalmed
  220. (c) those that are trained
  221. (d) suckling pigs
  222. (e) mermaids
  223. (f) fabulous ones
  224. (g) stray dogs
  225. (h) those that are included in this classification
  226. (i) those that tremble as if they were mad
  227. (j) innumerable ones
  228. (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush
  229. (l) others
  230. (m) those that have just broken a water pitcher
  231. (n) those that, from a great distance, resemble flies
  232.  
  233. Contemporary writers from Michel Foucault, in *The Archaeology
  234. of Knowledge*, through George Lakoff, in *Women, Fire, and Dangerous
  235. Things*, use Borges' Chinese encyclopedia to illustrate a range of
  236. different propositions, but the *core* proposition is the supposed
  237. arbitrariness -- the political character, in a sense -- of all
  238. culturally imposed categories.
  239.  
  240. At one level, that proposition expresses a profound truth and
  241. may encourage humility by combating cultural imperialism. At
  242. another level, though, the proposition tells a dangerous lie: it
  243. suggests that we have descended into the nihilism that so obsessed
  244. Nietzsche and other thinkers -- a world where *everything* is
  245. relative, all lines are up for grabs, all principles and
  246. connections are just matters of purely subjective preference or,
  247. worse still, arbitrary convention. Whether we believe that killing
  248. animals for food is wrong, for example, becomes a question
  249. indistinguishable from whether we happen to enjoy eating beans,
  250. rice and tofu.
  251.  
  252. This is a particularly pernicious notion in a era when we pass
  253. more and more of our lives in cyberspace, a place where, almost by
  254. definition, our most familiar landmarks are rearranged or disappear
  255. altogether -- because there is a pervasive tendency, even (and
  256. perhaps especially) among the most enlightened, to forget that the
  257. human values and ideals to which we commit ourselves may indeed be
  258. universal and need not depend on how our particular cultures, or
  259. our latest technologies, carve up the universe we inhabit. It was
  260. my very wise colleague from Yale, the late Art Leff, who once
  261. observed that, even in a world without an agreed-upon God, we can
  262. still agree -- even if we can't "prove" mathematically -- that
  263. "napalming babies is wrong."
  264.  
  265. The Constitution's core values, I'm convinced, need not be
  266. transmogrified, or metamorphosed into oblivion, in the dim recesses
  267. of cyberspace. But to say that they *need* not be lost there is
  268. hardly to predict that they *will* not be. On the contrary, without
  269. further thought and awareness of the kind this conference might
  270. provide, the danger is clear and present that they *will* be.
  271.  
  272. The "event horizon" against which this transformation might
  273. occur is already plainly visible:
  274.  
  275. Electronic trespassers like Kevin Mitnik don't stop with
  276. cracking pay phones, but break into NORAD -- the North American
  277. Defense Command computer in Colorado Springs -- not in a *WarGames*
  278. movie, but in real life.
  279.  
  280. Less challenging to national security but more ubiquitously
  281. threatening, computer crackers download everyman's credit history
  282. >from institutions like TRW; start charging phone calls (and more)
  283. to everyman's number; set loose "worm" programs that shut down
  284. thousands of linked computers; and spread "computer viruses"
  285. through everyman's work or home PC.
  286. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  287. It is not only the government that feels threatened by
  288. "computer crime"; both the owners and the users of private
  289. information services, computer bulletin boards, gateways, and
  290. networks feel equally vulnerable to this new breed of invisible
  291. trespasser. The response from the many who sense danger has been
  292. swift, and often brutal, as a few examples illustrate.
  293.  
  294. Last March, U.S. Secret Service agents staged a surprise raid
  295. on Steve Jackson Games, a small games manufacturer in
  296. Austin, Texas, and seized all paper and electronic drafts of its
  297. newest fantasy role-playing game, *GURPS[reg.t.m.] Cyberpunk*,
  298. calling the game a "handbook for computer crime."
  299. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  300. By last Spring, up to one quarter of the U.S. Treasury
  301. Department's investigators had become involved in a project of
  302. eavesdropping on computer bulletin boards, apparently tracking
  303. notorious hackers like "Acid Phreak" and "Phiber Optik" through
  304. what one journalist dubbed "the dark canyons of cyberspace."
  305.  
