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Russia and the West (Political Science)

Mar 15th, 2017
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  1. Introduction
  2.  
  3. The relationship between Russia and the West has always been a complicated one. Any discussion of the topic must begin with definitions. While Russia is a country and therefore can be identified fairly straightforwardly, the West is a much more elusive concept that only comes into view when viewed in relation to some other concept, such as the East or the Orient. European intellectuals have long juxtaposed Russia with the West, arguing that Russian values were not Western and therefore Russia could not be part of the West. At the same time, the majority of Russian thinkers and politicians have either sought to push Russia to develop in ways that would allow it to be incorporated into the West or declared that Russia is already part of the West. Here, the West includes Europe and the United States, as these are the relevant Western actors for Russian foreign policy. Until the recent rise of China, interactions with the West have been the main focus of Russian foreign policy. Even when dealing with Africa or the Middle East, Russian elites saw Russian interests in these regions as reflecting Russia’s more significant foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Western states. To this end, three relationships can be considered most crucial: those with the United States, NATO, and the European Union. Interactions with individual European countries largely reflect issues that arise in one or more of these three relationships, although the entry of a number of central European states into NATO and the EU have made these relationships more complicated over the last decade. The most significant issues in Russia’s relationship with the West include trade and energy exports, nuclear arms control and missile defense, and tensions over the extent to which Western human rights norms should trump the long-held international norm of sovereignty when the possibility of military intervention is considered.
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  5. General Overviews
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  7. There are a number of excellent late-20th- and 21st-century works that provide an introduction to the topic of Russian relations with Europe and the West. Trenin 2007 is the best short work that combines a thorough analysis of major themes with policy recommendations. The best introduction to the full historical range of developments in Russian foreign policy, beginning in the tsarist period and continuing through the present, may be found in Petro and Rubinstein 1997 and Donaldson and Nogee 2009. Tsygankov 2010 and Mankoff 2009 provide more detailed overviews of recent developments from a sympathetic and a critical perspective, respectively. Legvold 2007 is a selection of essays by security scholars that shows how Russian foreign policy fits into a historical context. Finally, Clunan 2009 and Lucas 2009 both focus on the importance for Russia of regaining lost status, though the former treats it as normal state behavior while the latter considers it a threat to the West.
  8.  
  9. Clunan, Anne L. The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
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  11. An identity-based account that shows how Russian foreign policy is based on a desire to restore its past status as an international power.
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  13. Donaldson, Robert, and Joseph Nogee. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009.
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  15. A wide-ranging introductory text that examines Russian foreign policy from the tsarist period through the present.
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  17. Legvold, Robert, ed. Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
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  19. A collection of essays by leading experts that places Russian foreign policy in a historical context.
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  21. Lucas, Edward. The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West. Rev. ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
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  23. Written by the former Russian correspondent for the Economist, this book stresses the potential danger of Russia’s resurgence to the West.
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  25. Mankoff, Jeffrey. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009.
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  27. An introductory text that focuses on diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Putin administration to restore Russia’s greatness and the impact of these initiatives on the Western world in general (and the United States in particular).
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  29. Petro, Nicolai N., and Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State. New York: Longman, 1997.
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  31. Provides an introduction to the major developments that have characterized the foreign policy of Russia during the tsarist, Soviet, and early post-Soviet periods.
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  33. Trenin, Dmitri V. Getting Russia Right. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007.
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  35. A short introduction from one of Russia’s leading foreign policy thinkers that focuses on how Russia is on a path to becoming a Western country without actually joining the West.
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  37. Tsygankov, Andrei P. Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. 2d ed. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010.
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  39. An excellent introductory text that covers Russian foreign policy from Gorbachev to Putin.
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  41. Journals
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  43. There are a number of excellent journals that routinely address relations between Russia and the West. The most respected Western academic journals include Europe-Asia Studies and Post-Soviet Affairs. Europe-Asia Studies is the successor to Soviet Studies, the long-running British journal with a focus on Russia. It presents articles on a variety of topics, including Russian foreign policy. Post-Soviet Affairs is also a wide-ranging journal, though focused primarily on Russia, rather than the wider post-Communist world. Problems of Post-Communism presents policy-oriented academic work on the region. Russian views are presented in English in Russia in Global Affairs and in Russian Politics and Law. The former focuses primarily on policy issues, while each issue of the latter examines a range of views on a specific theme. Eurasian Geography and Economics presents specialized articles on economics and especially energy issues, while Demokratizatsiya specializes in the efforts to transform Russia and the post-Communist region into democratic states.
  44.  
  45. Demokratizatsiya.
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  47. Articles on contemporary politics, with a focus on the transition to democratic rule in Russia and Eastern Europe. Demokratizatsiya describes itself as an international journal on post-Soviet democratization. It focuses on the end of the Soviet Union and the contemporary transformation of its successor states. Based at George Washington University.
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  49. Eurasian Geography and Economics.
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  51. The leading journal for articles focused on economic relations and geography, published by Bellwether Press. Has excellent coverage of issues related to energy. Formerly known as Soviet Geography from 1960 to 1992, then as Post-Soviet Geography from 1992 to 1995, and also as Post-Soviet Geography and Economics from 1996 to 2002.
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  53. Europe-Asia Studies.
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  55. The longest-running Soviet and post-Soviet studies journal, covering a variety of topics including history, politics, and economics. Based at Glasgow University in the United Kingdom. Known as Soviet Studies until 1992.
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  57. Post-Soviet Affairs.
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  59. The most prominent academic journal for scholars writing on the former Soviet Union, including the region’s politics, economics, and foreign policy. Based at the University of California, Berkeley.
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  61. Problems of Post-Communism.
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  63. Covers the contemporary societies of the Communist and post-Communist world, with a special focus on issues of interest to US foreign policy. The journal specializes in accessible and timely research on political, economic, and security-related developments in Europe and Asia, with a geographic span that includes Russia and China, central Europe and central Asia, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
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  65. Russia in Global Affairs.
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  67. Quarterly English-language Russian journal on foreign affairs and international relations. Models itself on Foreign Affairs and offers in-depth analyses on important security, economic, and social issues facing Russia and the world.
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  69. Russian Politics and Law.
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  71. This bimonthly journal publishes thematic issues featuring translations of some of the most important political science articles by authors working in the Soviet successor states. The materials selected include both articles examining the politics of the region and theoretical works of interest to the field as a whole.
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  73. Sources of Russian Foreign Policy
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  75. Russian foreign policy is fundamentally tied to Russia’s internal political development. Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet period presents some important continuities with the Soviet and Imperial periods, although liberal thinkers have repeatedly challenged the country’s leaders to transform its position in order to better face the challenges of the 21st century. At the same time, recent political events, including Russia’s relative weakness after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the transition to a market economy, have led to changes in Russian foreign policy. The events of the 1990s, gradually turned Russian elites away from their sympathy toward the West and have led to efforts to restore Russia’s “great power” status. There is ongoing debate in both the Russian and Western analyst communities on whether this shift will be beneficial or harmful to Russia’s long-term political development.
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  77. Historical Influences and Identity Formation
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  79. Scholars who write about Russian political culture often make implicit comparisons between Russia and the West. In a way, Russia and the West are complementary concepts, with each needing the other to exist. This is the argument made by Heller 2010. Neumann 1999 makes a related point, showing how Western ideas about Russia have changed over time. Mälksoo 2009 shows how European thinkers have sought to expand the concept of Europe to embrace more of Eastern Europe, though not going so far as to include Russia in this vision. Kotkin 2007 shows that most Western thinkers continue to think of Russia as Europe’s “other,” in this case by labeling it as part of Eurasia. Keenan 1986 provides a classic account of what is largely the consensus view of the nature of Russian political culture. However, this vision is not unchallenged, as both Miller 2011 and Trenin 2011 argue that this culture needs to be reinvented if Russia is to remain a successful state in the 21st century.
  80.  
  81. Heller, Peggy. “The Russian Dawn: How Russia Contributed to the Emergence of ‘the West’ as a Concept.” In The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy. Edited by Christopher S. Browning and Marko Lehti, 33–52. New York: Routledge, 2010.
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  83. Heller argues that interaction with Russia played a critical role in allowing European intellectuals to develop the West as a concept.
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  85. Keenan, Edward L. “Muscovite Political Folkways.” Russian Review 45.2 (1986): 115–181.
  86. DOI: 10.2307/130423Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  87. This classic article describes what Keenan sees as the enduring features of Russian political culture, focusing on the elements of traditionalism and stability.
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  89. Kotkin, Stephen. “Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance Across the Post-Mongol Space.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8.3 (2007): 487–531.
  90. DOI: 10.1353/kri.2007.0040Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  91. Kotkin seeks to characterize the nature of the post-Soviet space by critically assessing the uses and misuses of the term “Eurasia.”
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  93. Mälksoo, Maria. “The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe.” European Journal of International Relations 15.4 (2009): 653–680.
  94. DOI: 10.1177/1354066109345049Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  95. Examines attempts by Poland and the Baltics to enlarge the vision of Europe by counterposing their pasts to the conventional Western European understanding of the consequences of World War II in Europe.
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  97. Miller, Alexei. “The Labyrinths of Historical Policy.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.2 (2011): 61–74.
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  99. Shows how the relationship between history and politics in Russia has changed radically since the beginning of perestroika. The change in the discourse concerning the interpretation of history is linked to broader social and political transformation, during which the post-Soviet political agenda will give way to something different.
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  101. Neumann, Iver B. Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
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  103. Neumann examines how the East, including Russia, has been represented in European identity formation in different historical periods.
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  105. Trenin, Dmitri. Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011.
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  107. Author argues that Moscow needs to drop the notion of creating an exclusive power center out of the post-Soviet space and reinvent itself as a global player and as part of a wider community. Trenin sees Russia’s future as a Euro-Pacific country that is savvy in its use of soft power and fully reconciled with its former borderlands and dependents.
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  109. Internal Political Factors
  110.  