  306. Last May, in the now famous (or infamous) "Operation Sun Devil,"
  307. more than 150 secret service agents teamed up with state
  308. and local law enforcement agencies, and with security personnel
  309. >from AT&T, American Express, U.S. Sprint, and a number of the
  310. regional Bell telephone companies, armed themselves with over two
  311. dozen search warrants and more than a few guns, and seized 42
  312. computers and 23,000 floppy discs in 14 cities from New York to
  313. Texas. Their target: a loose-knit group of people in their teens
  314. and twenties, dubbed the "Legion of Doom."
  315.  
  316. I am not describing an Indiana Jones movie. I'm talking about
  317. America in the 1990s.
  318.  
  319. The Problem
  320.  
  321. The Constitution's architecture can too easily come to seem
  322. quaintly irrelevant, or at least impossible to take very seriously,
  323. in the world as reconstituted by the microchip. I propose today to
  324. canvass five axioms of our constitutional law -- five basic
  325. assumptions that I believe shape the way American constitutional
  326. scholars and judges view legal issues -- and to examine how they
  327. can adapt to the cyberspace age. My conclusion (and I will try not
  328. to give away too much of the punch line here) is that the Framers
  329. of our Constitution were very wise indeed. They bequeathed us a
  330. framework for all seasons, a truly astonishing document whose
  331. principles are suitable for all times and all technological
  332. landscapes.
  333. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  334.  
  335. Axiom 1:
  336. There is a Vital Difference
  337. *Between Government and Private Action*
  338.  
  339. The first axiom I will discuss is the proposition that the
  340. Constitution, with the sole exception of the Thirteenth Amendment
  341. prohibiting slavery, regulates action by the *government* rather than
  342. the conduct of *private* individuals and groups. In an article I
  343. wrote in the Harvard Law Review in November 1989 on "The Curvature
  344. of Constitutional Space," I discussed the Constitution's
  345. metaphor-morphosis from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian and
  346. Heisenbergian paradigm. It was common, early in our history, to
  347. see the Constitution as "Newtonian in design with its carefully
  348. counterpoised forces and counterforces, its [geographical and
  349. institutional] checks and balances." (103 *Harv. L. Rev.* at 3.)
  350.  
  351. Indeed, in many ways contemporary constitutional law is still
  352. trapped within and stunted by that paradigm. But today at least
  353. some post-modern constitutionalists tend to think and talk in the
  354. language of relativity, quantum mechanics, and chaos theory. This
  355. may quite naturally suggest to some observers that the
  356. Constitution's basic strategy of decentralizing and diffusing power
  357. by constraining and fragmenting governmental authority in
  358. particular has been rendered obsolete.
  359.  
  360. The institutional separation of powers among the three federal
  361. branches of government, the geographical division of authority
  362. between the federal government and the fifty state governments, the
  363. recognition of national boundaries, and, above all, the sharp
  364. distinction between the public and private spheres, become easy to
  365. deride as relics of a simpler, pre-computer age. Thus Eli Noam, in
  366. the First Ithiel de Sola Pool Memorial Lecture, delivered last
  367. October at MIT, notes that computer networks and network
  368. associations acquire quasi-governmental powers as they necessarily
  369. take on such tasks as mediating their members' conflicting
  370. interests, establishing cost shares, creating their own rules of
  371. admission and access and expulsion, even establishing their own *de
  372. facto* taxing mechanisms. In Professor Noam's words, "networks
  373. become political entities," global nets that respect no state or
  374. local boundaries. Restrictions on the use of information in one
  375. country (to protect privacy, for example) tend to lead to export of
  376. that information to other countries, where it can be analyzed and
  377. then used on a selective basis in the country attempting to
  378. restrict it. "Data havens" reminiscent of the role played by the
  379. Swiss in banking may emerge, with few restrictions on the storage
  380. and manipulation of information.
  381.  
  382. A tempting conclusion is that, to protect the free speech and
  383. other rights of *users* in such private networks, judges must treat
  384. these networks not as associations that have rights of their own
  385. *against* the government but as virtual "governments" in themselves
  386. -- as entities against which individual rights must be defended in
  387. the Constitution's name. Such a conclusion would be misleadingly
  388. simplistic. There are circumstances, of course, when
  389. non-governmental bodies like privately owned "company towns" or
  390. even huge shopping malls should be subjected to legislative and
  391. administrative controls by democratically accountable entities, or
  392. even to judicial controls as though they were arms of the state --
  393. but that may be as true (or as false) of multinational corporations
  394. or foundations, or transnational religious organizations, or even
  395. small-town communities, as it is of computer-mediated networks.