  111. There are a number of excellent studies of the domestic sources of Russian behavior toward the West. Malcolm, et al. 1996 provides a comprehensive account of the internal factors that affected Russia’s foreign policy in the early years of its post-Soviet independence. Shearman 2001 reviews a number of academic studies on this topic, with an emphasis on the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States. Ivanov 2002 presents an insider’s view of how Russia redefined its foreign policy in the 1990s. Zimmerman 2005 examines the extent to which ideas on economic development affect foreign policy orientations among Russian elites. Light 2000 and McFaul 1997–1998 also look at the role of ideas in foreign policy, concentrating on the role of liberal elites in ensuring that Russia largely refrained from engaging in conflicts with its neighbors during the turbulent 1990s. Graham 2010 brings this discussion forward to the Putin era, examining the impact of internal insecurity on the orientations of Russia’s foreign policy elites.
  112.  
  113. Graham, Thomas. “The Sources of Russia’s Insecurity.” Survival 52.1 (2010): 55–74.
  114. DOI: 10.1080/00396331003612471Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  115. Ensuring Russia’s survival and territorial integrity remains the top priority for Russia’s leaders, despite claims that Russia is again a great power. Russia is now surrounded by more dynamic states and regions, and these poles of power and attraction threaten to pull it apart over time. To survive, Russia must modernize.
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  117. Ivanov, Igor. The New Russian Diplomacy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2002.
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  119. In this volume, Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov describes the evolution of his country’s foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Drawing on Russia’s long diplomatic history, Ivanov analyzes the complex process through which a newly democratic Russia has redefined its foreign policy during a volatile transformation over the 1990s.
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  121. Light, Margot. “Democracy, Democratization, and Foreign Policy in Post-Socialist Russia.” In Democracy and International Relations: Critical Theories/Problematic Practices. Edited by Hazel Smith, 90–107. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000.
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  123. Light investigates the impact of Russian foreign policy on democratic peace theory, specifically by focusing on whether democratization has made Russia more or less war prone. She concludes that Russia has not become more war prone since becoming democratic.
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  125. Malcolm, Neil, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
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  127. Russia has emerged as a new and assertively independent force in world politics, in Europe and Asia, and especially in the other former Soviet states. This book provides the first systematic analysis of the domestic, political, military, and economic influences that shape Russia’s international behavior.
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  129. McFaul, Michael. “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy.” International Security 22.3 (1997–1998): 5–35.
  130. DOI: 10.2307/2539356Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  131. Examines why Russian democratization has not resulted in a major international conflict. He argues that the ideas and interests of the liberal winners of the transition are responsible for the preservation of peace.
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  133. Shearman, Peter. “The Sources of Russian Conduct: Understanding Russian Foreign Policy.” Review of International Studies 20.2 (2001): 249–263.
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  135. Examines academic studies on Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, with special emphasis on relations with the United States. He finds that the sources of Russian conduct are found in domestic, cultural, and ideational factors, rather than simple conceptions of the balance of power.
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  137. Zimmerman, William. “Slavophiles and Westernizers Redux: Contemporary Russian Elite Perspectives.” Post-Soviet Affairs 21.3 (2005): 183–209.
  138. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.21.3.183Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  139. Drawing on surveys of Russian foreign policy elites in 2004, Zimmerman examines the late-20th-century reprise of the 19th-century Westernizer-Slavophile divide. He assesses the extent to which preference of the form of economic development continues to be major predictors of Russian elite orientation.
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  141. Russian Elite Perspectives on the West
  142.  
  143. While Russians started the post-Soviet period with a highly positive view of the West, a perception that the West did not do enough to help Russia during its decade of troubles in the 1990s turned a large segment of the Russian population against the West. This shift is highlighted in Zimmerman 2002. Gromyko 2008 discusses the differences between Russian and Western civilizations, and how these differences have affected the relationship between the two sides. O’Loughlin and Talbot 2005 and Rose and Munro 2008 show that by the middle of the next decade, most Russians saw themselves as part of the Eurasian world, rather than as part of Europe. This trend solidified even further after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, as highlighted in Andreev 2010. Mendelson and Gerber 2008 blames the gradual shift toward anti-Westernism on a conscious media strategy implemented by the Putin administration. Novikov 2008 similarly argues that Russian political elites build up anti-Western sentiment in order to shore up their own rule. Shleifer and Treisman 2011 disagrees, arguing that attempts to place Russian anti-Westernism in civilizational differences are misguided. Instead, they blame differences and hostilities on differences in interests between the two sides.
  144.  
  145. Andreev, Andrei. “Russians’ Views on Foreign Policy After the Caucasus Crisis.” Russian Politics and Law 48.6 (2010): 7–18.
  146. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940480601Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  147. Argues on the basis of survey data that the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 greatly accelerated a gradual shift already under way in Russian public opinion, creating a consensus opposed to the West and to NATO.
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  149. Gromyko, Alexei. “Civilizational Guidelines in the Relationship of Russia, the European Union, and the United States.” Russian Politics and Law 46.6 (2008): 7–18.
  150. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940460601Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  151. Discusses the relationship between the Russian Federation and both the European Union and the United States. It examines the differences between Western civilization and Russian civilization, and the impact of these differences on the ongoing rivalry between Russia and the West.
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  153. Mendelson, Sarah, and Theodore Gerber. “Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation.” Washington Quarterly 31.2 (2008): 131–150.
  154. DOI: 10.1162/wash.2008.31.2.131Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  155. Discusses how the Russian leadership creates an image of the outside world as filled with enemies of Russia. Using survey data, it shows how young Russians have bought into this image and are becoming increasingly anti-Western.
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  157. Novikov, Denis. “‘Anti-Westernism’ as a Strategy: Distinctive Behaviors of the Contemporary Russian Elite.” Russian Politics and Law 46.6 (2008): 19–27.
  158. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940460602Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  159. Focuses on the strategic uses of anti-Westernism for the Russian political elite. Anti-Westernism performs two functions: constructing a mythology of both Russia and the West and channeling fear and aggression away from the domestic regime and toward the outside world.
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  161. O’Loughlin, John, and Paul F. Talbot. “Where in the World Is Russia? Geopolitical Perceptions and Preferences of Ordinary Russians.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 46.1 (2005): 23–50.
  162. DOI: 10.2747/1538-7216.46.1.23Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  163. Uses survey results to examine the effects of post-Soviet territorial reconfiguration of the Russian state on ordinary Russians’ sense of national identity. The survey probed Russian attitudes to determine which states of the former USSR they view as culturally closest to Russia and which they wish to reunify with Russia. Differences in responses show a clear split between Slavic, Eurasianist, and Baltic geopolitical visions.
  164. Find this resource:
  165. Rose, Richard, and Neil Munro. “Do Russians See Their Future in Europe or the CIS?” Europe-Asia Studies 60.1 (2008): 49–66.
  166. DOI: 10.1080/09668130701760323Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  167. Addresses historical differences between Russian elites about where the country’s future lies. Although cosmopolitan contacts of individuals with the West encourage people to be pro-European, Russians are likely to continue to view their world as a CIS space. This indicates a popular demand to reestablish imperial dominance, rather than a durable commitment to a Eurasian view of the world.
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  169. Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Treisman. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology.” Foreign Affairs 90.1 (2011): 122–138.
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  171. American attempts to use psychological approaches to Russian policy have not helped Washington achieve its objectives. This approach is based on a deep misunderstanding of Russian motivations. Today, Russia and the United States share few interests and even fewer priorities. Russia’s main demand is entirely negative: that Washington stop expanding NATO and emboldening anti-Russian governments and nongovernmental organizations on its periphery.
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  173. Zimmerman, William. The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993–2000. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
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  175. Drawing on nearly a decade of survey research, Zimmerman gauges the impact of Russia’s opening on its foreign policy and how liberal democrats orient themselves to foreign policy. He finds that the general public tended much more toward isolationism than did the predominant elites who steered Russia’s foreign policy in the 1990s.
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  177. Efforts to Restore Russia’s Great Power Status
  178.  
  179. Since Vladimir Putin first became Russia’s president, he has sought to restore Russia’s place among the great powers of the world. This vision and the policies it has engendered are spelled out in Tsygankov 2005. Lindley-French 2011 argues that this quest is impossible and that Russia needs to come to terms with its decline. Trenin 2011 argues Russia can restore its greatness but only if it gives up its imperial ambitions and focuses on modernization instead. Wallander 2007 believes that Russia has already given up such ambitions and is focusing instead on a mix of objectives labeled “trans-imperialism.” Spasskiy 2011 believes that this is not the case and that Russian elites are still focused on restoring Russia’s status as a superpower, though this goal is hopeless and damaging to Russia’s future.
  180.  
  181. Lindley-French, Julian. “What Does Russia Want?.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.2 (2011): 37–47.
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  183. Examines the goals of Russian foreign policy, arguing that Russia can no longer claim to hold the status of a superpower. The author believes that Russia will have to come to terms with its decline in order to be able to deal with future challenges to its international position.
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  185. Spasskiy, Nikolay. “The Island of Russia.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.2 (2011): 23–36.
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  187. Russians still do not see any worthy role for their country in the 21st century other than the role of a superpower. This article argues that setting this goal now would be hopeless and self-destructive, but unless the Russian elite proposes an alternative to superpower aspirations and unless society accepts this alternative, games over the superpower status will continue.
  188. Find this resource:
  189. Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia’s Post-Imperial Condition.” Current History 110.10 (2011): 272–276.
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  191. Russia’s post-Soviet politics have been complicated by its imperial legacy. In order to restore its greatness, Russia will have to give up notions of restoring its empire and focus instead on economic and political modernization.
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  193. Tsygankov, Andrei. “Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power.” Post-Soviet Affairs 21.2 (2005): 132–158.
  194. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.21.2.132Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  195. Three elements of Putin’s policies are examined: state concentration, cooperation with the West, and Russia’s projection of influence in the former Soviet region. The question of Western responses to Putin’s strategy is also addressed.
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  197. Wallander, Celeste. “Russian Transimperialism and Its Implications.” Washington Quarterly 30.2 (2007): 107–122.
  198. DOI: 10.1162/wash.2007.30.2.107Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  199. A fruitless debate has emerged over whether Russia is a postimperial power that seeks global cooperation or a neoimperial one that seeks to control weaker countries. Russian strategy is shaped by modern, or transnational, and imperialist causes. In other words, it is a new, “transimperialist” power requiring new strategies.
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  201. Russia’s Relations with the West
  202.  