  396. It's a fallacy to suppose that, just because a computer bulletin
  397. board or network or gateway is *something like* a shopping mall,
  398. government has as much constitutional duty -- or even authority --
  399. to guarantee open public access to such a network as it has to
  400. guarantee open public access to a privately owned shopping center
  401. like the one involved in the U.S. Supreme Court's famous *PruneYard
  402. Shopping Center* decision of 1980, arising from nearby San Jose.
  403.  
  404. The rules of law, both statutory and judge-made, through which
  405. each state *allocates* private powers and responsibilities themselves
  406. represent characteristic forms of government action. That's why a
  407. state's rules for imposing liability on private publishers, or for
  408. deciding which private contracts to enforce and which ones to
  409. invalidate, are all subject to scrutiny for their consistency with
  410. the federal Constitution. But as a general proposition it is only
  411. what *governments* do, either through such rules or through the
  412. actions of public officials, that the United States Constitution
  413. constrains. And nothing about any new technology suddenly erases
  414. the Constitution's enduring value of restraining *government* above
  415. all else, and of protecting all private groups, large and small,
  416. >from government.
  417.  
  418. It's true that certain technologies may become socially
  419. indispensable -- so that equal or at least minimal access to basic
  420. computer power, for example, might be as significant a
  421. constitutional goal as equal or at least minimal access to the
  422. franchise, or to dispute resolution through the judicial system,
  423. or to elementary and secondary education. But all this means (or
  424. should mean) is that the Constitution's constraints on government
  425. must at times take the form of imposing *affirmative duties* to
  426. assure access rather than merely enforcing *negative prohibitions*
  427. against designated sorts of invasion or intrusion.
  428.  
  429. Today, for example, the government is under an affirmative
  430. obligation to open up criminal trials to the press and the public,
  431. at least where there has not been a particularized finding that
  432. such openness would disrupt the proceedings. The government is
  433. also under an affirmative obligation to provide free legal
  434. assistance for indigent criminal defendants, to assure speedy
  435. trials, to underwrite the cost of counting ballots at election
  436. time, and to desegregate previously segregated school systems. But
  437. these occasional affirmative obligations don't, or shouldn't, mean
  438. that the Constitution's axiomatic division between the realm of
  439. public power and the realm of private life should be jettisoned.
  440.  
  441. Nor would the "indispensability" of information technologies
  442. provide a license for government to impose strict content, access,
  443. pricing, and other types of regulation. *Books* are indispensable to
  444. most of us, for example -- but it doesn't follow that government
  445. should therefore be able to regulate the content of what goes onto
  446. the shelves of *bookstores*. The right of a private bookstore owner
  447. to decide which books to stock and which to discard, which books to
  448. display openly and which to store in limited access areas, should
  449. remain inviolate. And note, incidentally, that this needn't make
  450. the bookstore owner a "publisher" who is liable for the words
  451. printed in the books on her shelves. It's a common fallacy to
  452. imagine that the moment a computer gateway or bulletin board begins
  453. to exercise powers of selection to control who may be on line, it
  454. must automatically assume the responsibilities of a newscaster, a
  455. broadcaster, or an author. For computer gateways and bulletin
  456. boards are really the "bookstores" of cyberspace; most of them
  457. organize and present information in a computer format, rather than
  458. generating more information content of their own.
  459.  
  460.  
  461. Axiom 2:
  462. The Constitutional Boundaries of Private Property
  463. and Personality Depend on Variables Deeper Than
  464. *Social Utility and Technological Feasibility*
  465.  