  203. Russia’s relations with the West vary by region. The closest relationship is with the European Union and its core western European states, especially Germany. The EU is Russia’s most important trading partner, and countries such as Germany and Italy are focused primarily on establishing cooperative relations with Russia. Other EU states have much more complex relationships with Russia, either because of tensions resulting from past history (Poland, Baltic States) or because of tensions that have resulted from Russia’s lack of democratization (Great Britain). Russia has gradually accepted the independence of other former Soviet states, which has helped to normalize relations with countries such as Ukraine and Moldova. The relationship with the United States has been the most complex, with cooperation on many issues tempered by mutual disappointment in the failure to build on the promise of the early 1990s.
  204.  
  205. The European Union
  206.  
  207. The European Union is Russia’s main trading partner and political interlocutor in the West. Hopf 2008 presents the best general introduction to the issues that affect this relationship. Despite initial optimism on both sides, the relationship has been beset by problems, as described in Haukkala 2010. The rise of anti-Russian rhetoric in the EU is highlighted in Tsygankov and Fominykh 2010, while Russian hostility toward the EU is examined in Kulhanek 2010. Practical aspects of cooperation are examined in Lankina 2005, which focuses on the factors that affect EU aid distribution to Russia, and Diener and Hagen 2011, which examines the practical complications of the existence of the Kaliningrad enclave surrounded by EU territory. Moshes 2012 looks at signs of greater willingness to cooperate with the EU under Russian President Medvedev, while Trenin 2011 provides some policy guidelines that would maximize the possibilities of Russian modernization through greater integration with the EU. (For a further discussion of Russian-European integration, see Creating a European Neighborhood.)
  208.  
  209. Diener, Alexander, and Joshua Hagen. “Geopolitics of the Kaliningrad Exclave and Enclave: Russian and EU Perspectives.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 52.4 (2011): 567–592.
  210. DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.52.4.567Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  211. Two political geographers examine the geopolitical issues associated with the shifting sovereignty of Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast during the 20th century, as well as the region’s evolving geopolitical status as a consequence of the European Union’s expansion to embrace Poland and Lithuania.
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  213. Haukkala, Hiski. The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in International Relations. London: Routledge, 2010.
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  215. Asks why the European Union and Russia have encountered severe difficulties in developing their relationship and why they have failed to live up to the promise and enthusiasm of the early 1990s. Haukkala answers these questions by focusing on changes in commonalities between the two sides’ perspectives on where their interests overlap.
  216. Find this resource:
  217. Hopf, Theodore, ed. Russia’s European Choice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
  218. DOI: 10.1057/9780230612587Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  219. Examines the past, present, and likely future course of Russia’s relationship with Europe. The contributors to this volume focus on the feasibility and desirability of making Russia more European.
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  221. Kulhanek, Jakub. “The Fundamentals of Russia’s EU Policy.” Problems of Post-Communism 57.5 (2010): 51–63.
  222. DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216570504Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  223. Kulhanek argues that Russia seeks to limit the EU’s effectiveness by playing up internal divisions within the European Union and prefers to cultivate bilateral relations with EU member states.
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  225. Lankina, Tomila. “Explaining European Union Aid to Russia.” Post-Soviet Affairs 21.4 (2005): 309–334.
  226. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.21.4.309Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  227. Examines the role played by patterns of aid allocation in defining the relationship between the EU and Russia. The author focuses on the roles played by bureaucratic efficiency, democratic performance, as well as economic, strategic, and cultural factors in the EU and its member states’ choices of projects to fund in Russia.
  228. Find this resource:
  229. Moshes, Arkady. “Russia’s European Policy Under Medvedev: How Sustainable Is a New Compromise?” International Affairs 88.1 (2012): 17–30.
  230. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01054.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  231. Moshes argues that Medvedev’s term in office brought about a change in Russia’s relations with the European Union. Moscow is still ready to use all available opportunities to tighten its grip on the post-Soviet space, but it is less keen to go into an open conflict when important interests of EU member states may be affected.
  232. Find this resource:
  233. Trenin, Dmitry. “Modernizing Russian Foreign Policy.” Russian Politics and Law 49.6 (2011): 8–37.
  234. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940490601Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  235. Trenin argues that Russian foreign policy should focus not on enhancing Russia’s status as a great power but on tapping external resources to facilitate the country’s modernization. This means relying on instruments of “soft power” and seeking to integrate with the European Union.
  236. Find this resource:
  237. Tsygankov, Pavel, and Filipp Fominykh. “The Anti-Russian Discourse of the European Union: Causes and Main Targets.” Russian Politics and Law 48.6 (2010): 19–34.
  238. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940480602Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  239. The authors analyze anti-Russian rhetoric in the EU as it pertains to Russian economic strategy, domestic policy, and foreign policy. They explain its causes mainly in terms of divergent economic interests and the EU’s internal needs for identity and consolidation.
  240. Find this resource:
  241. Germany
  242.  
  243. Russia and Germany have long been considered to have a special relationship. This is the point made by Rahr 2007. The recent history of this relationship, which can be traced back to German Ostpolitik during the Cold War era, is discussed in Timmins 2011. Chivvis and Rid 2009 discusses the sources of Germany’s tendency to err on the side of having a cooperative relationship with Russia over confronting Russia on issues such as democracy and human rights. Stelzenmüller 2009 addresses the question of whether Germany can unite Europe in developing a more balanced policy toward Russia. Szabo 2009 looks at whether the German instinct for cooperation can be balanced with American fears that Russia would use German friendship to divide the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
  244.  
  245. Chivvis, Christopher S., and Thomas Rid. “The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy.” Survival 51.2 (2009): 105–122.
  246. DOI: 10.1080/00396330902860850Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  247. For most German observers, Russian self-isolation is something to be avoided at all costs, a potentially disastrous development for the post–Cold War European order. They believe that isolating Russia would deprive the West of its few remaining economic levers over Russian policy and leave Europe and the United States with only cruder means of influencing Russian behavior.
  248. Find this resource:
  249. Rahr, Alexander. “Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship.” Washington Quarterly 30.2 (2007): 137–145.
  250. DOI: 10.1162/wash.2007.30.2.137Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  251. The leading German specialist on Russian politics argues that Germany and Russia have developed a special relationship in both the economic and political spheres.
  252. Find this resource:
  253. Stelzenmüller, Constanze. “Germany’s Russia Question.” Foreign Affairs 88.2 (2009): 89–100.
  254. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  255. The key question facing Germany in the 21st century is whether it will be able and willing to use its considerable political resources to change Russia’s behavior and to stand up to Moscow when necessary. Germany must be the initiator and leader of a pan-European Russia policy that focuses on cooperation whenever possible and containment when necessary.
  256. Find this resource:
  257. Szabo, Stephen. “Can Berlin and Washington Agree on Russia?” Washington Quarterly 32.4 (2009): 23–41.
  258. DOI: 10.1080/01636600903224746Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  259. Germany’s willingness to have a cooperative relationship with Russia worries American observers, who fear that Russia could use its special relationship with Germany to divide the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The author calls for the United States and Germany to set up a working group to manage a joint strategy toward Russia.
  260. Find this resource:
  261. Timmins, Graham. “German–Russian Bilateral Relations and EU Policy on Russia: Between Normalisation and the ‘Multilateral Reflex’.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011): 189–199.
  262. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580907Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  263. Traces Germany’s Russian policy in the post–Cold War era. Shows that it is focused on ensuring a cooperative relationship as a result of strong economic connections and energy relations.
  264. Find this resource:
  265. Other EU Member States
  266.  
  267. Russia’s relations with European states focus primarily on energy and trade issues. Cultural ties play a role in relations with Orthodox countries such as Greece and Cyprus, as detailed in Christou 2011. Peripheral EU states such as Spain, Portugal, and the Benelux countries are concerned about maintaining a common EU foreign policy, and as described in Casier 2011 and Simão 2011, this is the factor that primarily shapes their relations with Russia. More central EU states have other priorities. Gomart 2007 shows how France seeks to enlist Russia in its efforts to build a multipolar world. Great Britain’s relationship with Russia is most similar to the relationship between the United States and Russia; David 2011 describes this relationship’s swings between practical cooperation and disappointment with lack of progress in Russia’s democratization. Voronov 2010 shows how Russia’s proximity to Scandinavian states has required more extensive interaction and encouraged positive views, while Etzold and Haukkala 2011 focuses on the development of positive relationships between Russia and Scandinavia.
  268.  
  269. Casier, Tom. “The Bilateral Relations of the Benelux Countries with Russia: Between Rhetorical EU Engagement and Competitive Business Interests.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011): 237–248.
  270. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580912Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  271. Casier argues that the small size of the Benelux countries prevents them from playing a leadership role in formulating EU Russia policy. Instead, they focus on developing bilateral economic relationships with Russia.
  272. Find this resource:
  273. Christou, George. “Bilateral Relations with Russia and the Impact on EU Policy: The Cases of Cyprus and Greece.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011): 225–236.
  274. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580911Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  275. While Greece and Cyprus are sometimes described as Russian Trojan horses inside the EU, this article argues that their actual positions are more nuanced. While they do enjoy excellent relations with Russia, these relations are not maintained at the expense of relations with other EU members or the pursuit of a common EU foreign policy.
  276. Find this resource:
  277. David, Maxine. “A Less than Special Relationship: The UK’s Russia Experience.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011): 201–212.
  278. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580908Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  279. Argues that Britain’s recent troubled relationship with Russia is caused by a combination of disappointment with Russia’s failure to consolidate democracy and desire to privilege Britain’s relationship with the United States over their relationship with Russia.
  280. Find this resource:
  281. Etzold, Tobias, and Hiski Haukkala. “Is There a Nordic Russia Policy? Swedish, Finnish and Danish Relations with Russia in the Context of the European Union.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011): 249–260.
  282. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580913Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  283. The Nordics’ bilateral relations with Russia are a function of their economic ties. Finland has had the most intensive economic linkages, and it has also been by far the friendliest of the three. For Denmark the opposite has applied, with Sweden lying somewhere in between in both respects. In recent years, there has been a gradual convergence toward positive relationships.
  284. Find this resource:
  285. Gomart, Thomas. “France’s Russia Policy: Balancing Interests and Values.” Washington Quarterly 30.2 (2007): 147–155.
  286. DOI: 10.1162/wash.2007.30.2.147Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  287. French leaders see Russia as a strategic partner that is vital to their vision of a multipolar world where power is shared. The author argues that to make progress, France must link its relationship with Russia to the broader EU-Russia relationship.
  288. Find this resource:
  289. Simão, Licínia. “Portuguese and Spanish Relations with Moscow: Contributions from the EU’s Periphery to the CFSP.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011): 213–223.