  466. The second constitutional axiom, one closely related to the
  467. private-public distinction of the first axiom, is that a person's
  468. mind, body, and property belong *to that person* and not to the
  469. public as a whole. Some believe that cyberspace challenges that
  470. axiom because its entire premise lies in the existence of computers
  471. tied to electronic transmission networks that process digital
  472. information. Because such information can be easily replicated in
  473. series of "1"s and "0"s, anything that anyone has come up with in
  474. virtual reality can be infinitely reproduced. I can log on to a
  475. computer library, copy a "virtual book" to my computer disk, and
  476. send a copy to your computer without creating a gap on anyone's
  477. bookshelf. The same is true of valuable computer programs, costing
  478. hundreds of dollars, creating serious piracy problems. This
  479. feature leads some, like Richard Stallman of the Free Software
  480. Foundation, to argue that in cyberspace everything should be free
  481. -- that information can't be owned. Others, of course, argue that
  482. copyright and patent protections of various kinds are needed in
  483. order for there to be incentives to create "cyberspace property" in
  484. the first place.
  485.  
  486. Needless to say, there are lively debates about what the
  487. optimal incentive package should be as a matter of legislative and
  488. social policy. But the only *constitutional* issue, at bottom, isn't
  489. the utilitarian or instrumental selection of an optimal policy.
  490. Social judgments about what ought to be subject to individual
  491. appropriation, in the sense used by John Locke and Robert Nozick,
  492. and what ought to remain in the open public domain, are first and
  493. foremost *political* decisions.
  494.  
  495. To be sure, there are some constitutional constraints on these
  496. political decisions. The Constitution does not permit anything and
  497. everything to be made into a *private commodity*. Votes, for
  498. example, theoretically cannot be bought and sold. Whether the
  499. Constitution itself should be read (or amended) so as to permit all
  500. basic medical care, shelter, nutrition, legal assistance and,
  501. indeed, computerized information services, to be treated as mere
  502. commodities, available only to the highest bidder, are all terribly
  503. hard questions -- as the Eastern Europeans are now discovering as
  504. they attempt to draft their own constitutions. But these are not
  505. questions that should ever be confused with issues of what is
  506. technologically possible, about what is realistically enforceable,
  507. or about what is socially desirable.
  508.  
  509. Similarly, the Constitution does not permit anything and
  510. everything to be *socialized* and made into a public good available
  511. to whoever needs or "deserves" it most. I would hope, for example,
  512. that the government could not use its powers of eminent domain to
  513. "take" live body parts like eyes or kidneys or brain tissue for
  514. those who need transplants and would be expected to lead
  515. particularly productive lives. In any event, I feel certain that
  516. whatever constitutional right each of us has to inhabit his or her
  517. own body and to hold onto his or her own thoughts and creations
  518. should not depend solely on cost-benefit calculations, or on the
  519. availability of technological methods for painlessly effecting
  520. transfers or for creating good artificial substitutes.
  521.  
  522. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  523. Axiom 3:
  524. *Government May Not Control Information Content*
  525.  
  526. A third constitutional axiom, like the first two, reflects a
  527. deep respect for the integrity of each individual and a healthy
  528. skepticism toward government. The axiom is that, although
  529. information and ideas have real effects in the social world, it's
  530. not up to government to pick and choose for us in terms of the
  531. *content* of that information or the *value* of those ideas.
  532.  
  533. This notion is sometimes mistakenly reduced to the naive
  534. child's ditty that "sticks and stones may break my bones, but words
  535. can never hurt me." Anybody who's ever been called something awful
  536. by children in a schoolyard knows better than to believe any such
  537. thing. The real basis for First Amendment values isn't the false
  538. premise that information and ideas have no real impact, but the
  539. belief that information and ideas are *too important* to entrust to
  540. any government censor or overseer.
  541.  
  542. If we keep that in mind, and *only* if we keep that in mind,
  543. will we be able to see through the tempting argument that, in the
  544. Information Age, free speech is a luxury we can no longer afford.
  545. That argument becomes especially tempting in the context of
  546. cyberspace, where sequences of "0"s and "1"s may become virtual
  547. life forms. Computer "viruses" roam the information nets,
  548. attaching themselves to various programs and screwing up computer
  549. facilities. Creation of a computer virus involves writing a
  550. program; the program then replicates itself and mutates. The
  551. electronic code involved is very much like DNA. If information
  552. content is "speech," and if the First Amendment is to apply in
  553. cyberspace, then mustn't these viruses be "speech" -- and mustn't
  554. their writing and dissemination be constitutionally protected? To
  555. avoid that nightmarish outcome, mustn't we say that the First
  556. Amendment is *inapplicable* to cyberspace?
  557.  