  290. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580909Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  291. While Portugal and Spain play a secondary role in shaping European policy toward Russia, they do play a key role in ensuring that the EU has a common policy toward the East.
  292. Find this resource:
  293. Voronov, Konstantin. “Perceptions of Russia in the European North: Signs of the Times.” Russian Politics and Law 48.6 (2010): 35–50.
  294. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940480603Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  295. Analyzes the images of Russia that prevail in northern Europe and the historical and contemporary factors that have shaped them. It contrasts good-neighborly attitudes in Finland and Scandinavia with hostility to Russia in Poland and the Baltics.
  296. Find this resource:
  297. Creating a European Neighborhood
  298.  
  299. As the European Union has expanded, it has come into greater contact with the states that formerly comprised the Soviet Union. In doing so, it has inevitably come up against Russian interests on its western borders. As a result, Russia and the EU have sought to develop cooperative policies in the region. This effort has been called the development of a European “neighborhood.” Trenin 2002 looks at the extent to which Russia has come to terms with the loss of its western territories and how it is adapting to the new geopolitical environment. Popescu and Wilson 2009 shows the limits of Russia-EU cooperation in this region, while Averre 2009 discusses the need for a greater effort at developing this relationship. The other authors look at how the relationship has worked in three specific cases. Danii and Mascauteanu 2011 looks at the limits of EU engagement in Moldova. Stegniy 2011 assesses the possibilities for greater cooperation in Ukraine. And finally, Rotman and Veremeeva 2011 shows the limits of such cooperation in Belarus.
  300.  
  301. Averre, Derek. “Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighbourhood.’” Europe-Asia Studies 61.10 (2009): 1689–1713.
  302. DOI: 10.1080/09668130903278918Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  303. Averre argues that EU-Russian relations can no longer be reduced to bilateral technical negotiations over trade, visas, and scientific cooperation; nor can their focus be confined to the liberal-democratic “values agenda.” The global financial crisis, the breakdown of arms-control agreements, energy and resource dependencies, and disagreements over fundamental principles of international relations are forcing both sides to rethink the relationship.
  304. Find this resource:
  305. Danii, Olga, and Mariana Mascauteanu. “Moldova Under the European Neighbourhood Policy: ‘Falling Between Stools’.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27.1 (2011): 99–119.
  306. DOI: 10.1080/13523279.2011.544385Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  307. EU-Moldovan relations are characterized by the lack of political will in Moldova and the lack of commitment on the part of the EU, which in conjunction fail to provide the necessary incentives for the process of reform and the prospects of European engagement for Moldova.
  308. Find this resource:
  309. Popescu, Nicu, and Andrew Wilson. The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood. London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009.
  310. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  311. Criticizes the EU’s response to the crises facing its Eastern neighbors. It argues that the EU and Russia are effectively engaged in a competition for influence in this region and that Russia has been exploiting the EU members’ lack of unity on foreign policy questions to extend its gains at the EU’s expense.
  312. Find this resource:
  313. Rotman, David, and Natalia Veremeeva. “Belarus in the Context of the Neighbourhood Policy: Between the EU and Russia.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27.1 (2011): 73–98.
  314. DOI: 10.1080/13523279.2011.544384Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  315. Belarus’ location in the geographical heart of Europe places the country in a strategically important position between Russia and the EU. The authors argue that as a sovereign state, Belarus has no need to dissolve its identity either into the EU project or into a greater Russia. Instead, it can assert itself as an independent player in the international area.
  316. Find this resource:
  317. Stegniy, Oleksandr. “Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: ‘Lost in Translation?’” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27.1 (2011): 50–72.
  318. DOI: 10.1080/13523279.2011.544383Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  319. Relations between Ukraine and the European Union, under the European Neighborhood Policy and the newly launched Eastern Partnership Initiative, have undergone considerable progress in the development of multifaceted forms of cooperation between the two sides. Some EU officials persist in treating Ukraine mainly as a buffer between Europe and Russia.
  320. Find this resource:
  321. Trenin, Dmitri. The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002.
  322. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  323. Takes a look at the historical patterns of Russian territorial state formation, seeks to define the challenges and opportunities that Russia faces along its geopolitical fronts, and discusses various options for “fitting” Russia into the wider world.
  324. Find this resource:
  325. Former Communist States
  326.  
  327. Russia’s relations with its former satellites have been a work in progress over the last twenty years. Silayev 2010 shows how the imperial syndrome has gradually dissipated from Russia’s relations with eastern European states. Solozobov 2010 shows how this change has led to significant improvements in Russia’s relationship with Poland, while Levintova 2010 demonstrates how these changes are limited by the continued existence of Soviet-era stereotypes in both countries’ newspapers. Trenin 2011 shows that Russia has gradually come to accept the independent status of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, leading to more stable relations with these countries. Significant problems remain in Russia’s relations with the Baltic States. Galbreath and Lasas 2011 shows that these countries are still haunted by their past, leading them to act as spoilers in EU-Russia relations. Pridham 2009 shows the positive impact of EU conditionality on domestic politics in Latvia. Astrov 2009 argues that the most recent flareup of tension between Russia and Estonia was not intentionally provoked by the latter.
  328.  
  329. Astrov, Alexander. “States of Sovereignty: ‘Nature,’ ‘Emergency,’ and ‘Exception’ in the ‘Bronze Soldier’ Crisis.” Russian Politics and Law 47.5 (2009): 66–79.
  330. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940470505Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  331. Argues that the relocation of the Bronze Soldier statue in Tallinn was not a provocation intentionally staged by Estonian authorities but rather the result of efforts by the Estonian government to depoliticize the monument by diminishing its public significance and removing it to an area of private commemoration.
  332. Find this resource:
  333. Galbreath, David J., and Ainius Lašas. “The ‘Baltic’ Factor in EU-Russian Relations: In Search of Coherence and Co-operation in an Era of Complexity.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19.2 (2011): 261–272.
  334. DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2011.580914Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  335. The Baltic States, still haunted by their relationship with Russia, are more likely to be perceived as agenda spoilers than agenda setters in EU-Russian relations.
  336. Find this resource:
  337. Levintova, Ekaterina. “Good Neighbours?: Dominant Narratives About the ‘Other’ in Contemporary Polish and Russian Newspapers.” Europe-Asia Studies 62.8 (2010): 1339–1361.
  338. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2010.504386Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  339. Explores whether and how pre-Communist images and stereotypes of Russia and Russians and Poland and Poles are being perpetuated in the framing of Russian-Polish relations by the contemporary Russian and Polish print media.
  340. Find this resource:
  341. Pridham, Geoffrey. “Securing the Only Game in Town: The EU’s Political Conditionality and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Soviet Latvia.” Europe-Asia Studies 61.1 (2009): 51–84.
  342. DOI: 10.1080/09668130802532928Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  343. Using post-Soviet Latvia as a case study, Pridham examines how far the EU’s political conditionality has contributed to democratic consolidation. He concludes that there is no automatic locking-in effect of European integration and that conditionality assists democratic consolidation more in structural than in attitudinal or behavioral terms.
  344. Find this resource:
  345. Silayev, Nikolai. “How to Make Peace with Neighbors.” Russia in Global Affairs 8.2 (2010): 84–96.
  346. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  347. The normalization of Russia’s relations with its Western neighbors has become a steady trend. The so-called imperial syndrome is gradually fading away, to be replaced by more pragmatic relations that in the long term may lead to the emergence of a new European security system.
  348. Find this resource:
  349. Solozobov, Iurii. “An Answer to the ‘Polish Question’.” Russian Politics and Law 48.6 (2010): 51–63.
  350. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940480604Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  351. Relations between Russia and Poland began to improve after the Tusk government took office in Poland in 2007. Open dialogue between the two sides has led to the development of new, lasting themes that have generated a positive agenda for the future.
  352. Find this resource:
  353. Trenin, Dmitry. “Russia and the New Eastern Europe.” Russian Politics and Law 49.6 (2011): 38–53.
  354. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940490602Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  355. Argues that the countries of the new Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) now constitute a distinct and durable geopolitical reality. He discusses their relationships with Russia, the EU, and NATO.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. The United States
  358.  
  359. In the aftermath of the Cold War, both Russia and the United States have had to make major adjustments to their relationship. The trajectory of this relationship’s evolution is discussed in Goldgeier and McFaul 2003. Talbott 2003 provides a largely positive firsthand account of the Russian-American relationship from the point of view of an advisor inside the Clinton administration. The opposite point of view is presented in Cohen 2000, which argues that US policy toward Russia in the 1990s was an unmitigated disaster. The Russian view of the United States during this period is discussed in Tsygankov 2004. Mendelson 2002 looks at one specific but crucial aspect of the relationship—the effort to shift the two states’ militaries from seeing each other as enemies to discussing a potential partnership. Larson and Shevchenko 2010 and Trenin 2008 discuss more recent developments, focusing on what the United States can do to secure Russian cooperation on its foreign policy agenda. Charap 2010 looks at the limits to this cooperation that arise from domestic political constraints in the United States.
  360.  
  361. Charap, Samuel. “The Transformation of US-Russia Relations.” Current History 109.10 (2010): 281–287.
  362. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  363. Despite unprecedented opportunities for cooperation under presidents Obama and Medvedev, domestic political factors have prevented the US government from consolidating gains in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia.
  364. Find this resource:
  365. Cohen, Stephen F. Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia. New York: Norton, 2000.
  366. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  367. Cohen argues that the US-sponsored efforts to replace Communism in Russia with a democratic capitalist state had catastrophic consequences, leading to an unprecedented de-modernization of the country.
  368. Find this resource:
  369. Goldgeier, James, and Michael McFaul. Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2003.
  370. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  371. A good overview of the evolution of American foreign policy toward Russia in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. The authors argue that US foreign policy toward Russia was driven by the ideas held by American leaders.
  372. Find this resource:
  373. Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy.” International Security 34.4 (2010): 63–95.
  374. DOI: 10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.63Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  375. The United States can secure cooperation from Russia (and China) by recognizing that their foreign policy is shaped by the goal of restoring their “great power” status. Providing incentives that contribute to this goal can lead to greater success in achieving Russian cooperation with US foreign policy goals.
  376. Find this resource:
  377. Mendelson, Sarah. “U.S.-Russian Military Relations: Between Friend and Foe.” Washington Quarterly 25.1 (2002): 161–172.