  558. The answer is no. Speech is protected, but deliberately
  559. yelling "Boo!" at a cardiac patient may still be prosecuted as
  560. murder. Free speech is a constitutional right, but handing a bank
  561. teller a hold-up note that says, "Your money or your life," may
  562. still be punished as robbery. Stealing someone's diary may be
  563. punished as theft -- even if you intend to publish it in book form.
  564. And the Supreme Court, over the past fifteen years, has gradually
  565. brought advertising within the ambit of protected expression
  566. without preventing the government from protecting consumers from
  567. deceptive advertising. The lesson, in short, is that
  568. constitutional principles are subtle enough to bend to such
  569. concerns. They needn't be broken or tossed out.
  570.  
  571.  
  572. Axiom 4:
  573. The Constitution is Founded on Normative
  574. Conceptions of Humanity That Advances
  575. *in Science and Technology Cannot "Disprove"*
  576.  
  577. A fourth constitutional axiom is that the human spirit is
  578. something beyond a physical information processor. That axiom,
  579. which regards human thought processes as not fully reducible to the
  580. operations of a computer program, however complex, must not be
  581. confused with the silly view that, because computer operations
  582. involve nothing more than the manipulation of "on" and "off" states
  583. of myriad microchips, it somehow follows that government control or
  584. outright seizure of computers and computer programs threatens no
  585. First Amendment rights because human thought processes are not
  586. directly involved. To say that would be like saying that
  587. government confiscation of a newspaper's printing press and
  588. tomorrow morning's copy has nothing to do with speech but involves
  589. only a taking of metal, paper, and ink. Particularly if the seizure
  590. or the regulation is triggered by the content of the information
  591. being processed or transmitted, the First Amendment is of course
  592. fully involved. Yet this recognition that information processing
  593. by computer entails something far beyond the mere sequencing of
  594. mechanical or chemical steps still leaves a potential gap between
  595. what computers can do internally and in communication with one
  596. another -- and what goes on within and between human minds. It is
  597. that gap to which this fourth axiom is addressed; the very
  598. existence of any such gap is, as I'm sure you know, a matter of
  599. considerable controversy.
  600.  
  601. What if people like the mathematician and physicist Roger
  602. Penrose, author of *The Emperor's New Mind*, are wrong about human
  603. minds? In that provocative recent book, Penrose disagrees with
  604. those Artificial Intelligence, or AI, gurus who insist that it's
  605. only a matter of time until human thought and feeling can be
  606. perfectly simulated or even replicated by a series of purely
  607. physical operations -- that it's all just neurons firing and
  608. neurotransmitters flowing, all subject to perfect modeling in
  609. suitable computer systems. Would an adherent of that AI orthodoxy,
  610. someone whom Penrose fails to persuade, have to reject as
  611. irrelevant for cyberspace those constitutional protections that
  612. rest on the anti-AI premise that minds are *not* reducible to really
  613. fancy computers?
  614.  
  615. Consider, for example, the Fifth Amendment, which provides
  616. that "no person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to
  617. be a witness against himself." The Supreme Court has long held
  618. that suspects may be required, despite this protection, to provide
  619. evidence that is not "testimonial" in nature -- blood samples, for
  620. instance, or even exemplars of one's handwriting or voice. Last
  621. year, in a case called *Pennsylvania v. Muniz*, the Supreme Court
  622. held that answers to even simple questions like "When was your
  623. sixth birthday?" are testimonial because such a question, however
  624. straightforward, nevertheless calls for the product of mental
  625. activity and therefore uses the suspect's mind against him. But
  626. what if science could eventually describe thinking as a process no
  627. more complex than, say, riding a bike or digesting a meal? Might
  628. the progress of neurobiology and computer science eventually
  629. overthrow the premises of the *Muniz* decision?
  630.  
  631. I would hope not. For the Constitution's premises, properly
  632. understood, are *normative* rather than *descriptive*. The philosopher
  633. David Hume was right in teaching that no "ought" can ever be
  634. logically derived from an "is." If we should ever abandon the
  635. Constitution's protection for the distinctively and universally
  636. human, it won't be because robotics or genetic engineering or
  637. computer science have led us to deeper truths, but rather because
  638. they have seduced us into more profound confusions. Science and
  639. technology open options, create possibilities, suggest
  640. incompatibilities, generate threats. They do not alter what is
  641. "right" or what is "wrong." The fact that those notions are
  642. elusive and subject to endless debate need not make them totally
  643. contingent on contemporary technology.