  378. DOI: 10.1162/016366002753358393Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  379. Describes the inconsistent nature of efforts to increase military cooperation between Russia and the United States after the Cold War. Highlights the possibilities for cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Talbott, Strobe. The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. New York: Random House, 2003.
  382. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  383. Memoir by Bill Clinton’s chief advisor on Russia about efforts to build a new relationship between the United States and Russia after the collapse of Communism.
  384. Find this resource:
  385. Trenin, Dmitri. “Where US and Russian Interests Overlap.” Current History 107.5 (2008): 219–224.
  386. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  387. Russia’s leading geopolitical thinker discusses how Russia can help the United States achieve some of its key goals in the international arena, including countering nuclear proliferation, dealing with conflicts in the Middle East, and incorporating China into the international political system.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Tsygankov, Andrei P. Whose World Order? Russia’s Perception of American Ideas After the Cold War. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.
  390. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  391. Tsygankov examines how Russian elites engage American ideas of world order and why Russians perceive these ideas as unlikely to promote a just or stable international system.
  392. Find this resource:
  393. Cooperation with the West
  394.  
  395. Since the end of the Cold War, Russian cooperation with the West has increased in many areas. Areas where some cooperation already existed prior to the conflict, such as energy relations and trade, have seen the greatest progress. There have also been some new areas where cooperation has been quite successful, such as preventing nuclear proliferation and addressing climate change. Nevertheless, cooperation remains limited due to residual mistrust left over from the decades of conflict during the Cold War. The limits of cooperation are visible in areas such as the long drawn-out negotiations over Russian accession to the World Trade Organization and in the failure to develop a joint missile defense system.
  396.  
  397. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control
  398.  
  399. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Western states worried about the possibility of nuclear proliferation resulting from inadequate security at Russian nuclear facilities and poor working conditions for Russian nuclear scientists. Ball and Gerber 2005 assesses the effectiveness of Western programs that sought to ameliorate that threat. Gottemoeller 2005 discusses the extent to which the experience of providing nonproliferation to Russia could be used with other states. Khlopkov 2011 turns to the opportunities for non-military nuclear cooperation between Russia and the West. Orlov 2011 assesses changes in Russian nuclear strategy since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Several authors also assess various aspects of the future of Russia’s nuclear relationship with the West. Fenenko 2011 looks at how nuclear deterrence strategy might develop in the post–Cold War strategic environment. Pifer 2009 examines the future of nuclear arms control. Finally, Pomper, et al. 2010 discusses the possibility of a deal on tactical nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States.
  400.  
  401. Ball, Deborah Yarsike, and Theodore P. Gerber. “Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat?” International Security 29.4 (2005): 50–77.
  402. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  403. Using data collected in a survey of Russian WMD scientists, the authors assess the effectiveness of US and Western nonproliferation assistance programs aimed at keeping these scientists employed in Russia.
  404. Find this resource:
  405. Fenenko, Alexei. “Between MAD and Flexible Response.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.2 (2011): 86–101.
  406. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  407. Reviews recent changes in Russian and US nuclear strategy, with a focus on changes that have resulted from the post–Cold War strategic environment. The author argues that nuclear relations between the two countries are focused on developing rules that are meant to prevent escalation in the event of an unauthorized military clash or conflict with third countries.
  408. Find this resource:
  409. Gottemoeller, Rose. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Beyond Russia.” Washington Quarterly 28.2 (2005): 145–158.
  410. DOI: 10.1162/0163660053295248Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  411. Argues that cooperative threat reduction provides a new and practical set of tools to prevent WMD proliferation in Russia as well as in other countries around the world.
  412. Find this resource:
  413. Khlopkov, Anton. “A Peaceful Atom.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.1 (2011): 132–147.
  414. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415. Khlopkov describes the history and future potential of US-Russian cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the ratification and implementation of the 123 accord.
  416. Find this resource:
  417. Orlov, Vladimir. “Russia’s Nuclear Quest Comes Full Circle.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.4 (2011): 44–58.
  418. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  419. Assesses changes in Russian nuclear strategy since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Orlov argues that nuclear weapons have become a burden rather than an advantage for Russia. As a consequence, the role of nuclear weapons in Russian military strategy and their relevance for the future of Russian security needs to be reassessed.
  420. Find this resource:
  421. Pifer, Steven. “After START: Hurdles Ahead.” Current History 108.10 (2009): 304–310.
  422. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  423. The Obama administration regards a post-START treaty as the first step in a continuing process of nuclear arms reductions. But, as this article shows, this will prove the last easy nuclear arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow.
  424. Find this resource:
  425. Pomper, Miles, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov. “Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe.” Survival 52.1 (2010): 75–96.
  426. DOI: 10.1080/00396331003612497Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  427. Meaningful progress on tactical nuclear weapons will require a larger deal in which there are trade-offs between US concessions on issues of interest to Russia and Russian concessions on tactical nuclear weapons.
  428. Find this resource:
  429. Missile Defense
  430.  
  431. American plans to develop a missile defense system to defend Europe and the United States from potential nuclear missile strikes have in recent years become one of the key sticking points in preventing greater cooperation between Russia and the West. Moss 2009 spells out the United States’ strategic goals in developing missile defense. Tsypkin 2009 discusses the sources of Russian concerns about American missile defense plans. Wilkening 2012 argues that Russian concerns do not have merit on technical grounds. Possibilities for cooperation in jointly developing missile defense systems are discussed in Sokov 2010 and Trenin 2011, though Weitz 2010 argues that cooperation efforts will continue to fail because of long-standing obstacles.
  432.  
  433. Moss, Kenneth. “Defining Strategic Priorities: Ballistic Missile Defense, Iran, and Relations with Major Powers.” Mediterranean Quarterly 20.1 (2009): 31–51.
  434. DOI: 10.1215/10474552-2008-033Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  435. Moss argues that the United States must balance its concerns with Iran’s nuclear program, the dangers of proliferation of nuclear capabilities throughout the Middle East, and the strategic objectives the United States seeks with Russia, China, and Europe.
  436. Find this resource:
  437. Sokov, Nikolai. “Missile Defence: Towards Practical Cooperation with Russia.” Survival 52.4 (2010): 121–130.
  438. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2010.506825Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  439. Sokov argues that while there appear to be no impediments to Moscow agreeing to participate in a missile defense system that would protect Europe, or even the Middle East and the Gulf, involvement in a larger-scale system capable of intercepting strategic missiles is hardly possible.
  440. Find this resource:
  441. Trenin, Dmitry. “A European Missile Defense System to Replace the Great Game.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.2 (2011): 76–85.
  442. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  443. Trenin looks at options for cooperation on missile defense between Russia and the United States. He believes that arms control cannot transform strategic relations between Russia and the United States. Instead, the Euro-Atlantic area can only become truly secure if the two sides agree to develop a security community for the entire Euro-Atlantic area.
  444. Find this resource:
  445. Tsypkin, Mikhail. “Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defence.” International Affairs 85.4 (2009): 781–799.
  446. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00827.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  447. The American decision to deploy missile defenses in Poland endangered the central myth of Putin’s regime, challenged the status of Putin as Russia’s strongman, and introduced an additional uncertainty into the carefully scripted campaign for succession to Putin. It also hit the raw nerve of Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons.
  448. Find this resource:
  449. Weitz, Richard. “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defence.” Survival 52.4 (2010): 99–120.
  450. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2010.506824Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  451. Argues that the recurring obstacles that have long impeded extensive NATO-Russian BMD cooperation largely persist. Joint BMD projects cannot be used to create a political consensus on missile defense when it does not already exist.
  452. Find this resource:
  453. Wilkening, Dean. “Does Missile Defence in Europe Threaten Russia?” Survival 54.1 (2012): 31–52.
  454. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2012.657531Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  455. Wilkening argues that concerns that the later phases of the proposed European missile-defense architecture threaten Moscow’s strategic deterrent lack technical merit.
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Energy Relations
  458.  
  459. Russian energy exports provide the bulk of Russian export earnings. At the same time, much of Europe is dependent on Russian natural gas. The conflicting but interdependent interests of the two sides are described in Aalto 2008. Milov, et al. 2006 describes Russian energy policy since independence, while Baev 2008 examines the interconnections between Russian energy and security policies. Solanko and Sutela 2009 assesses the likely future trajectory of Russian gas exports to Europe. The question of whether European security is undermined by Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies is the subject of analysis in Heinrich 2008. Baran 2007 argues that this dependence is dangerous to Europe and needs to be ended, ideally by bypassing Russia to access Caspian energy. Locatelli 2010 considers the problems with this strategy caused by political instability in the Caucasus, while Baev 2010 argues that new the new competing southern gas pipeline projects planned by Russia and the EU are both economically irrational and are kept alive only because of their symbolic importance.
  460.  
  461. Aalto, Pami, ed. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Securing Europe’s Future Energy Supplies? Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008.
  462. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  463. Asks how the EU can ensure its future energy security when it is running out of its own energy resources and at the same time incorporating new members who are also dependent on energy imports. There is a special focus on northern Europe.
  464. Find this resource:
  465. Baev, Pavel K. Russian Energy Policy and Military Power: Putin’s Quest for Greatness. New York: Routledge, 2008.
  466. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  467. Examines the interplay between energy policy and security policy under Vladimir Putin. Assessing the internal contradictions of Putin’s drive to reestablish Russia as a great power, Baev argues that Russia’s desire to strengthen its role of energy provider is undermined by its inability to secure growth in production of oil and gas.
  468. Find this resource:
  469. Baev, Pavel K., and Indra Øverland. “The South Stream Versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitical and Economic (Ir)rationales and Political Stakes In Mega-Projects.” International Affairs 86.5 (2010): 1075–1090.
  470. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00929.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  471. The plan for the southern energy corridor delivering a new secure supply of natural gas to the European Union is shaped by projects for two pipelines—Nabucco and the South Stream. The authors argue that both projects are economically irrational but are kept alive because they have acquired symbolic status.
  472. Find this resource:
  473. Baran, Zeyno. “EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage.” Washington Quarterly 30.4 (2007): 131–144.
  474. DOI: 10.1162/wash.2007.30.4.131Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  475. Baran argues that the EU needs to develop an energy strategy that would wean Europe away from dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. She focuses on Caspian supplies as the best alternative and argues that pipelines from that region to Europe should be built in a way that bypasses Russia.