  644.  
  645.  
  646. Axiom 5:
  647. Constitutional Principles Should Not
  648. *Vary With Accidents of Technology*
  649.  
  650. In a sense, that's the fifth and final constitutional axiom I
  651. would urge upon this gathering: that the Constitution's norms, at
  652. their deepest level, must be invariant under merely *technological*
  653. transformations. Our constitutional law evolves through judicial
  654. interpretation, case by case, in a process of reasoning by analogy
  655. >from precedent. At its best, that process is ideally suited to
  656. seeing beneath the surface and extracting deeper principles from
  657. prior decisions. At its worst, though, the same process can get
  658. bogged down in superficial aspects of preexisting examples,
  659. fixating upon unessential features while overlooking underlying
  660. principles and values.
  661.  
  662. When the Supreme Court in 1928 first confronted wiretapping
  663. and held in *Olmstead v. United States* that such wiretapping
  664. involved no "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
  665. Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
  666. the majority of the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
  667. "itself shows that the search is to be of material things -- the
  668. person, the house, his papers or his effects," and said that "there
  669. was no searching" when a suspect's phone was tapped because the
  670. Constitution's language "cannot be extended and expanded to include
  671. telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's
  672. house or office." After all, said the Court, the intervening wires
  673. "are not part of his house or office any more than are the highways
  674. along which they are stretched." Even to a law student in the
  675. 1960s, as you might imagine, that "reasoning" seemed amazingly
  676. artificial. Yet the *Olmstead* doctrine still survived.
  677.  
  678. It would be illuminating at this point to compare the Supreme
  679. Court's initial reaction to new technology in *Olmstead* with its
  680. initial reaction to new technology in *Maryland v. Craig*, the 1990
  681. closed-circuit television case with which we began this discussion.
  682. In *Craig*, a majority of the Justices assumed that, when the 18th-
  683. century Framers of the Confrontation Clause included a guarantee of
  684. two-way *physical* confrontation, they did so solely because it had
  685. not yet become technologically feasible for the accused to look his
  686. accuser in the eye without having the accuser simultaneously watch
  687. the accused. Given that this technological obstacle has been
  688. removed, the majority assumed, one-way confrontation is now
  689. sufficient. It is enough that the accused not be subject to
  690. criminal conviction on the basis of statements made outside his
  691. presence.
  692.  
  693. In *Olmstead*, a majority of the Justices assumed that, when the
  694. 18th-century authors of the Fourth Amendment used language that
  695. sounded "physical" in guaranteeing against invasions of a person's
  696. dwelling or possessions, they did so not solely because *physical*
  697. invasions were at that time the only serious threats to personal
  698. privacy, but for the separate and distinct reason that *intangible*
  699. invasions simply would not threaten any relevant dimension of
  700. Fourth Amendment privacy.
  701.  
  702. In a sense, *Olmstead* mindlessly read a new technology *out* of
  703. the Constitution, while *Craig* absent-mindedly read a new technology
  704. *into* the Constitution. But both decisions -- *Olmstead* and *Craig* --
  705. had the structural effect of withholding the protections of the
  706. Bill of Rights from threats made possible by new information
  707. technologies. *Olmstead* did so by implausibly reading the
  708. Constitution's text as though it represented a deliberate decision
  709. not to extend protection to threats that 18th-century thinkers
  710. simply had not foreseen. *Craig* did so by somewhat more plausibly
  711. -- but still unthinkingly -- treating the Constitution's seemingly
  712. explicit coupling of two analytically distinct protections as
  713. reflecting a failure of technological foresight and imagination,
  714. rather than a deliberate value choice.
  715.  
  716. The *Craig* majority's approach appears to have been driven in
  717. part by an understandable sense of how a new information technology
  718. could directly protect a particularly sympathetic group, abused
  719. children, from a traumatic trial experience. The *Olmstead*
  720. majority's approach probably reflected both an exaggerated estimate
  721. of how difficult it would be to obtain wiretapping warrants even
  722. where fully justified, and an insufficient sense of how a new
  723. information technology could directly threaten all of us. Although
  724. both *Craig* and *Olmstead* reveal an inadequate consciousness about
  725. how new technologies interact with old values, *Craig* at least seems
  726. defensible even if misguided, while *Olmstead* seems just plain
  727. wrong.