  476. Find this resource:
  477. Heinrich, Andreas. “Under the Kremlin’s Thumb: Does Increased State Control in the Russian Gas Sector Endanger European Energy Security?” Europe-Asia Studies 60.9 (2008): 1539–1574.
  478. DOI: 10.1080/09668130802362292Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  479. Examines the effect of increased state control over the Russian gas sector and its ultimate impact on energy security in Europe. Heinrich analyzes the mechanisms by which the state has acquired ownership over several independent gas producers and the potential dangers state ownership poses for European energy supplies.
  480. Find this resource:
  481. Locatelli, Catherine. “Russian and Caspian Hydrocarbons: Energy Supply Stakes for the European Union.” Europe-Asia Studies 62.6 (2010): 959–971.
  482. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2010.489264Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  483. The 2008 Georgia war called into question the feasibility of transporting gas from the Caspian and central Asia to Europe via the Caucasus transit corridor. The aim of this article is to look at what the consequences might be as far as the EU’s diversification strategy is concerned.
  484. Find this resource:
  485. Milov, Vladimir, Leonard L. Coburn, and Igor Danchenko. “Russia’s Energy Policy, 1992–2005.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 47.3 (2006): 285–313.
  486. DOI: 10.2747/1538-7216.47.3.285Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  487. A critical analysis that reviews Russian energy policy, examining key problems in Russia’s oil, gas, coal, and electricity sectors that represent a potential drag on growth of the entire Russian economy and call into question the sustainability of further increases in exports to the West.
  488. Find this resource:
  489. Solanko, Laura, and Pekka Sutela. “Too Much or Too Little Russian Gas to Europe?” Eurasian Geography and Economics 50.1 (2009): 58–74.
  490. DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.50.1.58Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  491. The authors forecast Russia’s future gas exports to Europe on the basis of projections of Russian gas production, domestic consumption in Russia, gas demand in major European markets, and the further development of transport infrastructure linking the two regions.
  492. Find this resource:
  493. Trade and Economic Relations
  494.  
  495. Since the end of Communism, Russia has become closely integrated into the world economy. While most trade still involves energy (see Energy Relations), in recent years Russia has sought to play a larger role in other economic areas. Russia’s position in the world economy is discussed in Sokolov 2008. While the Soviet Union in its later years had trouble feeding its population, Wegren 2010 shows how the Russian government has revitalized the agricultural sector and the role this shift has had on Russian relations with the United States. Russian trade relations with the European Union are covered in Forsberg and Seppo 2009. Over the last several years, Russia’s effort to join the World Trade Organization became one of its top foreign policy priorities, culminating in Russia finally joining the WTO in late 2011. Åslund 2007 discusses the reasons for Russia’s effort to join and explains why the process took so long. Åslund 2010 continues the discussion, with a focus on the domestic repercussions of the effort. Portansky 2011 explains the benefits of WTO membership for Russia.
  496.  
  497. Åslund, Anders. “Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 48.3 (2007): 289–305.
  498. DOI: 10.2747/1538-7216.48.3.289Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  499. Discusses the reasons that prompted Russia to seek WTO membership and scrutinizes obstacles to membership, including complexities of the accession process and the country’s institutional malaise.
  500. Find this resource:
  501. Åslund, Anders. “Why Doesn’t Russia Join the WTO?” Washington Quarterly 33.2 (2010): 49–63.
  502. DOI: 10.1080/01636601003661670Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  503. Aslund argues that Russia could easily join the WTO, but questions whether the Kremlin is prepared to make a few major concessions to make accession possible. He argues that Russia’s WTO accession has become a litmus test of the relative power of the president and prime minister.
  504. Find this resource:
  505. Forsberg, Tuomas, and Antti Seppo. “Power Without Influence? The EU and Trade Disputes with Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 61.10 (2009): 1805–1823.
  506. DOI: 10.1080/09668130903278967Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  507. Discusses the history of trade disputes between the European Union and Russia. Argue that the EU has a poor record of solving such disputes and blame this lack of success on the poor choice of tools and excessively high expectations.
  508. Find this resource:
  509. Portansky, Alexei. “Russia’s Accession to the WTO: External Implications.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.2 (2011): 48–60.
  510. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  511. Writing for a Russian audience, Portansky presents the benefits of WTO accession for Russia, describes how the organization functions, and addresses how the government might overcome domestic opposition to secure WTO membership.
  512. Find this resource:
  513. Sokolov, Dmitrii. “Russia in the World Economy: Geopolitical Prospects.” Russian Politics and Law 46.6 (2008): 47–58.
  514. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940460605Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  515. Discusses the role of Russia in the world economy and explores the effect of international integration on Russian economic development. The effect of Russia’s geographical location on its place in the world economy is also examined.
  516. Find this resource:
  517. Wegren, Stephen K. “Russia’s Food Policies and Foreign Policy.” Demokratizatsiya 18.3 (2010): 189–207.
  518. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  519. Wegren sees food as an essential variable in US-Russian relations. He reviews the history of how food has impacted this relationship and discusses how Russia rebuilt its agricultural complex in the post-Communist period.
  520. Find this resource:
  521. Climate Change and the Environment
  522.  
  523. Russia will be one of the countries to most strongly feel the potential future impacts of climate change. From the melting of the permafrost to the opening of the northern sea route to commercial shipping, not to mention the potential impact on agriculture in the Black Earth zone, Russia is expected to feel both positive and negative effects of climate change. Howard 2010 looks at these effects, with a focus on the potential impact of climate change on Russian activity in the Arctic. To date, its interaction with the West on environmental issues has largely centered on the Kyoto protocols. Henry and Sundstrom 2007 discusses the reasons behind Russia’s decision to agree to ratify the protocols. Henry and Sundstrom 2010 analyzes the extent to which the Russian government has implemented the protocol’s provisions since ratification. Rowe 2011 looks at Russia’s role in the climate change debate from a slightly different point of view, examining the process through which climate policy is made in Russia. Rowe 2009 extends this analysis by looking at the role of public debate among scientists in shaping Russian climate policy.
  524.  
  525. Henry, Laura, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. “Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: Seeking an Alignment of Interests and Image.” Global Environmental Politics 7.4 (2007): 47–69.
  526. DOI: 10.1162/glep.2007.7.4.47Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  527. Argues that Russia ratified the Kyoto protocol in order to gain leverage in other international negotiations and to convey a positive image as an advanced industrialized state. Subsequent implementation efforts were slow and focused on maximizing profits through treaty mechanisms rather than maximizing emissions reductions.
  528. Find this resource:
  529. Henry, Laura, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. “Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: From Hot Air to Implementation?” In Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change. Edited by Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, 105–137. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010.
  530. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  531. Examines the extent to which Russia has pursued the goal of reducing carbon emissions, which is at the heart of the Kyoto protocol. The focus is on the government’s implementation strategy after Russia’s adoption of the protocol.
  532. Find this resource:
  533. Howard, Roger. “Russia’s New Front Line.” Survival 52.2 (2010): 141–156.
  534. DOI: 10.1080/00396331003764678Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  535. Howard focuses on Russia’s interests in the Arctic region, arguing that its goals are not centered on natural resources (which have been exaggerated) but on the strategic implications of climate change in the region. He argues that the outside world needs to recognize these strategic implications of climate change and should find ways of reassuring Russia.
  536. Find this resource:
  537. Rowe, Elana Wilson. “Who Is to Blame?: Agency, Causality, Responsibility and the Role of Experts in Russian Framings of Global Climate Change.” Europe-Asia Studies 61.4 (2009): 593–619.
  538. DOI: 10.1080/09668130902826154Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  539. Analyzes the politics of Russian climate change by pinpointing how global warming has been framed over a seven-year period in a leading daily newspaper and how climate experts have intervened in such framings. Rowe presents key findings about scientists’ involvement in public debate on climate change and how they have influenced the overall trajectory of Russian climate politics.
  540. Find this resource:
  541. Rowe, Elana Wilson. “Encountering Climate Change.” In Russia’s Encounter with Globalization: Actors, Processes and Critical Moments. Edited by Julie Wilhelmsen and Elana Wilson Rowe, 40–70. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
  542. DOI: 10.1057/9780230347571Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  543. Rowe argues that Russia’s role in globalization processes can be viewed through its policies on climate change, which are closely intertwined with its economic and energy policies. She examines how climate policy is made in Russia and its domestic impact.
  544. Find this resource:
  545. Conflict with the West
  546.  
  547. Although Russia cooperates with the West to a much greater extent than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, a number of sources of conflict remain. The longest lasting of these has had to do with the construction of a European security infrastructure that could replace the two-bloc system of the Cold War. Western efforts to turn NATO into such a structure have consistently met with hostility from Russia. Russian proposals to create a new organization have in turn foundered on the West’s unwillingness to accept Russia’s desire to dismantle NATO. In addition, Western efforts to intervene in other countries to stop crimes against humanity have been treated by Russian leaders as efforts to expand Western influence at Russia’s expense. The war in Georgia was the culmination of both of these trends, as Russia justified its intervention by pointing to the example of Western intervention in the Balkans while many Western observers argued that the war was a Russian effort to ensure that Georgia would not be offered NATO membership.
  548.  
  549. NATO Enlargement and the Future of Euro-Atlantic Security
  550.  
  551. The continuing role of NATO in European security has been an area of conflict between Russia and the West since the first proposals to expand NATO to include former Communist states were made in the early 1990s. Russian leaders have long maintained that NATO enlargement goes against promises made to Mikhail Gorbachev in exchange for his support for German reunification. On the basis of declassified archival documents, Kramer 2009 shows that this contention is not borne out by the evidence. Hunter 2000 examines the gradual deterioration of the relationship over the course of the 1990s. Conrad 2011 continues this review over the next decade, showing that cooperation has remained limited due to differences in identity between Russian and Western elites. Antonenko and Giegerich 2009 shows that the relationship reached its nadir in the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia war. The articles in Braun 2008 extrapolate how NATO-Russia relations in various spheres may evolve in the next decade. Antonenko and Yurgens 2010 argues that Russia and NATO have many goals in common and could benefit from greater cooperation. Kosachev 2011 discusses why it is so difficult for Russia to join NATO, while Trenin 2009 proposes alternative means of enhancing European security.
  552.  