  728.  
  729. Around 23 years ago, as a then-recent law school graduate
  730. serving as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, I
  731. found myself working on a case involving the government's
  732. electronic surveillance of a suspected criminal -- in the form of
  733. a tiny device attached to the outside of a public telephone booth.
  734. Because the invasion of the suspect's privacy was accomplished
  735. without physical trespass into a "constitutionally protected area,"
  736. the Federal Government argued, relying on *Olmstead*, that there had
  737. been no "search" or "seizure," and therefore that the Fourth
  738. Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
  739. houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
  740. seizures," simply did not apply.
  741.  
  742. At first, there were only four votes to overrule *Olmstead* and
  743. to hold the Fourth Amendment applicable to wiretapping and
  744. electronic eavesdropping. I'm proud to say that, as a 26-year-old
  745. kid, I had at least a little bit to do with changing that number
  746. >from four to seven -- and with the argument, formally adopted by a
  747. seven-Justice majority in December 1967, that the Fourth Amendment
  748. "protects people, not places." (389 U.S. at 351.) In that
  749. decision, *Katz v. United States*, the Supreme Court finally
  750. repudiated *Olmstead* and the many decisions that had relied upon it
  751. and reasoned that, given the role of electronic telecommunications
  752. in modern life, the First Amendment purposes of protecting *free
  753. speech* as well as the Fourth Amendment purposes of protecting
  754. *privacy* require treating as a "search" any invasion of a person's
  755. confidential telephone communications, with or without physical
  756. trespass.
  757.  
  758. Sadly, nine years later, in *Smith v. Maryland*, the Supreme
  759. Court retreated from the *Katz* principle by holding that no search
  760. occurs and therefore no warrant is needed when police, with the
  761. assistance of the telephone company, make use of a "pen register",
  762. a mechanical device placed on someone's phone line that records all
  763. numbers dialed from the phone and the times of dialing. The
  764. Supreme Court, over the dissents of Justices Stewart, Brennan, and
  765. Marshall, found no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers
  766. dialed, reasoning that the digits one dials are routinely recorded
  767. by the phone company for billing purposes. As Justice Stewart, the
  768. author of *Katz*, aptly pointed out, "that observation no more than
  769. describes the basic nature of telephone calls . . . . It is simply
  770. not enough to say, after *Katz*, that there is no legitimate
  771. expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because the caller
  772. assumes the risk that the telephone company will expose them to the
  773. police." (442 U.S. at 746-747.) Today, the logic of *Smith* is
  774. being used to say that people have no expectation of privacy when
  775. they use their cordless telephones since they know or should know
  776. that radio waves can be easily monitored!
  777.  
  778. It is easy to be pessimistic about the way in which the
  779. Supreme Court has reacted to technological change. In many
  780. respects, *Smith* is unfortunately more typical than *Katz* of the way
  781. the Court has behaved. For example, when movies were invented, and
  782. for several decades thereafter, the Court held that movie
  783. exhibitions were not entitled to First Amendment protection. When
  784. community access cable TV was born, the Court hindered municipal
  785. attempts to provide it at low cost by holding that rules requiring
  786. landlords to install small cable boxes on their apartment buildings
  787. amounted to a compensable taking of property. And in *Red Lion v.
  788. FCC*, decided twenty-two years ago but still not repudiated today,
  789. the Court ratified government control of TV and radio broadcast
  790. content with the dubious logic that the scarcity of the
  791. electromagnetic spectrum justified not merely government policies
  792. to auction off, randomly allocate, or otherwise ration the spectrum
  793. according to neutral rules, but also much more intrusive and
  794. content-based government regulation in the form of the so-called
  795. "fairness doctrine."
  796.  
  797. Although the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
  798. taken a somewhat more enlightened approach in dealing with cable
  799. television, these decisions for the most part reveal a curious
  800. judicial blindness, as if the Constitution had to be reinvented
  801. with the birth of each new technology. Judges interpreting a late
  802. 18th century Bill of Rights tend to forget that, unless its *terms*
  803. are read in an evolving and dynamic way, its *values* will lose even
  804. the *static* protection they once enjoyed. Ironically, *fidelity* to
  805. original values requires *flexibility* of textual interpretation. It
  806. was Judge Robert Bork, not famous for his flexibility, who once
  807. urged this enlightened view upon then Judge (now Justice) Scalia,
  808. when the two of them sat as colleagues on the U.S. Court of Appeals
  809. for the D.C. Circuit.
  810.  
  811. Judicial error in this field tends to take the form of saying
  812. that, by using modern technology ranging from the telephone to the
  813. television to computers, we "assume the risk." But that typically
  814. begs the question. Justice Harlan, in a dissent penned two decades
  815. ago, wrote: "Since it is the task of the law to form and project,
  816. as well as mirror and reflect, we should not . . . merely recite .
  817. . . risks without examining the *desirability* of saddling them upon
  818. society." (*United States v. White*, 401 U.S. at 786). And, I would
  819. add, we should not merely recite risks without examining how
  820. imposing those risks comports with the Constitution's fundamental
  821. values of *freedom*, *privacy*, and *equality*.
  822.  
  823. Failing to examine just that issue is the basic error I
  824. believe federal courts and Congress have made:
  825.  
  826. * in regulating radio and TV broadcasting without
  827. adequate sensitivity to First Amendment values;
  828.  
  829. * in supposing that the selection and editing of
  830. video programs by cable operators might be less
  831. than a form of expression;
  832.  
  833. * in excluding telephone companies from cable and
  834. other information markets;
  835.  
  836. * in assuming that the processing of "O"s and "1"s
  837. by computers as they exchange data with one
  838. another is something less than "speech"; and
  839.  
  840. * in generally treating information processed
  841. electronically as though it were somehow less
  842. entitled to protection for that reason.
  843.  
  844. The lesson to be learned is that these choices and these
  845. mistakes are not dictated by the Constitution. They are decisions
  846. for us to make in interpreting that majestic charter, and in
  847. implementing the principles that the Constitution establishes.
  848.  
  849.  
  850. *Conclusion*
  851.  
  852. If my own life as a lawyer and legal scholar could leave just
  853. one legacy, I'd like it to be the recognition that the Constitution
  854. *as a whole* "protects people, not places." If that is to come
  855. about, the Constitution as a whole must be read through a
  856. technologically transparent lens. That is, we must embrace, as a
  857. rule of construction or interpretation, a principle one might call
  858. the "cyberspace corollary." It would make a suitable
  859. Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution, one befitting the
  860. 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights. Whether adopted all at
  861. once as a constitutional amendment, or accepted gradually as a
  862. principle of interpretation that I believe should obtain even
  863. without any formal change in the Constitution's language, the
  864. corollary I would propose would do for *technology* in 1991 what I
  865. believe the Constitution's Ninth Amendment, adopted in 1791, was
  866. meant to do for *text*.
  867. The Ninth Amendment says: "The enumeration in the
  868. Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
  869. disparage others retained by the people." That amendment provides
  870. added support for the long-debated, but now largely accepted,
  871. "right of privacy" that the Supreme Court recognized in such
  872. decisions as the famous birth control case of 1965, *Griswold v.
  873. Connecticut*. The Ninth Amendment's simple message is: The *text*
  874. used by the Constitution's authors and ratifiers does not exhaust
  875. the values our Constitution recognizes. Perhaps a Twenty-seventh
  876. Amendment could convey a parallel and equally simple message: The
  877. *technologies* familiar to the Constitution's authors and ratifiers
  878. similarly do not exhaust the *threats* against which the
  879. Constitution's core values must be protected.
  880. The most recent amendment, the twenty-sixth, adopted in 1971,
  881. extended the vote to 18-year-olds. It would be fitting, in a world
  882. where youth has been enfranchised, for a twenty-seventh amendment
  883. to spell a kind of "childhood's end" for constitutional law. The
  884. Twenty-seventh Amendment, to be proposed for at least serious
  885. debate in 1991, would read simply:
  886.  
  887. "This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of
  888. speech, press, petition, and assembly, and its
  889. protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
  890. and the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
  891. due process of law, shall be construed as fully
  892. applicable without regard to the technological method or
  893. medium through which information content is generated,
  894. stored, altered, transmitted, or controlled."
  895. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  896. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
  897. http://adf.ly/TGowQ
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