  553. Antonenko, Oksana, and Bastian Giegerich. “Rebooting NATO-Russia Relations.” Survival 51.2 (2009): 13–21.
  554. DOI: 10.1080/00396330902860751Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  555. The crisis brought about by the 2008 Georgia War showed how dysfunctional NATO-Russia cooperation had become. The authors argue that NATO leaders should have used this crisis as an opportunity to reboot relations through pragmatic real-world cooperation instead of spouting empty rhetoric.
  556. Find this resource:
  557. Antonenko, Oksana, and Igor Yurgens. “Towards a NATO-Russia Strategic Concept.” Survival 52.6 (2010): 5–11.
  558. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2010.540780Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  559. Russia and NATO member states share numerous common policy objectives and could benefit from cost-effective cooperation that would help to strengthen both sides’ capacity to shape the new global and regional order.
  560. Find this resource:
  561. Braun, Aurel, ed. NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2008.
  562. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  563. A collection of articles by prominent scholars that review NATO-Russia relations in a variety of spheres, including NATO enlargement and the fight against terrorism.
  564. Find this resource:
  565. Conrad, Matthias. NATO-Russia Relations Under Putin: Emergence and Decay of a Security Community? An Analysis of the Russian Discourse on NATO (2000–2008). Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2011.
  566. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  567. Examines changes in Russian views of NATO during Putin’s first two terms as president. It finds that cooperation with NATO was undermined by the absence among Russian elites of a perception of a common identity with NATO member states.
  568. Find this resource:
  569. Hunter, Robert. “Solving Russia: Final Piece in NATO’s Puzzle.” Washington Quarterly 23.1 (2000): 115–134.
  570. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  571. Russia’s place remains the fundamental unresolved issue in European security. This article describes trends in NATO-Russia relations in the first decade after the Cold War, from initial Russian hopes for integration to an almost complete break in cooperation after the Kosovo conflict.
  572. Find this resource:
  573. Kosachev, Konstantin. “Three Birds with One Stone?.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.1 (2011): 92–104.
  574. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  575. A prominent Russian politician revisits the possibility of Russia becoming a member of NATO and discusses the options for Russia’s integration into European security infrastructure.
  576. Find this resource:
  577. Kramer, Mark. “The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia.” Washington Quarterly 32.2 (2009): 39–61.
  578. DOI: 10.1080/01636600902773248Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  579. On the basis of recently declassified archival documents, Kramer shows that Mikhail Gorbachev did not receive assurances in 1990 that in exchange for German reunification NATO would not expand.
  580. Find this resource:
  581. Trenin, Dmitri. “NATO and Russia: Partnership or Peril?” Current History 108.10 (2009): 299–303.
  582. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  583. Shows that while Russia’s membership in NATO is not a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future, the resultant gap in the European security framework threatens to produce future security crises. To resolve this problem, Trenin suggests that the West and Russia need to collaborate on a new European security structure that would include both members and nonmembers of NATO.
  584. Find this resource:
  585. Western Military Interventions in the Balkans
  586.  
  587. Military interventions have been the most frequent and serious source of tension between Russia and the West. Until 2008, Russian policies were largely predicated on their opposition to secessions and boundary changes, as described in Baev 1999. In the 1990s, disagreements largely focused on how to deal with the conflicts in Yugoslavia. Bowker 1998 shows that although Russia tended to support Serbia in the Yugoslav conflicts, its support was not as extensive as perceived in the West. Lynch 1999 argues that Russia has sought to limit the extent of disagreements in order to ensure that it retains a voice in European security affairs. Danilov 1999 places the sources of these disagreements with European states’ desire to weaken Serbia. Bogaturov 2011 extends this argument to the wider world and to the present time, arguing that Western military interventions seek to subordinate recalcitrant states to Western political hegemony. Averre 2009 argues that these types of interventions have caused long-term damage to Russia’s relations with the West. Fawn 2008 analyzes the impact of the Kosovo precedent on secessionist conflicts within the former Soviet Union. Fedorov 2009 argues that given past history on military interventions, Russia will be content to free ride on Western actions even when helping would improve Russia’s security.
  588.  
  589. Averre, Derek. “From Pristina to Tskhinvali: The Legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia’s Relations with the West.” International Affairs 85.3 (2009): 575–591.
  590. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00815.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  591. For Moscow, Western intervention in Kosovo constituted a flagrant breach of international law, a threat to post–Cold War European security governance, and a challenge to Russia’s status in the international order.
  592. Find this resource:
  593. Baev, Pavel. “Russia’s Stance Against Secessions: From Chechnya to Kosovo.” International Peacekeeping 6.3 (1999): 73–94.
  594. DOI: 10.1080/13533319908413786Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  595. Russia’s policy toward secessionist conflicts has changed profoundly from the early 1990s, when it supported the breakup of the Soviet Union. According to this article the fear of disintegration now drives Russian policies. European security institutions are not strong enough to compensate for Russia’s withdrawal from its periphery.
  596. Find this resource:
  597. Bogaturov, Alexei. “‘Coercion to Partnership’ and the Flaws of an Unbalanced World.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.4 (2011): 60–74.
  598. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  599. Argues that Western military interventions are designed to subordinate recalcitrant states to Western political hegemony but also to subordinate the international community in general to Western interests. He compares Russia’s position in the international community to the positions of India and China.
  600. Find this resource:
  601. Bowker, Mike. “The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community.” Europe-Asia Studies 50.7 (1998): 1245–1261.
  602. DOI: 10.1080/09668139808412593Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  603. Bowker argues that Western analysts often overstate the extent of Russian support for Serbia. He argues that although Russia is pro-Serbian, it is careful to stay within the boundaries of international consensus. Furthermore, its ability to influence Serbian actions is limited.
  604. Find this resource:
  605. Danilov, D. A. “Implications of the NATO Attack Against Yugoslavia for European Security and Russian-Western Relations.” Mediterranean Quarterly 10.3 (1999): 51–69.
  606. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  607. Danilov asserts that events in the Balkans are being used by leading European players as a mechanism for attaining their own political goals, rather than achieving justice for Kosovo. These actions have weakened European security architecture and have had a negative effect on relations with Russia.
  608. Find this resource:
  609. Fawn, Rick. “The Kosovo—and Montenegro—Effect.” International Affairs 84.2 (2008): 269–294.
  610. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00703.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  611. The independence of Montenegro and the arduous deliberations over Kosovo’s future have encouraged secessionist movements in the former Soviet Union. The article argues that the Russian position on Kosovo and on the unsettled conflicts in areas neighboring Russia could ultimately backfire on it.
  612. Find this resource:
  613. Fedorov, Yury. “Will Moscow Help with Trouble Spots?” Current History 108.10 (2009): 311–317.
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  615. Fedorov argues that Russia will not partner with the West in resolving crises in Iran and Afghanistan. Moscow cannot be called a rival to the West in these areas either. Instead, according to the author, Russia will be content to take advantage of Western efforts to secure the world’s trouble spots without providing much in return.
  616. Find this resource:
  617. Lynch, Dov. “Walking the Tightrope: The Kosovo Conflict and Russia in European Security.” European Security 8.4 (1999): 57–83.
  618. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  619. Examines the evolution of Russian policy shifts in the Kosovo conflict. NATO actions in the Kosovo crisis deeply undermined Russia’s policy of multipolarity. Russian accommodation after May 1999 highlighted Russian attempts to reinstate this policy and restore a Russian voice in European security affairs—with limited success.
  620. Find this resource:
  621. The Conflict with Georgia
  622.  
  623. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia provided a major shock to Russia’s relations with the West. Many Western observers blamed Russia for launching the war. This point of view is best represented in Cornell and Starr 2009. Russian scholars, on the other hand, largely blamed Georgia for launching the conflict, as shown in Gorenburg 2009. A similar point of view from a Western scholar can be found in Antonenko 2008. The EU conducted an exhaustive investigation into the causes of the war, and the findings reflected in the Tagliavini Report (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia: Report 2009) largely place the blame on Georgia, though Russia is shown to have contributed to the deterioration of security in the region through various actions meant to provoke Georgia into attacking. The Russian policies that brought the region to the brink of war are discussed in Filippov 2009. Allison 2008 and Cornell 2008 present two different perspectives of the consequences of the war for regional security in the Caucasus, while Blank 2009 addresses the war’s impact on US-Russian relations. Riabov and de Lazari 2009 shows how the metaphor of the Russian bear has been used to entrench views of Russian separation from the West in the aftermath of the war.
  624.  
  625. Allison, Roy. “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace’.” International Affairs 84.6 (2008): 1145–1171.
  626. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00762.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  627. Allison discusses what Russia’s military incursion into Georgia in August 2008 and formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia can tell us about Russian policy in the Caucasus, strategic objectives and attitudes to the use of armed force.
  628. Find this resource:
  629. Antonenko, Oksana. “A War with No Winners.” Survival 50.5 (2008): 23–36.
  630. DOI: 10.1080/00396330802456445Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  631. Antonenko blames Mikheil Saakashvili, the president of Georgia, for transforming the Russian-Georgian cold war into a hot one. His attack undermined his international credibility but also challenged the post–Cold War world order that had been built on the assumption that Russia and the West could settle all their differences by peaceful means.
  632. Find this resource:
  633. Blank, Stephen. “America and the Russian–Georgian War.” Mediterranean Quarterly 20.4 (2009): 32–48.
  634. DOI: 10.1215/10474552-2009-023Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  635. Analyzes the consequences of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the unfocused US response to that war. It describes the negative tendencies in both Russian behavior and European security that were illuminated by the war and concludes that the West suffered serious geopolitical defeats.
  636. Find this resource:
  637. Cornell, Svante. “War in Georgia, Jitters All Around.” Current History 107.10 (2008): 307–314.
  638. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  639. Cornell shows the impact of the Georgia war on Russia’s position and regional stability in the Caucasus. He argues that the war highlights Russia’s ambitions to control its periphery and will require a forceful response from the United States to contain Russia.
  640. Find this resource:
  641. Cornell, Svante, and S. Frederick Starr, eds. The Guns of August: Russia’s War in Georgia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009.
  642. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  643. A comprehensive collection of articles on the conflict. Argues that Russia planned for the war in advance and was the responsible party in launching the attack. Also includes overviews of Russian-Georgian relations in the post-Soviet period, an analysis of the conduct of the war, and a chapter on the implications of the war for European security.
  644. Find this resource:
  645. Filippov, Mikhail. “Diversionary Role of the Georgia–Russia Conflict: International Constraints and Domestic Appeal.” Europe-Asia Studies 61.10 (2009): 1825–1847.
  646. DOI: 10.1080/09668130903278975Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  647. In dealing with the countries in its immediate neighborhood, according to this article the Russian government seeks both to achieve goals related to ensuring greater influence on its periphery and domestic diversionary goals. The incumbent government in Russia benefits domestically from the political tensions with the West that the conflict with post-Soviet countries brings about.
  648. Find this resource:
  649. Gorenburg, Dmitry, ed. “The World After the Russian–Georgian War: Views from the Region.” In Special Issue: Russian Politics and Law 47.3 (2009).
  650. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  651. Explores the range of differing interpretations of the Russian-Georgian war among analysts in Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Russian analysts on all sides of the political spectrum agree that Russia behaved properly in the conflict. Ukrainian and Georgian authors side with Western analysts who tend to blame Russia for the conflict.
  652. Find this resource:
  653. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia: Report. 3 vols. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2009.
  654. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  655. Usually referred to as “The Tagliavini Report,” this is the result of the official EU investigation into the causes of the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Georgia. It places primary blame for the start of the conflict on Georgia, while also criticizing Russia for taking actions to provoke Georgia into initiating the conflict.
  656. Find this resource:
  657. Riabov, Oleg, and Andrzej de Lazari. “Misha and the Bear: The Bear Metaphor for Russia in Representations of the ‘Five-Day War’.” Russian Politics and Law 47.5 (2009): 26–39.
  658. DOI: 10.2753/RUP1061-1940470502Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  659. Analyzes the various uses made of the metaphor of the “Russian bear” in both Western and Russian political discourse. They conclude that the metaphor has played, on the whole, a harmful role and should be abandoned.
  660. Find this resource:
  661. The West’s Influence
  662.  
  663. The West has played a key role in the changes that Russia has undergone over the last twenty years. Western advisors arrived during the final days of the Soviet Union, offering to transform Russia into a Western market-based democracy. The failures of both economic and political reform during the 1990s soured the majority of Russians on Western advice. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to move in the direction of greater commonalities with Western states, especially on questions of economic policy. The West’s influence on Russian democratization has been mixed, as many analysts believe that an excessive focus on personalities rather than institutions contributed to the failure of democratization in the 1990s. Nevertheless, institutions such as international electoral observer missions and transnational civil society organizations have had at least some effect on constraining the development of Russian authoritarianism.
  664.  
  665. On Russian Economic Policy
  666.  
  667. Russian economic modernization has been strongly influenced by the West. At the same time, Russia has sought to use its foreign policy to improve its economic standing. Goldman 2008 describes Russian efforts to use its wealth and economic power to wield political influence in European states, while Dawisha 2011 shows the effect of using this influence on the Russian political system. The problems that face Russia’s economy are discussed in Aleksashenko 2012. Sapir 2010 shows the impact of the 2008–2009 global economic crisis on Russian monetary policy. Trenin 2009 argues that Russia needs Western assistance to modernize its economy. EU-Russia Centre 2010 details Russian efforts to deal with its economic problems by increasing cooperation with the EU, while Laqueur 2010 considers the possibilities for economic cooperation with the United States. Yevtushenkov 2011 makes a specific proposal that the Russian economy could be modernized through the establishment of a Euro-Russian innovation network.
  668.  
  669. Aleksashenko, Sergey. “Russia’s Economic Agenda to 2020.” International Affairs 88.1 (2012): 31–48.
  670. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01055.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  671. According to this article, Russia is facing a range of economic and demographic problems that will in the coming years lead to the widening of the gap in technology and living standards between Russia and developed countries.
  672. Find this resource:
  673. Dawisha, Karen. “Is Russia’s Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?” Post-Soviet Affairs 27.4 (2011): 331–365.
  674. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.27.4.331Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  675. Examines how Russia’s political system influences its foreign policy, through the connections between corrupt state officials and powerful state-owned corporations and private businesses. These businesses influence Russia’s energy policy and other economic policies. As a result, much of Russian foreign policy is driven primarily by the elites’ financial interests, rather than Russian state interests.
  676. Find this resource:
  677. EU-Russia Centre. The EU-Russia Modernisation Partnership. EU-Russia Centre Review 15. Brussels: EU-Russia Centre, 2010.
  678. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  679. Provides a range of views on the issues that Russia faces in its modernization effort. The authors also address the possibilities for cooperation with the EU as Russia pursues this modernization effort.
  680. Find this resource:
  681. Goldman, Marshall. “Moscow’s New Economic Imperialism.” Current History 107.10 (2008): 322–329.
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  683. Goldman describes the economic changes undertaken by President Putin in his first two terms in power, highlighting the key role of energy and of large semi-state corporations. He shows how Russia has been using its new economic clout to increase its influence in neighboring states and in Europe as a whole.
  684. Find this resource:
  685. Laqueur, Walter. “Moscow’s Modernization Dilemma.” Foreign Affairs 89.6 (2010): 153–160.
  686. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  687. According to Laqueur, Russia had begun to signal that it could be ready for détente with the West, and with the United States in particular. Shows that Moscow would like to trade its compliance on a range of international issues for technology and investment, both of which it needs for domestic growth and stability.
  688. Find this resource:
  689. Sapir, Jacques. “What Should Russia’s Monetary Policy Be?” Post-Soviet Affairs 26.4 (2010): 342–372.
  690. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.26.4.342Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  691. Russia’s financial policy is analyzed in the context of the Russian Central Bank’s response to the worldwide financial crisis and the need to focus on a range of issues including the country’s economic development, currency stabilization, and banking sector development.
  692. Find this resource:
  693. Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia Reborn.” Foreign Affairs 88.6 (2009): 64–78.
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  695. Trenin argues that Russia needs to change its foreign policy priorities to focus on building a common European economic space in order to assist in Russian economic modernization.
  696. Find this resource:
  697. Yevtushenkov, Vladimir. “Towards a Unified Innovative Market.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.1 (2011): 148–155.
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  699. Yevtushenkov argues that the Russian economy can best be modernized through the establishment of a Euro-Russian innovation network that would multiply the impact of any single foreign investment in the country.
  700. Find this resource:
  701. On Russian Democratization
  702.  
  703. The limited success of Russian democratization efforts over the last two decades has generated a voluminous body of literature. The role of Western assistance in these efforts has been mixed. The initial optimism of democratization specialists was deflated by Carothers 2002, which showed that the transition to democracy paradigm had failed and needed to be replaced. Mendelson 2001 provides an initial assessment of Western democracy promotion activities in Russia. Its finding that Western NGOs are limited in their ability to promote democracy in former Communist states is confirmed by others. Fawn 2006 focuses on the mixed results of international election observer missions, while Fawn 2009 looks at the limits of EU human rights promotion activities in Russia. The discussion of what type of regime Russia has ended up with instead of the hoped-for democracy is taken up by Way 2005. Treisman 2004 argues against Russian exceptionalism, making the case that Russia is behaving exactly as one would expect a middle-income capitalist democracy to behave. Zimmerman 2007 disputes this point, showing that Russia does not behave like a democracy, while Morozov 2011 makes the case for a strict definition of democracy that does not include Russia’s current form of government.
  704.  
  705. Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13.1 (2002): 5–21.
  706. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0003Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  707. Carothers writes that the transition paradigm that held sway among democracy promoters and academics for the first decade after the end of Communism needs to be abandoned in the face of evidence that the former Communist states are not making progress toward becoming Western-style liberal democracies.
  708. Find this resource:
  709. Fawn, Rick. “Battle Over the Box: International Election Observation Missions, Political Competition and Retrenchment in the Post-Soviet Space.” International Affairs 82.6 (2006): 1133–1153.
  710. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00592.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  711. According to this article, the OSCE international election observation missions have fueled a new political competition in the post-Soviet space. They have also provoked resistance from several post-Soviet governments, and these challenges risk corrupting the whole practice of election observation missions and have changed Russia’s policy toward the OSCE.
  712. Find this resource:
  713. Fawn, Rick. “‘Bashing About Rights’? Russia and the ‘New’ EU States on Human Rights and Democracy Promotion.” Europe-Asia Studies 61.10 (2009): 1777–1803.
  714. DOI: 10.1080/09668130903278959Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  715. Asks to what extent the concepts of human rights and democracy have been used for political expediency, rather than for the genuine promotion of their universal application.
  716. Find this resource:
  717. Mendelson, Sarah. “Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure.” International Security 25.4 (2001): 68–106.
  718. DOI: 10.1162/01622880151091907Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  719. Although Western NGOs have contributed to the establishment of local-level democratic institutions and election practices, these achievements have been limited by nondemocratic practices and human rights abuses.
  720. Find this resource:
  721. Morozov, Viatcheslav. “A Lesson Half-Learned.” Russia in Global Affairs 9.4 (2011): 132–143.
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  723. Morozov argues that democracy needs to be defined relatively narrowly in order to distinguish it from alternatives that are not truly democratic. He argues that democracy is not a set of institutions, but rather a process in which a society continually and collectively redefines its interests and values.
  724. Find this resource:
  725. Treisman, Daniel, and Andrei Shleifer. “A Normal Country.” Foreign Affairs 83.2 (2004): 20–38.
  726. DOI: 10.2307/20033900Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  727. Argues that during the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a Communist dictatorship to a multiparty democracy, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a belligerent adversary of the West to a cooperative partner. As a result, by the late 1990s Russia had become a typical middle-income capitalist democracy.
  728. Find this resource:
  729. Way, Lucan. “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.” World Politics 57.2 (2005): 231–261.
  730. DOI: 10.1353/wp.2005.0018Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  731. Explores the sources of regime competitiveness in the post–Cold War era through a structured comparison of regime trajectories. Competitive politics were rooted in the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections, and/or using force against opponents.
  732. Find this resource:
  733. Zimmerman, William. “‘Normal Democracies’ and Improving How They Are Measured: The Case of Russia.” Post-Soviet Affairs 23.1 (2007): 1–17.
  734. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.23.1.1Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  735. Responding to Shleifer and Treisman, Zimmerman examines ways to identify and specify in regard to what and compared with which other cohorts of states Russia may be considered normal. After analyzing a range of data, he concludes that Russia cannot be considered a normal country.
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